








Sojourning on Mecca’s Verandah:  








A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Anthropology and History) 













 Professor Webb Keane, Chair 
 Professor Nancy K. Florida 
 Professor Paul Christopher Johnson 
 Associate Professor Farina Mir 






























© Daniel Andrew Birchok 










 I cannot imagine that anyone ever reads the acknowledgements of a dissertation or 
monograph in the same way once he or she has written his or her own.  For me, the trail of debts-
-intellectual, personal, even medical—began to accumulate from the moment I arrived at 
Michigan as an MA student in Southeast Asian Studies.  It is with deep-felt regrets that it is only 
some of the most outstanding of these debts that I can acknowledge on these pages. 
 My dissertation committee has provided me with intellectual nourishment and support, all 
while allowing me to develop my project in my own way and on my own terms even when I am 
fairly certain they were not quite sure if I knew what I was doing.  Webb Keane has provided me 
the kind of sharp and straightforward criticism that one most needs to grow as a scholar, and he 
has done so in a manner that has been supportive, consummately professional, and always in my 
best interest.  Nancy Florida was the first of my mentors at Michigan and, among other things, I 
owe to her nearly all of what I know about how to approach Islam as a scholar of religion.  
Andrew Shryock has provided me with invaluable mentorship when it comes to myriad aspects 
of my professional life and I remain inspired by the many things we have in common 
intellectually.  Paul Johnson has been a tireless supporter of not only me, but all of my 
colleagues in Anthro-History, and I always look forward to hearing his so often unique take on a 
piece of writing.  Farina Mir came on the committee at just the right time, when I was struggling 
with the need for another historian’s eye.  She provided me with precisely that as I worked my 
way through the job market and the final stages of the dissertation. 
 
iii 
 The research on which this dissertation was based was supported by several generous 
funders, including the Aceh Research Training Institute (funded by AUSAID and administered 
by the University of Melbourne and the Universitas Syiah Kuala), a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral 
Dissertation Grant, a Rackham International Research Award, and the Roger Dashow Indonesia 
Research Fund at the University of Michigan.  The writing of the dissertation was supported by 
the final year of a Jacob K. Javits Fellowship, a Mellon Humanities Dissertation Seminar Grant, 
and a Rackham Centennial Award. 
 Among those in Indonesia to whom I owe much gratitude are first and foremost my 
research sponsors, which included Pusat Penelitian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM) at the 
Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta, the Pusat Latihan Penelitian at the 
Institut Agama Islam Negeri Ar-Raniry in Banda Aceh, and the Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan 
Masyarakat (PKPM) in Banda Aceh.  In particular, the faculty, staff, and students at PPIM saved 
me multiple trips to Jakarta to renew my visa.  The staff at PKPM provided not only visa and 
intellectual support in Aceh, but a place where I could find friendship and a weekly “English 
lunch.”  The Aceh Research Training Institute (ARTI) was not an official sponsor until the final 
five months of my research, but provided so much support to me that they might as well have 
been. 
 The administrators and staff at the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, the Perpustakaan 
Nasional Republik Indonesia, the Arsip Propinsi Aceh, and the Yayasan Perpustakaan dan 
Museum Ali Hasjmy made my archival work more productive and enjoyable.  Here I single out 
Ibu Endang Sumarsih at the Perpustakaan Nasional, and Ibu Ani and Ibu Hafni at the Arsip 
Propinsi Aceh for all of their help and our shared snacks and conversations.  Ida Tumengkol 
facilitated my access to the complete Waspada collection at her late father’s estate in Medan. 
 
iv 
 Bachtiar, my Acehnese teacher in the summer of 2005, deserves a special expression of 
gratitude for his dedication to developing an Acehnese language curriculum and then sticking 
with me through three months of intensive study.  Cut Zahara Hamzah and her family, as well as 
Munawar Liza Zainal, have been involved in helping me with my research since the writing of 
my MA thesis, when I was focused on Acehnese living in the United States.  Sayyid Hamzah and 
his family have become my oldest and dearest friends in Aceh and I sometimes regret not 
choosing to conduct my field research closer to them.   
 I could write pages about the following people, each of whom provided me with 
something during my research.  Unfortunately, for the sake of brevity, I will have to leave my 
expressions of gratitude at the mention of their names: Teungku Adami, Bapak and Ibu Zakaria 
Ahmad, Armia, Leena Avonius, Chris Bheda, Harold Crouch, the late Anwar Dayat, Bapak 
Dirman, Zubaidah Djohar, Jesse Gerstin, Jesse Grayman, Azwar Hamid, Basyuni Hamid, 
Hamrizal Hamid, Hendrik, Nurjannal Jalil, David Kloos, Dian, Sayyid Jauhari, Sayed Johar, Ibu 
Kartini, T.R. Keumangan, Barbara Leigh, Michael Leigh, Cek Li, Sayyid Mahli, the members of 
the Majlis Taklim Ansharullah, Dewie Marliza, the late Teungku Marwardi, Marzuki, Hasnul 
Arifin Melayu, Mujiburrahman, Ibu Nelly, Sarah Newman, Jane Palmer, the late Bapak Panyang, 
Raja, Teungku Ramli, Arskal Salim, Annemarie Samuels, Sarjev, Catherine Smith, Eka 
Srimuliyanti, Ida Tumengkol, Drs. A. Djalil Usman, Eve Warburton, Laura Meitzner Yoder, and 
Fajran Zain.   
 Also deserving of special thanks are the medical care professionals who got me back to 
the field and the archive following a period that involved three extended hospital stays.  At the 
Rumah Sakit Harapan Bunda these included Dr. Ridwan, Dr. Pria Agustus Yadi, and Taufik.  At 
the Raffles Hospital in Singapore it was Dr. Eric C H Teh.  Jean and Jim Allen, and Ronit Ricci 
 
v 
and Tamir Yahav generously allowed me to stay in their homes during a frustrating month of 
recovery in Singapore. 
 During the writing of this dissertation I benefited from the critical feedback of a number 
of colleagues.  I have presented iterations of chapters and parts of chapters in the following 
places: the Fakultas Adab at the Institut Agama Islam Negeri Ar-Raniry, the Asia Research 
Institute at the National University of Singapore, a Mellon Humanities Dissertation Seminar at 
the University of Michigan, the Anthropology and History Workshop at the University of 
Michigan, the Leiden University Centre for the Study of Islam and Society, the Islamic Studies 
Interdisciplinary Seminar at the University of Michigan, the Southeast Asian Studies Reading 
Group at the University of Michigan, the University of Pittsburgh Anthropology Colloquium 
Series, the Department of Asian Studies at Cornell University, and the Department of History at 
Carnegie Mellon University.  I received invaluable feedback and suggestions in each of these 
forums.   
 Individually I would like to thank the following mentors and colleagues for their input 
and criticism on iterations of chapters and parts of chapters that found their way into the 
dissertation: Danna Agmon, David Akin, Ismail Alatas, Saul Allen, Laura Brown, En-Chieh 
Choa, Rahmad Dawood, Deirdre de la Cruz, Michael Feener, Nancy Florida, Chiara Formichi, 
Brady G’Sell, Emily Hein, Federico Helfgott, Daniel Hershenzon, Laura Hilburn, Sarah 
Hillewaert, James Hoesterey, Anneeth Kaur Hundle, Paul Johnson, Webb Keane, David Kloos, 
Alexander Knysh, Sonja Luehrmann, John Mathias, Farina Mir, Emma Nolan-Thomas, Esteban 
Rozo Pabon, Rachel Rinaldo, Jessica Robbins, Guillermo Salas, Annemarie Samuels, Aaron 
Seaman, Nafisa Essop Sheik, Andrew Shryock, Catherine Smith, Stephen Smith, Stephen 
Sparks, Charley Sullivan, Nat Tuohy, Martin van Bruinessen, Kate Wright, and Chip 
 
vi 
Zuckerman.  Erika Alpert, Emily Hein, Laura Hilburn, Sarah Hillewaert, Jim Mannheim, Leah 
O’Donnell, Jane Palmer, Karen Siegel, and Charley Sullivan offered much needed help with the 
editing.  Of course, all shortcomings of substance and style are my own. 
 To say that Nicole Scholtz of the University of Michigan Clark Library helped me to 
make the maps would be a gross understatement.  We used ArcGIS software to create all three 
maps, drawing from several on-line databases, including ESRI World Water Bodies, GADM 
World, GeoFabrik OSM, OpenStreetMap from Cloudmade, Geonames, and an Indonesia 
geospatial data website.    
 It would be an inexcusable error of judgment if I did not offer a special expression of 
gratitude to Michael Feener.  Michael has shown an inexplicably enthusiastic interest in my 
work.  Aside from my committee, no other mentor has gone to such a great extent to support my 
professional development and the circulation of my scholarship.  Add to this the fact that I can 
think of no one with whom I would rather take an eventful, if somewhat ill-fated, road trip 
around Aceh’s southwest coast and one has the consummate colleague.   
 Also, I would like to acknowledge Ann Stoler and Nancy Hunt who, during an 
Anthropology and History seminar many years ago, first encouraged me to explore the ways in 
which Acehnese narrate histories of Islam. 
 The task of expressing gratitude to the people who mean the most to me is one for which 
the final two paragraphs of an acknowledgements section of a dissertation seems wholly 
inadequate.  All I can say is that I owe those people whom I will mention here much more than I 
could possibly offer them on the printed page.  I do not think my parents, Daniel and Annemarie, 
always have understood exactly what it is that I do and, especially, why it has taken me so far 
away from home so often and for so long.  Yet they have been a constant source of support, ever 
 
vii 
proud of me, and, really, all of it can be traced in some way to the foundational lessons they 
taught me growing up.  I owe no one more.   
 Writing a dissertation can be emotionally trying as it is.  Doing it with a family involves a 
never-ending quest for balance in which I found myself falling increasingly short of my ideal 
during the final stages of writing and revision.  Lori has been there from the beginning, and has 
seen me through all of the various shades of insecurity, arrogance, excitement, disinterest, 
despair, reengagement, and exhaustion that inflect the life of a graduate student.  The fact that 
she is still here through all of that, not to mention the challenges of being separated during 
research, says all anyone needs to know about her character and love of me.  I can only hope that 
I have and continue to prove an equal partner.  I could not have asked for a more well-timed gift 
than Anna, who in arriving a year after my return from research made the dissertation more 
important by making it less important.  James shared his older sister’s impeccable timing by 
joining the party just in time for the defense, but not before I had finished much needed revisions 
to Chapter 2.  I look forward to the many joyful distractions he and his sister are sure to provide 












Table of Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... ii 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ ix 
List of Appendices .......................................................................................................................... x 
Note on Anonymity of Informants ................................................................................................. xi 
Note on Language and Orthography ............................................................................................. xii 
Note on Research ......................................................................................................................... xiv 
Glossary of Foreign Terms, Organizations, and Institutions ....................................................... xix 
Introduction  Place, Temporality and Islam in an Indonesian Province ......................................... 1 
Chapter 1  History, Practices, and People: Aceh and Nagan Raya ............................................... 21 
Chapter 2  Making Aceh Special: Narrative Practice in Post-Colonial Aceh............................... 55 
Chapter 3  “Wild Churches” and Muslim Converts: Christianization, Islamization, and  
Aceh ............................................................................................................................................ 103 
Chapter 4  Placing Islamic Reform in Context: Darul Islam, Histories of Islamization, and  
Nagan Raya’s Entangled Genealogies ........................................................................................ 136 
Chapter 5  “Young People are Seeking Their Blessings”: Eschatology, Contingent Lives,  
and Temporalities of Ethical Practice in Nagan Raya ................................................................ 173 
Chapter 6  Putting the Habib Seunagan in Their Place:  Narrative, Ritual, and Genealogies of 
Islamization in Nagan Raya ........................................................................................................ 215 
Conclusion  On Localities, Peripheries, and Islam ..................................................................... 260 
Appendicies................................................................................................................................. 269 










List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: On market day men gather around a  traveling medicine seller, Jeuram, Nagan Raya . 41 
Figure 2: Food stall outside of public market at night, Jeuram, Nagan Raya ............................... 41 
Figure 3: Rice field in Nigan, Nagan Raya ................................................................................... 42 
Figure 4: Headstone for a “shewbuntar” (i.e., syahbandar) of Kuala Batee ................................ 96 
Figure 5: Inside of Habib Muda’s grave complex in Peuleukung, Nagan Raya ......................... 140 
Figure 6: Plaque commemorating Perti’s presence in Aceh ....................................................... 141 
Figure 7: Rows of containers of food for maulid feast, Kota Baru, June 2009 .......................... 155 
Figure 8: Top layer of food inside container for maulid feast, Kota Baru, June 2009 ............... 155 
Figure 9: First page of “Family Line of Teungku Tjik di Kila” ................................................. 162 
Figure 10: Déah in front of Intu’s Grave, Kuta Aceh, Nagan Raya ........................................... 221 
Figure 11: Déah on Habib Abdurrahim’s grave complex, Pulo Ie, Nagan Raya ....................... 222 
Figure 12: Inside of Habib Muda’s Grave Complex, Peuleukung, Nagan Raya ........................ 223 
Figure 13: Javanese dagger in main pillar of mosque at the  grave complex of Habib Muda, 
Peuleukung, Nagan Raya ............................................................................................................ 238 








List of Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of Texts Used in Majlis Taklim Attended by Author in Nagan Raya ............. 269 
Appendix 2: Majlis Taklim in the vicinity of Jeuram, Nagan Raya (July 2008-June 2009) ...... 271 






Note on Anonymity of Informants 
 
 In the ethnographic portions of this dissertation, I identify most people using 
pseudonyms.  There are important exceptions to this, including instances in which the person in 
question is a well-known public figure, is discussed in relation to the public historical record, or 
explicitly expressed to me that he or she wanted to be identified by name.  For religious teachers, 
who can and frequently do fit the role of public figure, I sometimes have decided to use 
pseudonyms, and sometimes real names, depending on the context and the wishes of these 
teachers.  Generally, I have not replaced place names with pseudonyms.  This is in large part 
because of the importance of historically specific places to my account, and the difficulty of 
discussing aspects of these places’ importance without identifying them.  However, I sometimes 
have omitted place names altogether if in my own judgment or in that of my informants it is 
better that a place be kept anonymous.  I have, of course, always followed the express wishes of 









Note on Language and Orthography 
 
 
 In this dissertation, I identify Acehnese and Indonesian terms and phrases with the 
abbreviations “Ac.” and “I.”  Both languages were used fluently during my fieldwork and 
archival research by the overwhelming majority of my interlocutors, who often switched back-
and-forth between languages mid-sentence.  For orthographic purposes, I follow Hoesein’s 
Djajdiningrat’s Atjehsch-Nederlandsch Woordenboek (Djajadiningrat 1934) for Acehnese; for 
Indonesian I follow the standard orthography used by the Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (Tim 
Redaksi Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia 2002).  In instances in which an interlocutor switched 
between both languages during a single string of discourse, I have either marked these passages 
“Ac. and I.,” or identified individual words and phrases using the language to which I deemed 
they belonged.  This suggests one further orthographic difficulty, namely, that some terms are 
shared between both languages.  This is especially the case as Indonesian loan words and 
Indonesianized spellings and pronunciations of Acehnese terms have found their way into the 
everyday speech of most Acehnese.  In these cases, I have made decisions about how to identify 
a word or phrase based on the context of its iteration. 
 Indonesian is a standardized dialect of Malay, a language used widely throughout Islamic 
Southeast Asia for centuries before the advent of the Indonesian nation.  For the sake of 
simplicity, I have identified Malay terms that I take from the pre-nationalist period as 
Indonesian.  However, I do sometimes refer to “Malay” in my analysis when writing about 
literature originating in the period before the twentieth century. 
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 The use of Islamic technical terms and Arabic-derived words and phrases pronounced in 
manners that are clearly meant to highlight their Arabic derivation presented still further 
orthographic challenges.  Generally, I follow standard Indonesian spellings of such terms, both in 
order to reflect Indonesian pronunciations that may be revealed through these spellings and to 
suggest that Indonesian usages of such terms involve semantic fields that are not identical with, 
and in fact often quite distinct from, usages originating in either Arabic-speaking or Islamic 
technical contexts.  For Islamic technical terms, however, I have sometimes included an Arabic 
equivalent and marked it with an “Ar.”  There are two exceptions to my preference for 
Indonesian orthographic conventions for these terms.  When speaking of an Islamic technical 
term or, for example, the name of a mystical order or some other collective entity in a context 
that is primarily concerned with translocal Islamic discourses and practices, I have used the 
Arabic variation.  I also have transliterated the names of Southeast Asian figures who wrote in 
Malay using the Arabic script as one would transliterate these names in Arabic.  For all Arabic 
transliterations, I have followed Hans Wehr’s A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Wehr 
1994). 
 I recognize that the orthographic choices I have made at times involve a significant level 
of arbitrariness.  When this conceals things that are important for the reader’s understanding of 






Note on Research 
 
 Most of the research on which this dissertation is based was carried out between October 
of 2007 and July of 2009.  Before conducting this research, however, I had engaged in several 
years of ethnographic research among Acehnese refugees living in the United States.  I also went 
on two preliminary research trips of three months each, the first in the North Sumatran city of 
Medan in 2005, and the second in Aceh in 2006.  These trips were valuable not only for helping 
me to establish contacts who would later aid me in my ethnographic research, but also gave me 
the opportunity to examine at least two archives.  These included the complete collection of the 
North Sumatran daily newspaper Waspada, held at the estate of the late Mohammad Said in 
Medan, and the collection of various sources at the Ali Hasjmy Library and Museum in Banda 
Aceh (Yayasan Perpustakaan dan Museum Ali Hasjmy). 
 From October until early December of 2007, I lived in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta 
(see Map 1).  In Jakarta, I conducted archival research at the Indonesian National Archives 
(Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia) and the Indonesian National Library (Perpustakaan 
Nasional Republik Indonesia).  I then traveled to Banda Aceh (see Maps 1 and 2), where my 
primary focus until June of 2008 was archival research in the Acehnese Provincial Archive 
(Arsip Propinsi Aceh).  In the Acehnese Provincial Archive I focused my attention on the large 
collection of the Indonesian Ulama Council for the Special Area of Aceh from the late 1960s 
until the end of the 1980s.  I also studied the smaller collections of some of the regency and sub-
regency-level governments on Aceh’s west coast, including the collection for the region that 
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would became the regency of Nagan Raya.  In at least one case, these regency and sub-regency-
level collections included documents from the Dutch colonial period.  Finally, I examined select 
materials from collections of provincial-level executive and legislative offices.   
 While in Banda Aceh, I also engaged in some ethnographic research.  For example, I 
spent several days with the Banda Aceh morality police (Wilayatul Hisbah, WH), and even 
joined them on a “raid” (I., razia) in which they issued warnings to motorcyclists who were not 
dressed by Islamic standards. 
 In July of 2008, I moved to the regency of Nagan Raya, where I would conduct 
ethnographic fieldwork until the end of June 2009 (see Map 2).  I rented a house in the town of 
Kota Baru, adjacent to the market center of Jeuram (see Map 3).  This location, and the fact that I 
lived alone, allowed me to travel around the Nagan Raya countryside via motorbike, which I did 
frequently. 
 My most basic ethnographic method was to make myself available to those around me.  I 
attended Jeuram’s coffee houses on a daily basis, making new acquaintances.  Some of these 
acquaintances wanted little to do with me.  But those who were interested in me and my research 
tended to involve themselves in my project in one of two ways, both of great value.  One group 
was interested primarily in incorporating me into their networks of social reciprocity.  These 
people invited me to family events, introduced me to relatives, and sought me out on later 
occasions for the purposes of keeping up on each other’s business.  The other group took 
themselves to be cultural or historical experts on certain topics.  They invited me to a range of 
places and events related to their expertise: tours of Nagan Raya’s many graves, Qur’an 
recitation competitions, Nagan Raya’s beach and mountain retreats, etc. 
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 I took it upon myself to be as actively involved in the social and ritual life of my Nagan 
Raya neighbors as they would allow.  I learned much from the ways in which I was allowed to 
participate in social and ritual events, as well as in the instances when I was restricted from doing 
so.  In practice this meant attending near daily ritual feasts (Ac., kandoeri) held for births, 
marriages, funerals, major holidays, the opening of fields, the collection of the harvest, etc.  A 
large percentage of my time was spent attending these ritual feasts.  Other aspects of local 
Islamic practice, however, were off limits to me.  Except on one occasion, which sparked 
controversy in my neighborhood in the months following it, I never was allowed to enter a 
mosque.  In Aceh, it is legally required that all people leave the streets during Friday communal 
prayers, and a similar custom is observed for evening prayers.  This made it difficult for me to 
observe these activities, although for occasions not involving the five daily prayers it was usually 
not a problem for me to observe activities going on inside mosques as long as I did so from 
outside the building.  Given the open-air quality of nearly all mosques in Nagan Raya, this was 
not difficult. 
 Conducting research among women in Nagan Raya was difficult.  Speaking with older 
women, and even conducting interviews with them, generally was not a problem.  But spending 
extended periods of time with women my own age or younger, especially if they were 
unmarried, quickly raised unsavory suspicions among neighbors.  Further, contexts in which men 
and women socialized together in Nagan Raya were circumscribed.  Even when attending the 
same events, men and women tended to do so in a segregated fashion.  Thus, my interactions 
with women tended to be with older women whom I could use local terms of address to identify 
as “mother” or “older sister,” and the wives and sisters of male friends, with whom I could only 
socialize in the presence of their male relatives. 
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 Upon arriving in Nagan Raya, I intended to try to conduct participant-observation at the 
lessons taught to young students at Islamic boarding schools in the region.  This proved 
impossible.  The heads of a few of these schools refused me access to them, a refusal they based 
on their concerns that I might be an agent of the U.S. government bent on the destruction of 
Islam.  But even those who were least threatened by me, and with whom I came to have warm 
and trusting relationships, felt that it was inappropriate for me, as a non-Muslim, to join boarders 
in their lessons.  Instead, I was channeled to majlis taklim (I.), more general religious studies 
held for villagers.  The way in which I became assimilated to the category of ordinary villagers 
was, in itself, telling.  It suggested both how the teachers at these schools understood the relative 
level of Islamic knowledge among ordinary villagers, and what they thought was the most 
appropriate way for me to begin my study of Islam.  By attending these lessons, I learned much 
about the ways in which villagers understood the transmission and usefulness of Islamic 
knowledge, and knowledge more generally, in the contexts of their daily lives. 
 Creating records of what were days exhaustingly full of motorbike rides, religious 
lessons, interviews, ritual feasts, multiple cups of coffee, tours of mosques and graves, and the 
occasional excursion to a beach or mountain stream proved one of the most difficult challenges 
of fieldwork.  Every evening I sat at my computer for at least an hour and took notes on the day.  
I tried to take as detailed notes as possible, but even the course of a few minutes has a way 
testing the limits of memory.  Did he say that in Acehnese or Indonesian?  How many women 
attended the feast?  What was the name of God used in the recitation?  I also traveled with a 
notebook, which I frequently pulled out in the midst of a discussion, event, or ritual, when this 
seemed appropriate.  Upon beginning to draft this dissertation, I found that some of my most 
valuable materials were hand-written notes in these notebooks, especially notes that I had 
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produced in partnership with ethnographic interlocutors, passing the notebook back-and-forth 
between each other, responding to each other’s scribblings and diagrams. 
 If the problem with note taking is that even in the course of a few minutes details slip 
from one’s memory, the problem with audio recordings is often the way their creation gives rise 
to an especially contrived and fraught social context.  Aware of this, I created three different 
kinds of audio recordings.  The first were recordings of ritual practices, sermons, recitations, and 
other contexts in which discourse was central.  In these contexts, structured by ritual and 
homiletic forms, my recording usually seemed to have few effects on the event in question.  The 
second type of recording that I made were oral history interviews, which were structured around 
questions that I asked regarding Nagan Raya’s past.  I tended to conduct oral history interviews 
among Nagan Raya’s elders, men and women in the sixties and older.  The third kind of 
recording that I made were ethnographic interviews in which I asked interlocutors to discuss 
topics of interest to my research.  These interviews often were sparked by more informal 
conversations with acquaintances that either they or I felt should be added to the corpus of 
materials that I was accumulating.  I made a point of trying to anchor the questions I asked 
during ethnographic interviews in concrete instances of speech, ritual, or social practice that I 
had observed.   
 I conducted both oral history and ethnographic interviews with local elites, but also made 
a point of speaking with non-elites as well.  Most often, I conducted interviews with someone 
whose particular combination of characteristics (e.g., age, occupation, gender, genealogy) 
seemed to have significance for the topic of the interview.  In total, I made just over one hundred 








Glossary of Foreign Terms, Organizations, and Institutions 
 
 
adat (I.; Ar. ‘āda)- local customary practice; in classical Islamic jurisprudence often taken as 
legally binding upon Muslims, but in twentieth and twenty-first century Indonesia widely 
taken as local practices outside of or in opposition to Islam 
 
agama (I.)- religion 
 
ajal (I.)- the moment of one’s death, determined and known by God before one’s birth 
 
akaj (Ac.; I., akal)- reason, rationality, or cleverness 
 
akhirat (I.)- the afterlife, beginning with the period in the grave after one’s death and ending with 
the eternal period following the day of reckoning 
 
aliran sesat (I.)- “lost streams;” used to refer to groups believed to be heretical 
 
amalan (I.)- good work, often consisting of ritual action 
 
assailaimualaikum-wailaikumsalam (I.)- Arabic greeting, “Peace be upon you-And upon you be 
peace,” widely taken in Indonesia as an Islamic greeting 
 
auliyā’ (Ar.; I., wali)- “friends of God;” usually used in reference to Islamic mystical teachers 
thought to have the ability to intercede with God on behalf of devotees; often glossed as 
“saint” 
 
autad (I.; Ar., autād)- in Islamic mystical discourses the four “pegs,” individuals that support the 
qutub; together these figures, along with others below them in a mystical hierarchy, are 
believed by many Islamic mystics to keep the world from falling asunder 
 
budaya (I.)- culture 
 
daerah istimewa (I.)- “special area;” one of Aceh’s four common toponyms, referring primarily 
to legal changes that gave the province special autonomy beginning in the late 1950s and 
underpinned by narratives of Aceh’s history as unique in when compared with the 




daerah modal (I.)- “area of capital;” one of Aceh’s four common toponyms, referring primarily 
to the financial and other support provided by Acehnese in service to the Indonesian 
Republic during the national revolution (1945-1949) 
 
dakwah (I.; Ar., da’wa)- activities undertaken by Muslims towards other Muslims in an effort to 
persuade them to live more properly Islamic lives; on extremely rare occasions, dakwah 
can include efforts to convert non-Muslims to Islam 
 
Darul Islam (I.)- “Abode of Islam;” armed rebellion that occurred against the Indonesian 
Republic in various parts of the archipelago between 1947 and 1962; in Aceh it lasted 
from 1953 to 1962; Also known as Darul Islam-Tentara Islam Indonesia (Abode of 
Islam-Indonesian Islamic Army), Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State), DI, 
and DI-TI 
 
 déah, dayah (Ac.)- buildings erected for the collective recitations of litanies and other mystical 
practices; also can be used to indicate Islamic boarding schools, especially in recent 
years; note: the second spelling represents common recent orthographic convention 
 
Dinas Syariat (I.)- the Syariat Department, charged in Aceh since 1999 with the designing and 
administration of Islamic legal statutes 
 
dōnja  (Ac.; I., dunia)- the world; in eschatological discourses, the space and time of one’s life 
before death 
 
èleumèë (Ac.)- knowledge 
 
fana (I.; Ar., fanā’)- in Islamic mysticism, the annihilation of an individual human being in 
mystical communion with God 
 
fatwa (I.; Ar., fatwā; plural fatāwā)- an Islamic legal opinion 
 
Gerakan Acheh Merdeka (GAM) (I.)- the Free Acheh Movement; from 1976 until 2005 this 
group struggled for an independent Acehnese nation-state using guerrilla tactics 
 
gereja liar (I.)- “wild churches;” used to denote buildings used as churches without the 
appropriate legal permits 
 
Habib (I.)- title used to denote a Sayyid; often used as a term of address or as a title in front of a 
Sayyid’s name 
 
hadis (I.; Ar. aḥādīṭṭ, singular ḥadīṭ)- reports of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad 
and his companions; used as a source in Islamic jurisprudence 
 




kandoeri (Ac.; I., khenduri)- ritual feasts involving prayers and often the recitation of litanies; 
these are held in Aceh for a variety of occasions including life passage rituals, major  
holidays, the opening of fields, harvests, and others; kandoeri have been a major site of 
polemics between Acehnese Muslims about proper Islamic practice 
 
ka’ōj (Ac.; I., nazar)- vows made to God, often through the mediation of a powerful mystic; 
ka’ōy usually involve the promise that one will recite certain versus or litanies or sacrifice 
an animal if a particular wish is granted  
 
kaphé (Ac.; I., kafir; Ar., kāfir)- a nonbeliever, i.e., a non-Muslim 
 
keistimewaan (I.)- specialness 
 
keramat (I., Ar., karāma)- preternatural abilities of people, often Islamic mystics, thought to 
reveal their closeness with God and purity of heart 
 
khalafiyah (I.)- divisive opinions, often over questions of Islamic ritual or doctrine 
 
khalifah (I., Ar., ḳalīfa)- “deputy;” someone in an Islamic mystical order who has been granted a 
license to direct the mystical seeking of others 
 
koeboe (Ac.; I., kubur)- gravesite 
 
Kristenisasi (I.)- “Christianization;” a reputed effort by Christians to progressively take control 
of or convert to Christianity the Indonesian archipelago; several influential late-twentieth 
century Indonesian Islamic intellectuals saw Christianization as an imminent threat to the 
Indonesian nation 
 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama (MPU) (I.)- Consultative Council of Religious Scholars; since 
1999 the official government body that, in Aceh, has taken over the duties of the 
provincial Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
 
Majelis Ulama Aceh (MUA) (I.)- Acehnese Council of Religious Scholars; founded in 1966 to 
fulfill Aceh’s autonomy in religious affairs; the council eventually was merged into the 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia Daerah Istimewa Aceh 
 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia Daerah Istimewa Aceh (MUI-DISTA) (I.)- Indonesian Council of 
Religious Scholars for the Special Area of Aceh; branch of the national Indonesian 
Council of Religious Scholars; created from the Majelis Ulama Aceh; came to be 
involved in the drafting of Islamic legal statues in addition to a more general 
“socialization” (I., sosialisasi) of Islamic norms; in 1999 transformed into the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Ulama 
 





maulid (I.)- the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday in the Islamic month of Rabiul 
Awal; in Aceh maulid is celebrated for a three month period 
 
mengislamkan (I.)- to “make something Islam;” this verb is commonly used to indicate the 
process of converting a person or a place to Islam or the activity of making a person or 
place more thoroughly Islamic 
 
meunasah (Ac.)- community house 
 
meuratéb (Ac.)- to recite litanies 
 
Muhammadiyah (I.)- an Islamic social and education organization founded in Yogyakarta, 
central Java, in 1912; in the Acehnese regency of Nagan Raya, “Muhammadiyah” was 
commonly used to denote anyone who was critical of any of a number of common village 
ritual practices (i.e., kandoeri, meuratéb) 
 
nafsu, hawa nafsu (I.)- desire 
 
Naqsyabandi (I.; Ar. Naqshabandī)- an Islamic mystical order 
 
oelèëbalang (Ac.)- hereditary territorial chief 
 
orde baru (I.)- “new order;” period of the dictatorship of Soeharto from 1966 until 1998 
 
pahala (I.)- units of heavenly reward one gains through good works (I., amalan) 
 
Persatoean Oelama Seloeroeh Atjeh (POESA) (I.)- All Aceh Religious Scholars Union; 
prominent Acehnese Islamic reform organization of the late 1930s through the early 
1960s; came to be led by the religious teacher and political leader Daud Beureueh 
 
Perti (I.)- Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah; an organization of religious teachers who opposed the 
dominant strands of Islamic reformism of the twentieth century; widely associated with 
such teachers outside of the Island of Java; in Aceh most closely associated with the 
religious teacher Muda Waly 
 
pesantren (I.)- Islamic boarding school 
  
puasa (I.)- a fast, most often the Islamic fast during the month of Ramadan, or the process of 
fasting 
 
qutub (I.; Ar., quṭb)- in Islamic mystical discourses, the central “pole” around which a hierarchy 
of mystical adepts are focused; along with the lesser figures in this mystical hierarchy, 
the qutub is believed by many Islamic mystics to keep the world from falling asunder 
 




raja (I)- king; in Aceh, another word commonly used for an oelèëbalang 
 
ratéb (Ac.)- religious litany 
 
rezeki (I. and Ac.)- livelihood; blessing; windfall; earnings; often used to refer to legitimately 
earned or acquired money, knowledge, or children in a manner intended to highlight the 
joint agency of humans and God 
 
salam-couplet- the Islamic greeting pair assailaimualaikum-wailaikumsalam 
 
samadiyah (I.)- litanies recited at funeral feast in order to lessen the suffering of the deceased in 
the grave 
 
sayyid- descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah and son-in-law 
‘Ali; the term is often added as a title in front of a Sayyid’s name 
 
sedekah (I.)- alms; freely given gifts, the giving of which is considered a pious act 
 
serambi Mekkah (I.)- “Mecca’s verandah;” one of Aceh’s four common toponyms, referring 
primarily to Aceh’s prominent history in the coming of Islam to the archipelago and 
historical importance as a site of Islamic scholarship and study 
 
seulaweuët (Ac.; I., selawat; Ar., ṣalawāt)- praises to the Prophet Muhammad 
 
silaturahmi (I.)- friendship 
 
silsilah (I.; Ar., silsila)- a chain of names, usually representing the transmission of the esoteric 
knowledge of an Islamic mystical order, most often traced from student to teacher back to 
the founding member of the order and often to the Prophet Muhammad; in Indonesia the 
term is sometimes used in an expanded sense to refer to any similar form of chain of 
transmission expressed in a genealogical-idiom 
 
sirr (Ar.)- in Islamic mystical discourse a “subtle organ” through which one perceives and 
responds to mystical experience 
 
surat pengislaman (I.)- certificate of conversion 
 
syariat Islam (I.)- the Islamic path; often used to refer to Islamic law; in Aceh “syariat Islam” is 
the most common way to refer to the program of Islamic legal reforms that began to be 
introduced in the province in 1999 
 
Syattariyah (I.; Ar., Shaṭṭārīya)- an Islamic mystical order 
 
syiar Islam (I.)- in Indonesian Islamic revivalist discourses, the positively-valued distinctive 




tanah rencong (I.)- “land of the Acehnese dagger;” one of Aceh’s four common toponyms, 
referring primarily to Aceh’s vigorous resistance to colonial powers and, after 
independence, the Indonesian state 
 
tarekat (I.; Ar., ṭarīqa)- an Islamic mystical order or path 
 
taubat (I.)- repentance 
 
teungku (Ac.)- term used for a religious teacher; teungku can be used as a title before the name of 
such a teacher; also sometimes used as a general title of respect for an Acehnese man 
 
teungku meunasah (Ac.)- religious official in many Acehnese villages who administers to the 
daily religious needs of villagers, especially life-passage and seasonal rituals 
 
teuku (Ac.)- title for a hereditary territorial chief (oelèëbalang) 
 
Thionghoa (I.)- respectful term indicating a person of Chinese ethnicity or a Chinese ethnic 
object 
 
ulama (I., Ac., and Ar.)- religious teachers; in Indonesian and Acehnese, ulama can also be used 
as a singular, although sometimes the Arabic alim is also used 
 
Wilayatul Hisbah, WH (Ar.)- in Aceh, the vice-police charged with enforcing certain legal 
statutes derived from Islamic law 
 
wujudiyah (I.)- a type of Islamic mystical philosophy; it often has caused controversy between its 
adherents and their critics 
 
zakat (I. and Ar.)- the Islamic religious tax 
 
ziarah (I., Ar., ziyāra)- the ritual or devotional visiting of graves 
 
ziké, dike (Ac., I., zikir, Ar., zikr)- “remembrance;” mystical litanies, usually consisting of the 











Place, Temporality and Islam in an Indonesian Province 
 
 
 It was well after dusk when I noticed the gathering crowd outside the mosque down the 
street from my house in Kota Baru, a village in the regency of Nagan Raya in the Indonesian 
province of Aceh (see Maps 1, 2, and 3).  As I made my way to the mosque courtyard to find out 
what was going on, I discovered that Teungku Hasani, a young and popular traveling preacher 
from a regency to the south, would be giving a sermon later that evening.  It was early in October 
2008, just after the end of the fasting month of Ramadan, and this would be the second time in a 
month that I had heard Teungku Hasani speak.   
 Upon beginning his sermon, Teungku Hasani worked the crowd as I had seen him do 
before.  He alternated between open admonishment of those present and humorous sequences 
that aimed simultaneously at ethical edification and comic relief.  For a while, he role-played 
stereotypical villagers, using different accents to mock their moral foibles.  Suddenly, he turned 
to the topic of Acehnese history.  Before long, he was employing a bellowing screech that he 
reserved for moments in which he clearly did not want his audience to miss the forcefulness of 
his point:  
Only a speck of dust, a speck of dust in this universe, at the tip of the island of 
Sumatra!  But however small Aceh is, the world knew Aceh.  The world once 
laughed.  Aceh made the Islamic world smile[…]  When Islam was strong in 





 This dissertation examines the ways in which Muslims in the Indonesian province of 
Aceh have engaged local Islamic pasts over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
(see Maps 1 and 2).  The excerpt from Teungku Hasani’s sermon quoted above is an apt example 
of one such instance of Acehnese engagement with a local Islamic past, namely, the period of the 
seventeenth-century Acehnese Sultanate.
1
  In his sermon, Teungku Hasani went on to describe a 
period of moral decay in Aceh that had reached its nadir in the present era, which he depicted as 
a time in which unmarried members of the opposite sex socialized freely and Acehnese children 
ignored the needs and wishes of their parents.  He exhorted his listeners to return to the ways of 
the seventeenth-century sultanate, when Islam was “strong” (I., kuat) and justice was the norm. 
 One of the striking aspects of Teungku Hasani’s sermon is the way in which it expressed 
a call to proper Islamic ethical practice in terms of a local Islamic past.  During research in Aceh 
from 2007 until 2009, I found such framings common.  In fact, Acehnese like Teungku Hasani 
were just as likely to orient themselves towards instances of local Islamic pasts as they were to 
turn to the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad.  In order to understand Acehnese 
engagement with an “Islamic tradition” (Asad 1986), I had to be attuned to historical episodes 
and periods beyond those of the founding period of Islam.  Thus, I argue in this dissertation that 
orientations to local Islamic pasts are often of central importance to Islamic practice.  Further, 
such local Islamic pasts have been central to the ways in which Islam has mediated the 
relationship between Acehnese people and the Indonesian nation. 
The Pasts of Islam 
 Talal Asad famously challenged anthropologists of Islam to “begin, as Muslims do, 
from[…] a discursive tradition[…] that relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur’an and the 
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Hadith” (Asad 1986, 14).
2
  Yet, Asad’s formulation left some ambiguity as to whether 
approaching Islam as a discursive tradition requires one to begin such an inquiry with the 
orientations of Islamic practitioners to the prophetic period in which Islam’s founding texts 
originated.  Undeniably, the Islamic discursive tradition relates itself to the Qur’an and the words 
and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, and thus the prophetic period.  But do the Muslims who 
engage this tradition always take these texts, and this period, as the exclusive spatial-temporal 
frame for their Islamic practice? 
 Orientations among Muslims to the person, words, and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad 
have been undeniably central to Islamic discourse and practice since the early centuries of Islam.  
Thus, much scholarship on Islam has made orientations to the Prophetic period central to its 
analysis.  Islamic jurisprudential traditions and other practices that take the life and words of the 
Prophet Muhammad and his companions to be paradigmatic, and thus the basis for justifying 
actions in the present, have been especially important (Bowen 1993b; Halevi 2007; Hodgson 
1974, I, 315-392; Mahmood 2005; Messick 1993; Metcalf 1993).  Further, the vast array of 
devotional practices oriented to the person of the Prophet Muhammad and his family have been a 
popular topic of scholarly accounts (Ho 2006; Hodgson 1955; Hoffman 1995; Hoffman-Ladd 
1992; Katz 2007; Sila 2001).  All of this scholarship suggests the centrality of the prophetic 
period of history for Muslims engaged in Islamic practice. 
 The Acehnese whom I studied, however, offer an interesting counterexample.  In pursuits 
ranging from the enforcement of Islamic law to private religious study, Acehnese Muslims often 
seemed more moved by appeals to local Islamic pasts, for example, narratives of Aceh’s 
Islamization or invocations of the justice and prosperity of the seventeenth-century Acehnese 
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 “Hadith” refers to the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (I., hadis; Ar., 
aḥādīṭṭ; singular, ḥadīṭ), which are studied by Islamic scholars and ordinary Muslims alike, and are among the most 
basic sources used in the determination of Islamic jurisprudence. 
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Sultanate, than they were by Qur’anic verses or examples drawn from prophetic precedent.  
Although they almost always could, and would, provide justifications for their acts drawn from 
the example of the Prophet Muhammad’s life and time, it often was a different group of pasts 
that underpinned the manners in which they engaged in narrative, social, and ritual practices tied 
to Islam. 
 Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr has argued that “public piety means more than an active 
and visible religious practice… it means to position believers in a specific historical context, 
creating a web of associations and co-occurrences between persons, events, and landscapes” 
(Shaery-Eisenlohr 2007, 534).  Precisely which persons, events, and landscapes frame Islamic 
practice in specific instances is one of the questions that lie at the heart of this dissertation.  This 
work thus joins in scholarship that has explored the varied spatio-temporal paths Muslims take to 
participate in an Islamic tradition writ large (Florida 1995; Grewal 2006; Ho 2006; Rogozen-
Soltar 2012; Shaery-Eisenlohr 2007; Werbner 2003).
3
  None of this scholarship rejects the idea 
that the period of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions is a primary frame through which 
Muslims engage Islamic discourse and practice, something no one with any basic acquaintance 
of Islam could reasonably do.  However, it does suggest that the prophetic period enters into 
relationships with the present of different Islamic practitioners through varied, and often local, 
spatial-temporal paths. 
Spatial-Temporal Orientations and Spatial-Temporal Frames 
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 Such works have examined American Muslim student-travelers in the Middle East (Grewal 2006), 
Muslim converts in Grenada who use the medieval history of the city to distinguish themselves from Muslims who 
are Moroccan immigrants (Rogozen-Soltar 2012), a Javanese poet drawing on exclusively Javanese Islamic 
historical episodes to write “history as prophecy” (Florida 1995), Pakistani laborers in Manchester transforming 
their urban neighborhoods through recitation practices modeled on the reclaiming of a Pakistani frontier region by a 
mystical adept (Werbner 1996), and other topics. 
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 At its most basic, then, this dissertation examines the spatial-temporal orientations of 
Acehnese Muslims to local Islamic pasts.  By spatial-temporal orientations, I mean the ways that 
Muslims engage in narrative, social, and ritual practices in manners that are framed by “co-
occurrences between persons, events, and landscapes” drawn from Islamic pasts, presents, and 
futures (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2007, 534).  These orientations are simultaneously spatial and 
temporal because of how they establish relationships between Islamic practitioners and the past 
in ways that are underpinned by different notions of space and time.  They resemble other 
instances in which the past comes to be recognizable and meaningful through practices of 
reading signs of the past in the present (Derogatis 2003; Ho 2006; Kelleher 2003; Rogozen-
Soltar 2012; Shryock 1997).  
 How, exactly, do such spatial-temporal orientations manifest in Islamic practice?  I argue 
that Muslims bring constellations of people, events, and places to bear on their Islamic practice 
through conceptual framings in which and through which such practice is carried out.  These 
spatial-temporal frames serve as interpretive devices through which Muslims place themselves 
into relationships with the past.  They are thus a means through which Muslims situate 
themselves within what Asad described as a discursive tradition, which “addresses itself to 
conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the 
present” (Asad 1986, 14). 
 As suggested in the previous section, the most common spatial-temporal frames 
examined by scholars of Islamic practice have been those connected to the prophetic period.  The 
words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad have been a particularly important spatial-temporal 
frame in and through which Islamic practice has been carried out.  The Prophet’s words and 
deeds and the revelations recorded in the Qur’an are the two most basic sources of Islamic 
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jurisprudence.  As such, they have long provided examples for Muslims to emulate as part of 
legal and ethical practices (Bowen 1993a; Mahmood 2005; Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996; 
Metcalf 1993).  To use a classic example, a Muslim might turn to the words and the deeds of the 
Prophet Muhammad to seek guidance regarding the division of an inheritance for whom the 
proper distribution to heirs is unclear.  For many Muslims, the jurisprudential frame provided by 
the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad is not simply legalistic, but deeply emotional 
and personal, tied to the regulation of one’s public and private conduct (Mahmood 2005; Metcalf 
1993).  Thus, the prophetic period frames the acts of Muslims in a variety of ways. 
 If the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad provide a spatial-temporal frame for 
Islamic practice that is thought by Muslims to be applicable in all places and times, other spatial-
temporal frames for Islamic practice are more parochial.  They remain Islamic frames because 
the people, places, and events that they bring into relationships are in some way tied to the 
founding period of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.  However, their greatest 
resonances derive not from the prophetic founding period, but from the ways in which they bring 
the significance of local Islamic pasts into relief. 
 Two types of spatial-temporal frames that have been central to the orientations of 
Acehnese Muslims to local Islamic pasts over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries recur at multiple points in this dissertation.  The first type is composed of genealogical 
idioms.  The second type is comprised by narratives of Islamization.  Both genealogical idioms 
and narratives of Islamization have provided frames within and through which Acehnese 
Muslims engage in narrative, social, and ritual practices.
4
  In doing so, they have facilitated 
processes through which Acehnese Muslims link themselves to local Islamic pasts.  Many of the 
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 These two types of spatial-temporal frames frequently were entwined.  Narratives of Islamization could be 
expressed in genealogical form (Bowen 1989a).  Genealogies often were traceable to local periods of Islamization.   
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genealogies discussed in this dissertation, and all narratives of Islamization, conceptually 
stretched to the period of the Prophet Muhammad.  However, such prophetic origins rarely were 
their focus.  Instead, these genealogies and narratives of Islamization drew attention to local 
pasts, often within the frame of the Indonesian nation.  They thereby linked Acehnese 
simultaneously to the Indonesian nation and Islamic history. 
Genealogy 
 It should not be surprising that Acehnese Muslims have linked themselves to Islamic 
pasts via genealogical idioms.  Genealogy has long been one of the most important ways 
Muslims have reckoned the transmission of Islamic knowledge.  Thus, for example, reports of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s words and deeds are arranged in chains of transmission (I., sanad; Ar., 
sanad), the strength of which Muslims use to determine the relative validity and legal 
applicability of particular reports.  The transmission of esoteric knowledge is similarly recorded 
in the form of chains linking generations of students and teachers (I., silsilah, Ar., silsila).  
Networks of Islamic teachers and their students often relate to each other using genealogical 
idioms (Dhofier 1999).  In many parts of the Islamic world, the descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammad, reckoned through patrilineal genealogies from the Prophet’s daughter Fatima and 
son-in-law Ali, remain key figures in devotional practices tied to the veneration of the Prophet 
and his family (Ho 2006; Hodgson 1955; Hoffman-Ladd 1992). 
 Beyond the commonplace status of genealogy as an idiom within the Islamic tradition, 
there are several characteristics of genealogical forms that have made them ideal conduits for 
connecting Acehnese Muslims to local Islamic pasts.  Many of these characteristics involve the 
ways that genealogies link people to the past in fashions that allow for creative shifts in spatial 
and temporal scale.   
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 As a conceptual chain stretching back in time, a genealogy encourages narrators to move 
back-and-forth along its links, stressing different points of its temporal expanse (Ho 2006; 
Shryock 1997).  In the case of genealogical idioms linking Muslims to the period of the Prophet 
Muhammad, this has a number of important advantages.  Such genealogies remain conceptually 
linked to the prophetic period of Islamic history.  Nonetheless, by sliding up and down such a 
genealogical chain, Muslims can highlight local links within it.  Narratively moving along a 
genealogical chain in this manner can bring powerful constellations of people, places, and events 
into relief (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2007).  Further, the social relationships expressed in genealogical 
idioms often come to be inscribed on geographic space (Evans-Pritchard 1940; Ho 2006; Shaery-
Eisenlohr 2007; Shryock 1997).  This can have the effect of tying the memory of people and 
events to material features of a landscape (e.g., graves, rivers, battlefields).  All of this facilitates 
the development of spatial-temporal orientations to local Islamic pasts expressed in a 
genealogical idiom.   
 Many of those whom I studied in the Acehnese regency of Nagan Raya used locally-
recognized genealogies to link themselves to a period in Nagan Raya’s past when the regency 
was widely believed to have been Islamicized.  These genealogies tied important local figures in 
the regency to ancestors who had participated in the conversion of Nagan Raya’s inhabitants to 
Islam.  Many in the regency described these genealogies to me by drawing attention to objects 
that dotted the Nagan Raya countryside.  These were most commonly graves, but also included 
points at which key historical figures had defeated Dutch colonial forces, as well as mosques and 
shelters set aside for the recitation of Islamic litanies.  Using narrative and ritual practices that 
occurred in relation to these objects, those whom I studied connected themselves and Nagan 
Raya to broader histories of the coming of Islam to the Indonesian archipelago.  These histories 
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ultimately stretched to the period of the Prophet Muhammad, but had as their focal point local 
episodes in the history of Nagan Raya’s Islamization. 
Narratives of Islamization 
 In Aceh, genealogical idioms often went hand-in-hand with narratives of Islamization, 
the second common spatial-temporal frame described here.  Narratives of Islamization recount 
the process through which the majority of the peoples who inhabit the Indonesian archipelago 
came to adopt Islam (Bowen 1989a; Drewes 1968; Florida 1995, 150-157, 319-351; Hasymy 
1989; Johns 1961, 1995; Laffan 2011).
5
  During the colonial period, Dutch officials became 
interested in narratives of Islamization in connection with the political and legal administration 
of the archipelago.
6
  Perhaps most notable in this regard was colonial-era scholarship on local 
customary practice (I., adat).  Dutch scholarship on adat, especially by the late nineteenth 
century, cultivated the idea that the vast majority of Indonesia’s inhabitants remained enmeshed 
in local custom, having never undergone a thorough acceptance of Islamic legal norms, social 
patterns, or ritual practices (Benda 1958; Bowen 2003; Florida 1997; Hurgronje 1906; Lev 1985; 
van Vollenhoven 1981).   
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 While there is no consensus on either how this process of conversion occurred or when it did, most 
scholars take the conversion of the archipelago to have been a process that began by the thirteenth century.  
However, the date of the beginning of Islamization is highly contested.  I use the thirteenth century because it 
represents the period for which there is significant archeological and historical evidence of an Islamic polity existing 
in Southeast Asia, namely, the Sultanate of Samudra-Pasai on what is today Aceh’s north coast.  However, there 




 Beginning in the seventeenth century, traders of the Dutch East India Company established bases in 
various parts of the Indonesian archipelago.  These bases were founded as outposts on maritime routes over which 
the spices of what is today eastern Indonesia were brought westward to Europe.  From these initial efforts to control 
the spice trade, Dutch involvement in the region became heavily entwined with local politics.  By 1800 this had 
resulted in authority over Dutch East India Company outposts being shifted to the Dutch government.  The 
following century saw a series of military campaigns to expand and consolidate Dutch power throughout the 
archipelago.  The colony thus formed was called the Netherlands East Indies, and it was the government of this 
colony that the Indonesian Revolution successfully overthrew from 1945 to 1949.  My decision to limit this 
discussion of narratives of Islamization to the period of late-Dutch colonialism and its aftermath should not be taken 
to mean that concern with when and how Islam came to the archipelago only began in the colonial period.  While 
not always framing their narratives in terms of a pan-archipelagic entity, Southeast Asians have long been concerned 




 Note how an implicit narrative of Islam as having originated outside of the archipelago 
underpinned the idea that Islam had yet to take root in much of Indonesia.  Scholarship on adat 
recognized varying degrees to which different peoples and regions of the archipelago had 
adopted Islam, suggesting Islam’s movement from one place to another within the archipelago as 
well.  Colonial officials made administrative policy based on such models of comparative 
Islamization, for example, codifying family law differently in different parts of the archipelago 
depending on their understandings of the extent Islam had been adopted in each region (Benda 
1958; Lev 1985; von Vollenhoven 1981).   
 Narratives of Islamization espoused by Dutch officials thus created value-laden 
geographies of the archipelago.
7
  Some regions, like Aceh, tended to be portrayed as having been 
Islamicized earlier than others.  As a result, these narratives took Islam to have deeper roots in 
these regions, and to have more thoroughly influenced social life there than in other parts of the 
archipelago.  The people of more recently Islamicized regions, for example the inhabitants of 
Java (see Map 1), were usually portrayed as being impure in their religious practice, mixing 
Islam with Hinduism, Buddhism, or indigenous spirit beliefs, as a result of their relatively late 
adoption of Islam (Laffan 2011, 65-121).
8
  This established hierarchies between different regions 
of the archipelago based on the relative Islamization of these regions.  Further, it did so squarely 
within the frame of the Dutch East Indies (i.e., the eventual Indonesian nation) through a master 
narrative of Islamization.   
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 By value-laden geographies, I mean something akin to the ways in which scholars have found spaces to 
come to be “imbued with value” as a result of narrative and social practices that “layer together place, value, and 




 But see C. Snouck Hurgronje (1906) for a conflicting opinion about Aceh’s relatively more thorough 
Islamization when compared to Java. 
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 Given the ties of these narratives to Dutch colonial policy, it may come as little surprise 
that after independence some Indonesian intellectuals began to give narratives of Islamization an 
explicitly nationalist politics.  An influential group of Islamic intellectuals and activists, among 
them some of newly independent Indonesia’s most important public figures, came to see 
correcting Dutch-propagated distortions in the history of Islam’s coming to the archipelago as an 
act of decolonization (Hasymy 1989).  This frequently meant altering Dutch versions of these 
narratives by stressing Islam’s deep-rootedness in Indonesian history and society.  Some of the 
rhetorical moves these intellectuals made to accomplish this end included moving the date of 
Islam’s arrival in the archipelago to the century immediately following the period of the Prophet 
Muhammad, as well as insisting on an Arabic source, implicitly taken as being closer to Islam’s 
center, for Islam’s original entry into the archipelago (Bowen 1989a; Hasymy 1989).
9
   
 While Islamic intellectuals altered the valences of these narratives of Islamization, many 
aspects of the narratives remained the same.  Most significantly for this discussion, the narrative 
device of Islam’s singular movement through the archipelago from one place to another 
remained an important feature of them (Bowen 1989a).  Thus, the value-laden geographies 
discussed above were bequeathed to the independent Indonesian nation.  Post-colonial narratives 
of Islamization continued to create hierarchies that placed different regions of Indonesia in 
unequal relationships with each other, even as they asserted that the peoples of the archipelago as 
a whole had been Islamicized to a much greater extent than Dutch officials had recognized.  
Post-colonial narratives of Islamization were organized under the master frame of an Indonesian 
nation undergoing a positively valued process of progressive Islamization.  Most importantly for 
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 These efforts to recast Dutch narratives of Islamization were not, of course, uncontested.  Some 
Indonesians continued to favor Dutch interpretations by which Islam was taken as a foreign influence, less 
authentically Indonesian than either adat or Hindu and Buddhist traditions that had predated Islam’s coming to the 
archipelago (Ricklefs 2012, 102). 
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this dissertation, they provided a spatial-temporal frame that highlighted local Islamic pasts 
associated with the Islamization of the archipelago. 
Broadening Studies of Islamic Practice 
 What are the stakes of examining the relationships Islamic practitioners cultivate to local 
Islamic pasts?  In the remainder of this introduction, I suggest three contributions that the 
arguments in this dissertation make to the scholarly study of Islam, Indonesian history, and the 
history of the broader Islamic world.  I begin by suggesting that attention to the orientations of 
Muslims to local Islamic pasts might expand the range of practices scholars can effectively study 
as Islamic practice.  
 Much historical and ethnographic scholarship on Islam has taken as a central focus the 
legal and ethical practices tied to the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad.  This has been 
especially true of scholarship focused on Islamic reform movements and practices of ethical self-
formation (Bowen 1993b; Deeb 2006; Geertz 1960; Hirschkind 2006; Laffan 2003; Khan 2012; 
Mahmood 2005; Metcalf 1982, 1993; Noer 1973; Peacock 1978).  Such a focus has not been 
without good reason.  As discussed above, the words and the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, 
drawn from the foundational period of prophetic history, undeniably lies at the heart of much 
Islamic practice, especially its jurisprudential traditions. 
 However, such a focus often is tied to a particular analytic emphasis.  This emphasis 
draws attention to the ways in which Islamic practice is a site of contestation for Muslims.  
Certain ways of performing prayer, for example, are taken as correct or incorrect by different 
groups of Islamic practitioners, depending on each group’s interpretation of Islam’s sacred texts.  
Muslims debate what kinds of contact between members of the opposite sex are considered 
proper, basing their arguments on the example of the Prophet Muhammad, and so on.  
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Underpinning such debate in many of these accounts are two attitudes, one to the past, and the 
other to the future.  The first of these attitudes I will call an authenticating relationship to the 
past; the second, a striving temporality.
10
  Authenticating relationships to the past are 
underpinned by an orientation to the foundational historical period of the Prophet Muhammad 
and his companions, which are read as proof texts used to determine proper belief and practice.  
Striving temporalities are geared towards the future, and they are underpinned by an ideal of on-
going moral improvement of self or society. 
 I have no quarrel with studies that examine authenticating orientations to the past or 
striving temporalities.  These are, indeed, important modes in which Muslims engage the Islamic 
past.  This certainly was true of the Acehnese Muslims whom I studied.  However, authenticating 
orientations and striving temporalities often assume a specific, and rather narrow, relationship 
between Muslims and the Islamic past.  Because Islamic practice is taken in these studies to be 
primarily something over which Muslims debate, the authenticating sources of the prophetic time 
period take center stage.  Muslims may engage local Islamic pasts with great enthusiasm, and 
even use them to justify their actions in the present, as this dissertation argues.  But in 
disagreements over proper practice, there is no question that the prophetic period trumps all 
others in providing source texts authorizing or condemning specific acts.
11
 
 Thus, I argue that in order to account for the local pasts that frame Islamic practice, one 
must move beyond an exclusive focus on the arguments of Muslims over what kinds of practices 
are proper.  Such a move has been characteristic of scholarship that has fashioned the most 
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 The resemblance of this terminology to that found in recent work by Lara Deeb and Naveeda Khan is not 




 What does remain in question, however, is which of the prophetic sources are valid in a given situation 
and how these sources are to be interpreted.  In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this often has been tied to a 
question of whether or not such an interpretation should be carried out through the mediation of an established 
school of jurisprudence (I., mazhab).  Because the established schools of jurisprudence were founded several 
centuries after the prophetic period, one could argue that those who turn to them turn to a local Islamic pasts. 
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evocative glimpses of the local Islamic pasts that frame the acts of Muslims (Florida 1995; 
Grewal 2006; Ho 2006; Ricci 2011; Rogozen-Soltar 2012).  These studies have been attuned to 
the ways in which Muslims argue over what is proper Islamic practice, but they have also 
emphasized the multifaceted ways that Muslims have cultivated relationships to Islamic pasts in 
manners that are not simply concerned with authenticating action in the present or ethical 
striving into the future.  Characteristic of this literature is attention to the use of genealogy, 
literature, ritual, social practices, and other means, besides the jurisprudential, through which 
Muslims forge links with Islamic pasts. 
 This dissertation takes its cue from such studies and examines the orientations of 
Muslims to local Islamic pasts through an expanded group of practices that it takes as Islamic.  
These include narrative practices such as authoring published histories or reading signs of the 
past in one’s surroundings, social practices such as the recognition of someone’s genealogical 
links to an Islamic historical figure, and ritual practices such as attending religious feasts (Ac., 
kandoeri) or making vows at the graves of powerful Sufis.  I do not consider these practices 
Islamic simply for the sake of expanding the fields in which one can study Islam.  Not all 
narrative, social, and ritual practices carried out by Muslims are Islamic.  However, I consider 
the narrative, social, and ritual practices examined in this dissertation to be Islamic by virtue of 
the fact that they serve to tie Acehnese Muslims to Islamic pasts, both local and universal. 
Aceh and the Indonesian Nation 
 A second contribution of my account of how Acehnese Muslims have engaged local 
Islamic pasts rests on the place of this dissertation within popular and scholarly histories of 
Indonesia and Aceh.  At the time of my research, it had been almost sixty-five years since 
Indonesians declared themselves an independent nation.  For more than half of those years, Aceh 
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had been involved in violent conflicts pitting Acehnese guerrillas against the Indonesian armed 
forces (Aspinall 2009; Kell 1995; Sjamsuddin 1985; Tiro 1984; van Dijk 1981, 269-339).  In that 
time, Aceh had become synonymous with antagonism to the Indonesian nation.  During my 
research, which occurred a full two to four years after the signing of the most recent peace 
agreement, I regularly met people in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, who still assumed that 
Acehnese guerrillas were at war with the Indonesian government.  These same people linked 
Acehnese antagonism to the Republic with Acehnese devotion to Islam, especially the idea that 
Acehnese have long sought the status of martyr through death in holy war. 
 Some astute observers of Acehnese history have recognized that Islam has not always 
been tied simply to Acehnese armed resistance to the Indonesian Republic.  Instead, Islam 
actually has bound Aceh and Acehnese to the nation in powerful ways.  Edward Aspinall, for 
example, writes a history of Acehnese political movements in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries that takes the categories Islam, Aceh, and Indonesia as primary markers of identity 
within the province of Aceh (Aspinall 2009).  He deftly shows how in different time periods 
these three markers of identity combined to produce different kinds of political goals and 
projects: an independent Indonesia, an Indonesian Islamic state, and a nominally secular 
Acehnese independent nation. 
 Aspinall’s account reflects broader approaches to the history of Islam and nation in 
studies of twentieth- and twenty-first century Indonesian history.  These approaches have taken 
Islam primarily as a marker of group identity in the context of political struggle over national 
sovereignty (Anderson 1972; Kahin 2003; Shiraishi 1990).  They point to Islam’s role in 
providing “a common bond[…] a sort of in-group symbol” for nationalist sentiments (Kahin 
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2003, 38), and suggest the importance of Islam for both representational politics and the kinds of 
national “imagined communities” famously described by Benedict Anderson (Anderson 1991). 
 Aspects of this dissertation no doubt intersect with these approaches.  The spatial-
temporal frames and orientations that are described in the chapters that follow clearly help to 
produce notions of belonging in the Indonesian nation that have been tied to both 
representational politics and imaginings of Indonesian national communities.  Indeed, one of the 
arguments of this dissertation is that Islam has mediated the relationship between Acehnese 
people and the Indonesian nation in powerful ways.  My primary focus is not the nation, 
however, but the ways in which Acehnese as Muslims have been oriented to local Islamic pasts.  
Because local pasts have been refracted through the twentieth-century founding of the 
Indonesian nation, they have become entangled with it.  To argue that Islam is “a sort of in-group 
symbol” that helps to constitute the identity of Indonesian Muslims in a national imagined 
community, however, is something altogether different than to say that Indonesian Muslims can 
be oriented to Islamic pasts that are entwined with the Indonesian nation. 
 I have drawn from approaches that attend to how participation in Islam has at times 
facilitated participation in the nation through fostering sensibilities and imaginaries that reflect 
affinities between certain kinds of Islamic and national practices (Bowen 1993b; Laffan 2003).  
The politics of representing Islam and nation are no doubt a central part of the story in the pages 
that follow.  However, my primary interest lies in how, through day-to-day narrative, social, and 
ritual practices, Acehnese Muslims have come to simultaneously participate in local Islamic 
pasts, Acehnese locality, and the Indonesian nation. 
 All of this serves as a counter-narrative to the idea that Islam has been linked inextricably 
to Acehnese political resistance, and to the notion that Aceh has been locked permanently in an 
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antagonistic relationship with Indonesia.  To scholars working on the relationship between Islam 
and politics elsewhere in Indonesia, it also suggests the utility of examining the spatial-temporal 
orientations of Muslims to local Islamic histories.  The narratives of Islamization discussed in 
this dissertation cover the entire archipelago.  Paying attention to how other Indonesians engage 
these narratives (or not) could be useful, for example, for reimagining the ways Indonesians have 
understood the relationship between different regions of the archipelago. 
Approaching Islamic Locality 
 Examining the spatial-temporal orientations of Muslims to pasts besides those of the 
prophetic period has a third benefit.  Such an examination can provide a ground for reconsidering 
common hierarchies of global and local, as well as center and periphery, in scholarship on the 
Islamic tradition.  Many projects aiming to destabilize these hierarchies have sought to do so by 
documenting ties between Southeast Asian Muslims and the broader Islamic world (Al-Attas 
1966, 1970; Azra 2004a, 2004b; Feener and Laffan 2005; Feener and Sevea 2009; Ho 2004, 
2006; Laffan 2003; Reid 1972, 2010; Riddell 1990, 2001, 2005; Roff 2005; van Bruinessen 
1989, 1990).  I, however, have chosen a different analytic tactic.  My research adopts single-sited 
ethnographic and archival methods.  While Aceh’s cosmopolitan past regularly recurred in the 
discourse of my archival and ethnographic interlocutors, very few of those about whom I write in 
this dissertation had ever left the Indonesian archipelago. 
 I see my project as a step towards a new kind of anthropology and history of Islamic 
locality.  My focus on how local pasts frame Islamic narrative, social, and ritual practice allows 
one to see how locally situated Islamic practitioners reconfigure hierarchies of global, local, 
center, and periphery.  Further, it illustrates that Muslims need not be cosmopolitan to effectively 
reconfigure these hierarchies.   
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 Rather than seek “multiple Islams” (El-Zein 1977; Geertz 1968; Gilsenan 2000), or 
meditate on the tensions between idealized universal norms and local iterations of practice 
(Beatty 1999; Bowen 1993b; Geertz 1960), my anthropology and history of Islamic locality takes 
its cue from my Indonesian interlocutors.  These interlocutors contextualized their narrative, 
social, and ritual practices through reference to Islamic histories of the archipelago.  In doing so, 
they made the local not a type of practice, but a relationship to the Islamic tradition that 
depended upon shifting configurations of people, places, and pasts. 
Chapter Summaries 
 Chapter 1 of this dissertation, entitled “History, Practices, and People,” introduces the 
reader to key events and themes of the Acehnese past and offers a description of the regency of 
Nagan Raya, where I conducted most of my ethnographic fieldwork from 2008 to 2009.  The 
dissertation then moves to two chapters that address how narrative practices in post-colonial 
Aceh have tended to inscribe Acehnese territory and its people within value-laden geographies 
underpinned by Aceh’s relationship with Islam and the Indonesian nation.  Chapter 2, entitled 
“Making Aceh Special,” examines two kinds of post-colonial narrative practices.  The first kind 
of narrative practice consists of the writing of histories of Aceh by Indonesian intellectuals 
beginning in the 1950s.  The second involves popular practices of reading signs of the past in the 
present in ways that invoke and evoke the major narrative themes of the histories developed in 
the 1950s.   Chapter 3, “‘Wild Churches’ and Muslim Converts,” describes interest in Aceh’s 
southern border among various groups of Acehnese and Indonesian elites in the 1970s.  The 
movement of non-Muslims across the Acehnese border worried these parties, who expressed 
their concerns in terms of the themes of Acehnese history developed in the 1950s.  The 
expression of these concerns thus reinforced the value-laden geographies established by the 
narrative themes.   
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 Chapter 4, entitled “Placing Islamic Reform in Context,” begins the second half of the 
dissertation, which is a historical ethnography of the Acehnese regency of Nagan Raya.  Chapter 
4 contrasts two ways that Muslims in Nagan Raya conceptually organized different kinds of 
Islamic practitioners at the time of my field research.  The first way was based on the relative 
adherence of practitioners to locally-recognized standards of reformed practice, while the second 
was based on practitioners’ genealogical relationships to paradigmatic figures in histories of 
Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  Chapter 5, “Young People Are Seeking their Blessings,” explores 
how Muslims in Nagan Raya were interested in how their life circumstances placed them in 
relationship to two nodes of ethical risk and responsibility, namely, “this world” (Ac., dōnja; I., 
dunia) and “the hereafter” (I., akhirat).  I argue that these orientations to the world and the 
hereafter represented a sort of “contingent” temporality (Bledsoe 2002), one that can be 
contrasted with the striving ethical models common in much recent literature on Islamic 
eschatological literature and ethical practice.  Chapter 6, “Putting the Habib Seunagan in their 
Place,” examines how the Habib Seunagan, a group at the center of a mystical complex in Nagan 
Raya who claim to descend from the Prophet Muhammad, have placed themselves in prestigious 
histories of the Islamization of Nagan Raya and Indonesia.  Key to how they have done so is the 
way ritual practices at their graves reinforce their narrative and genealogical claims for their 
thousands of followers. 
***** 
 I began this introduction by describing a sermon of Teungku Hasani, a young and popular 
traveling preacher from Aceh’s southwest coast.  In that sermon, Teungku Hasani inversely 
linked an alleged decline of morality in Aceh to a moment in Aceh’s Islamic past, the golden age 
of the Acehnese Sultanate.  In fact, in his two-hour sermon, he spent more time discussing 
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Acehnese history than he did the Qur’an or the life of the Prophet Muhammad.  I find this 
significant.  It provides the reader with an opening illustration of the expansive range of spatial-
temporal orientations to local Islamic histories through which Acehnese Muslims engaged in 
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  Aceh is a particularly interesting place to engage in a study of Islam, locality, and the 
spatial-temporal orientations that frame Islamic practice.  Acehnese have had a long engagement 
with the wider Islamic world and have practiced a range of genres of historical writing and 
performance.  Much daily Islamic practice in the province is full of allusions, both implicit and 
explicit, to local and global Islamic histories.  This is true, for example, of feasts held to 
commemorate the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, the reckoning of genealogical ties to 
paradigmatic Islamic figures, and visitations to the graves of Sufi adepts.
12
  In order to 
contextualize the narrative, social, and ritual practices that are described in the chapters that 
follow, this chapter introduces the reader to some of the most important themes of Acehnese 
history over the past eight centuries.  The chapter then turns to a sketch of the Acehnese regency 
of Nagan Raya, where I conducted ethnographic fieldwork.  
The Long and Short (Durée) of Acehnese History 
 I begin where many of the histories of my archival and ethnographic interlocutors began, 
with the rise of a series of Islamic kingdoms on the northwestern end of the island of Sumatra, 
the site of present day Aceh (see Map 1).  While some Acehnese historians have suggested that 
there were Islamic kingdoms established in what is today Aceh as early as the ninth century 
                                                          
 12 I use the adjective “Sufi” to refer to people and things associated with the mystical practices of the 
Islamic tradition, whether involved in institutionalized mystical orders (I., tarekat; Ar., ṭarīqa) or carried out more 
popularly among Muslims.  For three classic introductions to Sufism, see Hodgson (1974, I, 359-364, 392-409; 
1974, II, 201-254), Schimmel (1975), and Trimingham (1971). 
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(Hasymy 1989), the best evidence available, in the form of gravestones, coins, and references in 
the historical record, indicate the existence of a sultanate on Aceh’s north coast, near the site of 
present day Lhokseumawe, from the thirteenth century (see Map 2) (Alfian 1999; Said 1981, I, 
83-130).  This sultanate, most commonly referred today as Samudra-Pasai, is mentioned in the 
travel narratives of both Marco Polo and Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (Batuta 1829, 199-202; Polo 1855, 248-
251).  By the sixteenth century, however, it was the port of Aceh Dar as-Salām, at the site of 
present-day Banda Aceh (see Map 2), that had become the political center of the region.  Indeed, 
for at least the first half of the seventeenth century, Aceh Dar as-Salām was the preeminent port 
linking Southeast Asia to Indian Ocean networks of trade (Lombard 1986; Reid 2010; Said 1981, 
I, 157-376). 
 Many aspects of this early history of Islamic kingdoms in what is today Aceh could be 
presented in detail.  For the purposes of this sketch, I simply note that by the reign of the Sultan 
Iskandar Muda (r. 1607-1636), the Sultanate of Aceh Dar as-Salām was a central node in circuits 
of international trade driven, in part, by the entrance of Portuguese, Dutch, and English traders 
into the Indian Ocean.  The Acehnese Sultanate was one of a succession of maritime polities that 
dominated trade in Southeast Asia by providing a secure port for economic activity while taking 
profit generated via this trade in the form of port duties (Lombard 1986; Reid 2010).  These 
profits enriched the sultanate, and both fueled its expansion over much of Sumatra and the Malay 
Peninsula and inspired multiple failed attempts to conquer the sultanate’s primary rival in this 
period, Portuguese-held Malacca (Reid 2010).  Dominance of this trade also had other effects.  
Aceh became a site of literary production, especially religious scholarship and debate.  Today the 
best-known episodes in the history of this scholarship include mid-seventeenth century purges of 
mystics adhering to a strain of thought termed wujudiyah (Al-Attas 1966, 1970).  The production 
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and circulation of scholarship in various branches of Islamic knowledge in seventeenth-century 
Aceh, however, also had lasting influence within networks of religious scholars in the Indonesian 
archipelago beyond these well-known clashes (Azra 2004a, 2004b).   
 By the end of the seventeenth century, other ports elsewhere in Southeast Asia had begun 
to displace the Acehnese Sultanate in Indian Ocean trade networks (Andaya 1993), yet nominal 
Acehnese rule over the northwestern tip of Sumatra continued for three more centuries.  During 
this period, the sultanate continued to legitimize the rule of Aceh’s powerful local hereditary 
chiefs (Ac., oelèëbalang) by issuing letters of appointment (Hurgronje 1906, 4-15; Siegel 2000, 
35-37).  These chiefs actually often dominated the sultans and sultanas of these centuries, 
playing direct roles in deposing and bringing to power claimants to the throne, roles described in 
Malay- and Acehnese-language historical literature (Hurgronje 1906, 4-15, 120-151; Iskandar 
1958; Siegel 2000, 35-37).
13
  Ironically, this decentralized political arrangement brought Aceh to 
the center of world trade yet again in the early nineteenth century.   
 Between 1800 and 1830, the territories under the nominal control of the Acehnese 
Sultanate underwent an economic transformation and became the most lucrative pepper growing 
area in the world.
14
  Hereditary chiefs on Aceh’s west coast acted as regional strongmen with 
little interference from the sultanate.  These chiefs oversaw pepper plantations that produced this 
commodity of central importance in international markets.  The chiefs traded primarily with 
United States shippers, nearly all from Salem, Massachusetts, who had developed special ocean 
vessels capable of anchoring in the narrow shoals off Aceh’s west coast (Gould 1956; Putnam 
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 Mention of sultanas is not an instance of anachronistic political correctness.  From 1641 until 1699 the 
Acehnese Sultanate was ruled by four successive female sultans.  The rise to power of these sultanas was, itself, the 
result of the great influence of hereditary chiefs and of infighting among them.  See Said (1981, 377-423).  At the 
time of my fieldwork, these sultanas, along with the female admiral Malahayati, were important rhetorical figures in 




 Reid notes that by the 1820s Aceh was producing over half of the world’s pepper (Reid 1969, 7). 
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1922; Reid 1969, 6-17).  The chiefs who owned the plantations grew rich, and some of this 
wealth trickled down to Acehnese who worked on the plantations or were involved in the client 
networks of these chiefs (Drewes 1980).  The sultanate itself, however, was cut out of this trade, 
as it was not carried out in the sultan’s port.   
 Ironically, this trade, dominated not by the sultan but by hereditary chiefs, helped to 
protect the sultanate from Dutch colonial invasion until the last quarter of the nineteenth century.  
When a war broke out over control of the pepper trade, pitting Sultan Jauhar al-Alam Shah (r. 
1795-1823) against one of the main pepper-growing hereditary chiefs of the west coast, British 
officials, heavily invested in trade between Aceh and the British-controlled island of Penang, 
threw support behind the sultan.  Both parties signed an 1819 treaty that established a defensive 
alliance between the Acehnese Sultanate and Great Britain.  Even after the 1824 Treaty of 
London effectively restricted Britain’s territorial claims in Southeast Asia to the Malay 
peninsula, and the Netherlands’ to the Indonesian archipelago, the 1819 treaty between Great 
Britain and the sultanate continued to prevent the Netherlands from claiming a right of 
sovereignty over independent Aceh.  Only in 1871, when British officials legally altered Great 
Britain’s relationship with the Acehnese sultanate so as to make clear that they believed they had 
no obligations to defend Aceh militarily, did Aceh became an open target of the last wave of 
Dutch colonial expansion in the archipelago (Reid 1969, 6-78).
15
 
 When the Dutch finally moved decisively to incorporate Aceh into their colonial 
holdings, they did so by attacking the sultanate in 1873.  This initial assault on the sultan’s 
capital in what is today Banda Aceh, however, was routed by the sultan’s forces in short order.  
The attack precipitated three decades of guerrilla conflict, in what was to become one of the 
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 This is a grossly oversimplified account of seven decades of diplomatic, economic, military, and political 
maneuvering on the part of Acehnese, British and Dutch officials.  For what remains the most comprehensive 
account of these events, see Reid (1969). 
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costliest and deadliest wars of Dutch colonialism.  James Siegel estimates that a total of 12,500 
Dutch soldiers, most of them native Indonesians from Java and the Moluccas, lost their lives, 
while Acehnese deaths may have ranged from 60,000 to 70,000 out of a total population of only 
750,000 (Siegel 1979, 229).
16
  Acehnese resistance to the Dutch invasion and occupation very 
quickly came to be articulated in an Islamic idiom.  Most famous in this regard were the 
“histories of the holy war” (I., hikayat prang sabi), often deeply esoteric poetry meditating on the 
glories of the afterlife for Muslims who die fighting nonbelievers (Alfian 1987, 1992; Hasjmy 
1976; Hasymy 1971; Siegel 1979, 229-265).  These texts are known to have been recited by 
Acehnese guerrillas before going into battle (Siegel 1979, 262), and they remained at the time of 
my research powerful symbols evoking Aceh’s history of pious resistance to colonialism.   
 As the Dutch-Aceh War dragged on, leadership changed on the Acehnese side.  Dutch 
officials made efforts to bring Acehnese hereditary chiefs under their authority, often through 
handsome salaries and military support.  This policy met with ever variable success as many of 
these chiefs, perhaps most famously the west coast oelèëbalang Teuku Umar, periodically 
shifted their loyalties between Dutch forces and Acehnese resistance fighters (Reid 1969, 187-
283).  In 1903, Tuanku Muhammad Daud Shah, the man whom most Acehnese recognized as 
sultan following the 1874 death of his grandfather, surrendered to Dutch authorities.  Previously 
he led his own resistance, along with a circle of advisors and the support of loyal hereditary 
chiefs (Reid 1969, 187-282).  Religious teachers (I. and Ar., ulama) also played important roles 
in leading guerrillas against Dutch forces, especially as more and more hereditary chiefs came 
under Dutch sway (Reid 1969, 250-283).
17
  This last point is important to developments in Aceh 
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 Ulama, which I here gloss as “religious teacher,” is a general term for the Islamically-learned, although 
the exact nature of its proper referent is not infrequently contested in discourses on Islamic knowledge and authority.  
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in the post-independence period, discussed below.  Specifically, the increasing participation of 
religious leaders in resisting the Dutch helped to reinforce the perception that the hereditary 
chiefs as a class were more interested in their own power and wealth than living properly moral 
lives, and allowed some to claim the ulama as the last bastion of uncompromised resistance to 
the Dutch. 
 Sporadic resistance to the Dutch occupation continued until 1942, often in the form of 
suicide attacks by individual Acehnese assailants who burst into densely populated buildings or 
markets and attempted to kill as many Dutchmen as possible before being killed or arrested 
themselves (Siegel 2000, 82-83).  But from at least the end of the first decade of the twentieth 
century until the Japanese invasion of the archipelago in 1942, relative peace prevailed, and the 
Dutch succeeded in establishing the foundations of a bureaucratic colonial state.  These 
foundations included the building of schools, the development of transportation networks, 
support for agricultural infrastructure projects, and even the organization of government-
administered game parks, though given Aceh’s reputation for pious and fierce resistance to 
Dutch rule, one wonders which brave souls might have planned a hunting expedition to the rather 
remote locations this office oversaw (anonymous 1931; Controleur 1935).  This period also saw 
the immigration of large numbers of Chinese and Chinese-Indonesians, as well as Indonesians 
from other parts of the archipelago.  The former worked as laborers or opened small businesses, 
while the latter tended to come to Aceh as soldiers, administrators, and school teachers.  These 
two to three decades of relatively peaceful occupation were extremely significant, even though 
they have often been overlooked by both Acehnese historians and non-Acehnese scholars of 
Acehnese history (Taylor 2011).   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
In Arabic the term is plural, the singular being ‘alīm (Ar.).  In Indonesian ulama or alim (I.) may be used as a 
singular, dual, or plural.  I follow the Indonesian usage in this dissertation. 
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 Scholars of Acehnese history have not, though, overlooked the growth of Islamic reform 
movements, especially in the last decades of the Dutch occupation.  The most dominant of these 
movements in lowland Aceh was the Persatoean Oelama Seloeroeh Atjeh (POESA, All-Aceh 
Religious Scholars Union), founded in 1939, although branches of the national reformist 
organization Muhammadiyah had already been founded more than a decade earlier (Feener 
2013).  Pioneering work by James Siegel and Eric Morris has focused on POESA’s uniquely 
Acehnese expression of Islamic reform and engagement with Acehnese history beginning in the 
1930s, especially under the leadership of the charismatic religious teacher Daud Beureueh 
(Morris 1983; Siegel 2000).  Similarly, the anthropologist John Bowen has illustrated how 
between 1930 and 1960 Islamic reform movements of various kinds instilled practices and 
sensibilities that were closely tied to the adoption of Indonesian nationalism in this period 
(Bowen 1991, 1993b).  The development of these reformist movements was of central 
importance to later developments in Acehnese history.  One unfortunate effect of these studies, 
however, has been the circulation of the notion that Aceh has been dominated in the twentieth 
century by such reformist sensibilities.  This dissertation is, in part, meant to challenge that 
presumption.  
 By the time of the Japanese invasion of Aceh in February 1942, the extended Dutch-Aceh 
War and the Dutch occupation had already deeply impacted the region.  The sultanate had been 
dismantled, along with the pepper plantation economy that had seen Aceh rise to economic 
prominence for a second time in three centuries.  A devastating war had left as many as sixty to 
seventy thousand dead and countless others displaced.  A new Dutch colonial state had begun to 
lay down infrastructure, bringing with it Chinese and Indonesian migrants who in some cases 
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quite literally built new, relatively urban centers where there had been none before.
18
  Local 
authority came to rest in the hands of hereditary chiefs paid by the Dutch colonial government.  
Islamic reform movements were busy founding educational and social organizations throughout 
the region, while engaging in polemics with their rivals who resisted their programs of reform.  
Thus, on the eve of the Indonesian Revolution, which began with the August 17, 1945 
declaration of the Republic of Indonesia by the nationalist leaders Sukarno and Muhammad 
Hatta, Aceh had already undergone a series of radical transformations.   
 The period from the Revolution to the early 1960s brought yet a new round of turmoil 
and violence to Aceh.  Most important for this study, this was a period in which Aceh’s legal 
status as a “special area” (I., daerah istimewa) was solidified.  This status resulted from events in 
Aceh that included the development of certain standardized narratives of Aceh’s history during a 
guerrilla conflict that pitted Acehnese against each other and the Indonesian Republic. 
 Just months after the declaration of Indonesian independence by Sukarno and Hatta in 
August 1945, several key Acehnese public figures, including the charismatic religious teacher 
Daud Beureueh, declared the support of the Acehnese people for the Revolution.  Because Aceh 
was never reoccupied by the Dutch, it became a staging ground for the smuggling of arms and 
other revolutionary activities.  Perhaps the best-known episode in the history of Aceh’s 
contributions to the Revolution is the story of how Daud Beureueh collected the gold of 
Acehnese, especially the jewelry of Acehnese women, to purchase two airplanes that smuggled 
weapons into the archipelago through Aceh during this period.   
 During the Revolution, Aceh also was among the sites of a relatively wide-reaching 
social revolution in which local elites who were presumed to have been allied to the Dutch were 
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 For an example, see documents related to the leasing of land to Chinese merchants in the South Aceh 




attacked in different parts of the archipelago at the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946.  In 
Aceh, these attacks involved the killing of hundreds of hereditary chiefs, especially on Aceh’s 
north coast, by a coalition of Islamic youth groups allied to Daud Beureueh and POESA (Reid 
1979, 185-217; Sjamsuddin 1985, 24-31; van Dijk 1981, 270-286).  The political vacuum these 
killings helped to create was filled by Daud Beureueh, who declared himself “Military Governor 
of Aceh, Langkat, and the Surrounding Regions” (van Dijk 1981, 270-286).
19
  The killing and 
expulsion of these north coast hereditary chiefs was accompanied by Islamic reformist-inflected 
discourse, which evaluated these chiefs not only as suspect for their dealings with the Dutch, but 
as obstacles to a more properly Islamic Aceh as a result of their own allegedly impure Islamic 
practice. 
 Daud Beureueh’s rise to political power during the Revolution would come to have 
significant consequences for subsequent Acehnese history.  A series of administrative changes 
affecting the borders of Indonesian provinces in the final years of the Revolution led to Aceh’s 
absorption into the neighboring province of North Sumatra (van Dijk 1981, 286-293; Sjamsuddin 
1985, 34-82).  These changes effectively ended Daud Beureueh’s reign, for Aceh came to be 
administered from the city of Medan, just across what is today the Acehnese border (see Map 2).  
The administrative changes also raised the ire of many Acehnese, both those who supported 
Beureueh and those who felt that the loss of an independent administrative status for Aceh 
represented an affront to both the region’s long and prestigious history and its contributions to 
Indonesian independence.  This anger was compounded by on-going turmoil over the killing and 
expelling of hereditary chiefs during the Revolution, and a popular sense that absorption into 
North Sumatra would result in the political and economic marginalization of Acehnese (van Dijk 
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 “Langkat” is a region today just south of the Acehnese border along Sumatra’s east coast (see Map 2).  
Daud Beureueh claimed authority over Langkat during the period in which he was military governor of Aceh. 
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1981, 284-286, 293-299).  As a result of growing discontent related to these issues, Daud 
Beureueh declared his support for the Darul Islam-Indonesian Islamic Army (Darul Islam-
Tentara Islam Indonesia, DI-TII or Darul Islam, DI), a guerrilla movement that nominally 
supported the dissolution of the Indonesian Republic and the founding of the Indonesian Islamic 
State (Negara Islam Indonesia) (Formichi 2012; Saleh 1956; Sjamsuddin 1981; van Dijk 1981). 
 Darul Islam, both in Aceh and the archipelago at large, merged often vague commitments 
to an explicitly Islamic political order with concerns over domination by a central government in 
the Indonesian capital of Jakarta, a government often construed by non-Javanese Indonesians as 
dominated by Javanese political elites.  In the case of Aceh, Darul Islam would have long and 
lasting effects in terms of both the ways that Islam came to mediate the relationship between 
Acehnese and the Indonesian state, and broader questions of Acehnese autonomy. 
 Darul Islam came to follow a pattern that had no doubt become familiar to many 
Acehnese over seven decades of Dutch occupation, namely, that of regular but sporadic guerrilla 
war and military stalemate.  After initial successes in taking over some of Aceh’s urban centers 
in 1953, Darul Islam guerrillas quickly were beaten back to Aceh’s rural interior by the 
Indonesian armed forces.  From there they continued to launch raids, but, despite planning 
political arrangements predicated on their eventual victory, Darul Islam in Aceh never moved 
beyond the short-lived victories of 1953 (Gelanggang 1956; Sjamsuddin 1985, 83-161, 197-253; 
van Dijk, 306-330)  The Indonesian central government adopted a strategy of treating pockets of 
Darul Islam guerrillas in different parts of the archipelago (i.e., Aceh, West Java, Central Java, 
South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi) as separate “gangs” (I., gerombolan), and in Aceh this policy 
allowed for a unique and consequential end to the conflict beginning in the late 1950s.  With the 
help of the Acehnese intellectual and nationalist leader Ali Hasjmy, who himself had been 
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arrested at the beginning of Darul Islam because of his connections to youth groups associated 
with Daud Beureueh’s POESA, the cabinet of Indonesian prime minster Ali Sastromidjojo 
agreed to grant provincial status to Aceh in 1957.  Then, in 1959, the cabinet of Prime Minister 
Djuanda Kartawidjaja agreed to a unique special autonomy arrangement for the province 
(Hasjmy 1967, 1974; Sjamsuddin 1985, 254-318; van Dijk 1981, 330-336).  The new province 
came to be named the “Special Area of Aceh” (Daerah Istimewa Atjeh). 
 Aceh’s special autonomy, in theory parallel to that of the Special Area of Yogyakarta 
located on the island of Java, was justified explicitly in terms of Aceh’s historical connections to 
Islam and the nation’s debt to the region during the revolution (Bowen 1989a; Hasjmy 1974; 
Panitia Persiapan Pendirian Universitas Negeri Sjiah Kuala 1961a; Sjamsuddin 1985, 273-294).
20
  
The arrangement guaranteed provincial authorities autonomy in three areas: education, 
customary practice, and Islam.  The new arrangement was successful in getting many Darul 
Islam guerrillas to come down from the mountains.  Daud Beureueh himself eventually 
surrendered and was allowed to retire to his home in the regency of Pidie in 1962 (Sjamsuddin 
1985, 294-310; van Dijk 1981, 336-339).  In practice, perhaps because this special autonomy 
was so closely linked to Aceh’s Islamic history, Islam became the central focus of efforts at 
implementing Aceh’s new autonomy.  However, only when radical and violent changes in 
Indonesia as a whole took place in the mid-1960s did these efforts really begin in earnest. 
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 The Special Area of Yogyakarta (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta) is a region of central Java with 
provincial status that has enjoyed political autonomy within Indonesia since 1950.  Yogyakarta’s special autonomy 
entails the rule of the territory by the region’s sultan, and was awarded partly in recognition of the service of the 
Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX during the Indonesian Revolution, when he served as the Defense Minister for the 
nascent Indonesian Republic.  Thus, the pairing of a pre-colonial history with service to the nation that was a central 
aspect of Aceh’s claim to special status as it came to be recognized in 1959 had already served as a basis of such a 
status for Yogyakarta almost a decade earlier.  Indeed, as early as 1953, before Darul Islam had broken out, some 
Indonesians were already championing the idea of recognizing Aceh as a special area modeled on Yogyakarta 
(Djuruwarta keliling 1953c, 1953d). 
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 In precisely the same period when Aceh was gaining its special autonomy, Indonesian 
national politics were beginning what, in retrospect, might be identified as a long authoritarian 
turn.  The 1955 elections for delegates to the constitutional assembly, charged with authoring a 
new and permanent Indonesian constitution, resulted in a legislative body split among numerous 
and competing parties, and thus unable to fulfill its mandate (Lev 2009, 95-152).  In addition to 
Darul Islam, a second major rebel movement, loosely based on a coalition of Islamic reformist 
and non-revolutionary socialist parties, broke out between 1957 and 1959 (Lev 2009, 43-60, 153-
192).  As cabinet after cabinet fell, Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, found himself attempting 
to balance two major competing entities, the large Indonesian Communist Party and the 
Indonesian Army.  He progressively assumed more and more legislative power himself, pushed 
in this by both the Communist Party and the army, and disbanded the parliament in 1960, 
decreeing a return to the 1945 Constitution that concentrated powers in the hands of the 
president.  This period, which he named “guided democracy” (I., demokrasi terpimpin) would 
end in one of the most tragic political bloodbaths of the twentieth century. 
 Although the details remain unclear, on the evening of September 30, 1965, a small 
group, apparently from within the Communist Party, assassinated six of Indonesia’s top generals 
in an attempted coup (Anderson and McVey 1971; Cribb 1990; Crouch 1988, 97-157).  
Whatever the goals of the group that carried out these assassinations, the result was a seizure of 
power by the Indonesian army and violent purges of anywhere from five hundred thousand to 
two million suspected leftists and leftist sympathizers.  The violence was widespread and 
grotesque, especially in Central Java, East Java, and the island of Bali (Cribb 1990; Robinson 
1995, 235-303).  Much of the killing was carried out by Islamic youth groups, especially on Java 
where the youth wing of the mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama was mobilized through 
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clandestine ties to military officers (Crouch 1988, 135-157).  While the killings in Aceh were not 
as numerous as they were on Java and Bali, they involved similar kinds of brutality.  During my 
field research, I interviewed a man who claimed to have been wrongly accused of being a 
Communist.  During the violence following the attempted coup in Jakarta, he was hacked across 
the face and neck with a machete, along with tens of other suspected party members, before 
being left to die.  He survived this ordeal and was reintegrated into his village, in part through the 
patronage of a local military official.  In fact, he was one of two such survivors in the same 
regency, both of whom had long scars across their cheeks, jaws, and necks attesting to their 
ordeal.  In addition to the legacy of such violence, which continued to haunt Indonesian social 
and political life well into the twenty-first century, the lasting result of this period was the 
displacement of Sukarno by the general Soeharto in 1966.  This ushered in a political regime that 
named itself the “New Order” (I., orde baru). 
 The effects of the New Order on Acehnese society were many and complex.  Although 
Aceh had been granted special autonomy in 1959, little was done to implement this autonomy 
until after the killings of 1965 and 1966.  At this point, somewhat ironically, Aceh’s special 
autonomy began to be administered by New Order bureaucrats at both the national and local 
levels.  While in certain cases this new form of control undoubtedly reflected the interests of 
some Acehnese in connection with, for example, the implementation of statutes on Islamic taxes 
and religious courts, it gave the New Order central government an entry point into the daily 
governance of Acehnese affairs.  In particular, a series of bureaucratic institutions, the most 
prominent and important example being the Acehnese Ulama Council (Madjelis Ulama Atjeh), 
was founded in the decades after the 1965 coup attempt.
21
  Those associated with these 
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 The Acehnese Ulama Council, which became the Indonesian Ulama Council of the Special Area of Aceh 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia Daerah Istimewa Aceh) in the 1970s, and then the Consultative Council of Ulama 
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institutions legitimated many of them in terms of Aceh’s special status, and several involved the 
legislation and regulation of Islam.  As R. Michael Feener has shown, they created a legal and 
bureaucratic infrastructure that melded Aceh’s special autonomy with the imperatives of New 
Order rule.  Feener argues convincingly that Aceh’s special autonomy thus actually allowed the 
province to become a sort of New Order “laboratory” in which bureaucratic forms could be 
developed and tested before being adapted to other parts of the archipelago (Feener 2012; 2013). 
 Not all in Aceh would find these new bureaucratic forms, or the visions of nation and 
society that accompanied them, compelling.  In 1976, the intellectual and Indonesian exile Hasan 
Tiro declared Aceh an independent state (Tiro 1984).  The declaration precipitated a new 
guerrilla movement, the Free Acheh Movement (Gerakan Acheh Merdeka, GAM).  The rise of 
the Free Acheh Movement in the late 1970s has been attributed to the voracious extraction of 
resources, especially oil and natural gas, by the Indonesian central government in this period, and 
the minimal recompense for such extraction returned to the province and its population (Kell 
1995; Sukma 2003, 149-151).  Indeed, complaints about resource extraction were featured 
prominently in the literature of the Free Acheh Movement itself (Tiro 1984).  But the movement 
also highlighted the political and economic importance of the historical sultanate, Aceh’s long 
anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch, and other themes of Acehnese history.   
 Especially at its inception in the 1970s, a significant portion of the Free Acheh 
Movement leadership was drawn from networks of former Darul Islam fighters, and throughout 
its existence the Free Acheh Movement would continue to draw on these networks (Aspinall 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama) in 1998, has played an official advisory role to the Acehnese provincial 
government since its founding in 1965.  Beyond this advisory capacity, however, the Council has been involved in 
the drafting of legislation related to such matters as the religious tax (I., zakat), the monitoring of orthodoxy in the 
province, and the “socialization” (I., sosialisasi) of government programs.  See, for example, Feener (2012; 2013).  
The Ulama Council played an important role in the controversies discussed in Chapter 2.  I describe its history in 
more detail in that chapter. 
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2009).  Nonetheless, while the Free Acheh Movement’s political aims evolved throughout its 
three decade-long history, the movement remained consistent in its demand for an independent 
Acehnese nation-state, differentiating it from the Darul Islam rebellion (Aspinall 2009; Kell 
1995).  While at first relatively small and unknown even within the province, the Free Acheh 
Movement would become widely popular among Acehnese by the 1990s, especially along 
Aceh’s north and east coasts.  This support came in the wake of a brutal counterinsurgency, 
beginning in 1989, in which human rights violations abounded, the Indonesian army made little 
distinction between civilians and guerrillas, and military officials systematically attempted to 
take over Aceh’s most lucrative economic sectors.  These developments pushed much of Aceh’s 
overwhelmingly rural population to side with the guerrillas.  
 The end of the New Order and the beginnings of democratic reform in 1998 at first 
seemed to provide promise for Acehnese hoping for independence or, at least, an end to the by 
then almost decade-long counterinsurgency.  Indeed, military operations stopped for a time.  
After a historic referendum vote for independence in East Timor, Acehnese support for a similar 
referendum for Aceh burgeoned, culminating in a large demonstration in which, supporters 
claimed, anywhere from five hundred thousand to two million people descended on the 
provincial capital of Banda Aceh in November of 1999 (Aspinall 2009, 129-134).  But despite an 
initial positive reaction from Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid, the idea of 
independence was squashed by political elites in Jakarta.  Military operations, according to some 
even more brutal than those that had come before, were carried out between various short-term 
peace agreements from 1999 until 2005.  It took the devastating December 26, 2004 earthquake 
and tsunami to finally bring about an end to this conflict. 
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 If almost three decades of conflict between the Free Acheh Movement and the Indonesian 
army had claimed between twelve and twenty thousand lives, the earthquake and tsunami 
exceeded this total by at least a multiple of seven in the span of just an hour, killing more than 
one hundred forty thousand people (Aspinall 2009, 2, 221).  The tsunami thus has come to be a 
major event in common narratives of Acehnese history, in fact, even serving as a protagonist in 
some historical narratives.  The tsunami was almost immediately incorporated into narratives of 
Acehnese suffering, caused previously as a result of war, and now by natural disaster.  These 
narratives often were tied to notions of Aceh’s special relationship with Islam, sometimes 
through describing the tsunami as a trial from God, and sometimes through interpreting it as a 
divine punishment and warning to Acehnese as a result of their alleged moral decline and the 
conduct of the on-going war.   
 Aceh’s relationship to Islam was also invoked in narratives of the tsunami by identifying 
the disaster as a bittersweet divine gift, one that brought international pressure to bear on a peace 
process that eventually ended the conflict in August of 2005, eight months after the devastating 
waves crashed on Aceh’s shores.
22
  The implementation of this peace process has been, at the 
time of this writing, remarkably successful.  There have been moments of political tension and 
violence, and armed and organized crime tied to networks of military and former guerrillas on 
Aceh’s north and east coast remains a problem (World Bank 2008a, 2008b; World Bank/DSF 
2007).  But there has been no resumption of open hostilities, and the Free Acheh Movement has 
successfully transformed itself into a local and electorally successful political party, although 
much work remains in transforming Acehnese political culture into a more thoroughly 
democratic entity.   
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 Edward Aspinall points out that notwithstanding the important role of the tsunami, significant steps 
towards peace already had been taken in the months before the disaster.  See Aspinall (2009, 220-236). 
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 Aside from the obvious changes in the political and military status quo, perhaps the 
greatest transformations since the signing of the 2005 peace accords have involved the 
development of a series of religious bureaucracies in the province.  These received their legal 
mandate from a new round of religious autonomy that began with legislation at the national level 
in 1999 after the fall of Soeharto.  Not unlike the legal autonomy promised Acehnese as a means 
to end Darul Islam in the late 1950s, these legal changes were in part an attempt to appease 
guerrillas and their supporters through the promise of a fuller implementation of Islamic law in 
the province.   
 There were many ironies involved in these legal reforms.  Primary among them was the 
fact that the 1999 legislation promised very little that had not been promised in the earlier legal 
autonomy of the late 1950s, and that the Free Acheh Movement never demanded the 
implementation of Islamic law, but rather an independent Acehnese state.  Still, since the end of 
the conflict, the implementation of Islamic law has become an increasingly popular cause among 
a large number of Acehnese, at least in the abstract.
23
  Even more importantly, it has resulted in 
the development of a new and expanding layer of religious bureaucracy that, while substantively 
changing little about the ways in which Islamic law has been legislated and juried in Aceh since 
the 1950s, has made the enforcement of Islamic law a central and highly visible feature of 
Acehnese legal and public life (Feener 2012). 
Aceh in 2007-2009 
 Aceh sits at the northwest tip of the island of Sumatra, the western most point of both the 
Indonesian archipelago and the modern Indonesian nation (see Map 1).  At the time of my 
research, most of which was carried out between 2007 and 2009, the province had a population 
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 As will become apparent in Chapter 5, this support is complicated by a variety of factors that challenge 
assertions by those who claim the legal reforms are wildly popular, but also for those who would claim that most 
Acehnese find the reforms unnecessary and oppressive. 
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of just over 4.4 million, not quite two percent of Indonesia’s total population of just over two 
hundred thirty-seven million (Baden Pusat Statistik 2013a).
24
  Geographically, Aceh consists of a 
flat, and in many places narrow, coastal plain that runs into a highland mountain range, the Bukit 
Barisan.  The majority of the population lived on this plain, especially its north and east coasts, 
and consisted of Acehnese-language speakers.  The province was overwhelmingly rural.  If one 
included all Acehnese cities having regency status (I., kota madya), only slightly less than fifteen 
percent of the province’s population could be said to live in relatively large urban areas 
(approximately six hundred forty thousand people).   
 Aceh’s highlands, its off-shore islands, and parts of its coast also were home to non-
Acehnese populations who spoke their own languages.  In addition to one or more local 
languages, nearly everyone in Aceh spoke the national language of Indonesian.  The majority of 
Aceh’s population was Muslim, with less than two percent of the province’s residents adhering 
to other religions, mostly Indonesians of Chinese descent who lived in Aceh’s urban centers and 
market towns and who were Buddhist, Catholic, or Protestant. 
Narrators of Acehnese Pasts 
 The first part of this dissertation, consisting of Chapters 2 and 3, examines and analyzes 
Islam and narrative practice in the province of Aceh in the immediate post-colonial period.  
These chapters focus especially on the period from the 1950s to the 1970s.  Driving the events 
described in this the account was a group of provincial elites, many of them associated with the 
figure of Ali Hasjmy, Aceh’s governor from 1957 until 1964, and the holder of several other key 
government and university posts over his long career.  These elites published histories of Aceh 
beginning in the 1950s that both drew from older historical traditions and forged new narrative 
content and styles.  Working in tandem with these provincial elites was a second group, namely, 
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nationally-known Islamic intellectuals who also authored versions of these histories.  These 
included well-known figures on the national political scene, for example, the prominent 
intellectual HAMKA, and local intellectuals from outside of Aceh such as the nationalist 
journalist Mohammad Said.  The histories that these intellectuals helped to propagate were 
central to the creation of value-laden imaginaries of Aceh’s place in the Indonesian nation, and 
they have served as one of the most important spatial-temporal frames through which Acehnese 
have engaged in narrative, social, and ritual practice in the post-colonial period. 
 The third group about which I write in the first part of this dissertation is hardly a group 
at all, except by virtue of not being the provincial or national elites just described.  The histories 
written by the intellectuals described above gained wild popularity in Aceh in the decades after 
which they began to be published.  I offer a range of examples of how these histories have been 
narrated outside of the works of the elite intellectuals who published some of the most 
authoritative versions of them.  I look at professional drivers, school teachers, religious scholars, 
anti-Christian activists, journalists, and others.  Bringing attention to the wide-range of narrators 
who have recounted these histories, and the wide-range of contexts in which they have done so, 
suggests something of the extremely wide resonances of the narratives themselves, and illustrates 
that these narratives have not simply been the historical projects of twentieth and twenty-first 
century political and intellectual elites. 
Nagan Raya 
 Nagan Raya, the regency on Aceh’s southwest coast where I conducted field research 
beginning in 2006 and for a year in 2008 and 2009, was among the most rural of Aceh’s 
regencies (see Map 2).  The majority of Nagan Raya’s 140,000 inhabitants lived on the eastern 
bank of the Seunagan River in a landscape of gently rising hills between the flat coastal plain and 
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the Bukit Barisan mountain range (see Map 3) (Badan Pusat Statistik 2013b; Pemerintahan 
Kabupaten Nagan Raya 2013).  This area to the east of the Seunagan River had been the center 
of population in this region since at least the early twentieth century (Controleur 1935).   
 Nagan Raya’s wide band of rising hills, crossed at several points by natural and human-
made streams and irrigation ditches, provided an ideal environment for rice cultivation.  This rice 
cultivation began around the town of Simpang Peut and continued up river to the town of Uleue 
Jalan, whose name literally means “the end of the road,” in this case the end of the road before 
one reached the pass to Aceh’s mountain highlands (see Map 3).  Halfway along the road 
between Simpang Peut and Uleue Jalan was the town of Jeuram (see Map 3).   
 Although the administrative offices of the regency moved to a brand new complex to the 
south in 2007, Jeuram remained the symbolic center of the Nagan Raya heartland for most of 
those with whom I spoke in 2008 and 2009.  The town was organized around a two-story 
concrete market place.  This market place was enclosed in a square formed by a row of shops 
facing the market on three sides and the local military post on the fourth.  In 2009 the town’s 
population sat at just around one thousand, but swelled to many times that during the day, as 
farmers, traders, school children, bureaucrats, denizens of coffee houses, and travelers on their 
way to or from Meulaboh, the closest relatively urban center (see Map 2), came to do business 
(see Figure 1).  At night, however, once all but a handful of late-night coffee houses had closed, 
Jeuram’s central market could feel like an abandoned ghost town, with only the occasional 
motorbike whirling around the central square (see Figure 2).
25
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 Jeuram, by all oral accounts I received, was founded in the early twentieth century as a military garrison 
during Dutch colonialism.  During the colonial period it housed a barracks in which lived four battalions of military 
police (Controleur 1935).  Oral histories that I collected indicate that, in addition to these Dutch military and 
administrative personnel, Jeuram was inhabited at that time by Chinese shop owners and at least one school teacher 
from Padang, a port several hundred kilometers to Aceh’s south, as well as a handful of other Padang-speaking 
merchants.  The out-going Dutch administrator of Nagan Raya in 1935 also mentioned traders of South Asian 





Figure 1: On market day men gather around a  









Figure 3: Rice field in Nigan, Nagan Raya 
 
 Directly adjacent to Jeuram were a few relatively urban villages that, in daily 
conversation, could be considered part of Jeuram itself.  I resided, in 2008 and 2009, in a house I 
rented in one of these adjacent villages, named Kota Baru.  From there I was able to travel by 
motorbike to all of Nagan Raya’s villages, while returning most nights to Kota Baru for evening 
coffees at a neighbor’s coffee house, an establishment frequented by those living in Kota Baru 
and men from the villages located just a few kilometers to Kota Baru’s east along a partially-
paved road leading to the village of Nigan (see Map 3 and Figure 3).  It is probably not a 
coincidence, then, that I ended up focusing much of my ethnographic research on the people who 
lived on either end of and along this road between Jeuram and Nigan. 
 Many families that I knew in Nagan Raya were involved in rice cultivation, as well as 
other agricultural pursuits, including the development of small-scale palm oil and chocolate 
groves.  To the south and east of Nagan Raya’s heavily populated rice-growing region, and 
 
43 
increasingly in the coastal regions to the west of Simpang Peut, were large palm oil plantations, 
most of which were held by the Socfindo corporation, a formerly government-owned company 
that was privatized in 2001 and is today controlled by a Belgium-based multi-national 
corporation.  Most who worked on these plantations, some the children and grandchildren of 
those who worked on them in the late colonial period (Controleur 1935), were of Javanese 
descent (Java is Indonesia’s political and population center; see Map 1).  These people had 
relocated to Aceh, some under the auspicious of government-sponsored transmigration projects, 
in order to work on the palm plantations, and they maintained a Javanese social and cultural 
identity.  When local mini-buses stopped in the area just to the south of Simpang Peut, the area 
where the majority of these people lived, one most often heard Javanese, rather than Acehnese or 
Indonesian, spoken on the street.  To the west of the Seunagan river was a landscape almost 
completely empty of residents (see Map 3).  This area had become the site of relatively large-
scale industrial coal mining operations owned and run by Chinese companies.  This region was 
also the site of illegal logging and the unauthorized clearing of forest for the purposes of planting 
small, freely-held palm oil groves. 
 During my fieldwork, those not involved in rice cultivation or other agricultural-related 
fields were mostly employed in the government bureaucracy, found work in the service sector, or 
engaged in petty trade, owning shops or traveling as shipping agents or traveling salesmen.  
While itinerant traders were overwhelmingly male, the bureaucracy and sedentary trading sector 
included both men and women, and I knew at least one fairly wealthy female shop owner.  
Around four or five of Jeuram’s shops, including a gold dealership and small grocery, were 
owned and operated by Chinese Indonesians.
26
  At least one man from Padang owned a tailoring 
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 In the past there seems to have been many more Chinese-Indonesians who owned shops in Jeuram.  The 





  Some local business ventures had proven quite successful, and at least one Nagan 
Raya businessman I knew, an Acehnese, had become very wealthy through investing in large 
trucks used in the transportation of stones and soils extracted from local river beds for the 
purposes of making concrete.  In addition, a handful of young men had traveled great distances, 
to seek work, for example, to Malaysia or Jakarta (see Map 1).  These men returned to Nagan 
Raya after several years, in some cases with considerable wealth, but in others with only their 
experience to show for their troubles.
28
 
 In the pre-colonial and colonial periods, Nagan Raya had been ruled by several hereditary 
chiefs (Ac., oelèëbalang; I.., raja), all with their own territorial domains (Controleur 1935).  
Unlike on Aceh’s north coast, there were very few purges of these chiefs following the 1945 
Declaration of Indonesian Independence.  However, at the time of the Japanese invasion in 1942, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Chinese population in Jeuram moved to Meulaboh, a nearby coastal town and the closest relatively urban center (see 
Map 2).  The reasons for this move, rarely stated explicitly but implied in the context of historical narratives, 
included national legal changes in the status of Chinese and Chinese-Indonesians, anti-Chinese violence in Nagan 





 Aceh’s west coast south of Meulaboh (see Map 2) was home to a large group of Padang-speakers, often 
referred to in Aceh as aneu’ djamèë (Ac.), i.e., “children of the guests.”  The origins of these people were ascribed 
locally to the Acehnese Sultanate’s seventeenth-century conquests of Sumatra’s west coast, where Padang-speakers 
are thought to originate.  But it is clear that large numbers of Padang-speaking people were migrating to Aceh in the 
nineteenth century as traders, religious teachers, and refugees from political and religious unrest (Controleur 1935; 
Ddjajadiningrat 1934, I, 321; Suryadi 2001).  This included the father of the religious teacher Muda Waly, who may 
be the most important figure in lineages of Islamic knowledge espoused in Aceh today, and whom I discuss in more 
detail below (Waly 1993).  In Nagan Raya, however, there were not very many of these aneu’ djamèë, unlike in the 
coastal regions elsewhere to the north and south where entire villages were known to be dominated by them.  The 
few Padang-speakers that I knew did not even count themselves as aneu’ djamèë, claiming that they were very 
recent migrants to Aceh and, thus, “Padang people” (I., orang Padang).  In the colonial period there also seems to 
have been a relatively small number of aneu’ djamèë in Nagan Raya when compared to other parts of Aceh’s west 




 One man’s story was particularly tragic.  He had worked at a lucrative business in Jakarta as a mid-level 
clerk and manual laborer for many years, meeting his wife, who also happened to be from Nagan Raya, and starting 
a family.  He claimed to have entrusted his savings to a friend upon preparing to return to Nagan Raya.  This friend 
was supposed to transport his savings to him at a later date.  The friend never arrived with the savings, and at the 
time of my fieldwork the man’s wife and in-laws were growing increasingly impatient with his lack of resources and 
unemployment.  What he had anticipated as a comfortable return home with a reasonable amount of wealth and 
some prestige not only had failed to materialize; he had come to experience relative poverty, became the object of 
regular gossip by neighbors, and was feeling pressure from his wife and in-laws as a result of his lack of ability to 
support his family. 
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the chief Pon Ben, who had ruled Nagan Raya’s heartland under Dutch colonialism, 
disappeared.
29
  For a short period after Indonesian independence, the head of what was then the 
sub-regency of Seunagan (i.e., roughly what would become the regency of Nagan Raya) was 
held by a man with no apparent affiliation to any of Nagan Raya’s chiefly families.  But when 
this man took the hills to join Darul Islam in 1953, the post fell to Teuku Azman, a descendant of 
the chiefs of Nagan Raya’s mountainous region of Beutong.  Teuku Azman ruled the sub-
regency until the early 1960s.  Upon his resignation, the position passed to a relative of his wife, 
who was a descendant of the locally prestigious family of the Habib Seunagan, discussed below.  
During the New Order the position of head of the sub-regency fell into the hands of a series of 
technocrats unrelated to either Teuku Azman or the Habib Seunagan.  By the time of this writing, 
however, the post has come to be occupied by none other than Teuku Azman’s son, who won the 
first free elections for local officials in Nagan Raya’s history, held in 2007, and then reelection in 
2012.   
Social and Ritual Life in Nagan Raya: Kandoeri and Silaturahmi 
 Social and ritual life in Nagan Raya, as in much of the rest of Aceh, revolved around 
periodic feasts known as kandoeri (Ac.; I., khenduri).
30
  These feasts closely resembled the well-
documented Javanese slametan (I.) (Beatty 1999; Geertz 1960).  They came in many shapes and 
forms, depending on the occasion for which they were held and the particular beliefs and 
religious sensibilities of those holding and attending them.  At the most basic level, kandoeri 
entailed the gathering together of Muslims for the purposes of sharing food and reciting prayers.  
They were held for yearly cyclical occasions such as the major Islamic holidays, to mark 
                                                          
 
29
 Decades later, in the 1980s, Pon Ben’s body was found buried in a part of Meulaboh that had been a 








seasonal transitions such as the opening of fields or the collection of the harvest, and life passage 
rituals ranging from birth and death to the buying or building of a house (see Bowen 1993b; 
Hurgronje 1906). 
 From the 1930s through the 1960s, kandoeri had been a major site of sometimes 
vociferous disagreement over proper religious practice in Nagan Raya and elsewhere in Aceh 
(Abdurrahman, Amin, Berueuh, and Indrapuri 1948; Bowen 1993b; Feener 2013).  This was in 
large part because these feasts could be associated with local spirits and, perhaps more 
importantly, could be construed as what John Bowen identifies in Aceh’s Gayo highlands as 
“transactional” rituals, that is, rituals the completion of which are believed to bring about specific 
effects (Bowen 1993b).  Perhaps most important among these transactional rituals, both in the 
past and at the time of my fieldwork, were the samadiyah litanies recited at funeral kandoeri.  
These litanies were believed by most of those whom I knew in Nagan Raya to lessen the 
suffering of the deceased during his or her afterlife.
31
  For some Muslims, the idea that the ritual 
actions of the living could alter the fate of the deceased seemed an affront to the notion that 
humans are responsible for their earthly actions.  Transactional rituals were seen by some in 
Nagan Raya as underpinned by the idolatrous assumption that ritual could place limitations on 
God’s agency. 
 As a result, some Muslims in Nagan Raya stopped attending kandoeri around the mid-
twentieth century.  Others began to hold their own kandoeri, which did not include the 
transactional rituals and other elements of more traditional kandoeri that they found 
objectionable.  Nonetheless, most feasts held in Nagan Raya during my research entailed 
transactional prayers and long-standing patterns of kandoeri ritual.  This was especially the case 
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 As described in more detail in Chapter 5, Islamic eschatology includes a period following one’s death, 
but before the day of reckoning, in which the deceased are made to suffer for their earthly sins before they are 
allowed to enter paradise.  One site of this suffering is widely believed to be the grave itself. 
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for funeral feasts, which were by far the most common kandoeri held in the regency; the death of 
a family member entailed an initial week in which a kandoeri of some kind was held each night, 
and then further feasts, usually on the fortieth day after burial, then the forty-fourth, one 
hundredth, and one thousandth.  Given such a rigorous schedule, anyone who wanted to could 
attend a funeral kandoeri somewhere in Nagan Raya almost every night. 
 Kandoeri were such a central part of social life in Nagan Raya that even those who had 
moral scruples about attending these feasts found it difficult not to attend.  I once saw a verse on 
the wall of an office in Nagan Raya: 
Eat cakes (Ac., timphan) 
[With] drums (Ac., rapa’i) as entertainment 
The five daily prayers [we] can take or leave 
What is important is kandoeri 
(This is Nagan, Brother!!!) 
 
The person responsible for the posting of this verse stressed that it was tongue-in-cheek, and was 
meant in part as a subtle criticism of those who neglected their religious duties (i.e., the five daily 
prayers) in order to instead attend kandoeri.  This was not a criticism of kandoeri per se.  
“Kandoeri reflect the social aspect of Nagan Raya life,” he told me.  “It is how we have cordial 
social relations (I., bersilaturahmi).  And cordial social relations are part of Islam.  So kandoeri 
are part of Islam.”  To refuse to be present at kandoeri meant isolating oneself from the ritual and 
social life of one’s neighbors.  Such anti-social behavior was widely taken to be un-Islamic.  As I 
overheard one bewildered elderly woman tell another while sitting on a minibus leaving Jeuram 
early one morning, “You know, I hear there are people who do not go to kandoeri.  I have never 
met anyone like that!”   
Institutional Networks: Habib Seunagan, Naqsyabandi, and Muhammadiyah 
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 While general ritual and social life in Nagan Raya revolved around kandoeri, there were 
three institutional networks of Islamic practitioners widely recognized within the province.  The 
group taken locally as having the deepest historical roots in the region was an extended family of 
Sayyids whom I will refer to as the Habib Seunagan.
32
  The Habib Seunagan, whose eponymous 
ancestor was credited with Islamicizing the Nagan Raya countryside, were at the center of a 
ritual, mystical, and devotional complex with tens of thousands of followers.  Aside from 
engaging in spiritual guidance and mystical healing, their religious practice focused heavily on 
periodic kandoeri at which prayers were recited and food distributed to the sometimes thousands 
who attended these feasts.  These kandoeri were held at the graves of deceased members of the 
family’s patriline.  Certain of these deceased family members were widely thought by followers 
to have the power to mediate between the human and divine realms, and devotees visiting their 
graves often came with requests in the form of a vow made to the deceased.  All of this took 
place under the institutional auspices of the Syattariyah (I.; Ar., Shaṭṭārīya), an Islamic mystical 
order (I., tarekat; Ar., Ar., ṭarīqa) with a long history in the Indonesian archipelago.
33
  
 The Habib Seunagan were also widely known to have a penchant for practices that most 
Muslims other than their followers found startlingly unorthodox.  Over the years such practices 
had included beginning the Ramadan fast several days early, allowing the family’s devotees to 
break their fast before sundown, and holding that the Qur’an allowed a man a maximum of nine 
wives, instead of the four that are almost universally recognized as the limit by Islamic jurists 
(Bowen 1989b; Snouck Hurgronje 1906, II, 14).  In 2006, while conducting preliminary research 
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 Sayyids are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, usually traced via a patriline to the Prophet’s 




 On the Syattariyah elsewhere in Indonesia see Fathurahman (2008). 
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in Meulaboh (see Map 2), it was stories that I heard of a strange family in the hills (i.e., the 
Habib Seunagan) that sent me to the eastern bank of the Seunagan river for the first time. 
 If the Habib Seunagan were well known for their large kandoeri at the graves of the 
family’s deceased ancestors, the second group of practitioners widely recognized in Nagan Raya 
was most commonly associated with the religious boarding schools that dotted the Nagan Raya 
countryside.  These were the religious teachers who traced their intellectual lineage to the South 
Acehnese religious scholar Muda Waly (1917-1961).  At their schools, full-time boarders, part-
time day students, and adult community members participated in studies of basic subjects such 
Qur’anic recitation and Arabic grammar, followed by progressively more advanced topics like 
Islamic jurisprudence, theology, and mysticism. 
 Many aspects of Islamic practice were shared by the Habib Seunagan and the intellectual 
descendants of Muda Waly.  Both groups, for example, advocated participation in kandoeri and 
engaged in Islamic mysticism.  There were also important differences between them, however.  
Muda Waly’s protégées tended to be teachers and members of the Naqsyabandi mystical order, 
and their mystical practices varied from those of the Habib Seunagan.  While both stressed the 
recitation of litanies, especially the names of God (Ac., ziké or dike; I., zikir, Ar., zikr) and 
praises to the Prophet Muhammad (Ac., seulaweuët; I., selawat, Ar., ṣalawāt), the Habib 
Seunagan and their followers tended to use loud and flamboyant recitation styles in large 
communal recitations.  Teachers of the Naqsyabandi, on the other hand, preferred much less 
flamboyant and often silent recitations at secluded and relatively small retreats.  The bookish 
knowledge of rural Naqsyabandi teachers had allowed them in the past to robustly defend their 
practices from critics.  They were known as scholars of Islamic law who defended kandoeri on 
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principled grounds, but rejected some of the strange practices associated with the Habib 
Seunagan. 
 The final institutional group of practitioners recognized widely in Nagan Raya was 
commonly referred to as “Muhammadiyah,” the name of a Java-based Islamic social and 
educational organization founded in 1912.
34
  There had existed an influential branch of this 
organization in Nagan Raya since the late colonial period.  But when most in Nagan Raya used 
the term Muhammadiyah, they did so to indicate those who, whether affiliated with 
Muhammadiyah or not, engaged in the active reform of Islamic practices common in the region, 
especially practices like kandoeri that were associated with daily village social and ritual 
practice.   
 Those who identified themselves or were identified by others as Muhammadiyah, 
whether they were official members of the Muhammadiyah organization or not, tended to be 
inspired by strands of Islamic reformist thought traceable to the late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Cairo-based thinkers Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā.  Both ‘Abduh and 
Riḍā were well-known for their opposition to what they took as local accretions to Islamic 
practice and a general rationalist ethic tied to a turn towards direct interpretation of scripture 
(Adams 1968; Hourani 1983).  ‘Abduh and Riḍā’s thought underpinned the religious activism of 
POESA, discussed in the sketch of Acehnese history above.  Chapter 4 discusses in greater detail 
what twentieth- and twenty-first-century ‘Abduh-style reform entailed in Nagan Raya.  Here I 
simply note that at the time of my fieldwork, Muhammadiyah-style religiosity seemed to be on 
the wane.  Most active Muhammadiyah members were in their sixties or older.  Those who 
embraced this style of religiosity tended to do so privately, in their own religious practice, while 
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participating in circumscribed manners in practices such as kandoeri that in the past 
Muhammadiyah activists had criticized and avoided. 
 While these three institutional networks of Islamic practitioners were widely recognized 
in Nagan Raya, and many ordinary Muslims in the regency felt an affiliation with one of them, 
the majority of Islamic practitioners in Nagan Raya engaged in an eclectic style of religious 
practice.  This is not to say that they were undiscerning in their pursuit of Islamic knowledge and 
participation in Islamic ritual.  Many people with whom I spoke criticized what others had said 
or done, decide not to participate in a particular practice, or begin a new Islamic aesthetic or 
ritual discipline based on what they took to be consistent with their needs and sense of proper 
practice.  This was consistent with a sensibility that I found throughout Aceh, one that took the 
pursuit of different forms and kinds of knowledge (Ac. èleumèë) to be a primary occupation of 
daily life.  The pursuit of Islamic knowledge, from whatever its source, was perceived by most as 
an unequivocal good.   
 Thus, public lessons for elderly villagers held at boarding schools run by Naqsyabandi 
teachers, for example, sometimes were attended by those who conscientiously took themselves to 
be Muhammadiyah-style reformers in their sensibilities.  Some villagers who had been initiated 
into the Naqsyabandi mystical order attended kandoeri at the graves of the Habib Seunagan, 
engaging in the demonstrative litanies of the Syattariyah.  A noodle stall owner with no apparent 
affinity to the Naqsyabandi sent his daughter to a Qur’anic school run by a well-known teacher 
of this affiliation because of the high quality of the classes.  And when preachers were invited to 
speak at village events, most villagers attended, regardless of how they perceived their own 
affiliations or that of the preacher. 
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 Further, there were other ways in which those in Nagan Raya understood themselves to 
be organized into different kinds and classes of Islamic practitioners.  One of the most common 
involved claims of genealogical ties to eponymous ancestors who were thought to have played a 
central role in the history of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  The ways in which Muslims in the 
regency linked themselves genealogically to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization is a central 
concern of the second half of this dissertation.  Here I simply note that these genealogical ties to 
Nagan Raya’s Islamization could both reinforce and run against the grain of the networks of 
affiliation of the Habib Seunagan, Naqsyabandi, and Muhammadiyah.  Further, they were 
entwined with local politics in vitally important ways.  In 2007, for example, it became clear that 
many in the regency were viewing the first free elections for local officials in Nagan Raya’s 
history through the idiom of genealogies linking candidates to Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  Most 
of the serious candidates could claim such a genealogy, and all who could do so highlighted their 
genealogical pedigree.  As mentioned above, the eventual winner, Teuku Zulkarnainy, was the 
son of the hereditary chief who had ruled the sub-regency of Seunagan from 1953 until the early 
1960s.  Teuku Zulkarnainy held a clear advantage because he was the descendant of both local 




Non-Muslims in Aceh 
 As will become apparent in the chapters that follow, Aceh’s non-Muslim populations 
have been central in Acehnese historical discourses of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
                                                          
 35 This raises important questions about the ways in which Acehnese, and the people of Nagan Raya in 
particular, reckon descent.  Classic ethnographic treatments of kinship and family life in Aceh, most notably James 
Siegel’s The Rope of God, have stressed a pattern of matrifocality through which women come to control rice land 
and homes, while men frequently leave homesteads for long periods in search of wealth (Siegel 2000).  It is 
important to recognize, however, that these patterns remained formally underpinned by patrilineal patterns of 
inheritance.  As John Bowen has pointed out for Aceh’s Gayo highlands, rice land and houses were given as gifts to 
daughters before death rather than bequeathed as inheritance after death (Bowen 2003; Siegel 2000).  Still, most 
Acehnese continue to recognize different kinds and levels of descent from both patrilineal and matrilineal lines. 
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In these discourses they have served as rhetorical figures in portrayals of Acehnese 
cosmopolitanism, in controversies over alleged Christian missionary activities, and in other 
contexts.  But it is important to note that, aside from these portrayals, non-Muslims native to 
Aceh have long considered themselves part of Acehnese society, even if they sometimes have 
been ambivalent about doing so given what many non-Muslims have taken as discriminatory 
attitudes and practices shown towards them in the post-colonial period.  Many Chinese 
Indonesians in Aceh’s urban centers spoke Indonesian, dialects of Chinese, and Acehnese 
relatively fluently. 
 In Nagan Raya, the non-Muslim population was exceptionally small, in part because the 
regency had no major urban centers.  There were a handful of non-Muslim families who lived in 
the market towns of Jeuram and Simpang Peut.  With the exception of a few bureaucrats and 
policemen, these consisted of Chinese Indonesians who were Buddhist, Protestant, and Catholic.  
In Jeuram there were four or five such Chinese-Indonesian households.  In nearby Meulaboh, 
however, there was a sizable Chinese-Indonesian community.  Nagan Raya’s non-Muslim 
Chinese Indonesians tended to commute to Meulaboh to engage in worship and other religious 
activities.  As will become apparent in the chapters that follow, however, these activities, 
especially those of Christians, had to be carried out in a subtle fashion, as local concerns over 
Christian missionary activities had led to tensions and violence in the past. 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has introduced some of the major events and themes of Acehnese history, as 
well as described the historical, social, and religious context of the regency of Nagan Raya at the 
time of my research.  In the next chapter, the discussion turns to how some Indonesians have 
narrated elements of the Acehnese past.  These narrators have drawn on many of the historical 
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events and themes discussed above.  In doing so, they have developed spatial-temporal frames 
that have placed Aceh within the broader histories of the Indonesian nation and the Islamization 
of the Indonesian archipelago.  The ways in which some of these spatial-temporal frames have 
come to inflect popular Acehnese narrative practices, encouraging Acehnese to seek signs of the 
past in their daily lives, is central to my analysis in later chapters of the spatial-temporal frames 











Making Aceh Special: Narrative Practice in Post-Colonial Aceh 
 
 
Only a speck of dust, a speck of dust in this universe, at the tip of the island of Sumatra!  
But however small Aceh is, the world knew Aceh.  The world once laughed.  Aceh made 
the Islamic world smile[…]  When Islam was strong in Aceh at the moment it was led by 
Iskandar Muda, the world smiled to look upon Aceh. 
     -Teungku Hasani, Halal-Bi-Halal Sermon, Kota Baru,  
      Nagan Raya, October 2008 
 
 This chapter begins my account of Acehnese engagement with local Islamic pasts by 
focusing attention on twentieth- and twenty-first-century narrative practice in Aceh.  Of 
particular interest are four narrative strands of Acehnese history that a group of Acehnese elites 
and influential Indonesian Islamic intellectuals began to author and publish in the 1950s.  These 
narrative strands took the entwined histories of Islam, Aceh, and Indonesia as their objects.  The 
four strands came to serve as powerful spatial-temporal frames through which Acehnese 
Muslims placed themselves within the conjoined histories of Aceh, Islam, and the Indonesian 
nation.   
 While cultivated by provincial and national elites in the 1950s, these narrative strands 
came to resonate widely among ordinary Acehnese.  At the time of my research, the four 
narrative strands regularly appeared in public discourse.  Most importantly for the arguments in 
this dissertation, they had come to permeate day-to-day practices through which Acehnese read 
signs of the past in the present on the Acehnese landscape and on the bodies of Acehnese 
neighbors.  Such embodied and emplaced practices of reading the Acehnese past in the present 
 
56 
have been central ways through which Acehnese orient themselves to local Islamic pasts.  
Without knowledge of these narrative practices, and the four narrative strands associated with 
them, it would be impossible to fully make sense of, for example, Teungku Hasani’s sermon 
described briefly in the introduction, re-quoted as the epigraph to this chapter.  
Four Narrative Strands 
 Beginning in the 1950s, a group of influential Indonesian elites, including both Acehnese 
and non-Acehnese, began to author and publish histories of Aceh.  These histories focused on 
four narrative strands that congealed around common toponyms for the province: “Mecca’s 
verandah” (I., serambi Mekkah), “land of the Acehnese dagger” (I., tanah rencong), “region of 
capital” (I., daerah modal), and “special area” (I., daerah istimewa).  By the end of the decade, 
in a bid to end the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh, Aceh had been named a “special” (I., istimewa) 
area of the Indonesian nation, with autonomy in the fields of education, customary practice, and 
religion.  These four narratives were mobilized by their authors to support this autonomy and 
provide evidence for the claim that Aceh was, indeed, special. 
 More important than Aceh’s legal status, however, is how the four narrative strands 
cultivated by these intellectuals rhetorically placed Aceh in histories of Islam and the Indonesian 
nation.  These narratives, like the narratives of Islamization described in the Introduction, 
positioned Aceh in a value-laden geography of the nation.  Indeed, one of these four narrative 
strands marked Aceh as the first place in the archipelago that Islam had taken root.  It thereby 
bestowed prestige on the province and its inhabitants, at least for anyone who had adopted the 
anti-colonial project of reversing Dutch emphases on the archipelago’s pre-Islamic past.  Thus, 
the four narratives discussed in this chapter placed Aceh squarely within the new Indonesian 
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nation, but in a manner that stressed Aceh’s locality through a comparative frame that used the 
province’s historic relationship with Islam as its primary analytic.   
 The four narrative strands cultivated by Acehnese elites in the 1950s very quickly 
resonated among the Acehnese population at large.
36
  This was not simply because they gave 
Aceh a prestigious place in the history of the coming of Islam to the archipelago.  The 
Indonesian intellectuals who authored them had drawn on long-standing narrative traditions of 
wide popularity in the region.  These included centuries-old poetic histories as well as 
performance traditions that drew on the Acehnese past for their subject matter. 
Pre-Colonial Historical Narrative 
 Post-colonial narrative practice in Aceh has drawn heavily upon long-standing pre-
colonial Acehnese narrative traditions.  Some of these pre-colonial traditions were tied to the 
sultan’s court in Aceh Dar as-Salām.  Others had been much less the product and purview of the 
sultanate, originating and circulating outside of the court.  Both court literature and more popular 
genres of historical narrative continued to inform Acehnese narrative practice following 
Indonesian independence in 1945.  Further, a pattern of cross-resonances between court literature 
and popular narrative practice continued in a slightly altered form in the post-independence 
period, as histories published by authors closely aligned to the state influenced and were 
influenced by more popular practices of history-telling.   
 Perhaps best known among Aceh’s pre-colonial narrative traditions is a genre of 
historical writing known as hikayat (Braginsky 2004, 2006; Drewes 1979, 1980; Iskandar 1958; 
Siegel 1979), traceable in Aceh to at least the seventeenth century.  Often written in verse, 
hikayat tended to be narrative accounts of royal courts and lineages, usually focused on the 
heroic deeds of the most important members of these courts.  In this sense they complimented 
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other common genres of Acehnese court literature, such as chronicles of Aceh’s successive 
sultans (Salleh 1992).  Until the eighteenth century, Acehnese hikayat were written almost 
exclusively in Malay using Arabic script (Drewes 1979; Feener 2011, 11-16).  In this, as well as 
in much of their subject matter and many of their narrative motifs, they resembled similar 
instances of court literature being authored elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the same period.  
They thus, in part, reflected the Acehnese Sultanate’s place in a larger Malay-speaking political 
world (Andaya 2001; Braginsky 2004; Feener 2011, 11-16). 
 In the eighteenth century, however, an important transformation occurred in this 
historical genre.  Alongside older Malay-language court chronicles, hikayat written in Acehnese-
language and inscribed in Arabic script began to appear.  This shift seems to have been tied to 
turmoil following the seizure of the Acehnese throne by a Bugis dynasty, resulting in an 
increasing devolution of political power from the sultanate to regional hereditary chiefs (Ac., 
oelèëbalang) (Feener 2011, 12).  The transformation from Malay-language to Acehnese-
language hikayat accompanied a change in some of this genre’s subject matter.  The court 
histories that were the most common topics of the earlier Malay hikayat remained important 
themes in some of these Acehnese-language texts (Drewes 1979).  But other events began to be 
inscribed in this narrative form as well.  For example, at least two hikayat describing aspects of 
the nineteenth-century pepper trade survive into the present, one describing moral degradation 
alleged to have been caused by the trade itself, the other focused on the exploits of a local 
hereditary chief on Aceh’s west coast (Drewes 1980; Hurgronje 1906, II, 120-121). 
 For whom were these seventeenth through nineteenth-century histories written?  It is 
known that by the time of the Dutch invasion of Aceh in 1873, the audience for hikayat literature 
was quite wide and included a broad cross-section of Acehnese society.  As has been shown for 
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similar genres of Southeast Asian literature, access to these narrative forms has never been 
limited to the strictly literate.  This is in large part because they are narrative forms that depend 
upon recitation and performance, allowing them to be “read” even by those unable to read their 
textual inscriptions (Florida 1995, 1-51; Sweeney 1987).
37
  The eighteenth-century turn to 
Acehnese-language hikayat may have further contributed to the familiarity of non-elite Acehnese 
to the forms and themes of the hikayat tradition (Feener 2011, 13-15).  Snouck Hurgronje 
recorded the recitation of hikayat as a popular amusement in the 1890s (Hurgronje 1906, II, 268).  
Alongside such recitations were traveling troupes of various kinds of performing artists who 
drew upon this literature in their performances (Hurgronje 1906, II, 216-268).  This suggests that 
the audiences for Malay and Acehnese-language hikayat traditions almost certainly included 
Acehnese outside of immediate court circles, as well as those who themselves could not read the 
written texts. 
Colonial Transformations 
 The transformations wrought in Aceh during the almost seventy years of colonialism 
following the initial 1873 Dutch assault on the sultanate affected narrative form and practice in 
the province in profound ways.  Nonetheless, narrators of Acehnese history in this period 
continued to draw on older traditions even as they transformed them.  I will examine three 
developments in Acehnese narrative practice in this time period: the creation of a new sub-genre 
of hikayat during the Dutch-Aceh War, the historical themes cultivated by a group of influential 
Islamic reformists in the 1930s, and the transposition of hikayat literature into print media forms 
in the late-colonial period. 
Histories of the Holy War 
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 The four-decades-long Dutch-Aceh War served as a catalyst for the elaboration of a 
genre of hikayat that today usually is referred to as the “history of the holy war” (Ac., hikayat 
prang sabi).  These texts involved historical and mystical discourses that drew much of their 
significance from the context of the Dutch invasion and subsequent Acehnese resistance to it.  
Most of these histories of the holy war revolved around the stories of young men who chose to 
join a military expedition after experiencing visions of the paradise that awaits Muslims who die 
as martyrs.  These visions described the afterlife using fantastic imagery of light, radiance, and 
jewels (Siegel 1979, 229-265).  Many of these texts devoted less attention to the stories of these 
young men, than to their elaborate visions of paradise.   
 Scholarly analyses of the histories of the holy war have ranged from sophisticated 
treatments of their mystical significance and symbolism, to scholarship linking the intensity of 
armed Acehnese resistance in this period to these poetic works (Alfian 1987, 1992; Hasjmy 
1976; Hasymy 1976; Siegel 1979, 229-265).
38
  What I want to draw attention to here is how they 
constituted texts concerned with pasts and futures.  Although almost all of these texts were 
written during the Dutch-Aceh War, not all of them were set in the war’s immediate context.  
Instead they aimed to evoke reflection on multiple and entwined temporalities.  These 
temporalities included the pasts and presents in which individual versions were set, and the 
eschatological futures that underpinned the visions of paradise that were often the central feature 
of the accounts. 
Narrative of Moral Decline 
 By the late 1930s the Dutch-Aceh War had been decisively settled, and Aceh had been 
effectively incorporated into the Dutch East Indies.  This period saw the founding of the 
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 I note here that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive alternatives.  I would argue that hikayat 
prang sabi literature was clearly deeply esoteric and tied to the exigencies of war with the Dutch. 
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Persatoean Oelama Seloeroeh Atjeh (POESA), described briefly in the Introduction.  POESA 
represented an Acehnese organization that embraced the styles of Islamic reformism that were 
becoming popular in many parts of the archipelago at the time, drawn from the thinking of the 
Cairo-based scholars Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā (Morris 1983; Siegel 2000).  The 
organization would come to play a major role in post-independence politics, which is discussed 
in more detail below (Reid 1979, 7-37, 185-217; Sjamsuddin 1985; van Dijk 1981).   
 Eric Morris and James Siegel have analyzed historical narratives of Aceh’s past as they 
appeared in the POESA journal Penjoeloeh beginning in 1939 (Morris 1983, 75-93; Siegel 2000, 
98-133).  Both of these analysts find a common narrative vision on the pages of Penjoeloeh, one 
that stressed Aceh’s glorious past in a manner akin to the way Teungku Hasani did in the 
epigraph which opened this chapter.  Following this glorious past, Penjoeloeh authors posited a 
period of decline, one both evident in and caused by the moral decay of the colonial period.
39
  
Their reason for doing so was to exhort their readers to take up the way of proper Islam, often 
identified with the forsaking of practices like kandoeri (Ac., ritual feasts) that these authors took 
to be innovations in proper Islamic practice.  Along with forsaking these innovations, POESA 
further tended to stress rational self-discipline as a means to moral control and improvement 
(Siegel 2000). 
 The glorious past to which Penjoeloeh authors looked back on, however, tended to be 
expressed in manners that lacked detail.  As in Teungku Hasani’s quotation above, the period of 
the Sultan Iskandar Muda loomed large.  This was, after all, the Acehnese Sultanate’s high-water 
mark, and many of the best-known hikayat focused on this period.  More important than 
historical specificity for Penjoeloeh authors, however, was the moral narrative itself, one of 
                                                          
 39 Similar themes had appeared in one instance of the histories of the holy war literature half a century 
before (Siegel 1979, 230-235). 
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decline that could only be reversed through Islamic renewal and reform.  This moral narrative 
has continued to be employed in Aceh well into the present, as the example with which this 
dissertation opened, that of Teungku Hasani’s sermon, attests.  It also clearly informed the 
historical narratives of the Free Acheh Movement, which transposed it from one of moral decline 
and renewal to one of nationalist loss and recovery through a guerrilla struggle for an 
independent Acehnese nation-state. 
Hikayat as Printed Prose 
 In addition to the development of the hikayat subgenre devoted to the mystical histories 
of the holy war and the narrative of moral decline common in POESA literature, a third 
development in Acehnese narrative practice in the colonial period deserves attention.  It entailed 
the transformation of older hikayat literature from recited verse into printed prose.  In Kutaradja 
(present day Banda Aceh), for example, the weekly newspaper Bentara Negeri experimented 
with serialized tales of unnamed kings and their courts.  These stories maintained some of the 
most marked stylistic features of older hikayat literature, for example, the use of recurrent 
phrases such as “maka” to indicate the beginning of lines and other textual units (Ora et Labora 
1916).  But it presented these tales in a distinctly new form, on the pages of a printed newspaper 
in daily installments.  
 It is difficult to know how widely these serializations in Bentara Negeri may have been 
read.  The newspaper was affiliated to the Javanese-based Islamic traders union, and early 
nationalist organization, Sarekat Islam, whose activities frequently were the main focus of 
Bentara Negeri’s news coverage.  It was printed in Malay-language and Roman script.  As such, 
the paper probably circulated primarily among self-consciously modern readers educated outside 
of Aceh or in Malay-language primary schools that had begun to be built in Aceh only in the 
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previous decade.  Still, keeping in mind that the hikayat traditions on which such serializations 
were based were primarily oral and that classic hikayat were meant to be recited, one wonders if 
Bentara Negeri’s serializations may have found unintended audiences.  Perhaps some were read 
out loud in Banda Aceh’s coffee shops or in private homes.  Regardless, given that the styles and 
episodes of hikayat literature had long found themselves circulating in a wide range of 
performance genres even before colonialism, it should not be surprising that they were adapted 
to this new form.   
 All three of these developments in narrative practice would influence Acehnese post-
colonial narrative in profound ways.  The histories of the holy war would find their way into 
powerful representations of the Acehnese past that the next few sections of this chapter describe.  
I already have suggested briefly how POESA’s narrative of moral decline has influenced both 
the religious exhortations of teachers such as Teungku Hasani and political movements like the 
Free Acheh Movement.  The transposing of hikayat literature into print media forms represented 
by the serialization of tales of kings and courts in Bentara Negeri represented a step towards the 
kinds of histories that began to be authored in Aceh in the 1950s. 
The 1950s, Islamization, and Historical Narrative 
 Beginning in the 1950s a powerful new group of histories began to be cultivated and 
circulated in Aceh.  As the anthropologist John Bowen has pointed out, these new histories 
heavily depended upon specific versions of narratives of the Indonesian archipelago’s 
Islamization (Bowen 1989a).  It was these narratives of Islamization that gave the new histories 
being produced in Aceh many of their specific spatial-temporal resonances.  I argue that these 
resonances placed Aceh firmly within a value-laden geography of the archipelago, marking Aceh 
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as “special” (I., istimewa), but doing so in a manner that brought the Acehnese past within the 
broader history of the Indonesian nation. 
 The immediate context of the development of new histories of Aceh was the end of a 
period of great civil strife in Aceh.  As described in the Introduction, within a month of the 
August 17, 1945 declaration of Indonesian independence in Jakarta, the charismatic religious 
teacher Daud Beureueh and his All-Aceh Religious Scholars Union (POESA, Persatoean Oelama 
Seloeroeh Atjeh), along with three other prominent Islamic scholars, had declared Acehnese 
support for the new Indonesian Republic.
40
  Beginning in December of that year and continuing 
into the following January, violent clashes erupted in Aceh, known as the Cumbok War.  These 
episodes pitted militias allied to factions supporting Daud Beureueh and POESA against several 
Acehnese hereditary chiefs (Ac., oelèëbalang).  The POESA-affiliated youth groups attacking 
these hereditary chiefs claimed that they did so because the chiefs had collaborated with the 
Dutch during the colonial period, many of these chiefs administering their territories while on the 
colonial payroll.  Further, these youth groups claimed to attack these chiefs as a result of their 
allegedly immoral and un-Islamic behavior, which stereotypically consisted of gambling, 
drinking alcohol, and cruelty towards their subjects.  While these clashes remained limited to 
Aceh’s heavily populated north coast, they allowed Daud Beureueh to consolidate political 
power, so that by mid-1946 he had taken the title of Military Governor of Aceh, Langkat, and 
Karoland, and effectively held both civil and military executive authority in the region (Reid 
1979, 185-217; van Dijk 1981, 270-286). 
Daud Beureueh’s hold on power would be challenged, however, when between 1948 and 
1950, as the Revolution came to a close, representatives of the nascent Indonesian Republic’s 
government engaged in a series of drawings and re-drawings of Aceh’s administrative 
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boundaries.  On April 15, 1948, the revolutionary Republic’s Interior Ministry incorporated 
Aceh into the province of North Sumatra, effectively ending Daud Beureueh’s claims to civil 
power by ending Aceh’s provincial status.  In 1949, Aceh’s provincial status was regained when 
this decision was overturned.  However, in 1950 the region again became a part of North 




The loss, regain, and re-loss of Aceh’s provincial status sparked controversy within Aceh, 
and this controversy became linked to other complaints voiced by Acehnese in the early 1950s.  
Some Acehnese, especially those allied to POESA, leveled accusations against the central 
government in Jakarta, claiming that it was dominated by groups that were Communist, atheist, 
or “Hindu-Javanese.”  These critics decried the new government for actively working against the 
Islamization of Indonesian law and society while simultaneously thwarting the political and 
economic aspirations of Indonesians outside the island of Java.  Opposing these POESA-allied 
voices were some of the former hereditary chiefs who, though now severely weakened, were 
challenging the loss of property and political power they had suffered during the blood-letting of 
December 1945 and January 1946 (van Dijk 1981, 273-299). 
As a result of this turmoil, throughout the early 1950s rumors circulated in Aceh and the 
rest of North Sumatra about secret meetings of dissatisfied political factions, preparations for 
rebellion, and preemptive raids by the Indonesian Republic’s Military Police Brigade (van Dijk 
1981, 270-286; Sjamsuddin 1985, 47-63; Djuruwarta keliling 1953a, 1953b, 1953d).  The 
primary object of speculation by 1953 was whether or not Daud Beureueh, disappointed with his 
loss of political power following the administrative reorganization of Aceh, would join the Darul 
Islam rebellion (Darul Islam).  This rebellion, centered in West Java but with branches in several 
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other locations in the archipelago, aimed to replace the Indonesian Republic with an Islamic 
state.  On September 20, 1953 Daud Beureueh did, in fact, declare his support for this pan-
archipelagic guerrilla movement (van Dijk 1981, 270-286; Sjamsuddin 1985, 47-63).  In taking 
to the hills as a Darul Islam guerrilla, Daud Beureueh was accompanied by a significant 
following that included those who allied themselves with POESA’s religious aims of more 
thoroughly Islamicizing Acehnese political and social life, as well as civil servants and 
politicians whose dissatisfactions were more closely tied to the administrative reorganizing of 
Acehnese territory (Sjamsudddin 1985). 
By 1957, Darul Islam in Aceh had been on-going for four years.  Several different 
political administrations, in both the national capital of Jakarta and the North Sumatran capital of 
Medan, had failed to move the conflict any closer to a viable resolution.  Beginning in July of 
1956, the sitting cabinet of Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo drafted and approved 
the first of a series of political and legal reforms that went into effect between 1957 and 1959.  
These reforms were intended to end Darul Islam in Aceh through appealing to those guerrillas 
who were most concerned with Aceh’s loss of provincial status and administrative autonomy.  In 
1957, Aceh was reestablished as a province.  In 1959, this province was named the Special Area 
of Aceh (Daerah Istimewa Aceh), with unprecedented powers to govern its own affairs in three 
specific areas: education (I., pendidikan), local custom (I., adat), and religion (I., agama).   
It was in the context of this period of civil strife and open violence that new histories of 
Aceh began to be developed.  These histories drew on older Acehnese narrative traditions such 
as hikayat and court chronicles, as well as the recent history of the Indonesian revolution, for 
their content.  John Bowen argues that the new histories were designed to strengthen provincial 
unity in the face of the violent struggles of the 1940s and 1950s (Bowen 1989a, 681).  He draws 
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attention to one central feature of these histories, which taken together he terms “the Aceh 
history” (Bowen 1989a).  For Bowen, the primary feature of the Aceh history was a narrative of 
Islamization that depended upon a temporally and spatially continuous process of conversion.  
This history posited chains of people and places, sometimes at the village level, meant to 
illustrate a progressive and continuous process of conversion that was alleged to have begun on 
Aceh’s lowland coast before winding through the rest of the province and, eventually, much of 
the rest of the archipelago.   
Drawing on the work of Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Bowen identifies the narrative of 
Islamization underpinning the Aceh history as dependent upon a new chronotope, that is, a 
model of space-time underlying different narrative types (Bakhtin 1981, 84-258).  One could 
identify the Aceh history as a systematic working out of the narratives of Islamization described 
in the Introduction.  Indeed, some of the Acehnese intellectuals who wrote these histories 
articulated their project explicitly in terms of an anti-colonial politics intended to reverse errors 
in Dutch colonial understandings of Islam (Bowen 1989a; Hasymy 1989).  This suggests that, in 
addition to the desire to forge unity in a province bitterly divided after decades of internal civil 
strife, there were other reasons to author histories of Aceh and its Islamization in this period.   
A Partnership of Local and National Elites: Ali Hasjmy, Mohammad Said, and HAMKA 
While most authors of the new published versions of Acehnese history were Acehnese, 
some of the most influential versions of these histories were written by non-Acehnese 
Indonesians.  Mohammad Said’s two-volume Aceh Sepanjang Abad, for example, was in its third 
printing and remained the most popular published work of Acehnese history in Aceh at the time 
of my research (Said 1981).  Said, however, lived in Medan and was of Minangkabau ethnicity, a 
fact often remarked upon by Acehnese, who tended to take the interest that this historian showed 
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in Aceh as evidence of Aceh’s general historical importance.  This section turns to the 
biographies of three intellectuals who authored the new histories of Aceh described above.  Only 
one of the three described here, Ali Hasjmy, was Acehnese.  This is significant for understanding 
precisely how these new histories were effective in placing Aceh in a value-laden geography of 
the archipelago underpinned by narratives of Islamization. 
Ali Hasjmy   
At the time of my research between 2006 and 2009, there was probably no name in Aceh 
more closely associated with the writing of Acehnese history than that of Ali Hasjmy (1914-
1998).  An Indonesian Revolutionary as a youth, Hasjmy would serve as Aceh’s governor (1957-
1964), the rector of the State Islamic Institute in Banda Aceh (1968-1982), and the head of the 
Acehnese Ulama Council (1982-1998).  In addition to penning and re-penning his own versions 
of Aceh’s history over his decades-long career, he may have been the single most important 
figure in popularizing certain recurring narratives of Acehnese history (Bowen 1989a; Hasjmy 
1978; Hasymy 1976, 1989).  Of particular importance for understanding Ali Hasjmy’s history 
writing is the nature of his involvement in the end of the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh. 
At the time Darul Islam began in 1953, Hasjmy was arrested.  He had been associated 
with POESA at various points in his career, serving as an activist and teacher, and was therefore 
suspected of involvement in the rebellion.  Upon his release, he was given a minor government 
post in Jakarta.  As Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo’s cabinet began to prepare to grant Aceh 
provincial status, they came to settle on Hasjmy as the best candidate to be appointed as the new 
province’s governor.  They did so because Hasjmy was popular in Aceh and, although he had 
cooperated with POESA in the past, Hasjmy had a rivalry with Darul Islam’s Aceh commander 
Daud Beureueh (Sjamsuddin 1985, 254-273).  Upon becoming governor in 1957, Hasjmy set 
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about his work with gusto.  He joined in negotiations regarding Aceh’s special autonomy, 
arranged for the surrender of Darul Islam leaders who were satisfied with the central 
government’s granting of provincial status and autonomy to Aceh, and vociferously criticized 
those who remained in the hills (Hasjmy 1967). 
As John Bowen suggests, histories of Aceh written and published in the 1950s were 
closely tied to the context of Darul Islam.  For Hasjmy, this manifested itself in at least two 
ways.  Hasjmy fashioned himself a peacemaker.  He played upon this image after being 
appointed governor of Aceh as part of the central government’s bid to end Darul Islam.  More 
than one person with whom I spoke about Hasjmy remembered that he frequently repeated the 
phrase, “I bring water, not fire” (Ac., Lōn ba ië, kòn apoej), to describe this role of peacemaker.
42
  
Thus, Hasjmy in many ways personified Bowen’s observation that the development of histories 
of Aceh in the 1950s occurred in a context in which their authors sought to provide narratives 
that stressed unity following the violence and conflict of the previous decade.  Further, Aceh’s 
legal status as a “special area” (I., daerah istimewa), granted in 1959, depended upon being able 
to mark the province as different, indeed “special” (I., istimewa), in relation to the rest of the 
archipelago.  Only one other provincial-level territory in Indonesia held this legal designation, 
the Special Area of Yogyakarta.  Yogyakarta had earned this status as a result of its sultan’s 
service to the Republic during the Indonesian Revolution and in recognition of the Yogyakarta 
Sultanate’s rich history.  As will become apparent in the next section, the histories that Hasjmy 
and other Acehnese published, beginning in the 1950s, tended to stress similar themes, 
                                                          
 
42
 Hasjmy saw his role as peacemaker extending to other arenas as well.  For example, he famously sought 
compromise between Islamic reformers critical of Acehnese performing arts traditions involving women and the 
aficionados of these performances (Archive of the Indonesian Ulama Council for the Special Area of Aceh (1967-
1982) held at Arsip Propinsi, Banda Aceh, Folder 201, Bundle 29). 
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meditating on Aceh’s history and service to the nation.  Hasjmy and others offered their histories 
explicitly as justifications for Aceh’s special status. 
Hasjmy was also a committed Indonesian nationalist.  He framed the histories he 
authored and helped to circulate as part of an anti-colonial project.  Indeed, as a young activist, 
Hasjmy had idolized the Indonesian nationalist leader, and eventual first Indonesian president, 
Sukarno, composing poetry about him.
43
  It was, in part, the nationalist resonances of the 
histories authored by Ali Hasjmy that linked him to non-Acehnese intellectuals.   
Mohammad Said 
As mentioned above, Mohammad Said was of Minangkabau ethnicity and lived in 
Medan.  Within months of Indonesia’s declaration of independence he founded the newspaper 
Waspada, which remained at the time of my research one of Indonesia’s largest independently 
owned newspapers.  Said was a nationalist, and enough of an elite on the national scene that he 
socialized with the likes of Vice-President Muhammad Hatta in Jakarta.  In this he clearly was 
aided by being Minangkabau.  Nonetheless, he was primarily an intellectual of note on a local 
scale, based in North Sumatra, who would become the most well-regarded historian of Aceh 
among Acehnese. 
Said first published his two-volume Aceh Sepanjang Abad [Aceh through the centuries] 
in 1961, but he had been experimenting with writing the history of Aceh as early as the 1950s.  
While accompanying the vice-president, Muhammad Hatta, on a trip to Aceh in 1953, for 
example, Said advocated, before Darul Islam had even broken out, that Aceh be granted a special 
autonomy status parallel to that of Yogyakarta (Djuruwarta keliling 1953c, 1953d).
44
  His 
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reasons for suggesting that such a status be granted rested on the Acehnese Sultanate’s long 
Islamic history and the Acehnese people’s service to the Republic during the Revolution. 
Mohammad Said 
If Mohammad Said was a prominent but relatively local intellectual, HAMKA (1908-
1981) was one of Indonesia’s most important Islamic intellectuals of the twentieth century.
45
  
The author of novels, political works, and influential philosophical treatments of such topics as 
Islamic mysticism, he rose to prominence as an Islamic reformer in the pre-colonial period and, 
in the post-colonial period, became involved in Islamic party politics and head the national 
Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia).  His public influence and reputation was 
in part tied to his indefatigable efforts founding, editing, and writing in a series of periodicals, 
including Pedoman Masyarakat, Panji Masyarakat, and Gema Islam. 
Unlike Mohammad Said, HAMKA was not particularly well-known as a writer of 
Acehnese history, especially considering the breath of his other interests and the sizable oeuvre 
which he left his readers.  However, he had taken an interest in Aceh throughout his career, 
attending, for example, the meeting at which POESA was founded in 1939 (anonymous 1939).  
In 1981 he delivered a paper at a conference convened largely at Ali Hasjmy’s initiative, on the 
topic of the coming of Islam and its spread throughout the Indonesian archipelago (Hasymy 
1989, 219-229).  This returns the discussion to Bowen’s chronotope of Islamization and its 
significance for authors such as Said and HAMKA. 
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 That it was Said who accompanied Hatta on this trip is never made explicit in the newspaper reports on 
which I draw here.  However, Mohammad Said’s daughter, Ida Tumengkol, who now oversees her late father’s 
estate in Medan, suggested to me in a personal communication that it is almost certain that it was her father.  She 
noted that in the early days of the paper Said would often undertake such assignments himself, in large part because 
he enjoyed them.  Considering Said’s interest in Aceh, his connection to Acehnese elites, and the fact that it was 





 “HAMKA” is an acronym for Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah.  HAMKA was called by this acronym 
in daily interactions and almost always wrote under it. 
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What compelled non-Acehnese authors such as Said and HAMKA to write histories of 
Aceh?  One answer to this question clearly lies in their anti-colonial politics, expressed in terms 
of a recasting of narratives of Islamization.  Both men were involved in prominent Islamic 
reformist circles, HAMKA being at the center of several of these circles at the national level.  
Interest in the project of reversing the valences of Dutch authored narratives of Islamization, 
while by no means limited to Islamic reformists, was especially prominent among them.  Further, 
the fact that both HAMKA and Mohammad Said were of Minangkabau ethnicity is significant as 
well.  Javanese constituted approximately half of Indonesia’s population and were dominant 
among Indonesian nationalist leaders, but people of Minangkabau descent had been 
disproportionately represented among the Indonesian Revolution’s elite.  They tended to play 
prominent roles in the Islamic political party Masjumi.  I would argue that such intellectuals 
were drawn to histories of Aceh as a result of the ways in which such histories resonated with 
anti-colonial sentiment.  Mohammad Said, for example, dedicated Aceh Sepanjang Abad “to the 
martyrs who have died resisting aggressors” (I., kepada para syuhada yang sudah tewas 
menentang aggressor) (Said 1980, vi). 
There was much in Aceh’s history that may have drawn non-Acehnese intellectuals to the 
writing of Acehnese history.  This included the basic chronotope of Islamization, which could be 
turned to anti-colonial intellectual projects.  But there were a range of other episodes and themes 
of Acehnese history that could be made to resonate with the kinds of nationalist and anti-colonial 
sentiments of authors such as Mohammad Said and HAMKA. 
Four Narrative Strands: Or, How Aceh Got Its Names 
 In this section, I turn to the four narrative strands of Acehnese history that recurred in the 
writings of authors like Hasjmy, Said, and HAMKA.  Each of these narrative strands drew on a 
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recognizable collection of historical episodes that shared similar themes.  Within each strand, 
these episodes and themes came to congeal around common toponyms for Aceh: “Mecca’s 
verandah” (I., serambi Mekkah), “land of the Acehnese dagger” (I., tanah rencong), “region of 
capital” (I., daerah modal), and “special area” (I., daerah istimewa).  Some of these toponyms 
and narrative episodes, for example those associated with the Mecca’s verandah toponym, 
already had been in common circulation in Aceh during, and probably before, the colonial period 
(Hurgronje II, 19).  Nonetheless, the authors of published histories of Aceh that began to appear 
in the 1950s narrated these episodes in a new way.  Employing narrative devices such as the 
chronotope of Islamization, these historians wove their histories within the frame of the 
Indonesian nation.  Yet, they did so by stressing Aceh’s unique contributions to Indonesian 
history.  They thus took Aceh to be an integral part of Indonesia, but in a manner that rested 
upon a value-laden geography of the archipelago in which it was Aceh “specialness” (I., 
keistimewaan) that linked it to the nation.  
Mecca’s Verandah 
Of the four narrative strands examined here, it was the strand associated with the 
toponym “Mecca’s verandah” (I., serambi Mekkah) that was most directly underpinned by the 
chronotope of Islamization described by Bowen.  Authors writing histories of Aceh as Mecca’s 
verandah highlighted the importance of Aceh as the site of seminal events in the history of Islam 
in the Indonesian archipelago.  Chief among these was the initial “entry” (I., masuknya) of Islam 
into the region.  The precise dates and places of this event varied in different accounts, and the 
question of precisely what was meant by Islam’s entry into the archipelago rarely was 
considered.  Nonetheless, the claim of Acehnese primacy in the history of Islam’s coming to the 
archipelago has been central in published narratives of Aceh’s Islamic history, at least since the 
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decade following Indonesian independence (Hasymy 1989; Panitia Penyelenggara Musabaqah 
Tilawatil Qur’an 1981).   
One of the primary means through which Aceh’s place in narratives of Islamization came 
to be solidified in post-colonial history writing was the convening of a series of conferences on 
the question of Islam’s coming to the Indonesian archipelago.  The first, a 1963 conference held 
in Medan and attended by figures such as HAMKA and the Indonesian Minister of Information 
Roeslan Abdul Gani, concluded that Islam first arrived in the archipelago somewhere on the 
coast of Sumatra in the seventh century, and that the first Islamic kingdom in the islands was in 
Aceh (Hasymy 1989, 6-8).  Two later conferences, held in Aceh in 1978 and 1980, were 
sponsored and attended by a group of intellectuals surrounding Ali Hasjmy.  HAMKA submitted 
a paper at the 1980 conference, and Mohammad Said participated in both.  The central findings 
of these conferences were perhaps best expressed in the title of a work published in Banda Aceh 
the year after the second conference, “From Here It Spread” (I., Dari Sini Ia Bersemi) (Panitia 
Penyelenggara Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur’an 1981).  Indeed, papers delivered at the 1980 
conference stressed the movement of Islam from Aceh to, among other places, Java, Ternate, and 
“the eastern parts of Indonesia” (Hasymy 1989).
46
  Under Hasjmy’s direction, participants in 
these latter two conferences took the early date for Islam’s arrival in the archipelago that had 
been established at the previous conference as their starting point.  Yet, they made Aceh’s claims 
to be the site of this early arrival of Islam even more explicit, eliminating any ambiguity about 
precisely where on Sumatra’s coast this arrival had occurred (Hasymy 1989).   
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 There was also a focus at the 1980 conference on Aceh’s historic relationship with the Malay Peninsula.  
However, this interest usually was expressed by participants in terms of cultural, political, and economic exchange.  
In this sense, participants linked Aceh with the Malay Peninsula through the frame of a common Islamic culture and 
history.  However, they rarely included the peninsula in narratives of Islamization, narratives of Islamization instead 
being focused on the archipelagic nation.  See Hasymy (1989a). 
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The conferences just described focused explicitly on Islam’s coming to the archipelago.  
Another common way historians of Aceh in the post-colonial period have expressed the Mecca’s 
verandah narrative strand has been through genealogies of rulers of successive Islamic kingdoms 
in the territory that today constitutes the province (Bowen 1989a; Djamil 1968; Hasjmy 1978; 
Said 1981; Zainuddin 1961).  A related genre has involved biographic and novelistic accounts of 
particular figures within these genealogies that flesh out particularly important links along it, 
especially the sixteenth century Sultan Iskandar Muda (Hasymy 1976; Zainuddin 1957).  The 
authors of these works often have drawn explicitly on hikayat and court chronicles, borrowing 
both content from these sources and elements of their form (e.g., lists of successive rulers 
punctuated by these rulers’ major accomplishments, themes from the biographies of the most 
important sultans). 
 In addition to sultans of Islamic kingdoms, the other key characters that appear in the 
Mecca’s verandah narrative strand are those of Aceh’s most famous ulama of the sixteenth 
through eighteenth centuries.  The origin of the term Mecca’s verandah itself is attributed to one 
of these figures, the seventeenth-century court member Nūr al-Dīn ar-Ranīrī.  A south Asian of 
Hadrami descent, ar-Ranīrī wrote, among other works, a universal history of Aceh entitled 
Bustān al-Salāṭīn that contains the earliest known usage of the term (Riddel 2005, 39; Salleh 
1992).  Ar-Ranīrī is most famous for his violent condemnation and purging of rival mystics.  
Ḥamzah af-Fanṣūrī, in Indonesia widely taken as a founding figure of Malay literature, is often 
identified in these accounts as Ar-Ranīrī’s flesh-and-blood rival, although recent evidence shows 
that his life and career occurred a century before Ar-Ranīrī’s purges (Feener and Laffan 2005; 
Laffan 2011, 10-12).  Together with the later figure ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf al-Sinkilī, today widely 
credited in Aceh with resolving tensions resulting from Ar-Ranīrī’s purges, Ar-Ranīrī and 
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Ḥamzah af-Fanṣūrī are essential characters in many versions of the Mecca’s verandah narrative 
strand (Azra 2004b; HAMKA 1989; Said 1981; Zainuddin 1957).
47
  Today most local 
discussions of Islam in Aceh, ranging from published volumes on the educational genealogies of 
twentieth-century ulama to informal chats over coffee about Aceh’s morality police, sooner or 
later reference the great ulama of the seventeenth-century sultanate.   
 The term Mecca’s verandah also has come to be associated with Aceh’s role as a 
stopping point for pilgrims and scholars on their way to Mecca in past centuries, a usage 
recorded by C. Snouck Hurgronje in the last decade of the nineteenth century (Hurgronje 1906, 
II, 19).  Indeed, the imagery of “Mecca’s verandah” would seem most appropriate to this 
historical phenomenon, with Aceh serving as a sort of courtyard for those wishing to travel to 
Arabia.  This theme also was stressed by those who cultivated histories of Aceh as Mecca’s 
verandah beginning in the 1950s, although these authors tended to focus on the movement of 
Islam eastwards from Aceh to the rest of the archipelago (Hasymy 1989).  That in histories of 
Aceh as Mecca’s verandah the general narrative drive has been the eastward movement of Islam 
from the Indian Ocean to the archipelago was made clear in a conversation I had with a local 
school teacher in a café one evening.  Upon finding out that I was interested in Acehnese history, 
this man proceeded to use salt shakers and plates to create a map of the Indian Ocean and its 
littorals in order to dramatize why Aceh is known by the term “Mecca’s verandah.”  After using 
his fingers to draw the eastward motion of Islam’s movement across the Indian Ocean he paused, 
                                                          
 47 In addition to the accounts cited here by authors participating in the development of the Mecca’s 
verandah narrative strand, there has been a great number of works published on these three figures.  See, for 
example, Al-Attas (1966, 1970), Azra (2004a, 52-86), and Riddel (1990, 2001).  The history of Islamic scholars and 
debate in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Aceh is far more complex and involves webs of educational and 
familial ties all around the Indian Ocean and Indonesian archipelago.  These three figures, to the extent they are the 
focal points of most histories of these networks and confrontations focused on Aceh, often are made to stand in for 
multiple other individuals and strands of thought.  For a treatment that names and considers some of the other 
scholars and mystics that most often drop out of both popular and scholarly accounts, see Laffan (2011, 10-22). 
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looking confused.  After a few moments of silence, he mused, “It is more like Indonesia’s 
verandah, isn’t it?  Well, never mind.  This is why Aceh is called Mecca’s verandah.” 
 Histories of Aceh as Mecca’s verandah, thus, have focused on the archipelago’s 
conversion through the initial coming of Islam to Aceh.  While this conversion process begins in 
some of these accounts as early as the seventh century, it is the seventeenth-century Sultanate of 
Aceh Darussalam that represents the pinnacle of these developments.  In these histories, the 
Acehnese Sultanate provides the stage on which great ulama of the past confront each other, and 
Islamic rulers create realms that attract visits from scholars and pilgrims from far-flung regions 
of the Islamic world.  Characteristic of much of the writing following in the Mecca’s verandah 
narrative strand is the following passage, drawn from HAMKA’s paper to the 1980 conference 
on the coming of Islam to the Indonesian archipelago described above: 
Referencing Aceh as “Mecca’s Verandah” is not just something that is fabricated, 
but a historical reality that cannot be denied[…]  If we mention the names of two 
Acehnese Religious Scholars (I., Ulama Aceh), it is the same as 1,000 or 2,000 
[ordinary] people[…  Syaikh Abdurrauf As Singkily] was a Great Ulama who 
lived at the time of the Kingdom of Iskandar Muda[…] in the Seventeenth 
Christian Century.  In the era of the Government of [Iskandar Muda…] Aceh met 
with greatness in this world and the afterlife (I., kebesaran dunia dan akhirat)[…]  
Aceh was a Maritime Country, full of populations from all of the people of the 
Islamic World[…]  Aside from Abdurrauf[…] there are also other names that 
became stars of Knowledge in Aceh (I., bintang Ilmu Pengetahuan di Aceh), 
specifically, two prominent names: Hamzah Fanshuri and Nuruddin Raniri.  
These two names have come to be repeated very often because of their 
disagreements in understanding Islamic mysticism (I., Ilmu Tashawwuf)[…]  If an 
Acehnese refers to his or her country as MECCA’s VERANDAH, he or she is not 
simply arrogant[…]  authentic proof is what has caused Aceh[…] to earn the 
name MECCA’s VERANDAH.  (HAMKA 1989, 221, 224-225, 228-229; 
emphasis in original) 
   
Land of the Acehnese Dagger 
 While the chronotope of conversion to Islam and the themes of religious study and 
dispute are central to the works produced by the group of intellectuals examined here, these 
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authors stressed other themes tied to Aceh’s historic place in the global politics and economy of 
the Indian Ocean world, often in the same works.  Along with the sultanate’s position as the 
culminating point in a history of conversion and a stage for the actions of Aceh’s famed ulama, 
several of these histories involved the military and economic preeminence of the sultanate 
(Hasjmy 1978; Said 1981, Zainuddin 1957).  These accounts often highlighted the historic role 
of the sultanate in staving off Portuguese rivals, based in Malacca, in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.  While ultimately failing to take Malacca, seventeenth-century Acehnese 
forces did manage to keep the Portuguese from the immediate environs of the sultanate’s core 
territory of influence, through military confrontations that became one of the common subjects of 
court literature of the time (Hurgronje 1906, II, 80-117; Iskandar 1958; Reid 2010; Salleh 1992).  
These episodes were adapted into the works of authors of Acehnese history, often through giving 
these episodes an explicit anti-colonial resonance.  It was these anti-colonial resonances that 
were played upon by those authors who wrote in terms of the narrative strand of Aceh as “the 
land of the Acehnese dagger” (I., tanah rencong). 
 While the sultanate’s resistance to the Portuguese almost certainly aimed at the 
consolidation of the sultan’s power through the control of inter-oceanic trade networks, the 
authors of histories of Aceh frequently took the seventeenth-century sultanate to be acting, on 
principle, against the earliest instances of European colonialism.  Such an anti-colonial arc was 
present clearly in the writings of intellectuals from the 1950s, some of whom were veterans of 
the Indonesian Revolution and who explicitly placed Acehnese resistance to the Portuguese in a 
narrative culminating in the eventual winning of Indonesian independence (Hasjmy 1976, 1997; 
Ishak 1977).  In these histories, Acehnese resistance to colonialism was deeply tied to the 
sultanate’s relationship with a broader Islamic cosmopolitan world.  Allied with the Ottomans, 
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and flying the crescent moon and star standard of the Ottoman caliph, the historical sultanate did, 
in fact, reject Portuguese interference in an explicitly religious idiom that tied Aceh to this 
broader Indian Ocean Islamic cosmopolis (Reid 2010).   
 In published histories of Aceh that stressed the theme of Aceh’s long anti-colonial 
struggle, Acehnese resistance to the Portuguese in the seventeenth century was often put side by 
side with the decades-long Dutch-Aceh War.  This was not a new narrative move.  During the 
early stages of the Dutch-Aceh War, representatives of the Acehnese Sultanate continued to 
invoke, and attempted to mobilize, connections and networks associated with their long-standing 
ties to the Ottomans, which they took as having enabled their predecessors’ past resistance to 
colonial intervention (Ho 2004, 219-221; Reid 1969, 19, 119-129; 1972).  Some post-colonial 
authors writing histories focused on the Dutch-Aceh War did so through linking this resistance to 
earlier periods of anti-colonialism.  Others offered analyses of the histories of the holy war 
(hikayat prang sabi), the works of esoteric verse describing the afterlife for those who fell as 
martyrs on the field of battle (Alfian 1987, 1992; Hasjmy 1976; Hasymy 1971).  Still others 
focused on the conduct of the war by Acehnese fighters, chiefs, and ulama (Said 1981, II; Talsya 
1980).  A narrative strand of resistance to colonialism thus was developed that entailed a history 
of pious struggle against colonial powers, bookended by resistance to the Portuguese in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the Dutch in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  It is 
these narrative themes that have come to be associated with the idea of Aceh as the land of the 
Acehnese dagger.   
Region of capital 
It was the practical defeat of most Acehnese resistance in the late colonial period that, 
ironically, set the stage for the third narrative strand and toponym that would come to serve as a 
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dominant interpretative frame for Acehnese history, that of Aceh as the “region of capital” (I., 
daerah model).  Following several decades of relatively stable, if uneasy, Dutch rule in Aceh, the 
Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies in 1942 ushered in the beginnings of the Indonesian 
Revolution.  On August 17, 1945, within days of the Japanese surrender ending World War II, 
Indonesia’s first president and vice-president, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, respectively, 
declared Indonesia an independent nation.  When the Netherlands moved to reassert its authority 
over the archipelago in the following months, it did not attempt to retake Aceh.  Remaining 
unoccupied throughout the Revolution, Aceh became a major staging ground for the anti-
colonial struggle.   
Along with histories of the old Acehnese Sultanate and the Dutch-Aceh War, then, the 
group of intellectuals involved in the development of new histories of Aceh began to focus on 
the period of the Indonesian Revolution.  At least one, the journalist T.A. Talsya, made these 
histories the central motif of his work, eventually finishing a three-volume series in the form of a 
timeline of the Revolution in Aceh (Talsya 1990a, 1990b, 1990c).  Other authors also 
approached this subject, often tying histories of Aceh’s pious resistance and grand past in the 
sultanate to its place in the eventual Indonesian national struggle (Hasjmy 1976; Seksi 
Penerangan/Dokumentasi Komite Musjawarah Angkatan 45 1959).  All of the accounts stressed 
the great service of Aceh to the cause of Indonesian independence, and the sacrifices Acehnese 
had made along the way.   
The list of episodes within this narrative strand was long.  A famed radio broadcast 
declaring the continuing existence of the Indonesian Republic was made from Aceh’s Gayo 
highlands in December 1948 following a Dutch offensive on Java in which most of the 
Indonesian nationalist leadership was captured.  This broadcast featured prominently in many of 
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the histories of Aceh that began to be developed in the 1950s.  The symbolically most important 
episode of these histories, however, was the purchasing of two DC-3 aircraft.  These planes were 
used to run weapons into Aceh and from there to various fronts.  They were said to have been 
paid for by the gold of Acehnese women, in some versions of the narrative, gold collected by 
Daud Beureueh.  This collective act of sacrifice in order to purchase these two airplanes, more 
than any other, has come to symbolize the narrative strand of Aceh as the “region of capital,” the 
site from which much of the operating capital of the Revolution, financial and otherwise, was 
alleged to have originated.  A replica of one of these two DC-3s stood as a monument in central 




The fourth narrative strand that came to dominate published histories of Aceh in the post-
colonial period was that associated with the toponym “special area” (I., daerah istimewa).  On a 
certain level, this was simply a legal designation, one that was modeled on Yogyakarta’s special 
autonomy, as previously described.  In 1959, Aceh officially became the Special Area of Aceh, 
with autonomy in customary practice (I., adat), religion (I., agama), and education (I., 
pendidikan).  But almost as soon as Aceh’s special legal status was enacted, Ali Hasjmy and his 
allies began to craft narratives that took the granting of special autonomy as the solution to the 
civil strife that had racked Aceh for the previous decade, as well as the appropriate answer to 
Acehnese complaints against the Indonesian central government.  Rather than positioning Darul 
Islam guerrillas primarily as defeated rebels, the stories Hasjmy weaved about the period of 
rebellion leant credence to the Acehnese branch of Darul Islam’s claims of mistreatment at the 
hands of the central government.  In these narratives, Aceh deserved its measure of autonomy, 
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 A second replica stood in the Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park (I., Taman Mini Indonesia Indah), 
just outside the Indonesian national capital of Jakarta, attesting to the importance of this episode in national histories 
of the Revolution. 
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given its long Islamic history and service to the Indonesian Republic.  Hasjmy’s narratives 
implied that Darul Islam guerrillas were not so much traitors as they were Indonesians frustrated 
by the central government’s refusal to acknowledge Aceh’s rightful place in the nation.  The 
achievement of provincial status and special autonomy were portrayed in Ali Hasjmy’s histories 
as the fulfillment of Darul Islam’s most important objectives (Hasjmy 1967; Panitia Persiapan 
Pendirian Universitas Negeri Sjiah Kuala 1961a, 1961b).  While rarely explicitly pointing to his 
own role in bringing about the compromise of special autonomy, Hasjmy no doubt was aware of 
how these histories supported an image of him as a peacemaker. 
Perhaps more important than the specifics of Hasjmy’s narrative of how Aceh came to be 
a special area, were the ways in which he propagated this narrative as part of his work as 
governor, and later as he took up other government and university posts.  In his efforts to enact 
Aceh’s special autonomy, Hasjmy engaged in high profile public works projects in the province.  
The most conspicuous of these, and Hasjmy’s proudest legacy, was the founding of Banda 
Aceh’s main university campus.  In sermons and speeches celebrating milestones in the growth 
of this university campus and other of his public works projects, Hasjmy narrated the events that 
had led to the enactment of Aceh’s special autonomy.  This narrative was circulated in pamphlets 
and anniversary publications at these events, as well as at other public commemorations and for 
national holidays (Hasjmy 1967; Panitia Persiapan Pendirian Universitas Negeri Sjiah Kuala 
1961a, 1961b).  Hasjmy thus wrote the history of Aceh as a special area not simply with paper 
and print, but by inscribing this history on the landscape in monuments, university campuses, 
and other objects in the built landscape, objects indexing the compromise that led to the end of 
Darul Islam and the recognition of Aceh as a special area. 
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The narrative strand of Aceh as a “special area” (I., daerah istimewa), thus, represented 
the process leading to the legal ratification of Aceh’s special status in the new nation.  It entailed 
both historically deep precedents, namely, the special characteristics of Aceh’s history and 
culture, and more immediate causes, for example, the Darul Islam rebellion and the compromise 
struck to end it.  This narrative strand quickly became as recognizable and widely-circulated as 
the other three, becoming the object of published narratives, invoked by public figures and 
ordinary Acehnese alike, and inscribed in the very name of the province.  That this narrative 
strand came to be as dominant in representations of the Acehnese past as the other three was 
evident in the framed photographs of the most iconic moments in the string of events that led to 
Aceh’s special legal status adorning the walls of the provincial archive in Banda Aceh during my 
research.  In 1998, Aceh was granted a new round of autonomy by the Indonesian central 
government in Jakarta, and its name was changed to Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.  Nonetheless, 
the period in the late 1950s in which Aceh came to be the Special Area of Aceh remained one of 
the dominant frames through which Acehnese narrated their history throughout the period of my 
research.   
Rahdman’s Moral Boundary 
 The histories that were written according to one or more of the four narrative strands 
described above were not homogenous.  Particular authors wrote their own versions for their 
own reasons.  Comparisons of individual histories written within the same narrative strand reveal 
differences in emphasis that are significant for understanding the intentions and assumptions of 
specific authors.  My purpose in describing each of these four narrative strands, however, has 
been to present the reader with a taste of the narrative episodes and themes that have come to 
dominate discussions of Acehnese history in the post-colonial period, rather than to compare 
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individual accounts.  As will become apparent in the next two sections of this chapter, the 
episodes and themes of these histories have had immense consequences for Acehnese narrative 
practice. 
 This and the next section turns to day-to-day narrative practices in Aceh.  None of the 
narrators described in this discussion had published printed histories, or even considered 
themselves proper sources of Acehnese history.  They included a professional driver, two school 
teachers, an academic, and others.  I turn to these instances of narrative practice for several 
reasons.  On the most basic level, these instances of narrative practice illustrate just how deeply 
the four narrative strands described in the previous section permeated Acehnese historical 
discourse by the time of my research.  Further, these narrative strands had infused Acehnese 
historical discourse in part because they had become common frames through which Acehnese 
had learned to read indexes of the past in the present in the Acehnese landscape and on the 
bodies of their neighbors.  The material objects and qualities that Acehnese narrators took as 
inscriptions of history on land and bodies motivated specific instances of history-telling.  The 
instances of history-telling sparked by these signs of the past could then provide context in which 
Acehnese carried out social commentary and action.  Drawing attention to these day-to-day 
experiences of historical narration, especially their embeddedness in daily social contexts, allows 
me to illustrate the extent to which Acehnese social practice is tied to a finely tuned sense of 
Aceh’s place in the history of Islam and the Indonesian archipelago.  This will be central to the 
linking of non-prophetic history and Islamic piety in later chapters.  My discussion begins with a 
particularly evocative example, one that illustrates both the explanatory power of the four 
narrative strands previously discussed and the ways in which these narratives help constitute 
value-laden geographies of the archipelago. 
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 On a breezy evening in early June of 2008, I found myself on the campus of Universitas 
Syiah Kuala in Darussalam, the university district of Aceh’s provincial capital, Banda Aceh.  I 
was enjoying the company of Rahdman, a jolly, middle-aged fellow, and a successful 
professional driver who had benefited from the burgeoning ex-patriot population in the city in 
the years since the December 2004 earthquake and tsunami.  Rahdman had a penchant for 
articulating opinions on social issues that he felt cut against the grain of conventional wisdom.  
On this night, our discussion began with his offering a critique of the much-heralded 
implementation of a form of Islamic law underway in Aceh since 1999.  The way he saw it, 
rather than the vice police (Wilayatul Hisbah or WH) cracking down on young couples 
romancing in the streets, the best thing instead would be to create places for young adults to 
enjoy themselves, for example, movie theaters.  On one hand, this might very well lead to the 
sorts of loose morals the recent reforms sought to prevent, especially extra-marital sex.  But on 
the other, it would at least give kids things to do.  And besides, he added, morals should be 
taught at home. 
 To this point, I had been following Rahdman’s logic.  But then he narrated a story that 
caught me by surprise.  He asked me if I had seen, wandering around Banda Aceh, a certain girl 
from Medan, Indonesia’s third largest city (see Map 2).  I told him that I had not.  He continued, 
letting me know that this young lady was “crazy” (I., gila), putting his index finger to his 
forehead in the common gesture used to denote someone suffering from mental illness.  He 
revealed that she walked around uncovered, although I did not remember later if Rahdman had 
been more specific in describing precisely how she dressed.  “What happens now, when she is 
not just left alone, is that she is arrested by the vice police and talked to and then let go,” 
Rahdman continued.  “But this does not solve anything.  How are people going to feel if 
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something happens (I., sesuatu terjadi)?” he asked.  “She should be taken back to Medan!”  
Aware that Medan, just south of the Acehnese border in the province of North Sumatra, has the 
reputation for being a city of gangsters, prostitutes, and just about every other form of vice, I 
found myself confused.  I asked Rahdman if his point was that she should be taken home to her 
family.  But he indicated that he did not think that she had a family.  So would the government in 
North Sumatra, her home province, help her using funds from that region?  Rahdman was 
noncommittal on this point, and more uninterested in my question than anything else.  Then I 
decided to ask about what I thought was the obviously unaddressed question: “If one takes her to 
Medan, couldn’t something happen (sesuatu terjadi) there?”  “Why of course!” Rahdman replied 
smiling, in fact, almost laughing at me.  “But Mr. Daniel!  Then it would not be happening on 
Mecca’s verandah (I., serambi Mekkah)!” 
 Rahdman’s comments reflected sensibilities about religious and moral practice, the 
territory of Aceh, and the Indonesian nation that I found consistent with much public discourse in 
the province during research there between 2006 and 2009.  Most striking was the way in which 
Rahdman’s invoking of the Mecca’s verandah toponym revealed a qualitative moral difference 
between the territory of Aceh and that of North Sumatra.  Something might happen to the woman 
in Medan, he admitted, “[but then] it would not be happening on Mecca’s verandah.”   
 It would be a mistake to interpret Rahdman’s comments as deriving from a sense that 
once the young woman of whom he spoke had been swept across the border, she would no 
longer be an Acehnese concern.   His invocation of the Mecca’s verandah toponym entailed a 
range of historical and social resonances marking Aceh and North Sumatra as qualitatively 
different kinds of places within the Indonesian archipelago.  Rahdman’s unblinking assumption 
that such a reply would be sufficient and self-evident as a response to my inquiry reveals the 
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broad, if often vague, explanatory powers of the narrative arcs described above, which are most 
often cited in daily conversation in Aceh through the shorthand of the toponyms around which 
they have congealed.  Much of this explanatory power rests in the ways in which the narrative 
strands described above have become embedded in daily Acehnese social life. 
Narrative Practice in Post-Colonial Aceh: Living Among the Signs of History   
 Anyone who has spent a significant amount of time in Aceh in recent years will have 
sooner rather than later heard what has become an exceptionally common way that Acehnese 
invoke the cosmopolitan aspects of Aceh’s Islamic and anti-colonial past.  “Aceh,” my 
interlocutors regularly repeated, “[it stands for] Arab-Cina-Eropa-Hindia!”  This phrase, 
associating each of Aceh’s letters with a different group of visitors thought of as having distinct 
cultural and racial characteristics (i.e., Arabs, Chinese, Europeans and Indians), was meant to be 
a concise encapsulation of Aceh’s cosmopolitan history, a way of invoking the continuing 
presence of the seventeenth-century sultanate in the present. 
 It would be easy to dismiss this phrase as an empty multi-culturalist discourse with little 
historical depth.  However, invocations of Aceh’s cosmopolitan past were not simply cynical or 
abstract appeals to either a principled cultural pluralism or an imagined Islamic 
cosmopolitanism.  The racialized groups identified using this acronym were widely taken in 
Aceh as having contributed cultural and biological materials to the Acehnese present, making 
their past in the Acehnese Sultanate detectable in daily social interactions.  People and objects 
that exhibited qualities linking them to these racial and ethnic groups were taken as embodied 




 Consider, for example, the response of Saifuddin to the news that the Acehnese 
government had restricted the public performance of a dance held by Chinese-Indonesians to 
celebrate the Chinese New Year: 
Our laws, that are supposed to be based on Islamic law, do not yet reflect… the 
foundations of Islam that are exceptionally tolerant[… that] respect and give a 
sense of security to other religious communities (I., umat)[…]  If the measure 
[used to deny permits for a public celebration] is that the lion dance is not 
Acehnese culture (I., budaya Aceh), I think we need to discuss history in depth.  
Did Chinese and Arabs come to the Acehnese coast in the past?  Did these early 
Chinese migrants (I., pendatang) not give color (I., memberi warna) to the 
accomplishments of Acehnese history?  Look at all the faces that resemble 
Chinese!  Is it true that in the blood of the Acehnese people there are absolutely 
no Chinese genes? 
 
Saifuddin was a young academic who spent much of his time in coffee shops frequented 
by students and college instructors.  I heard similar discourses, with different valences depending 
on the politics of the person speaking, throughout my time in Aceh.  Darker-skinned men and 
women, especially if they were known to have come from a particular village or area, were 
identified as the descendents of Indians.  Light-skinned people, some alleged to have blue eyes, 
were thought of as the progeny of Portuguese who had abandoned their previous political and 
religious allegiances to become Acehnese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  These 
light-skinned people were assumed to have originated in Lam No, where large numbers of such 
Portuguese converts were said to have once lived.  Such discourses were not meant solely for 
consumption by interested non-Acehnese such as me.  They appeared in Acehnese newspapers, 
for example, and the popular Acehnese pop singer Sabirin is a light-skinned man from the village 
of Lam No who sometimes croons about his Portuguese blood for his Acehnese fans. 
These examples of reading the racialized bodies of Acehnese neighbors as indexes of 
Acehnese history represent just one of the ways in which I found Acehnese to inhabit a social 
landscape full of signs of the past.  My Acehnese acquaintances interpreted phenotypic 
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differences through a framing informed by notions of the Acehnese Sultanate’s cosmopolitan 
grandeur.  The past thus evoked actually could have been construed as much more recent.  Aceh 
in the late-nineteenth century, at the time of the Dutch invasion, was still frequented by people 
from around the Indian Ocean Islamic world (Hurgronje 1906, I, 17-23).  Further discussion of 
late nineteenth-century Aceh, below, will suggest some of the ways that these practices of 
reading the past on racialized bodies have been structured by the four narrative strands discussed 
above. 
Ibu Juanda 
If reading the past of the Acehnese Sultanate in the racialized bodies of Acehnese 
neighbors evoked the toponyms of Mecca’s verandah and the land of the Acehnese dagger, a 
conversion I had with a school teacher, Ibu Juanda, revealed how embodied experiences of place 
could be tied directly to the four narrative strands discussed above.  Recall that beginning in the 
late 1950s, the newly established provincial government under Ali Hasjmy sponsored a series of 
public works projects that were, in important senses, narrative acts.  These public works indexed 
the history of violent strife in the 1940s and 1950s, and the resolution of the conflict in the 
achievement of Aceh’s special legal status.   
Ibu Juanda was still a girl when the most prominent of these public works projects began.  
This was the founding of the “Student City” (I., Kota Pelajar Mahasiswa, Kopelma) of 
Darussalam.  Today incorporated into Banda Aceh, Darussalam was founded as the site of a new 
state university, Syiah Kuala, and, in addition, became the location of the Acehnese branch of the 
State Islamic Institute in 1963.  It remained at the time of my fieldwork the most widely-known 
and remembered instance of the public works projects Hasjmy instituted in his term as governor.  
Its centrality to narratives of Ali Hasjmy’s successfully brokering of an end to the rebellion was 
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reflected in comments such as the following, offered by a member of the Acehnese Ulama 
Council: “What did Daud Beureueh’s taking to the hills get us?  Darussalam.  A university 
campus.  That is good.  But was it worth the suffering and bloodshed of the rebellion?”  Even the 
name of the neighborhood selected for the creation of this university campus seemed fortuitously 
to suggest its place in the ending of Darul Islam, as Darussalam can be translated from Arabic 
into “land of peace.”
49
  
Ibu Juanda recalled with great poignancy the period of “mutual self-help” (I., gotong-
royong) Hasjmy organized to clear the land that would be used for the construction of the 
campus.  Only in only fifth grade at the time, she joined adults and other children in this project:  
Darussalam is the heart (I., jantung-hati) of the Acehnese people (Ac., oereuëng 
Atjèh)[…]  It was built because of the contributions (I., sumbangan) of the 
Acehnese people[…] the people gave it moral (I., moral) support.  I was in fifth 
grade at the elementary school.  I, with all of my class mates, came to clear the 




 Ibu Juanda next went on to discuss a dark point in Darussalam’s history.  Sometime after 
a monument had been erected to memorialize the act of mutual self-help in which she had 
participated, someone, widely assumed to be Darul Islam-affiliated, shot at the monument.  She 
linked this to a more general climate of danger in the area.  “There was shooting there at night,” 
Ibu Juanda said, “But it was safe during the day.  DI protected Darussalam.  DI protected the 
safety of the people.”  More than one interlocutor recalled to me that Darussalam was a heavily 
Darul Islam-leaning territory at the time of the land clearing described by Ibu Juanda.  Yet Ibu 
                                                          
 49 For some of Hasjmy’s own accounts of the project, see Panitia Persiapan Pendirian Universitas Negeri 
Sjiah Kuala (1961a; 1961b). 
 
 50 The Indonesian phrase jantung-hati, which Ibu Juanda used multiple times in this interview to refer to 
how the Acehnese people feel about Darussalam, is interesting in this context.  A compound made up of two words 
that might be translated “heart,” jantung being the physical heart and hati being the liver, which in Indonesia is 
taken to be the seat of emotions and thus the emotional “heart,” this phrase is most often used to designate a 
beloved, if not favorite, child. 
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Juanda noted here that no one was harassed during this massive public works project, despite the 
nightly crossfire. 
 The most telling moment in Ibu Juanda’s recollection of the history of the Darussalam 
campus came as she linked her experience as a child helping to clear land for the campus to her 
choice of vocation as an educator.  A successful English teacher, Ibu Juanda had rejected several 
offers to work elsewhere in the archipelago, and even overseas, turning down significant sums of 
money in the process.  When she had taken work elsewhere, she always found her way back to 
the Universitas Syiah Kuala, the state university located on the Darussalam campus, where she 
worked as an instructor preparing future generations of English teachers.  Finally, she was given 
the opportunity to help run a new experimental elementary school on the Unsyiah campus:  
When we built the new school, it was just like when I was in fifth grade.  We held 
mutual self-help with the students and lecturers of the English Department.  We 
even ate bundled sticky rice (Ac., boe leukat) [as she had during the land clearing 
for the Darussalam campus in the 1950s].  My soul (I., jiwa) very much loves 
Darussalam.  My father once told me, “If you work at the factory, you will help a 
few, but in Darussalam you can help the Acehnese people (I., rakyat Aceh).” 
 
 Ibu Juanda clearly was moved by her experience clearing land for the Darussalam 
campus.  Her emotional response was anchored in the physical place of Darussalam and her 
participation in its creation.  Her stories about the campus, while deeply personal, clearly echoed 
the central motifs of the narrative strand associated with Aceh’s legal status as a special area.  In 
fact, her narratives were strikingly consistent with the language and narrative styles employed in 
printed programs commemorating the founding of the campus, produced in the early 1960s 
(Panitia Persiapan Pendirian Universitas Negeri Sjiah Kuala 1961a; 1961b).  She stressed how 
Darussalam had helped to bring about an end to the conflict with Darul Islam guerrillas, the 
campus’ role in reconciling the Acehnese people following a decade of conflict, and its 
continuing promise for the Acehnese future.  She did so in a manner that entwined her personal 
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history as an educator with the founding of this campus.  While speaking about Darussalam, not 
all Acehnese were moved to the same degree as Ibu Juanda was.  Indeed, some people with 
whom I spoke expressed cynicism towards Ali Hasjmy’s compromise with the central 
government and took his public works projects primarily as opportunistic and self-serving.  
Nonetheless, Ibu Juanda’s story of her participation in the founding of Darussalam offers a 
striking example of how narratives of Acehnese history could be inscribed in the Acehnese 
landscape in powerful ways.  
Ibu Juanda’s narration of her personal involvement in the creation of Darussalam clearly 
participated in the narrative of Aceh as a special area.  This was in large part because of her 
personal experience in helping to build the most prominent monument to Aceh’s special legal 
status, the Darussalam campus.  Before concluding this section, I turn to two examples in which 
the embeddedness of Acehnese in a social context full of deeply-resonate signs of the past is 
apparent despite the fact that those involved in these instances of historical narration did not 
directly participate in the events they narrated.  In these instances, effects of the popularization of 
the four aforementioned narrative strands on the daily narrative practice of non-elite Acehnese 
are clearly visible. 
“Arab-Cina-Eropa-Hindia” in the Nineteenth and Twenty-first Centuries   
I begin by returning to the practice of reading the cosmopolitan past on the bodies of 
neighbors.  It is difficult to know just how long practices of reading history on the bodies of 
others have been prominent in Aceh.  In his classic ethnography-cum-military intelligence report, 
C. Snouck Hurgronje indicated that in the late-nineteenth century a multitude of different kinds 
of social and racial groups were recognized in Aceh (Hurgronje 1906, I, 17-23).  In some cases, 
these groups were thought to belong to specific villages and regions, not unlike the ways in 
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which, during my field research, different parts of Aceh were thought of as the home of the 
descendants of Indians or Portuguese (Hurgronje 1906, I, 19).  But if these regions and the 
phenotypes associated with them were at the time taken as indexes of the sultanate’s past, this 
was not noted by Hurgronje.  Hurgronje did note, however, that Teungku Kutakarang, the author 
of one of the best known instances of the histories of the holy war, had suggested that Acehnese 
were descendant from Arabs, Persians, and Turks.  Hurgronje related that at the time of his field 
research in the 1890s, Teungku Kutakarang’s theories of Acehnese descent were being circulated 
widely in Aceh (Hurgronje 1906, I., 17-19). 
Hurgronje’s discussion of the categories of social and racial differences that were salient 
in late nineteenth-century Aceh suggests some important ways that post-colonial practices of 
reading history on human bodies has been shaped by the histories of Aceh popularized since the 
1950s.  While the “Arab-Cina-Eropa-Hindia” frame is intended in part to celebrate Aceh’s 
historically vibrant cosmopolitanism, the Aceh described by Hurgronje was far more diverse 
than even this frame allows.  It included black Africans and white Circassians, and entailed a far 
more noticeable presence of other Southeast Asian peoples, for example, Bugis, Bataks, and 
those from the island of Nias.  I suggest that the ways of narrating history propagated by the 
authors who cultivated the four narrative strands represents one of the reasons why the historical 
presence of these people has not been central in post-colonial Acehnese narrative practice as has 
been, for example, the presence of Arabs, Chinese, Europeans, and South Asians.   
From one point of view, because Bataks and those from Nias were associated with a 
history of slave trading, specifically as the human objects of this trade, they did not feature 
prominently in the narratives of Aceh’s pre-colonial past authored in the 1950s and after.  While 
the slave trade was part-and-parcel of the economic and political milieu of the sultanate, it had 
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no place in the histories of Hasjmy and his circle, which focused on the sultans, ulama, and 
traders who contributed to Aceh’s brilliance in past centuries.  One can, in fact, already see 
inklings of this bias towards rulers, scholars, and traders in Teungku Kutakarang’s nineteenth-
century assertions of Acehnese descent from Arabs, Persians, and Turks mentioned above.  The 
histories of the 1950s systematized the idea that Acehnese descended from the people traveling 
relatively freely in pan-Indian Ocean trade circuits, and it did so in specific ways.  One of these 
ways reflected the placing of Aceh in a chronotope of Islamization.  Recall that in histories 
reliant on this chronotope, Aceh was the font from which Islam flowed to the rest of the 
archipelago.  If since the 1950s Islamization has represented the primary idiom through which 
Aceh’s relationship to the Indonesian nation has been expressed, highlighting the contributions 
of Javanese, Bugis, and Bataks to the Acehnese past reverses the appropriate direction of 
historical contributions from Aceh to the rest of the archipelago. 
Herein lies one reason why the published histories of the 1950s, and subsequent popular 
narrative practice in Aceh, have tended to focus upon cosmopolitan peoples from outside of the 
archipelago.  These peoples (i.e., Arabs, Chinese, Europeans, and South Asians) have been 
inscribed in the Acehnese past as contributors of Islam, blood, and culture to the Acehnese 
present.  These contributions, especially Islam, have been understood to then have been passed 
on to the rest of the archipelago.  This helps to explain why the published histories of Aceh 
discussed above rarely name contributions of other archipelagic peoples to Aceh, or even the 
presence of other archipelagic peoples in Aceh.  Some instances of these presences, for example 
the eighteenth-century Bugis dynasty that ruled the Acehnese Sultanate, are too important to 
ignore completely.  But the narrative emphasis of histories of Aceh since the 1950s has been on 
the contributions of Indian Ocean cosmopolitans and not on such figures as the Bugis dynasty.  
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This tendency was even stronger in the examples of popular narrative practice that I heard during 
my field research.  I never heard anyone suggest that a passerby had Bugis features, for example, 
but was prodded daily to notice the Portuguese eyes, Chinese faces, and Indian skin tone of those 
around me. 
A “Portuguese” Gravestone in Kuala Batee 
 The narrative strands developed in the 1950s infused the kinds of narrative practice 
described in this section with historical meanings.  This occurred through the reading of 
embodied and emplaced features of daily social experience as indexes of the past.  This was also 
apparent in one final example I will present.  This example illustrates how the narratives strands 
of the 1950s have become dominant enough frames for interpreting signs of the past that they 
foreclose certain other readings of Acehnese history.  In Kuala Batee, a sub-regency of Aceh’s 
southwest coast in the regency of Aceh Barat Daya (see Map 2), is a rather unusual gravestone 
(see Figure 4).  When I visited the stone in 2008, it recently had been moved from above the 
grave on which it previously stood to the courtyard of a local elementary school, in part because 
it had been deemed of historical value by local authorities, and in part because these same 
authorities had felt it inappropriate to leave the stone on the grave of the Acehnese Muslim it had 
hitherto marked.  It had a long and formal inscription in English and had been sent by Salem-
based merchants to an Acehnese port captain (I., syahbandar) of Kuala Batee upon this captain’s 
death in 1824.
51
  This syahbandar, according to the inscription a man of many virtues and talents 
associated with the trade in pepper, was probably was one of the chief trading partners of a group 
of merchants who frequented the coast.  
                                                          
 51 As described in the Introduction, Salem merchants dominated the world pepper market of the early 
nineteenth century through their relationship with Acehnese chiefs, who sold them the region’s pepper off-shore, 





Figure 4: Headstone for a “shewbuntar” (i.e., syahbandar) of Kuala Batee 
 
 
 The nineteenth-century pepper trade can be considered a contemporary analogue to the 
modern crude oil market.  It was dominated by Acehnese chiefs who controlled pepper 
plantations all along the west coast of Aceh.  It was especially lucrative for both these chiefs and 
the Salem traders who carefully guarded both the sailing technology that made it possible to 
trade in the shoals off the coast and the maps that made it possible for them to return to the same 
sections of coastline in multiple years.  This trade left an indelible mark on Acehnese social and 
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domestic patterns, spawning its own instances of Acehnese-language hikayat literature (Drewes 
1980; Hurgronje 1906, II, 120-121; Siegel 2000).
52
 
 While most Acehnese are vaguely aware of the past importance of the pepper trade, and 
the topic has been considered by some Acehnese historians, it has never been incorporated fully 
into any of the four narrative strands described in this chapter, nor made into one of its own.  
This may be in part because the period is one in which the sultanate itself, the focal point of most 
of the histories described here, was particularly weak, trade occurring at the local level with 
regional chiefs.
53
  The details of this history of the pepper trade are fairly obscure to most 
Acehnese.  When several friends and I visited the school and stone in 2008, a teacher there 
explained to us that although she knew little about it, its inscription was in Portuguese.  Her 
misrecognition of the language on the stone was suggestive of the dominant ways Acehnese have 
come to organize their history.  In her explanation of the significance of the stone, she was 
acutely aware that it existed as a result of Aceh’s place of importance in global economic history.  
However, she was far less aware of the specific U.S. trading interests that had been so important 
in the region of Aceh’s southwest coast.  She assimilated the stone into the narrative strands that 
stress the old sultanate and its Portuguese rivals.  In the process, she overlooked the much more 
                                                          
52
 This trade had very important resonances for US audiences as well, especially after the 1831-32 “Battle 
of Quallah Batoo” affair called into question the allegedly anti-imperial nature of the trade.  Until 1831, the practice 
of offshore trading in flat-bottomed U.S. vessels had been touted as anti-imperialist because it avoided both military 
intervention and the sending of U.S. traders to shore.  But when one of these vessels, the Friendship, was attacked 
and several of its crew members captured by an Acehnese minor chief, a low-grade battle ensued.  This was 
followed by a retaliatory attack the next year by the U.S. Navy frigate Potomac.  In Salem, this series of events 
spawned public reflections on the “battle,” the trade, and U.S. interests overseas (Putnam 1922, 70-110; Warriner 
1835, 9-118).  Here I would be remiss if I did not thank Michael Feener, who helped me to fully understand the 
significance of what is today an isolated and difficult to reach beachhead in an especially rural section of Aceh’s 
coastline.  
 
 53 Thus, for example, Mohammad Said treats the topic in a chapter sub-titled “As a Result of the Civil 
War,” implicitly suggesting that it represented a low point of history from the point of view of the sultanate (Said 
1981, I, 470-533). 
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recent claims of her specific region of Aceh to global political and economic historical 
importance, namely, the early nineteenth-century pepper trade with American merchants. 
On Living among the Signs of History 
 In many respects, the ways in which I describe Acehnese living among embodied and 
emplaced signs of history is not unusual.  In presenting the above account, I have, for example, 
been inspired by William Kelleher’s description of similar practices in North Ireland in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Kelleher 2003).  Before turning to my conclusion, I want to make clear why I have 
devoted so much attention to these practices.  What makes them significant for the broader 
arguments of this dissertation? 
 While it is true that reading signs of the past in the present may be a fairly common 
activity in different societies and historical periods, there is something remarkable about both the 
ubiquity and intensity with which the seeking of these signs occurs in Aceh.  This ubiquity and 
intensity is also characteristic of the related practice of invoking the four toponyms previously 
described, each associated with one of the narrative strands developed beginning in the 1950s.  
During my research, references to these four toponyms were exceedingly common and could 
overwhelm any observer astute enough to recognize them.  Tens of universities and Islamic 
boarding schools in different parts of the province used some form of “verandah” or “Mecca’s 
verandah” in their name, as did the major Indonesian-language Acehnese daily, Serambi 
Indonesia, owned by the largest media conglomerate in the country (Kompas Gramedia Group).  
In 2008 and 2009 I frequently met with government officials who would begin conversations by 
noting, “This is the Special Area of Aceh,” before pausing to add, “Actually, it is no longer the 
Special Area of Aceh, but it is still special.”
54
  “Land of the Acehnese dagger” appeared on 
                                                          
 54 These were references to the official name of the province, changed from Special Area of Aceh to 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (roughly, the Country of Aceh Realm of Peace) in 1998.  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
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everything from glass encased Acehnese daggers for sale at tourist shops in Banda Aceh to 
headlines in newspapers and periodicals.  Acehnese wishing to make a claim against the 
Indonesian central government, usually regarding alleged political and economic neglect of the 
province and its inhabitants, invoked the “region of capital” toponym to suggest that the nation’s 
debt to its Acehnese citizens remained unpaid.  Acehnese pop music and other popular cultural 
forms regularly made reference to Aceh using any one of these place names.  Religious teachers 
such as Teungku Hasani used them in sermons in order to effect moral persuasion through the 
toponyms’ historical weight.  Non-Muslims in the province turned to these toponyms to make 
claims of belonging in Aceh in the face of discrimination. 
 But it is not simply the ubiquity and intensity of these references that makes them of 
interest to this dissertation.  Because of the ways in which they were tied to the narratives 
cultivated by intellectuals such as Ali Hasjmy, Mohammad Said, and HAMKA, these 
invocations of Acehnese place, and daily encounters with the Acehnese past, served as means 
through which Acehnese came to inhabit the value-laden geographies inscribed by these 
intellectuals.  Recall that my discussion of popular Acehnese narrative practice began by relating 
the story of Rahdman’s moral boundary.  This was the boundary between Aceh and North 
Sumatra, which once crossed entailed movement into a qualitatively different kind of moral 
space, one in which the moral problems raised by the presence and behavior of the young woman 
who was the object of Rahdman’s commentary ceased to matter in the same way.  Rahdman’s 
explanation for this qualitative difference was simply an invocation of the Mecca’s verandah 
toponym.  He clearly felt that the historical episodes that congealed in this reference would be 
sufficient to explain the moral contrast between Aceh and North Sumatra that he assumed in his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
was selected at the time in part because the mix of Acehnese and Arabic languages it reflected was felt by many to 
better represent Aceh’s historical and cultural uniqueness.  In 2009 the province’s name was changed yet again, this 
time simply to the Province of Aceh (Propinsi Aceh). 
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commentary.  The next chapter will treat in more detail some of the contrasting moral resonances 
between Aceh and North Sumatra that Rahdman assumed, as well as how these resonances have 
been tied to broader value-laden geographies of the archipelago.  For now, I simply draw 
attention to the fact that by invoking the Mecca’s verandah toponym, Rahdman participated in 
the inscribing of these value-laden geographies. 
Conclusion: Islam, Aceh, Nation, and Narrative 
 After a brief description of elements of pre-colonial and colonial Acehnese narrative 
practice, this chapter began in the 1950s, examining the cultivation by Indonesian elites of four 
narrative stands linking Aceh to the history of Islam and the Indonesian nation.  These narrative 
strands placed Aceh squarely within the frame of the Indonesian nation by using such narrative 
devices as the chronotope of Islamization and themes of anti-colonial struggle culminating in 
Indonesian independence.  These same narrative devices also marked Aceh as “special” (I., 
istimewa) by giving Aceh primacy in narratives of Islamization and anti-colonial resistance.  
This inscribed Aceh within a value-laden geography of the archipelago, evident in the title of a 
1981 collection of essays, “From Here It Spread” (Dari Sini Ia Bersemi), the “here” being Aceh, 
and the “it” being Islam.   
 Especially to the extent that they were underpinned by the chronotope of Islamization, the 
four narrative strands discussed in this chapter positioned Islam as mediating the relationship 
between the Indonesian nation and Aceh.  This was true, for example, in common narratives of 
the archipelago’s Islamization, in which the Indonesian nation was placed on a progressive path 
towards ever deeper conversion, with Aceh as its vanguard.  It was also true in histories of 
Acehnese pious resistance, in which anti-colonial resolve inspired by a selflessly pure Islamic 
spirit again anticipated the eventual telos of the nation.  This may help to explain why Islamic 
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intellectuals like HAMKA and Mohammad Said, who were not Acehnese but whose 
formulations of the nation were heavily tied up in Islamic imaginaries, were so enthusiastic about 
these histories.  
 In part because the narrative strands cultivated by Acehnese intellectuals in the 1950s 
were clearly drawn from long-standing Acehnese narrative traditions, and in part because of the 
ways in which they came to be embodied and emplaced in daily practices of reading the past in 
the present, they have remained popular in Aceh ever since they began to be published in the 
decade after Indonesian independence.  Through practices of reading the signs of the past in 
one’s immediate social context, Acehnese have come to inhabit the value-laden geographies that 
these narrative strands inscribe. 
 This last point is central to understanding how this dissertation participates in a body of 
scholarship that explores the varied spatio-temporal paths Muslims take to participate in an 
Islamic tradition writ large (Florida 1995; Grewal 2006; Ho 2006; Rogozen-Soltar 2012; 
Werbner 2003).  Not all of the narrative strands and practices discussed in this chapter took up 
Islamic themes explicitly.  However, to the extent that these histories partook of the chronotope 
of Islamization, they clearly involved Acehnese actively orienting themselves to local Islamic 
pasts.  For example, in his discussion of the boundary between Aceh and North Sumatra, 
Rahdman tied the Mecca’s verandah toponym directly to an Islamic social and political project 
(i.e., Aceh’s recent Islamic legal reforms) and a value-laden geography that contrasted differing 
moral responsibilities depending upon whether one was in Aceh or North Sumatra.  Similarly, 
the interest in Acehnese history on the part of Indonesian intellectuals such as HAMKA quite 
clearly drew upon these figures’ visions of a progressively more Islamic nation and society. 
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 This chapter began with an epigraph that requoted the sermon of Teungku Hasani with 
which the introduction to this dissertation opened.  The multiple rhetorical effects of Teungku 
Hasani’s invocation of the seventeenth-century sultanate should now be clear.  Teungku Hasani 
was drawing on an over century-old rhetorical strategy of Acehnese religious teachers, one that 
marks the present era as a period of moral decline in relation to Aceh’s grand past.  He could 
trust that the reference would resonate for his audience, given the ways in which many Acehnese 
are aware of the signs of the seventeenth-century sultanate in their daily lives.  In the chapters 
that follow, both the four narrative strands and the embodied and emplaced practices of reading 
the past in the present described here reappear.  This is because they are central to the ways in 










“Wild Churches” and Muslim Converts: Christianization, Islamization, and Aceh 
 
 
But Mr. Daniel, then it would not be happening on Mecca’s verandah! 
    -Rahdman, professional driver, Banda Aceh, June 2008 
 
 The previous chapter described a process through which Indonesian elites in the 1950s 
cultivated four narrative strands of Aceh’s place in the history of Islam and the Indonesian 
nation.  While these four narrative strands drew on historical subject matter ranging from Aceh’s 
early Islamic history to the Darul Islam rebellion and its aftermath, one of their key narrative 
motifs was the chronotope of Islamization (Bowen 1989a).  It was Aceh’s status as the first place 
in the archipelago to receive Islam that was the key to how the chronotope established a 
particular configuration of relationships involving Aceh, Islam, and Indonesia.  On one hand, 
these narratives placed Aceh firmly within the nation; on the other, they did so by drawing 
attention to Aceh’s “special” (I., istimewa) qualities.   
 In this chapter, I examine in more detail how the chronotope of Islamization linked Aceh 
to Islam and the nation in powerful ways for different groups of Indonesians.  I do this through 
analyzing a controversy over “wild churches” (I., gereja liar), that is, churches built without the 
proper permits, along Aceh’s southern border with the province of North Sumatra.
55
  This 
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 Liar also can have the meaning of “illegal,” and this is clearly an intended connotation, and perhaps the 
primary thrust, of the phrase “gereja liar” (i.e., “illegal churches”).  However, the meaning of liar as “wild” is played 
upon in the documents that I discuss below, and it is clear from these documents that those who opposed these 
churches tended to see them not simply as illegal, but as the result of Christians crossing the border into Aceh in an 
unrestrained and disorderly manner.  I have chosen to use the translation “wild churches” to capture both senses of 
the Indonesian, and to highlight the concern over what the term’s usage in these documents suggests was both 
unrestrained and unregulated activity in Aceh’s southern border region. 
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controversy allows me to illustrate how powerful linkages between Acehnese locality, Islamic 
history, and the Indonesian nation already could be by the late 1970s.  The archival record 
surrounding these episodes includes the voices of several different parties to the conflict over 
wild churches, each of which contextualized their interest in terms of the history of Aceh, 
Islamization, and Indonesia. 
 In March of 1978, four “wild churches” were burned down in the South Acehnese sub-
regency of Simpang Kanan (see Map 2).  A few months later, two delegates representing the 
self-proclaimed “Islamic Community of the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan” arrived at the 
offices of the Acehnese Ulama Council in Banda Aceh.
56
  These delegates attributed Muslim-
Christian tensions in Simpang Kanan, which they claimed had resulted in the church burnings, to 
the migration of Christian laborers across the Acehnese border from North Sumatra.  The 
Acehnese Ulama Council already had been involved in monitoring and addressing the influx of 
Christian laborers across the border, which the council, like the Islamic Community of the Sub-
Regency of Simpang Kanan, saw as a threat to Aceh’s Islamic history.  The church burnings of 
1978, as well as additional church burnings in 1979, were covered in national Islamic presses as 
well. 
  The convergence of local, provincial, and national attention on the church burnings in 
Simpang Kanan facilitated a synergy of provincial and national imaginaries that took the 
territories of Aceh and North Sumatra to be value-laden with moral and religious significances.  
Indeed, the region along the Acehnese and North Sumatran border was an especially fruitful site 
through which Acehnese and other Indonesian Muslims in this period worked out questions of 
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 Technically, by 1978 the Acehnese Ulama Council had been absorbed into the Indonesian Ulama 
Council as one of the latter’s provincial branches.  Nonetheless, its members continued to see themselves as the 
Acehnese Ulama Council and, as I will describe in more detail below, as the model on which the national Indonesian 
Ulama Council was founded in 1975.  For the sake of simplicity, and to recognize this continuity, throughout this 
dissertation I refer to the council as the Acehnese Ulama Council. 
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national interest related to the spatialization of religious practice, the proper relationship between 
religious communities, and the specter of proselytization.  Of particular importance was the 
perceived threat of “Christianization” (I., Kristenisasi), a preoccupation of many national Islamic 
intellectuals and politicians of this period.  Narratives of Christianization mirrored narratives of 
Islamization in that they involved a model of the gradual conversion of the archipelago to 
Christianity.  However, as one might expect, Christianization was taken as a shadowy conspiracy 
by many Islamic intellectuals, who saw it as both a religious threat and a threat to the nation.  It 
is not insignificant that some of the very same non-Acehnese Islamic intellectuals who were 
invested in narratives of Aceh’s Islamic history (i.e., HAMKA) also were concerned with 
Christianization.  The Islamic Community of the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan, the provincial 
Acehnese Ulama Council, and writers publishing in national Islamic presses covering the 
controversies over wild churches in the late 1970s, all took Aceh as a central locality in their 
entwined narratives of Islamization and Christianization.  This suggests, again, the ways in 
which Islam, and especially histories of Islamization, tied Aceh to the nation for many 
Indonesians. 
Interreligious Tensions in South Aceh, 1968-1980 
 
 On August 18, 1978, two delegates, Muhammad Hamzah and Sabarin AS, appeared 
before the Acehnese Ulama Council in Banda Aceh in order to deliver a report entitled 
“Growth/Activities of the Christian Religion in the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan” (Ummat 
Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978c).  In the letter of explanation carried by the two men, 
Hamzah was identified as the head of an elementary school and the agent of an Islamic revivalist 
organization in Simpang Kanan, a sub-regency of South Aceh (Ummat Islam Kecamatan 
Simpang Kanan 1978b).  Aside from these details about the two men, the sources found in the 
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archive of the Acehnese Ulama Council held in Banda Aceh reveal only that they represented a 
group calling itself the “Islamic Community of the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan.”
57
  The 
reason for their visit, conversely, is abundantly clear in the multiple pieces of correspondence 
that accompanied the report the two men left with the ulama council following their meeting.  In 
March of the same year, four “wild churches” (I., gereja liar), buildings used for Christian 
worship without the proper permits, had been burned by what appear to have been angry groups 
of Muslim neighbors.  Hamzah and Sabarin had made the 500 kilometer trek along unfinished 
and frequently blocked roads to report on these church burnings. 
 Using Hamzah and Sabarin’s report, along with other correspondence and reports found 
in the same archival folder (Folder 234, Bundle 36 of the Archive of the Ulama Council of the 
Special Area of Aceh held in the Provincial Archive in Banda Aceh), one can reconstruct a 
decade of tensions leading up to the March 1978 church burnings.  The tensions revolved around 
migrant laborers who had crossed the Aceh-North Sumatra border from their homelands in order 
to engage in agricultural work in South Aceh.
58
  Most of these laborers were of Toba Batak 
ethnicity, but some were Karo as well.  Predominantly Christian, both Protestant and Catholic, 
these groups began to build churches that later were accused of being illegal because their 
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 Others had served this role on earlier occasions when the Islamic Community of the Sub-Regency of 
Simpang Kanan approached government officials at the regency level.  See, for example, Ummat Islam Kecamatan 
Simpang Kanan (1978a).  While presumably there may be some people alive who remember Hamzah and Sabarin’s 
mission, it was difficult for me to locate such people.  Simpang Kanan is south of the area where I had received 
permission to conduct research.  It was impossible to travel there to ask questions about these men without violating 
my research permit and, given the sensitive nature of the reasons for Hamzah and Sabarin’s visit in 1978 (i.e., the 
burning of four churches in the sub-district), potentially drawing the attention of local authorities.  Those with whom 
I was able to speak about the interreligious tensions of the 1970s, most from places near Simpang Kanan where I 
could conduct research, quickly changed the subject, telling me that they knew nothing about the topic. 
 
 58 Both Toba Batak and Karo peoples are thought of in Indonesia as being native to the mountain highlands 
of North Sumatra.  In post-colonial Indonesia they also have widely been thought of as being the indigenous 
inhabitants of North Sumatra as a whole, although, as will be seen in my discussion below of anti-Christianization 
polemics, this has been contested by those who feel the native Malay populations of North Sumatra’s coast have 
been pushed aside by their highland neighbors.  Today, most Toba Bataks and some Karo are Christian, but 
significant portions of both populations are Muslim.  In the period of the 1970s, many, if not most Karo, were not 
affiliated with any of the state-recognized religions, as will become apparent in what follows. 
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patrons never had acquired proper permits.  Further, local Muslim inhabitants began to suspect 
that at least some among these laborers were involved in Christian missionary activities. 
 There appear to have been at least three major periods of tension.  The first involved calls 
in the late 1960s by prominent Islamic organizations in South Aceh (i.e., Muhammadiyah, Partai 
NU, PI Perti) for the government to address the issue of illegal churches.
59
  These same 
organizations also objected to the promotion of non-Muslims as village and sub-regency heads 
(Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978c).  In July of 1968, a controversial article in the 
Medan printing of the national daily Sinar Harapan appeared, which, it can be assumed, 
discussed some of the tensions in the region.  The same coalition of Islamic organizations 
attacked this article for “damaging the good name of Aceh and [that of] a prominent Islamic 
religious teacher,” demanding that the article’s author, a priest named Dj. Sinamo, be brought 
before the local courts to answer for his defaming comments (Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang 
Kanan 1978c).
60
  This seems to have resulted in a November 1968 law passed at the level of the 
South Aceh Regency restricting church building and mission activities in the regency (Ummat 
Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978c).   
 The second round of tensions revolved around the building of a Catholic Church in 
Mandumpang, Simpang Kanan in 1975.  This church was opposed not only by local Muslims 
but, at least officially, by representatives of the Batak Protestant Christian Church (Huria Kristen 
Batak Protesten, HKBP) and a non-Christian group of indigenous practitioners whose practice 
was identified as “Pambi religion” (I., agama Pambi).  Whether or not this non-Muslim 
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 Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate an extant copy of this edition.  The priest may have been 
Catholic, or he may have been of the Batak Protestant Christian Church (Huria Kristen Batak Protesten, HKBP).  
Other churches implicated in the archival record of the events include the Indonesian Christian Church (Huria 
Kristen Indonesia, HKI) and the Indonesian Church of God (Gereja Tuhan Indonesia, GTI). 
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opposition reflected rivalries between Catholics and these other groups, or some sort of Muslim-
Protestant-Pambi alliance born of calculation or other circumstances, is unclear.  But in May of 
the same year the Governor of the province of Aceh, Muzakir Walad, banned the use of private 
homes as churches (Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978c). 
 The third period of tension, beginning in 1977, included several minor skirmishes, the 
trafficking of pig meat by Christians “in an open manner,” a new bureaucratic instruction issued 
by Governor Walad ordering that requests for new church permits in the province not be 
considered, and, finally, the church burnings of March 1978 (Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang 
Kanan 1978a, 1978c).  Despite the involvement of local authorities, a second round of church 
burnings and related incidents occurred in June of 1979 before the tensions seem to have faded 
(anonymous 1979b, 1979c). 
 My interest in the string of events that led to the 1978 and 1979 church burnings in 
Simpang Kanan lies primarily in the ways in which certain Muslim parties who became involved 
in the events, directly or through authoring representations of them, articulated the significance 
of these tensions.  While reconstructing these events in more detail and with greater accuracy is 
no doubt an interesting and worthwhile project, it is not my goal here.  Similarly, I have little 
desire to apportion responsibility for violence now over thirty years old, even if it remains a 
sensitive subject in contemporary Aceh.  On one level, my sources, primarily drawn from the 
Acehnese Ulama Council’s archive in Banda Aceh and writings published in national Indonesian 
Islamic presses, simply do not allow me to address these questions as effectively as I might.  
More importantly, I instead approach these materials as windows into local and national 
imaginaries that allow one to see how Aceh’s presumed place in Indonesian and Islamic history 
became central to issues of Indonesian national concern.  Before moving forward with this 
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analysis, I first must turn to some important aspects of the context in which controversies over 
the churches built by Christian laborers in South Aceh occurred. 
Religious Transformations in the New Order 
 By the time Hamzah and Sabarin found their way to the Acehnese Ulama Council in 
1978, much had changed in Indonesian political and religious life since Aceh had officially been 
recognized as a special area in 1959.  On September 30, 1965, an aborted coup attempt, alleged 
to have been carried out by factions within Indonesia’s large Communist party, resulted in the 
deaths of seven of the Indonesian military’s highest-ranking generals in Jakarta (Anderson and 
McVey 1971; Crouch 1988, 97-134).  This ushered in the end of Sukarno’s presidency, which, 
under pressure from both the army and the Communist Party, had become increasingly autocratic 
beginning in the late 1950s, precisely the period in which Aceh was gaining official recognition 
for its special place in histories of Islam and the nation (Crouch 1988, 43-68; Feith 1962).  The 
coup precipitated a blood bath in which five hundred thousand to a million people accused of 
being leftists or leftist sympathizers were murdered in mass killings throughout Indonesia 
(Anderson and McVey 1971; Crouch 1988, 135-244).  These killings helped to raise to power 
the military regime that came to be called the “New Order” (I., orde baru), led by the general 
Soeharto, who held the presidency until the beginnings of democratic reform in 1998. 
 Much has been written on the New Order, most of it focusing on its peculiar relationship 
to and deployment of dispersed forms of violence, its continuities with the colonial era, and its 
development of disciplinary discourses focused on local customary practice (I., adat), religion, 
and idealized notions of Indonesian social organization (Bowen 1986, 1989b, 2003; Florida 
1995, 1-51; Lev 1985; Pemberton 1994; Stange 1986).  Here I want to briefly highlight a few 
points about the early years of the New Order that are most pertinent to this chapter.  First, 
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following the killings of 1965 and 1966 many Indonesians who had previously practiced 
mystical and ritual traditions that were not, or only loosely, affiliated with Islam, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Hinduism, or Buddhism converted to one of these world religions (Kipp 1996; 
Ricklefs 2012, 138-150; Stange 1986; Steedly 1993).  The Indonesian state had recognized these 
five traditions as legitimate religions since independence.  But, in the years following the 
massacre of the Indonesian left, not to be affiliated with one of them carried potentially grave 
consequences, as it meant that one ran the risk of being taken as a leftist.  The charge was all the 
more potent when used against those who engaged in mystical practices not affiliated with a 
recognized religious tradition, usually identified as “beliefs” (I., kepercayaan), as in Java the 
Communist party had been widely associated with such mystical practices.  This rush to affiliate 
with one of these religious traditions continued for over a decade, as individuals and groups 
converted, sometimes in mass conversion ceremonies of entire villages.   
 At first glance, Aceh appears as a place where the above described scramble for religious 
affiliations would be a minor concern.  Ninety-eight percent of the Acehnese population was 
Muslim, with small Christian and Buddhist minorities in urban areas.  In 1965, one would have 
been hard pressed to find someone in Aceh who did not already profess one of the state-
recognized faiths.  Just across the Acehnese border in a region of North Sumatra known as 
Karoland, however, there lived large numbers of ritual practitioners, unaffiliated with one of the 
five state-recognized faiths.  Karo mystical practitioners had long been attracted to southwest 
Aceh, not infrequently converting to Islam during their travels, because of the presence of 
powerful Islamic mystical teachers there (Kipp 1996, 5, 215-223).  This pattern would take on 
new meanings following the massacres of the mid-1960s.  Indeed, as will become apparent 
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below, these Karos played a sometimes significant role in religiously-inflected spatial 
imaginaries of Indonesian Muslims following the rise of the New Order. 
 Another aspect of post-1965 political and religious life in Indonesia that unquestionably 
influenced Aceh was the creation of new and powerful bureaucratic institutions that arose from 
the violence of the mid-1960s.  Aceh played a prominent role in the development of such 
bureaucratic institutions, although to this point Aceh’s role has been relatively unrecognized 
(Feener 2013).  Aceh’s special autonomy in the fields of education, religion, and customary 
practice allowed it, ironically, to become a sort of experimental field for new methods of 
governmentality and bureaucratic apparatuses that would later be adopted by the New Order on a 
national level.  Here it is important to keep in mind that Aceh gained such autonomy through a 
deal brokered between local elites, including Ali Hasjmy, and the national government in a 
period just before the advent of the New Order.  This was the period when a steadily-weakening 
Sukarno was becoming ever more autocratic.  While many accounts have stressed a discontinuity 
between the Sukarno years and the New Order (Florida 1995, 1-51; Pemberton 1993), others 
have suggested important continuities across both periods and late-colonialism (Lev 1985).  It 
should come as little surprise, then, that Aceh’s autonomy, won during the final years of 
Sukarno’s presidency, came to facilitate the development of some of the New Order’s most 
potent bureaucratic forms. 
 What kinds of bureaucratic forms were developed in Aceh in the early New Order?  As 
Michael Feener has illustrated, bureaucratic institutions involved in the administration and 
socialization of Islamic discourses and practices frequently were developed in Aceh at this time 
(Feener 2012).  This was in large part because “religion” (I., agama) was one of the areas 
guaranteed autonomous administration under Aceh’s status as a special area.  The Acehnese 
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Ulama Council, to which Hamzah and Sabarin paid their visit in 1978, was one such 
organization.  The council was founded in Aceh shortly after the killings of 1965 and 1966.  The 
explicit rationale for its creation, still recognized in the founding myths circulated by its 
members today, was the felt need for an Islamic legal basis to justify the killing of suspected 
Communists, thereby tying the institution and the New Order to the same originating violence.
61
  
That this first Acehnese council became a model on which a national network of similar 
institutions was later developed, with branches at the national, provincial, regency, and sub-
regency levels, has remained an important part of the self-representations of the institution  
(Feener 2013).  The original Aceh council was absorbed into this national network, known as the 
Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), in 1975.  It remained a provincial 
branch of the Indonesian Ulama Council until it was granted autonomy in 1998 as a result of a 
new round of legal reforms in the province.   
 Other bureaucratic fields besides religion gained similar institutions from the Aceh 
“laboratory” as well (Feener 2012).  The “Aceh Development Board” (in English), a group of 
economic planners drawn primarily from Banda Aceh’s largest state university, was already 
claiming to be the predecessor to the national system of Planning Bodies for Development 
(Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, BAPPEDA) in 1976, just two years after 
BAPPEDA’s founding.  BAPPEDA would become perhaps the most powerful bureaucracy of 
the New Order, a political regime obsessed with economic development.  The Aceh 
Development Board routinely claimed in its yearly economic reports that the “success of this 
planning body (i.e., the Aceh Development Board)[…] was an example[…] for other areas in 
Indonesia.  The Presidential decision[… that] founded BAPPEDA throughout Indonesia, at its 
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 This was made clear to me in a meeting with a high-ranking member of the Ulama Consultative Council 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama, MPU), the current body claiming the mantle of the original organization.  See 
also Feener (2013) and Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama (2006, 1-6). 
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root[…] was based on the model of the Aceh Development Board” (Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Daerah Istimewa Aceh 1976).  Other New Order bureaucracies, while not 
claiming to have been founded in Aceh, came to play special roles there.  An Acehnese branch of 
the Union for Efforts at the Improvement of Islamic Education (Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan 
Pendidikan Islam, GUPPI), for example, was founded in Aceh in the 1970s as part of an effort to 
drum up support for the government during elections.  It came to be involved in efforts at Islamic 
outreach that were important to later Islamic legal reforms in the province (Feener 2013). 
 A third and final point related to the political and religious context relevant to my 
discussion in this chapter centers on the increasing suspicion that began to fester between many 
Indonesian Muslims and Christians following the advent of the New Order.  These suspicions 
manifested themselves in fears among some Muslims of what came to be called 
“Christianization” (I., Kristenisasi), a blanket term associated not only with proselytization, but 
with fears of neo-imperialist threats of which Christian missions were understood as the 
vanguard.  While such discourses predated independence, they became increasingly popular in 
the early New Order.  Protestants and Catholics increased their numbers by greater percentages 
than did Muslims following the killings of 1965 and 1966, and this may have compounded some 
Muslims’ fears regarding Christian missionary efforts (Mujiburrahman 2006).   
 Controversies over alleged Christianization became amplified in the national press, 
especially periodicals associated with prominent Islamic intellectuals such as HAMKA.  Anti-
proselytization laws that remained from the late Dutch period made it illegal to conduct mission 
work among a people who already belonged to one of the state-recognized religions.  These laws 
often were understood in territorialized manners, identifying certain regions, namely, those 
without large populations of Muslims, Christians, Hindus, or Buddhists, as possible mission 
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fields, while demarcating other territories as off-limits.  In nationally-circulating publications in 
the 1970s, public figures such as HAMKA and the former Indonesian prime minister 
Muhammad Natsir articulated their fears that wealthy and powerful Christian missionaries were 
targeting poor Muslims in areas where such activities were illegal (Natsir 1973).  These figures 
responded publically to events such as a 1967 controversy over the building of a Methodist 
church in Meulaboh, West Aceh (see Map 2), one of the earliest examples of national attention to 
allegedly illegal churches (Hefner 2000; Mujiburrahman 2006).  Mujiburrahman, in his study of 
Muslim-Christian relations during the New Order, takes this controversy as the starting point of 
the sometimes bitter polemics between Muslims and Christians that have come to characterize 
one major strand of Indonesian religious discourse ever since (Mujiburrahman 2006, 29-35).  
Addressing such controversies, intellectuals such as those mentioned above read them through 
the lens of Christianization, seeing them as religious and political threats to the nation 
(anonymous 1979a, 1979c; Mujiburrahman 2006, 29-35, 57-104; Natsir 1973).   
 Hamzah and Sabarin probably would have traveled through Meulaboh to reach Banda 
Aceh in 1978.  During fieldwork in the region, I found that the 1967 episode over the Meulaboh 
church remained one of the most important focal points of public memory.  Most Muslims, 
almost fifty years later, passionately defended the local government’s decision to refuse 
permission for a “new church” (I., gereja baru) in Meulaboh.  Catholics with whom I spoke 
recalled how, following the violence of 1965 and 1966, the church and school that they believed 
to have been fully legal were dismantled.
62
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 Mujiburrahman’s account identifies the Meulaboh controversy as being focused on the building of an 
illegal Methodist church, although he does record the involvement of the Indonesian Catholic Party in debates on the 
issue in the national parliament (Mujiburrahman 2006, 29-35).  There remains a large Methodist presence of 
predominantly Chinese-Indonesians in Meulaboh, who remain without an official church or other building for the 
conduct of ritual practice.  But Catholics, too, recalled in great detail how their church and school were rapidly 
dismantled over a period of several days in the late 1960s.  One of the reasons this episode has remained in public 
memory may be that it continues to be a live issue.  During my fieldwork, for example, Catholics were able to 
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Wild Churches in ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf’s Homeland 
 
 Keeping the above context in mind, one is better equipped to engage archival and press 
sources relating to the tensions that led to the church burnings of 1978 and 1979 in Simpang 
Kanan.  Less than two months after Hamzah and Sabarin’s visit to the Acehnese Ulama Council 
in August of 1978, the national level Indonesian Ulama Council sent a letter to Banda Aceh 
requesting information from the Acehnese Council about the church burnings earlier that year 
(Rimba 1978).  Attached to the letter sent by the Acehnese Ulama Council in response was the 
report of the Islamic Community of the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan brought by Hamzah and 
Sabarin.  The months after Hamzah and Sabarin’s visit, therefore, marked a point at which at 
least three self-consciously Muslim organizations, each operating on a different administrative 
scale, became involved in the controversies over the wild churches on Aceh’s west coast.  These 
were the Islamic Community of the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan, the provincial Acehnese 
Ulama Council, and the national Indonesian Ulama Council.  My analysis in this section will 
focus on the ways in which sources drawn from interested parties on each of these administrative 
levels described the problem of wild churches through interconnected geographic imaginaries 
linking Aceh, Islam, and Indonesia.  I begin with the Islamic Community of the Sub-Regency of 
Simpang Kanan.   
 Whether or not Hamzah and Sabarin had realized their report might make it into the 
hands of the Indonesian Ulama Council in Jakarta, it is clear that the organization they 
represented was attempting to address the tensions in South Aceh through making appeals up a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
secure an unmarked building for informal use by members of their community.  In private, many Catholics with 
whom I spoke understood this be a small victory in a decades-long struggle to regain their religious community’s 
lost buildings and property.  However, upon its opening, neighbors were already reported to be complaining about 
the founding of a “new church” (I., gereja baru) and the exact legal status of the building was being questioned 
publically.  Further, rumors spread rapidly that the new building had been built using funds for post-tsunami 
reconstruction from Catholic charities, something that, if not surprising, in this context carried with it the sinister 
connotations of the meddling of outsiders in local religious affairs. 
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bureaucratic chain.  Before sending Hamzah and Sabarin to Banda Aceh, the Islamic Community 
of the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan had asked for help from local authorities in South Aceh 
(Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978a).  Frustrated by what they took as a lack of 
response by these local authorities, Hamzah and Sabarin came to the Acehnese Ulama council 
with numerous pleas.  Primary among them was a request that the Council act to rein in the 
growing Christian presence in Simpang Kanan: “[W]e hope[…] that the growth and activities of 
the Christian religion in the form of the unrestrained outreach (I., dakwah liarnya) in Simpang 
Kanan immediately will receive attention and a positive solution that achieves religious harmony 
(I., kerukunan beragama)” (Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978c). 
 Of all of the extant sources on the incidents of Muslim-Christian tensions in South Aceh, 
the most detailed and descriptive are those that were generated by the Islamic Community of the 
Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan.  These materials, both the report submitted to the Acehnese 
Ulama Council and documents submitted to local authorities in South Aceh earlier the same 
year, are full of references, for example, to the regular trips Karo laborers were making through 
Muslim villages while carrying pig meat, the names of specific people involved in 
confrontations, and other details.
63
  Such details were tied to an extremely local knowledge of 
and interest in place and politics.  They were not repeated in the materials of the Acehnese 
Ulama Council or the national-level sources I discuss below, which tended to treat the problems 
in the sub-regency in a general manner through reference to anonymous actors at the sub-
regency, provincial, and national level.   
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 Pig meat is forbidden for practicing Muslims, and many Indonesian Muslims find being in the presence 
of pigs, dead or alive, repulsive.  In fact, the practice of pig farming is a recurring motif in Acehnese discourses that 
are meant to illustrate how religious others in Aceh have crossed lines of interreligious respect and decency.  Ali 
Hasjmy, for example, in an oral history interview recorded in 1974 and kept at the Indonesian National Archive in 
Jakarta, blamed the outbreak of the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s in large part on the personal habits of Batak 
military units stationed in Aceh.  These Bataks, he said, “sometimes bathed naked [in rivers…] and they ate pigs” 
(Hasjmy 1974).  Pigs featured prominently in at last one national-level formulation of the threat of Christianization 
along the Aceh-North Sumatra border, which I discuss in more detail below. 
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 Even more telling of the kinds of spatial imaginaries at play in these reports were certain 
references to history.  A June report to local authorities, for example, contextualized the church 
burnings in light of “historical background” that included, among the first two bullet points of 
the historical section, references to Aceh’s status as “the AREA OF MECCA’S VERANDAH 
since centuries past” and the “‘AREA OF CAPITAL’ for the struggle[…] for independence” 
(capitalized as in original) (Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978a).  The fourth bullet 
point in this section drew attention to the “blood of Acehnese MARTYRS (I., SYUHADA)… 
shed in the [national] struggle” (Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978a).  Later, the 
letter identified South Aceh as the birthplace of “Shyekh Abdurauf Syiak Kuala,” the last of the 
great sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Acehnese ulama prominent in the Mecca’s verandah 
narrative strand (Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978a).   
 Thus, within the first page of a four page report, the Islamic Community of the Sub-
Regency of Simpang Kanan had placed the tensions in South Aceh firmly within historical 
frames tied to three of the four narrative strands and toponyms described in Chapter 2.  They 
invoked two of the toponyms explicitly (i.e., Mecca’s verandah, area of capital) and evoked a 
third through references to martyrdom and the anti-colonial struggle (i.e., land of the Acehnese 
dagger).  The authors of the report, however, gave these narratives a distinctly local inflection, 
placing the alleged affronts of Christian migrants in “the land of Shyekh Abdurauf Syiak Kuala’s 
birth.”  This reference to ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf placed the specific territory of Simpang Kanan, and 
South Aceh more generally, within broader narratives of Aceh writ large that the Islamic 
Community of the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan clearly felt would move the authorities they 
encountered on their bureaucratic journey.
64
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 The rest of the June report described the encroachment of Christian laborers and missionaries into the 
region.  Given the prominence of the historical section of the report, however, it would be a mistake not to consider 
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 It is impossible to say, based on the extant sources, how the Acehnese Ulama Council 
responded to Hamzah and Sabarin’s visit.  The council already had been involved in attempts to 
address the influx of Christian laborers in South Aceh for several years.  In 1975, for example, at 
the time of an earlier controversy over the building of an allegedly illegal Catholic Church in 
Mandumpang, South Aceh, the Acehnese Ulama Council’s Commission on Research and 
Planning had issued a programming plan entitled “Overcoming the Problem of Christianization 
in the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan, South Aceh” (Komisi B Majlis Ulama Aceh 1975).  By 
the time the Acehnese Ulama Council turned their files on the church burnings of 1978 over to 
the national Indonesian Ulama Council in Jakarta, two months after Hamzah and Sabarin’s visit, 
the Acehnese Ulama Council’s head, Teungku H. Abdullah Ujong Rimba, seemed a touch 
exasperated by the on-going difficulties on the southwest coast.  He noted in his letter to the 
Indonesian Ulama Council that, “[we] have already made efforts to discuss the aforementioned 
problem with the provincial authorities but have yet to complete everything.  Please keep in mind 
the busyness associated with other duties.  But, God willing, we will continue again” (Rimba 
1978).   
 While it is unclear how the Acehnese Ulama Council responded to Hamzah and Sabarin’s 
visit, the documents associated with the 1975 programming plan make clear some of the spatial 
imaginaries at play for the council in the controversies over Christian presences in South Aceh.  
This plan of action was issued in response to a letter from the regency-level Ulama Council 
describing local concerns over Christian laborers and missionaries in Simpang Kanan.  The letter 
explained: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
how the narratives invoked in it placed the events in Acehnese history.  The report to the Acehnese Ulama Council 
delivered by Hamzah and Sabarin in August of 1978 did not contain as many references to Aceh’s history or South 
Aceh’s place in it.  However, the June report to local authorities was included along with the August report and was 
saved in the Acehnese Ulama Council’s files in the provincial archive in Banda Aceh. 
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[C]onsistent with its position next to an area in which Christians already have 
advantages/strengths (i.e., North Sumatra), the area of the sub-regency of 
Simpang Kanan has been made the center of activity for the followers of 
Christianity for all of the Regency of South Aceh[…]  [I]n the midst of Islam has 
been founded a church, even though Aceh itself absolutely consists of the Muslim 
community (I., umat Islam), and is a place where the substance of the Islamic path 
(I., syari’at Islam) is carried out.  (Budiman and Lubis 1975) 
   
 Note that this mention of the carrying out of the “the substance of the Islamic path” is a 
reference to Aceh’s special autonomy in religious affairs.  While not mentioning Aceh’s legal 
status explicitly, anyone associated with the Acehnese Ulama Council at this time would have 
understood the reference immediately.  The council’s own legitimacy was in part derived from 
this special legal status and such references were common-place in their own documents and 
literature.  Further, note the stark spatial contrast drawn in this complaint.  North Sumatra was 
identified as “an area in which Christians already have advantages/strengths.”  Aceh is a place 
that “absolutely consists of the Muslim community.”  The proximity of North Sumatra to 
Simpang Kanan is taken as both a logical reason for the tensions (i.e., “consistent with its 
position next to an area”) and an implicit threat.   
 Aside from the oblique reference to Aceh’s special legal status, the 1975 letter by the 
South Aceh Ulama Council made no mention of any of the toponyms associated with Aceh’s 
history.  It reflected a dry, bureaucratic language that was characteristic of New Order 
government sources more generally.  The proposed plan of action forwarded by the provincial-
level Acehnese Ulama Council’s Commission on Research and Planning was written in an 
equally bureaucratic style, and it made no explicit mention of any of Aceh’s claims to special 
status.  But both documents participated in another idiom of spatialized religious difference that 
distinguished between Aceh and North Sumatra.  This was the discourse of “Christianization” (I., 
Kristenisasi) discussed briefly in the previous section.  Both documents invoked Christianization 
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explicitly as a threat linking Aceh to the alleged efforts of Christian missions to convert Muslims 
elsewhere in Indonesia. 
 As mentioned briefly above, theories and fears of Christianization were widely circulated 
in Indonesia in the 1970s.  This occurred, among other means, through publications such as Panji 
Masyarakat.  In these publications Islamic intellectuals such as HAMKA and the former 
Indonesian prime minister Muhammad Natsir promoted the idea that Indonesia was threatened 
by an on-going process of missionary activity tied to neo-imperial threats.  While having a 
variety of iterations and forms (Mujiburrahman 2006), these discourses were unmistakably 
linked to spatial imaginaries of the nation that, in many ways, mirrored those underpinned by 
narratives of Islamization.  Christian missions were portrayed as originating elsewhere, either 
outside the particular region of Indonesia considered at risk or outside the nation altogether.  
These missionaries were identified as entering an Islamic part of the archipelago in order to trick 
or tempt Muslims into apostasy using financial resources, misleading information, seduction, or 
intimidation and force (Natsir 1973).  Success or failure in combating Christianization was 
articulated in terms of territorial integrity.  Losses in the battle with Christian missionaries rarely 
were expressed in terms of individual converts, but through the loss of regions to mission 
activities.  All of this was apparent in an article by Muhammad Natsir, published in Panji 
Masyarakat in June of 1973: 
Indonesia today, even more so since receiving independence, has become a target 
of Christianization efforts from all corners of the world.  From Europe, where 
there is the “World Council of Churches”[…] and from the Vatican[… and] from 
the United States[… from where come] Baptists, Adventists, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, “Student Crusade for Christ,” and others…  All of these come to 
Indonesia with resources from foreign peoples in the form of priests, religion 
teachers, and social workers[…]  They come here with modern tools for Christian 
propaganda[…] in fact even bible ships (I.., kapal2 penginjil) that come to[…] 
islands such as Lombok, Sumbawa, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and others[…]  
In regions outside of Java, such as Nusatenggara and Kalimantan, missionaries 
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already use modern communication devices[…]  Civil servants and postal workers 
receive “service” from missionary offices, especially in areas from East Kupang 
to Waingapu, twice a week[…]  The map that has just been published by the 
Council of Indonesian Churches[...] gives a picture of the Indonesian archipelago 
already divided up to become targets of not less than 41 Churches[…]  What is 
more[…] Catholic factions have also publicized a map, making it even clearer 




 All of the sources I have examined thus far in this chapter, including those of the Islamic 
Community of the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan, participated in this spatial imaginary of 
Christianization.  Hamzah and Sabarin’s report to the Acehnese Ulama Council, for example, 
made repeated mention of Christian missionaries, ministers, and priests “from outside the area” 
(I., dari luar daerah) and, in one case, “from overseas” (I., dari luar negeri) (Ummat Islam 
Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978a, 1978c).  One of the reports made explicit that these figures 
were coming “wildly across the Tapanuli-Aceh border” (I., secara liar melalui perbatasan 
Tapanuli Aceh) and asked the government to “immediately bring order” (I., segara menertibkan) 
to this influx (Ummat Islam Kecamatan Simpang Kanan 1978a).  Similar language ran 
throughout the documents of the Acehnese Ulama Council and its regency-level counterparts. 
 Returning to the 1975 plan of action of the Acehnese Ulama Council’s Commission on 
Research and Planning, the Commission proposed to “pursue as much objective data as 
possible,” all the while conducting preemptive “faith immunizations” (I., immunisasi akidah), in 
order to counteract the threat of Christianization in South Aceh.  These “faith immunizations” 
included providing sermons and other religious literature to Islamic officials at the local level, as 
well as other interventions in Islamic educational institutions in the sub-regency.  Keeping a 
medicalized idiom, the plan referred to the problem of “Christianization in Aceh” as an “abscess 
that although[…] treated with medicine[…] sometimes swells until it can be felt painful and 
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bothersome” (Komisi B Majlis Ulama Aceh 1975).  The medical metaphors of the action plan 
evoked a sense of invasion that was constitutive of the discourse on Christianization.   
 What emerges in the documents, then, is a fusing of two complementary spatial 
imaginaries, that of Aceh as historically and morally distinct from, but historically constitutive 
of, the rest of the archipelago, and that of an Indonesian nation under territorial threat as a result 
of Christianization.  The 1978 reports from the Islamic Community of the Sub-Regency of 
Simpang Kanan articulated the alleged encroachment of Christian laborers and missionaries in 
terms colored by evocative references to Aceh’s Islamic history and South Aceh’s specific place 
within that history as the birthplace of ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf.  The 1975 letters and reports of the 
provincial and regency-level Ulama Councils did not mention Aceh’s special history explicitly, 
but did so implicitly through invoking Aceh’s legal status.  Both groups of sources focused on a 
tide of Christian missionary activity taken as an instance of Christianization.  The history of 
Aceh as a special place and fears of Christianization came to be mapped onto the space of Aceh 
and North Sumatra, with the Aceh-North Sumatra border representing a boundary along which 
the moral valences of both discourses were brought into relief.  Note how in all the documents I 
have discussed, influxes of Christians arose from across the Acehnese border with North 
Sumatra.   
 How were the events in South Aceh received by wider networks of national-level 
religious activists and bureaucrats?  I have been able to find no evidence of actions taken by the 
national-level Indonesian Ulama Council once the file of materials I have discussed here was 
turned over to their care in October of 1978.  But a series of 1979 reports in the magazine Panji 
Masyarakat offers clues (anonymous 1979a, 1979b, 1979c; Fauzan 1979).  These reports reveal 
that in June of 1979 six more churches were burned and several other altercations between 
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Simpang Kanan’s Muslim and Christian residents occurred.  In the second half of 1979, a 
ceremony was held that consisted of a joint pledge of peace by Muslims and Christians, 
accompanied by exchanges of highly symbolic objects of regional ethnic identity, the Acehnese 
dagger (I., rencong) and the Batak ceremonial cloth (I., ulos) (anonymous 1979c).  National 
press coverage of this “customary practice ceremony” (I., upacara adat), said to have been 
attended by 6,000 people, attributed it to the intervention of regency-level authorities on both 
sides of the Acehnese border (i.e., the regencies of South Aceh, Central Tapanuli, and Dairi) 
(anonymous 1979c). 
 National press coverage of the controversies over wild churches involved spatial 
imaginaries similar to those described in the documents above.  These articles tended to stress 
territorialized and ethnicized identities that were tied to religious affiliation and marked by 
highly symbolic objects, such as pigs.  Consider the following, from an October 1979 Panji 
Masyarakat article: 
This is what has happened since Indonesia became independent.  Muslims have 
been sufficiently tolerant, for the sake of the Unity of the People, for the sake of 
the national Five Principles (I., Pancasila).  But beginning with the 1945 
Revolution, the lands of the Kingdom of Serdang (i.e., the area of the North 
Sumatran capital of Medan) have been colonized by our brothers (I., saudara-
saudara kita) from the Batak lands, followers of Christianity who are 
aggressive[…]  The method of this colonization was amazing.  Before colonizing, 
what was done first was the releasing of domesticated pigs into the land that 
would be colonized.  The native Malay population in those lands was forced to 
retreat… because of the feeling of repugnance at facing pigs[…] [B]ecause[…] 
the ones who colonized these lands also were participants in the Revolution[…  
Muslims] were afraid of being identified as “Contra-revolutionary [if they 
opposed Christians…]”  However, in their hearts[…] arose a question: “Is this 
really the meaning of religious harmony?”  [Namely], that the followers of 
another religion freely let their pigs roam, the founding of churches cannot be 
slowed down, while the founding of mosques in one’s own land and one’s own 
village is difficult?  Today churches are founded all the time, and there are also 
many pigs[…]  Now it is heard that this same method has been used as well in[…] 




 In this quotation the movement of Christian laborers into Simpang Kanan is described as 
the extension of strategies by Batak peoples to take over new territory from their Muslim 
neighbors in North Sumatra.  This plot was alleged in the article to hinge on the cultivation of 
pigs, which the article claimed were used to push Muslims residents from their homes.  Here one 
sees Christianization articulated as both a neo-colonial and territorialized process, expressed in 
distinctly ethnic terms.  Note the ways in which the quotation places the process it describes in 
the context of colonialism and the Indonesian nation.  Muslims had been reluctant to oppose their 
Christian “brothers” (I., saudara-saudara) because of their shared revolutionary struggle.  Yet 
the process of pushing Muslims from their homelands using pig cultivation is described using the 
same word as was used to indicate Dutch colonialism, that is, penjajahan (I.) 
 How was the relationship between Aceh and the nation described in national news 
coverage?  Consider the following, from a different October 1979 article: 
[T]hese new immigrants (i.e., Christians in Simpang Kanan), who have a different 
religion and customary practice, have not been able to adapt themselves to the 
population in the area[…]  Where ever these new immigrants live, they care for or 
raise pigs[… offending] the feelings and peace of mind of the population.  Aside 
from this they founded churches at an increasing rate[…]  Did not the Christian 
community[… elsewhere in Aceh] intend to found churches[…]?  But they 
respected the people around them and the laws of the Government of the Province 
of the Special Area of Aceh regarding its specialness (I., keistimewaannya): 
Education, Religion and Customary Practice[…]  The psychology of the 
Acehnese population is such that it is not certain an Acehnese will become angry 
if he is personally offended.  But if his religion is affronted, he will voluntarily 
sacrifice his life[…] to protect the sacredness of his religion and be known as a 
martyr[…]  (Fauzan 1979)  
 
 Note two complementary logics at work in the above passage.  On one hand, the 
quotation suggested that Indonesian Christians living in Muslim-majority regions were required 
to act in a way that did not offend the sensibilities of their Muslim neighbors.  This logic had 
been expressed as early as 1967 by the Indonesian Minister of Religion, Saifuddin Zuhri, 
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specifically in reference to the Meulaboh controversy described above (Mujiburrahman 2006, 
35-38).  It would go on to be a common refrain during Muslim-Christian tensions in different 
parts of Indonesia for decades to come, placing the onus on religious minorities to protect 
“religious harmony” (I., kerukunan beragama).  Religious minorities were expected to avoid 
upsetting the local majority by refraining from public displays of religious practice and identity. 
 But note also how the above formulation drew attention to the special characteristics of 
Aceh and the Acehnese.  Had not other Christians in Aceh wanted to found their own churches, 
yet decided against doing so because of Aceh’s special status?  This special status compounded 
the more general notion that religious minorities were responsible for maintaining religious 
harmony.  The author of the above quotation went on to buttress this argument through a 
psychologized rendering of the “land of the Acehnese dagger” narrative strand.  If Acehnese 
were relatively tolerant of personal insult, this author suggested, an affront to an Acehnese’s 
religion conversely was grounds for a vigorous, even violent, defense. 
 These quotations from Panji Masyarakat reveal that the fused spatial imaginaries of Aceh 
as a special place and Christianization as a threat to the nation were compelling beyond Aceh’s 
borders.  This reflected, in part, the same interests that brought non-Acehnese intellectuals to 
narrate histories of Aceh more generally.  Note how narratives of threatened Christianization 
paralleled narratives of Islamization, even as the former narrated a perceived threat to the 
historical process of Islamization that the latter purported to describe.  Narratives of 
Christianization created their own value-laden geographies of the archipelago, at times 
reinforcing and at times challenging the valences of the value-laden geographies inscribed by 
common narratives of Islamization.  Given Aceh’s central place in narratives of Islamization, it 
is little wonder that perceived threats of Christianization raised the ire of many of the same 
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intellectuals who took reversing of the valuations of Dutch narratives of Islamization to be an 
anti-colonial act.  The Acehnese border with North Sumatra became a place on which national 
attention to questions of religious pluralism, proselytization, and the place of Aceh in the 
Indonesian nation came to be focused.  The moral boundary separating Aceh from North 
Sumatra was doubly inscribed, once by Aceh’s seminal place in narratives of Islamization, and 
once by North Sumatra’s status as a perceived center of Christianization. 
Crossing Borders with the Acehnese Ulama Council in the 1970s 
 
 Perceived threats of Christianization in South Aceh were not the only thing in the region 
of the Aceh-North Sumatra border that drew the attention of the Acehnese Ulama Council and 
their national activist and bureaucratic allies in this time period.  On September 29, 1978, during 
the two months between Hamzah and Sabarin’s visit and the passing of the Acehnese Ulama 
Council’s documents on the matter to the Indonesian Ulama Council in Jakarta, one Berti 
Yuswar Lingga, a farmer from just south of the Acehnese border in the regency of Dairi (see 
Map 2), converted to Islam in Banda Aceh.  Witnessing this conversion were high-ranking 
members of the Acehnese Ulama Council, including Ali Hasjmy, then vice-chair, and Abdullah 
Ujong Rimba, then chair.  Rimba was listed on Yuswar’s certificate of conversion to Islam (I., 
surat pengislaman) as the one who “converted” (I., di Islam) Berti Yuswar (Surat Keterangan 
Memeluk Agama Islam 1978).  The certificate of conversion is signed by the head of the 
Department of Religion for Banda Aceh, placing the ceremony in that city and, given the profile 
of those serving as witnesses at the event (e.g., Ali Hasjmy), presumably at the grand 
Baiturrahman Mosque (Surat Keterangan Memeluk Agama Islam 1978).   
 Berti Yuswar, who took the name of Baktiar Yusuf at his conversion ceremony, was not 
the first convert from Dairi to have sparked the interest of the Acehnese Ulama Council.  Seven 
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years earlier, on March 8, 1971, one Nubung Sinulingga had taken the name Moehammad while 
converting at Baiturrahman (Surat Keterangan Masuk Islam 1971).  This conversion of a 
“customary chief” (I., kepala adat) from the religion of Perbegu, a sort of spirit cosmology 
adhered to by many Karo people, was publicized widely by the Acehnese Ulama Council, who 
contacted the local press and the Banda Aceh branches of the national radio and television 
stations in the weeks before and after Nubung’s conversion (Linga 1971; Rimba 1971a).  
Nubung’s coming to Banda Aceh with the intention of converting was first announced in a 
February 22, 1971 letter from the chair of the “Committee for the Building of the Gunungsajang 
Mosque-Madrasah” in Dairi (Linga 1971).  In this correspondence, the chair noted that Nubung 
was the “grandchild of a former supernatural teacher” (I., tjutju dari Guru… jang sakti dulu).  
With Nubung’s conversion to Islam, the Gunungsajang Mosque-Madrasah Committee was 
optimistic that the conversion of his followers and descendants, as many as five hundred 
households, would follow.
66
   
 The 1971 conversion of Muhammad Nubung Sinulingga seems to have involved the 
Acehnese Ulama Council because the convert was a part of a network of “new Muslims” (I., 
mualaf) from Dairi that had been fostering ties with Acehnese governmental agencies in support 
of their religious education and development.  In fact, the other points discussed in the letter 
from the Committee for the Building of the Gunungsajang Mosque-Madrasah announcing 
Nubung’s imminent arrival in Banda Aceh suggests the extent of these ties.  In it were mentioned 
the trials the committee had experienced when the chair took a brief leave of his position in April 
1970 and requests for “funding and resources” so that “our children, who have just entered 
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 This expectation that others would follow in Nubung’s footsteps was in part based on patterns of 
conversion to Islam and other religions in this period.  As discussed above, it was not uncommon in the years after 
the 1965 and 1966 massacres that entire villages or family groups would convert to one of the religions recognized 
by the Indonesian state.  See the description of HAMKA’s trip to Siberteng below.  On this pattern, as it related to 
the conversion of Christianity on Java, see Ricklefs (2012, 138-150). 
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Islam… are not as if blind in our religion” (Linga 1971).  The letter discussed a representative 
who previously had been sent from Dairi to Banda Aceh with the goal of gathering financial aid.  
In fact, as of June 6, 1971, after Nubung Sinulingga’s conversion had been publicized by the 
MUI, over six hundred thousand Indonesian rupiah, along with three pieces of “pure gold” and 
six hundred seventy-two pieces of mixed cloth, had been collected for the building of the 
Gunungsajang mosque and madrasah, all from the regencies of West and South Aceh 
(Sinulingga and Sinulingga 1971).
67
   
Further correspondence links the Acehnese Ulama Council with Karo converts in Dairi.  
From April until October of 1971, for instance, a series of letters was circulated between the 
Dairi Department of Religion, Dairi village heads, and various government offices in Aceh, 
including the Acehnese Ulama Council, the Department of Religion, and the Office of Religious 
Affairs.  These letters regarded Karo students who had been sent to religious boarding schools in 
Aceh, in particular the town of Tiro in Pidie, but who were in need of funds to support 
themselves and their studies (Kudadiri 1971; Rimba 1971b; Rimba 1971c). 
Dairi lies three-fourths of the way along what is now the Banda Aceh-Medan road on the 
west coast of Sumatra.  It is slightly further from Banda Aceh than the sub-regency of Simpang 
Kanan, from which Hamzah and Sabarin made the 500 kilometer trek in the same time period.  
Why were Acehnese Ulama Council members and other Acehnese officials so involved in 
supporting the new Muslims of a poor and rather isolated regency on the other side of Aceh’s 
border?   
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 These were substantial amounts, although not nearly sufficient for finishing the mosque and madrasah 
project.  For example, in a January 1971 letter a 20 by 8 meter housing unit for teachers that already had begun to be 
erected is identified as having cost 2,000,000 rupiah to that point.  The source does not indicate how much work was 
left to be finished on that unit (Sinulingga, Lingga and Setepu 1971). 
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Rita Smith Kipp suggests that Karo, who make up the majority of the inhabitants in Dairi, 
have long been attracted to Islam in small numbers as a result of their close proximity to 
Muslims living to their north and east.  The Karo stories regarding pre-colonial conversions to 
Islam that Kipp cites all contain protagonists from Aceh.  She suggests that links in the pre-
colonial period between small numbers of Muslim converts in Karoland, and their patrons and 
teachers in southwest Aceh, were strong (Kipp 1996, 5, 215-223).
68
  Seen in this light Acehnese 
Ulama Council support for new Muslims from Karoland can be understood as part of a broader 
history of conversion, patronage, and the seeking of education and other resources that have long 
connected Karo people with Acehnese.   
However, following the massacres of 1965 and 1966, Karoland came to hold a specific 
place in certain national imaginaries of legitimate mission fields in the post-massacre rush to 
affiliate with one of Indonesia’s five recognized religions.  Until this point, Karo largely engaged 
in ritual practices identified as Perbegu or Pambi.  Following the massacres of the mid-1960s, 
however, a large number of Karo began converting to Christianity, with a smaller group 
becoming Muslim.  Still others began efforts to have their indigenous practices recognized as a 
form of Hinduism (Kipp 1996, 215-223; Steedly 1993).  It is difficult not to see such patterns as 
they manifested in the 1970s through the lens of the spatial imaginaries described above, 
imaginaries that took the border between Aceh and North Sumatra to be a marker of qualitatively 
different kinds of places as a result of differing histories of Islamization. 
Returning to the pages of Panji Masyarakat, one finds an evocative 1979 description of 
Karo conversion.  In this article readers were taken on a ride along with an elderly HAMKA as 
he traveled to a conversion ceremony in the village of Siberteng.  HAMKA’s journey to the Karo 
                                                          
 
68
 For a related discussion of conversion into Islam among the highland peoples of North Sumatra as a 
means of participating in the political and economic life of Malay sultanates, see Steedly (1993, 51-52; 1996). 
 
130 
highlands, narrated by his traveling companion H. Amiruddin Siregar, included several features 
also found in the Acehnese Ulama Council archival sources regarding newly converted Karos in 
Dairi.  The remoteness of the village, the desire to build schools and mosques with the financial 
support of a sponsor from outside the region, and the linking of the conversion of the village 
head to the conversion of the village are all features of this narrative that would have seemed 
familiar to those Acehnese officials who were working with Karo converts in the early years of 
the 1970s: 
At 17:00 in the evening from Kabanjahe came a representative of the 
Coordinating Body for Islamic Da’wah in Karoland who wanted to invite Buya 
Hamka to personally conduct a conversion ceremony (I., pensyahadatan) for 200 
Karo families in the village of Siberteng, sub-regency Barosjahe Brastagi[…]  
They said very clearly that the road to the village of Siberteng was quite 
difficult[…  A]round 1967 the Karo population that was Muslim was about 
16,500 people, but now it had already reached more or less 65 to 73 thousand[…]  
Once [during the journey] the Toyota jeep flipped and I (i.e., the author) hit my 
head against a metal pole.  Luckily Buya sat in the front rather comfortably so that 
he could hold on tightly[…  W]e arrived in Siberteng at 11 and the ceremony 
immediately began[…]  In a choked-up voice Buya Hamka led Nikel Baros (i.e., 
the village head) in converting to Islam, and finally Buya gave his own name to 
Nikel Baros.  Buya said “I give my name ABDUL MALIK to become yours[…]”  
[E]ven I joined in the commotion and in fact shed a few tears[…]  The climax of 
the event was the profession of faith (I., pensyahadatan)[…  A sponsor] had 
already promised he would build a Mosque and a School for the village[…]  [T]he 
coming of Buya Hamka[…] had not been planned but was truly the will of God, 
so that Buya could spread Islam (I., meng Islamkan) in Karoland[…]  We left 




 I raise the example of the Acehnese Ulama Council’s support of Muslim converts from 
Dairi as another instance in which one sees a significant interest in the region of the Aceh-North 
Sumatra border among Acehnese and non-Acehnese Muslim elites.
70
  This interest again focused 
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 Buya is a title of respect that commonly was used in front of HAMKA’s name.  It continued to be used 
by many Indonesians at the time of my research.  Recall that “HAMKA” is an acronym for Haji Abdul Malik Karim 




 I should note that this interest was not limited to the southern portion of that border, near the sub-regency 
of Simpang Kanan and the regency of Dairi, the location on which I have focused here.  Interest in the southern 
border regions generated most of the extant materials in the Acehnese Ulama Council’s archive.  But the northern 
 
131 
on the religious affiliations of those living along and crossing, potentially or actually, this border.  
While no explicit links were made between the territory of South Aceh and the support of new 
Muslims in Dairi, for example, through claims that the support of new Muslims might stem the 
Christian presence in Simpang Kanan, the implicit links between the two are suggestive.  These 
links include those of proximity and circumstance (i.e., Karo were present in South Aceh in the 
period, new Karo converts might have traveled the same roads as did Hamzah and Sabarin in 
1978, etc.) and those related to underlying similarities in the ways in which both interreligious 
tensions in South Aceh and support for new Muslims in Karoland were carried out against a 
backdrop of new possibilities for Christian and Muslim missionary activity opened up by the 
advent of the New Order and set along the Aceh-North Sumatra border. 
Conclusion: Islamization and Christianization in an Indonesian Province 
 
 This chapter has examined a series of documents in the archive of the Acehnese Ulama 
Council from the 1970s.  These documents reveal an intense interest on the part of the council, as 
well as other parties inscribed in the sources, in the region along either side of Aceh’s southern 
border with the province of North Sumatra.  What has this treatment of the Aceh-North Sumatra 
border in the 1970s revealed that is of consequence for my larger discussion of space, time, and 
Islamic practice in Aceh in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries? 
 The concern shown by local, provincial, and national political actors regarding the 
presence of Christians in South Aceh in the 1970s could be taken as driven by what Timothy 
Cresswell has called a “moral geography” (Cresswell 2005).  Moral geographies consist of 
socially-recognized valences marking places as proper or improper for certain classes of people, 
objects, or activities (Bourdieu 1970; Cresswell 1996, 2005; DeRogatis 2003).  The interesting 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
portion of the Aceh-North Sumatra border, just south of the town of Kuala Simpang, also was a site of interest (see 
Map 2).  See, for example, the materials held in the folder entitled “Bundle (Regarding) Religious Followers at the 
Transmigration Project in Pernaram, Regency of East Aceh” (Folder 313, Bundle 56). 
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question in this case is how such a moral geography came to be inscribed on Indonesian territory.  
The answer to this question lies in the combination of common narratives of Islamization and 
people’s deeply-resonating experiential and affective relationships with the Acehnese past.  
These two factors allowed for the fusing of the idea of Aceh as a special place and the spatialized 
articulations of the threat of Christianization discussed above.  Further, these fused geographic 
imaginaries were compelling for a wide variety of social actors on local, provincial, and national 
levels because of how narratives of Acehnese history placed the province in a relationship with 
the Indonesian nation, marking Aceh as unique within, yet constitutive of, the Indonesian 
Republic. 
 Of particular interest to my discussion in this chapter is the way in which Aceh’s special 
status was linked to narratives of Islamization.  This is because the documents I analyze here all 
were tied to Islamic activism involving Islamization or the staving off of the perceived threat of 
Christianization.  Accounts of Islamization and Christianization represented parallel narrative 
forms, each relying on episodes that described conversion in terms of the progressive movement 
of Islam or Christianity through the archipelago.  In the course of Indonesia’s twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century history, narratives of Islamization and Christianization have jointly 
transformed and re-inscribed value-laden geographies of the archipelago, a point vividly made in 
the quotation by Muhammad Natsir above: “The map that has just been published by the Council 
of Indonesian Churches[...] gives a picture of the Indonesian archipelago already divided up to 
become targets of not less than 41 Churches.”
71
  Thus, controversies over wild churches in South 
Aceh, or interest in Karo converts on the other side of Aceh’s border with North Sumatra, 
represent phenomena in which assumptions about the intersection of Acehnese history, Islam, 
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and the Indonesian nation intersected with issues of national concern tied to religious pluralism, 
proselytization, and the place of religion in the national imaginary. 
 Remembering this helps to clarify the stakes of these controversies for the different 
groups who became involved in them.  For national Islamic elites like HAMKA and Mohammad 
Natsir, as well as many of those who read their works on the pages of Panji Masyarakat and 
other journals, alleged Christianization in Aceh was one in a series of assaults on the nation, a 
harbinger of imminent religious and political ruin that required a decisive response.  That such an 
assault was taking place on “Mecca’s verandah” must have appeared particularly threatening.  It 
was one thing to push Muslim Malays out of North Sumatra, a province widely recognized as 
Christian even in the 1970s even though Muslims made up a majority of its population.  But 
converting Aceh to Christianity, as unlikely a possibility as this may seem in retrospect, was an 
affront to the very font of Indonesian Islam.
72
  As such, it threatened to reconfigure the entire 
archipelago-wide map of valuations based on differential degrees and histories of Islamization. 
 Ironically, this point may have been made most effectively through an example that 
appears to be among the most local of expressions of the fused geographic imaginaries described 
in this chapter.  Recall that in their June 1978 report to local authorities in the Regency of South 
Aceh, the Islamic Community of the Sub-Regency of Simpang Kanan drew attention to the 
regency’s status as the birthplace of ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf.  Above I drew attention to how this claim 
rested on histories of Aceh as Mecca’s verandah that allowed authorities in Simpang Kanan to 
draw attention to their locality’s place in that narrative strand.  Yet ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf was not only a 
great mystic and religious scholar, but held the pedigree (I., silsilah) for the Islamic mystical 
order of the Syattariyah, expressed in genealogical form.  Many mystical teachers of this order in 
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the archipelago in later centuries traced their own pedigrees to him, thereby making ‘Abd al-
Ra’ūf a human embodiment of Islam’s transmission via Aceh.  The invoking of South Aceh as 
‘Abd al-Ra’ūf’s birthplace in the context of the controversy over alleged Christianization in 
Simpang Kanan was thus an extremely powerful example of the fusing of Aceh’s special place in 
the nation and the threat of Christianization, begging a suggestive rhetorical question: From here 
(Simpang Kanan) it (Islam) spread? 
 Those Indonesian Muslims who in the 1970s became involved in controversies over wild 
churches in South Aceh did so as Muslims acting within historical frames underpinned by 
narratives of the archipelago’s Islamization and what they perceived as the threatened reversal of 
this centuries-long process.  These historical frames undoubtedly inscribed a “web of 
associations and co-occurrences between persons, places, and landscapes” in which these Islamic 
practitioners took action (Shaery-Eisenlohr 2007, 534).  They did so out of an entwined sense of 
religious and national duty, one that rested on an orientation to a period of Islamic history not 
that of the Prophet Muhammad.  Further, recalling my analysis of Acehnese as living among the 
signs of history, there is every reason to believe that, rather than cynically justifying religious 
intolerance and interreligious violence through appeals to history, those Muslims involved in 
these controversies were motivated by deeply-felt connections to Acehnese place and Islamic 
pasts.  This, of course, should not be taken as a justification for their actions.  Nor should it 
suggest that all Indonesian Muslims responded to this configuration of Acehnese, Indonesian, 
and Islamic history in the manner that the Muslims described in this chapter did.  What it 
illustrates, however, is that embodied and emplaced narrative practices involving the narrative 
strands described in Chapter 2 could be tied to the participation of Acehnese and other 
Indonesians in the Indonesian nation through actions underpinned by spatial and temporal 
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Placing Islamic Reform in Context: 
Darul Islam, Histories of Islamization, and Nagan Raya’s Entangled Genealogies 
 
 
 This chapter turns to a historical ethnography of the regency of Nagan Raya.  It begins by 
focusing on two different ideal type schemes for dividing Muslims in Nagan Raya into groups of 
Islamic practitioners, both of which were utilized by residents of the regency in daily social 
practice.  The first scheme identified groups of Islamic practitioners based on the relative 
adherence of these groups to standards of reformed Islamic practice.  The second scheme 
organized Muslims through identifying their place in genealogical histories of Nagan Raya’s 
Islamization. 
 My description of these ideal types continues an illustration of how the narration of 
Islamic history in Aceh has created “web[s] of associations and co-occurrences between persons, 
events, and landscapes” that have infused narrative, social, and ritual practice with significances 
(Shaery-Eisenlohr 2007, 534).  Of particular importance to this discussion are two periods, the 
time of Nagan Raya’s initial Islamization, and the period leading to the Darul Islam rebellion of 
the 1950s.  Although Darul Islam had been over for almost fifty years at the time of my 
fieldwork, the context provided by the rebellion, and the ideal types that crystallized in the 
archival and oral histories of Darul Islam that I collected, continued to frame how residents of 
Nagan Raya described different groups of Islamic practitioners.  The same was true of the period 
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of Nagan Raya’s Islamization, which different people in Nagan Raya placed in different 
centuries, but which always contained the same basic narrative elements and historical figures. 
 The two ideal type schemes that are the object of this chapter reflected differences 
between Muslims in Nagan Raya.  These differences were not absolute and enduring but 
dependent on social context.  Nonetheless, they were assumed to be real by those living in the 
regency.  Even if most people whom I observed were eclectic in their religious practices, specific 
types of practice could be identified as being reformed or unreformed according to criteria that 
were recognized widely within the regency.  Similarly, certain individuals at the time of my 
fieldwork were recognized as belonging to specific patrilines that stretched back to the period of 
Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  The members of these patrilines, together with their followers and 
devotees, were understood to constitute a recognizable group.  Both of these schemes depended 
heavily on the historical periods of Nagan Raya’s Islamization and Darul Islam to produce their 
most powerful resonances.  They thus represented how Muslims in Nagan Raya were oriented to 
local Islamic pasts win ways that inflected their daily social practices. 
 The second ideal type system described here, which was based on genealogical ties to 
Nagan Raya’s period of Islamization, is of particular interest to the broader arguments of this 
dissertation.  This was in large part because of how it ran against the grain of the first, which 
grouped Muslims based on their relative adherence to Islamic reformist practice.  The use of 
standards of relative adherence to Islamic reformist practices has been a dominant, perhaps the 
most dominant, way in which anthropologists and historians of twentieth and twenty-first-
century Islamic reformism have understood Muslims to recognize differences between each 
other (Abdullah 1971; Bowen 1993b; Deeb 2006; Dhofier 1999; Geertz 1960; Kobo 2009; 
Laffan 2003; Noer 1973; Peacock 1978; Rasmussen 2010; Scheele 2007).  In these studies 
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genealogical idioms frequently have been treated primarily as instances of unreformed Islamic 
practice, associated with Islamic “traditionalism” and targeted by Islamic reformers of various 
kinds.  The genealogical imaginary described in this chapter, however, was shared by those who 
self-consciously identified as reformers as well as those who took an anti-reformist stance.  This 
allowed for the idiom of genealogy to cut across polemics of reform that had characterized much 
of mid-twentieth-century Islamic discourse in Nagan Raya.  Further, it illustrated how important 
genealogical idioms were to the ways in which Muslims in Nagan Raya placed themselves in 
relationship to the Islamic past.  
Three Key Historical Figures: Habib Muda, Zakaria Yunus, and Muda Waly 
 In Nagan Raya, the archival and oral histories that I collected about the Darul Islam 
rebellion tended to focus on three narrative protagonists: Habib Muda, Zakaria Yunus, and Muda 
Waly.  Each of these men represented their own institutional network of Islamic practitioners and 
adhered to greater or lesser degrees of locally-recognized standards of reformed Islam.  Further, 
two of these figures, Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus, were descendants of genealogical 
patrilines that were believed to stretch back to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  When 
narrators in Nagan Raya put forward histories of these figures’ activities during Darul Islam, 
these narrators rarely simply were telling stories about these men as individuals.  Instead, their 
histories revealed how narrators understood, or sought to inscribe, relationships between 
different groups of Muslims in the regency.  
Habib Muda  
 At the time of Darul Islam, Habib Muda (d. 1972) was the most prominent family 
member of the Habib Seunagan, the group of Sayyids described in Chapter 1 as being at the 
center of a ritual, mystical, and devotional complex of the Syattariyah Sufi order.  The archival 
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and oral historical records make it clear that by the time of the Indonesian Revolution, Habib 
Muda was already well-known as a mystically powerful and charismatic figure (Daud 2009; 
Njaksih 1970).  During my fieldwork, I heard countless stories of Habib Muda’s miraculous 
abilities, which included powers of healing and extraordinary sensory perception.
73
  Using a 
commonly circulating photograph, for example, more than one interlocutor showed me where 
Habib Muda was shot in the head by a Dutch soldier during the prolonged Dutch-Aceh War of 
the late nineteenth-century.  This occurred in his childhood.  However, Habib Muda felt no 
effects of the wound, living, according to a recently published biography, to the ripe old age of 
112 (Daud 2009).  His grave, located in the Nagan Raya town of Peuleukung, was one of two 
centers of ritual practice associated with the Syattariyah Sufi order, and drew daily visitors 
seeking the Sufi’s intercessionary aid, as well as tens of thousands of devotees at regular points 




 Zakaria Yunus (1906-1996), like Habib Muda a Nagan Raya native, was the figure most 
closely associated with reformed Islamic practice in oral histories of the mid-century that I 
collected during my fieldwork.  Yunus’ career as an Islamic reformer and educator had begun 
during the late-colonial period, when he traveled to Padang Panjang, several hundred kilometers 
south of Aceh on Sumatra’s west coast, to study with some of the most prominent circles of 
‘Abduh-inspired activists in the archipelago.  Upon returning to Nagan Raya in the 1930s, Yunus 
founded an Islamic reformist school in Jeuram (Controleur 1935).  In 1953, he became the leader 
of Darul Islam in Nagan Raya.  After the rebellion he held a high-ranking post in the Office of  
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 These abilities commonly are associated with particularly powerful and pure-of-heart Sufis, both in 









Figure 5: Inside of Habib Muda’s grave complex in Peuleukung, Nagan Raya 
 
Religious Affairs (I., Kantor Urusan Agama) for the regency.  I spoke with several former 
reformist activists, men and women in their sixties, seventies, and eighties, who remembered 
Yunus with deep respect and fondness.  It was clear that a good portion of their enthusiasm for 
reformist activism had derived from respect for this man.  At least one man who remembered 
Yunus said as much, noting that a recent decline in interest in reformism had begun with Yunus’ 
death in 1996. 
Muda Waly 
 The third figure who featured prominently in histories of Darul Islam in Nagan Raya was 
the Sufi and scholar Muda Waly (1917-1961).  Muda Waly lived, taught, and died in Labuhan 
Haji, in the regency of South Aceh.  However, his influence at the time of my research expanded 
throughout Aceh as a result of generations of students who had studied at the network of Islamic 




Figure 6: Plaque commemorating Perti’s presence in Aceh 
 
 
 In Nagan Raya, Muda Waly’s influence began in the early 1950s.  At that time, several of 
Muda Waly’s students who originated from the area around the Nagan Raya village of Nigan 
(see Map 3), returned home from their studies at Muda Waly’s boarding school in South Aceh.  
Beyond his network of intellectual protégées, Muda Waly’s influence was due in part to his 
founding, in 1940, of an Acehnese branch of Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti), a nominally 
national group of politically organized anti-reformists.
75
  This affiliation with Perti has remained 
a central part of his legacy.  Some of his intellectual descendants have even secured a monument 
commemorating Perti’s Acehnese branch, located in Muda Waly’s hometown of Pawoh, South 
Aceh (see Figure 6). 
The Terms of Reform in Nagan Raya 
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 This was part of a wider expansion of Perti’s influence in areas of Sumatra outside of the west coast 
region of Minangkabau, an expansion that frequently went hand-in-hand with affiliation with the Naqsyabandi 
mystical order.  See van Bruinessen (2007, 99). 
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 Like in much of the archipelago, Islamic reformers in Nagan Raya in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries have been inspired by stands of Islamic reformist thought traceable to the 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century figures Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā (Bowen 
1993b; Geertz 1960).  ‘Abduh and Riḍā are best known their attempts adopt particular forms of 
rationalist inquiry within Islamic intellectual traditions.  Further, they advocated for a return to 
the direct interpretation of Islamic scripture, thereby circumventing the legal methods and 
decisions established in Sunni Islam’s four major schools of jurisprudence.  However, precisely 
how ‘Abduh and Riḍā’s influence has affected the goals and actions of Islamic reformers since 
the late nineteenth century has varied markedly from place to place and in different time periods.  
What have been the aims of Islamic reformers in Nagan Raya in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries?  Oral histories of the high water mark of Islamic reform in the regency, which 
occurred between 1930 and 1960, offer answers to this question. 
 There were several aspects of mid-twentieth century Islamic reformism that recurred in 
oral histories offered to me by people in Nagan Raya, both those who considered themselves 
sympathetic to the goals of ‘Abduh-inspired reform and those who considered themselves 
opposed to these goals.  One female reform activist, Ibu Kadidjah, remembered traveling to 
Nagan Raya’s villages in the 1950s in order to teach women how to do their five daily prayers.  
“All they knew was how to recite ‘There is no god but God’ over and over again!  They could 
not do the five daily prayers!” she exclaimed to me.   
 For women such as Ibu Kadidjah, engagement with Islamic reform was in large part 
about helping villagers learn to complete their daily obligations.  Her reference to the repetitive 
recitation of “There is no god but God” suggested a second target of reformed practice in Nagan 
Raya, i.e., the mystical practices of both the Habib Seunagan and the Naqsyabandi.  Such 
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practices, including the recitation of litanies, came under the scrutiny of reformers of the 1930s 
to the 1960s.  Aside from an emphasis on the repetition of prescribed litanies, which reformers 
suggested distracted practitioners from their obligatory prayers, the devotion that participants of 
Sufi orders showed towards their teachers was something that reformers took as easily leading to 
idolatry through inserting a human mediator between practitioners and God. 
 When distinguishing their general religious outlook from groups such as the Habib 
Seunagan and Naqsyabandi, there were two powerful oppositions to which ‘Abduh-inspired 
reformers in Nagan Raya tended to return.  Again consider the words of Ibu Kadidjah: 
The difference between Muhammadiyah and Muda Waly (i.e., the Naqsyabandi) 
was only the question of having a school or not having a school (I., bermazhab-
mazhab aja)[…. Muhammadiyah] left behind what was recommended (I., sunnat-
sunnat).  [Muda Waly] made what was recommended obligatory (Ac. and I., 
meungnjò sunnat, diwajibkan).  For Muhammadiyah what was recommended 
could be left behind.  For Muda Waly, Islam was about the hereafter (I., akhirat).  
Muhammadiyah was concerned with this world (Ac., dōnja) and the hereafter[…]   
 
 In this quotation, Ibu Kadidjah distinguished between Muhammadiyah, the reformist 
organization in which she was an official member, and Muda Waly, the most important figure in 
the branch of the Naqsyabandi Sufi order that became popular in Aceh in the 1940s and 1950s.
76
  
She first did so by suggesting that the major question separating the two was one of whether or 
not these groups “had a school” (I., bermazhab-mazhab).  This referred directly to an ‘Abduh-
inspired rejection of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, in this case the Syafi’i school which 
had long been dominant in the archipelago.  Ibu Kadidjah’s suggestion that Muda Waly “made 
what was recommended obligatory” was part of a critique of the four schools of jurisprudence, 
namely, that these schools had accumulated legal precedents that were inconsistent with what 
actually was required in Islamic scripture.  Similar language was used regularly by people in 
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 Presumably, Ibu Kadidjah would have been a member of Muhammadiyah’s women’s wing, Aisyiah, 
rather than Muhammadiyah itself. 
 
144 
Nagan Raya to distinguish between reformers, who were said “not to have a school of 
jurisprudence” (I., tidak bermazhab), and their opponents, who were said “to have a school” (I., 
bermazhab).    
 The second way in which Ibu Kadidjah distinguished between Muhammadiyah and the 
Naqsyabandi was by suggesting that members of the Naqsyabandi were not interested in “this 
world” (Ac., dōnja), but simply “the hereafter” (I., akhirat).  At the time of my fieldwork, this 
opposition remained a major point of contention between reformers and those whose practice 
reformers found objectionable.  But note that the accuracy of the characterization was not 
contested.  Instead, it was the effects of these two different orientations that were at issue.  
Members of the Naqsyabandi, for example, did not reject the proposition that “Islam is about the 
hereafter.”  Instead, they charged that the orientation to the world characteristic of ‘Abduh-
inspired reformers had led reformers to seek worldly power and, as a result, to cooperate with the 
late-colonial regime.  Reformers leveled a parallel accusation against the opponents of Islamic 
reformism, claiming that an unreformed emphasis on the hereafter had resulted in a lack of will 
to effectively oppose the Dutch.  One reformer, Bapak Jami, even went as far as to suggest that 
this emphasis on the hereafter was itself a colonial conspiracy: “It was the Dutch orientalist 
Snouck Hurgronje who taught traditionalists (i.e., opponents of reformism) to seek the hereafter.  
Divide-and-conquer!  That was the Dutch strategy.”
77
 
The Peak of Islamic Reform in Nagan Raya, 1930-1960 
 It is telling that contestation over contrasting orientations to the world and the hereafter 
focused on the late-colonial period.  At the time of my fieldwork, many men and women who 
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 The ways in which ideas of “this world” and “the hereafter” were employed to make this opposition 
between reformers and their opponents was not necessarily characteristic of how these ideas were invoked in other 
contexts.  Chapter 5 examines how orientations to the world and the hereafter inflected ideas about proper ethical 
pursuits irrespective of Islamic practitioners’ stances towards Islamic reform. 
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saw themselves as sympathetic to projects of Islamic reform waxed nostalgically about the 1930s 
through the 1960s.
78
  In Nagan Raya, like in much of the rest of Aceh, this was a period in which 
open debate ensued between Islamic reformers and the Muslims who were the objects of reform 
efforts (Bowen 1993, 21-32; Feener 2013).  My interlocutors saw it as a time in which reformed 
styles of religiosity were on the rise.  They contrasted this with recent decades in which zeal for 
Islamic reform had declined.  Consider the following quotation by Haji Mustafa Ahmad, a high-
ranking official of the Muhammadiyah organization: 
The history of Muhammadiyah [on Aceh’s southwest coast] begins in the time of 
the Dutch.  Muhammadiyah was not accepted at first.  People have schools of 
jurisprudence (I., bermazhab) here.  But Muhammadiyah goes right to the Qur’an 
and words and deeds of the Prophet[…]  Eventually Muhammadiyah was 
accepted.  This was all happening in the 1930s.  There were branches everywhere, 
in each sub-regency[…]  It is true that Muhammadiyah has declined [in recent 
years…] there are not enough Muhammadiyah cadres [today]. 
 
 Haji Mustafa’s quotation, solicited during an oral history interview that I conducted at his 
house, noted both the growth of Muhammadiyah in the 1930s, and its subsequent decline in 
recent years.  This was characteristic of much of the discourse that I heard during my fieldwork 
in Nagan Raya, which took reformed religious sensibilities and activism to have been at their 
height around the middle of the twentieth century. 
 Oral histories I collected from men and women in their seventies and older were full of 
references to the mid-century period of confrontation between reformers and their opponents.  
Among the most common leitmotifs of these oral histories were versions of stories of pitched 
debates in which well-known figures associated with reformist and anti-reformist camps would 
discuss publically the issues of the day.  These pitched debates predominantly focused on 
kandoeri, the ritual feasts that laid at the heart of daily ritual practice in Nagan Raya.  
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 This included both men and women who could remember parts of this period themselves, and those who 
could not but who recalled the events as they had heard them repeated. 
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  Reformers found kandoeri to be economically wasteful, and thus irrational, as well as an 
accretion to proper Islamic practice authorized by Islamic scripture.  The opponents of reformers 
took kandoeri as central to village reciprocity, an important way to generate heavenly reward for 
oneself and one’s relatives, and authorized by scripture through appeals to the Syafi’i school of 
Islamic jurisprudence.  Debates about kandoeri revolved around some of the central issues raised 
by polemics of Islamic reform in Nagan Raya: the status of the four schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, orientations to the world and the hereafter, styles of rationalism, etc.  In 
recollections of these pitched debates, my interlocutors rarely remembered the details of the 
arguments forwarded by their participants.  However, both those who identified as sympathetic 
to reformers and those who opposed them remained thoroughly convinced that their own 
position had carried the day.
79
   
 If self-identifying reformers were nostalgic for the 1930s through the 1960s, their anti-
reformist rivals spoke of the period with far more trepidation.  These included both the followers 
of the Habib Seunagan and participants in Naqsyabandi ritual practice.  They spoke disdainfully 
of reformist activists in the period who attempted to alter daily village rituals and eliminate 
mystical practices.  While opponents of reformism asserted that it had been their intellectuals 
that won the pitched debates of the 1930s and 1940s, it was clear that the three to four decades 
that represented the height of ‘Abduh-inspired reformism were ones in which the followers of the 
Habib Seunagan and Naqsyabandi felt themselves to be on the defensive.  This sense only 
increased with the outbreak of the Darul Islam rebellion. 
Darul Islam: A Quarrel among Religious Scholars 
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 Compare this to Bowen’s account of oral histories of similar events in the Gayo highlands in the same 
time period (Bowen 1993b, 22-31). 
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 With the advent of Darul Islam in 1953, the confrontations of the 1930s moved from 
pitched debates to open violence.  Recall that Darul Islam arose in Aceh as a result of a series of 
factors that included the commitment of some activists to the ideal of an Islamic state, general 
discontent over Aceh’s loss of provincial status, and many Acehnese people’s sense of 
marginalization at the hands of a Javanese-dominated national government.  In addition, the 
conflict came to be inflected in important ways by reformist and anti-reformist polemics.  This 
was especially the case in Nagan Raya. 
 At the provincial level, Darul Islam was led by Daud Beureueh, undoubtedly the most 
dominant ‘Abduh-inspired Islamic reformer of the period.  In Nagan Raya, it was Zakaria Yunus 
who served as Darul Islam’s top leader, thereby tying the rebellion locally to Yunus’ own 
networks of Islamic reformist activists.  Conversely, the most vehement opposition to Darul 
Islam at the provincial and regency levels was voiced by a coalition of religious leaders that 
included Muda Waly and Habib Muda.  This coalition joined together in endorsing a legal 
opinion authored by Muda Waly that condemned the rebellion and its leadership on the basis that 
according to Syafi’i legal precedent it is abominable to rebel against a legal political authority, 
which the opinion took the Indonesian president Sukarno to be (Daud 2009; Waly 1993).  Thus, 
the most important Islamically-learned figures at both the Acehnese provincial and Nagan Raya 
regency levels split on the question of whether to support or oppose the rebellion, and they did so 
along lines that reflected their stances towards ‘Abduh-style reformism. 
 The anti-Darul Islam coalition, of which both Muda Waly and Habib Muda were a part, 
is of particular importance for understanding how those in Nagan Raya came to understand Darul 
Islam to be inflected by reformist and anti-reformist polemics.  This coalition was careful to 
fashion itself a union of traditional and Sufi scholars, rhetorically contrasting their practice and 
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pedigree to the reformist leaders of the rebellion.  The anti-Darul Islam coalition consciously 
crafted this self-fashioning in a manner that depended upon widely-recognized markers of 
unreformed Islamic practice.  These markers of unreformed practice were employed in conjoined 
political and religious acts that both expressed opposition to Darul Islam and highlighted the 
contrasting religious sensibilities of the rebellion’s leadership. 
 Chief among these acts was the legal opinion Muda Waly put forward.  It condemned 
Darul Islam on the logic that supporting imperfect, even corrupt, political leadership was 
preferable to the risk of anarchy that arose when Muslims took up arms against the state.  
Because the opinion rested on Syafi’i jurisprudence, it highlighted the differing legal orientations 
of the anti-Darul Islam coalition and the leadership of the rebellion, the latter of which explicitly 
rejected the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence.  Further, it was consistent with a stereotype of 
unreformed Islamic legal practice as adhering to arcane jurisprudential form over legal and 
political substance.   
 A second example entailed oaths of allegiance through which Muda Waly’s followers 
simultaneously pledged their loyalty to the Indonesian nation and their mystical teacher (Ansah, 
Halimi, and Wali Elchalidy 1958; Wali Elchalidy 1958).  These oaths merged the bonds forged 
between citizen and nation with those of Sufi master and disciple.  For mystical teachers such as 
Habib Muda and Muda Waly, as well as their followers, the bonds between teacher and disciple 
were idealized as absolute and unbreakable.  Reformers, conversely, found such bonds to 
inappropriately place a human teacher between the individual seeker and God.  These oaths of 
allegiance, therefore, simultaneously recruited people to the anti-rebellion camp while drawing 
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 At the time of my fieldwork in Nagan Raya, the conjoined political and religious stance 
forwarded by Muda Waly and Habib Muda in opposition to Darul Islam remained a salient 
aspect of collective memories of the 1950s and early 1960s.  Further, for Habib Muda and Muda 
Waly’s followers, these memories also revealed the broader sense noted above that the 1930s 
through the 1960s was a time when non-reformed leaders and practices were under attack.  I 
repeatedly heard Muda Waly’s followers, for example, tell versions of a story about 
assassination attempts carried out against their revered teacher.  The following, which I recorded 
from one of Muda Waly’s close personal associates, Teungku Adnan of Bakongan, was typical: 
There were a lot of happenings that showed he (i.e., Muda Waly) held special 
abilities (I., kelebihan)[…]  Once[…] [b]ecause he wasn’t on good terms with DI-
TI, they planned to kill him[…]  [T]he leadership of DI[…] sent someone to shoot 
him.  He (i.e., the would-be assassin) brought a weapon and[…] climbed a 
coconut tree.  It just so happened that every day after dawn prayers, he (i.e., Muda 
Waly) sat below that coconut tree.  He recited prayers.  He read his holy books.   
 
 In stories such as these, Muda Waly became the target of violent attack by the Darul 
Islam guerrillas that he opposed.  But note how Teungku Adnan’s story went on to draw 
attention to features of Muda Waly’s practice that distinguished him from Darul Islam leaders, 
and the relationship of these features to his miraculous survival and the repentance of his would-
be assassin:   
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 Examples of these oaths are found in the Acehnese provincial archive in Banda Aceh.  However, none of 
the oaths kept there are signed.  Instead, they are in the form of fill-in-the-blank form documents.  Thus, I cannot be 
certain that such joint oaths were ever administered.  Nonetheless, based on the rest of the documents in the archival 
bundle (Secretary of the Special Area of Aceh (1961) Folder 194, Bundle 11), it is clear that they were created in a 
period in which Muda Waly was advising local authorities regarding the encroachment of Darul Islam guerrillas into 
South Aceh.  In fact, based on these documents, Muda Waly was quite adamant that the provincial government 
authorities were not doing enough to protect members of his institutional network despite his followers’ loyalty to 
the Indonesian Republic, and that this might force locals in the region to take matters into their own hands.  I thank 
Michael Feener for bringing these oaths to my attention. 
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The person in the tree (i.e., the would-be assassin), he wanted to shoot.  But the 
gun would not fire.  It would not fire!  So it could not happen.  He (i.e., the 
would-be assassin) wanted to come down.  But that could not happen either[…] 
he was stuck in the tree!  His hand would not let go.  So he asked for help: “Help!  
Help!”  “What’s that?” [Muda Waly said.]  He (i.e., Muda Waly) was reading his 
holy books.  “Who is that that is asking for help?”  He asked his students, “Who is 
that?”  His students replied, “There is someone in the coconut tree.  He is asking 
for help.”  “Well help him!” [Muda Waly replied].  “But we cannot help him, 
Father.”  “Why not?”  It was like I said, he was stuck in the tree.  “We will recite 
litanies,” said the students[…  When that did not work, Muda Waly said] “Oh, 
God the Most High must be very angry with him.”  He (i.e., the would-be 
assassin) asked specifically that Father (i.e., Muda Waly) come[…]  Finally, 
[once Muda Waly had come to the tree himself,] the man in the tree was able to 
come down.  He came down and asked for forgiveness.  He said, “I was ordered 
to kill you, Father.”  [Muda Waly asked] “Who ordered that?”  “Our father and 
leader.  But when I tried to shoot you, the gun would not fire and I got stuck in the 
tree[…]”  [Muda Waly] forgave him his sin[…]  “I do not have enemies.  You 
have many,” he (i.e., Muda Waly) said.  After that he (i.e., the would-be assassin) 
wanted to go home[…] he repented and he sought the Sufi way.  After that he 
went home.  (Another interviewer asks: “He was given a mystical lineage also?”)  
Yes[…] for the Naqsyabandi path.  He took it back to his father, the leader of DI-
TI.  (Chuckles.)  
 
 ‘Abduh-inspired reformers in Nagan Raya who complained to me about the mystical 
practices of the intellectual descendants of Muda Waly often did so by drawing attention to the 
allegedly irrational beliefs underpinning these practices.  Muda Waly was saved in Teungku 
Adnan’s story by virtue of miraculous powers explained only in terms of the will of God (i.e., 
“Oh, God the Most High must be very angry with him.”).  The books (I., kitab) Muda Waly read 
in the story were no doubt those of the intellectual tradition he propagated.  His students 
attempted to bring the would-be assassin out of the tree by reciting litanies.  And upon repenting, 
the would-be assassin joined the Naqsyabandi mystical order and brought the Naqsyabandi’s 
mystical lineage back to the leader of Darul Islam, a clear reference to Daud Beureueh.   
Teungku Adnan’s story, and others like it, was rich and multivalent.  However, one of the things 
it undoubtedly illustrated was that the efforts of the anti-Darul Islam coalition to portray Darul 
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Islam in terms of a conflict between reformist and anti-reformist religious networks remained 
salient well into the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
The Decline of Polemics of Reform After 1962 
   One reason I have drawn my descriptions of Islamic reform in Nagan Raya from oral 
histories of the period of the 1930s to the 1960s is because people I knew in Nagan Raya most 
often described the differences between reformed and unreformed Islamic practitioners, through 
referencing this period of confrontation.  This was, in part, because the confrontations between 
‘Abduh-style reformers and the Islamic practitioners whom they attempted to reform had been 
on the wane since the end of Darul Islam in the 1960s.  Some reformers suggested to me that this 
had been the result of the death of Zakaria Yunus in 1996, or the lack of effort on the part of 
reformers to attract and train new cadres in recent decades.  However, there were other reasons 
that the intense disagreements of the 1930s through the 1960s had faded. 
 Some people with whom I discussed the reluctance of Muslims in Nagan Raya to engage 
in public arguments over the issues that had once defined Islamic reformist and anti-reformist 
polemics suggested that this reluctance was the result of a decision by the Acehnese Ulama 
Council that effectively barred public discussions of “divisive opinions” (I., khilafiyah).  I have 
yet to find evidence of an official decision to this effect.
81
  However, the archive of the Acehnese 
Ulama Council is full of references to the inappropriateness or illegality of discussing divisive 
opinions in public.  It is clear from these sources that the council, beginning in the 1970s, was 
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 See also a brief reference to a similar decision regarding public discussion of divisive opinions by 
Muslims in the Gayo highlands in Bowen (1993b, 18-21).  In the instance described by Bowen, it is a 1948 opinion 
of PUSA declaring certain funerary practices as forbidden that is cited by a man engaged in an argument with a 
friend.  According to this man, the same opinion also outlawed discussion of divisive opinions.  The text of the 
opinion, however, makes no mention of the impermissibility of discussing divisive opinions (Abdurrahman, Amin, 
Berueuh and Indrapuri 1948).   
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putting pressure on reformists and their rivals to tone down the tenor of their polemics.  These 
efforts reinforced New Order attempts to dampen publically visible argument and dissent.   
 Such efforts were not entirely successful.  In 1970, for example, Muda Waly’s son and 
biographer, Muhibbuddin Waly, visited Habib Muda in his home village of Peuleukung after 
returning from studies in the Middle East (Hasan 1970).  In his public comments on this 
occasion, which also symbolically renewed the ties between the two families established during 
Darul Islam, Muhibbuddin drew attention to a range of practices attacked by reformers, most 
importantly kandoeri held at funeral feasts.  Muhibbuddin claimed to have seen such practices 
carried out by religious scholars in the Middle East, thus suggesting their legitimacy.  Concerned 
regency government informants identified Muhibbuddin’s speech as full of “divisive opinions,” 
but no record exists showing if Muhibbuddin was ever made to suffer any consequences for this 
breach (Hasan 1970).   
 Nonetheless, as one moves chronologically through the archival record for Nagan Raya, 
such altercations become less common, and they hardly feature at all in the oral histories that I 
recorded in the regency.  The reaction of the majority of the ‘Abduh-style reformers with whom I 
discussed a reformed preacher named Zulkarnainy was telling.   
 Zulkarnainy, a native of South Aceh, delivered at least two public sermons in Nagan 
Raya in 1962, and lived near Jeuram at that time.  His sermons resulted in several altercations, 
and even a fist fight, all precipitated by his thinly-veiled attacks on the Habib Seunagan (Arsjad 
and Basa 1962; Musa and Idham 1962).  However, some of the very same people who waxed 
nostalgically about the confrontations of the 1930s through the 1960s, and lamented the decline 
in reformist activism since this period, attempted to distance themselves from this man.  “He 
Zulkarnainy was too bold,” Haji Mustafa told me, “and did not respect the peace.” 
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 This suggestion that reformist and anti-reformist polemics might threaten the peace was 
not simply New Order discourse.  It had a clear evidentiary basis given the history of 
confrontation and conflict previously described.  Awareness of this history of open confrontation 
seemed to permeate efforts by reformists in Nagan Raya to seek compromise during the years of 
my fieldwork.  Reformist activists whom I knew in Nagan Raya made a point of sometimes 
attending kandoeri, despite the fact that in the past kandoeri had been the central practice against 
reformist polemics had been launched.  These reformers justified their participation in kandoeri 
in manners that resembled rationales offered by similarly compromise-seeking reformers 
elsewhere in the archipelago (Beatty 1999; Geertz 1960).  Some expressed the idea that these 
ritual feasts were, ultimately, an instance of Acehnese “culture” (I., budaya), and thus attending 
them was not a violation of proper religious practice.  Other reformers, when attending such 
feasts, simply ignored the prayers at kandoeri that they found objectionable, either pretending 
they did not hear them, or leaving before they started.  Indeed, by the 1950s, some reformers 
already had developed what they called a “modern kandoeri” (Ac., kandoeri modern).  In this 
kandoeri, participants redistributed to orphans and the poor a share of the food prepared at ritual 
feasts, a change intended to serve a social purpose and minimize economic waste.  Similarly, the 
modern kandoeri eliminated the prayers reformers found most objectionable, those widely 
believed to generate heavenly rewards (I. pahala) for deceased friends and family members. 
 In fact, some of these compromises had been institutionalized in local practice in Nagan 
Raya.  Consider the maulid feast that I attended in the town of Nigan in March of 2009.  Maulid 
is the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday.  It is celebrated in Aceh over a three-
month period through large reciprocal feasts in which villagers attempt to provide food for as 
many neighboring villages as possible.  These neighboring villages are then invited to send 
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groups (I., rombongan) of predominantly young men to partake of the food and participate in 
ritualized recitations. 
 The maulid feast in Nigan resembled those that I had attended elsewhere in Nagan Raya 
and in the vicinity of Meulaboh over the course of the three-month “maulid season” (I., musim 
maulid).  About seven or eight groups, each with as many as forty men, arrived in the courtyard 
of Nigan’s Islamic boarding school just after midday prayers.  After being assigned a place in a 
mosque or school building, each group began their recitations.  These included the names of 
God, praises to the Prophet Muhammad, and episodes from the life of the Prophet Muhammad 
and other prophets.  The recitations continued until just before sundown prayer, with a short 
break halfway through for the mid-afternoon prayer.   
 After beginning in a relatively restrained manner, with reciters sitting calmly in their 
groups on the floor, the recitations became increasingly loud and flamboyant.  Groups began to 
move their bodies, sometimes in violent or intricately choreographed patterns.  Eventually, all of 
the groups stood up and, one-by-one, began to hop and jump.  By the end of the afternoon, it 
almost seemed that chaos had come to reign at the event, as even the carefully-choreographed 
groups formed a sort of maulid mosh pit, with men excitedly yelling “Peace be on the Prophet” 
while hopping and bumping into each other excitedly. 
 To this point, there was little in the celebration that seemed reconcilable with the kinds of 
‘Abduh-style reformism described above.  Indeed, maulid festivals of various kinds have long 
been the target of such reformers in many parts of the archipelago.  These reformers have taken 
the celebration of maulid to be a deviation from proper scriptural practice.  The demonstrative 
recitations and bodily movements typical of Acehnese maulid celebrations were at variance with 












copious amounts of food produced for those who participated in the feast have been identified by 
reformers in the past as economically wasteful, and a potential hardship on poorer families who 
are expected to make their contribution (see Figure 7 and Figure 8).  
 Yet just before the end of the litanies, when things were building to a crescendo, a man 
who worked for the regency Office of Religious Affairs pulled me over to a small pavilion in 
which children were sitting.  “These are the orphans!” he said as he pointed excitedly.  “See, we 
will not waste all this food.  The orphans get their share!”  Indeed, food was distributed to this 
handful of children first, before being divided up among those who had conducted recitations, 
who quickly left to bring their feast home to waiting family members. 
 At most of the maulid feasts that I attended, food was set aside for orphans in this 
manner.  This clearly was inspired by the previously mentioned models of “modern kandoeri.”  
It responded, albeit in a somewhat symbolic way, to the accusations made, beginning in the 
1930s, that village feasts were economically wasteful.  While it may seem a small adjustment to 
an otherwise thoroughly non-reformed practice, the passing of food to orphans in this manner 
was something that at least one of my reformist interlocutors identified as allowing him to attend 
such feasts in good conscience. 
 Despite the fact that such compromises had been struck, and public debate about religious 
difference clearly was muted when compared to the open confrontations of the 1930s through 
1960s, it is important to remember that one of the ways that those in Nagan Raya conceptualized 
differences between Islamic practices and practitioners continued to be in terms of the categories 
of reformist polemics of the mid-twentieth century.  This was in part because differences in 
practice remained salient, even if they no longer remained cause for open confrontation.  Some 
mosques, for example, recited the call to prayer twice on Fridays at midday, reflecting a legal 
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opinion that was popular among Muda Waly’s intellectual descendants.  The Habib Seunagan 
engaged in flamboyant styles of recitation that both Muda Waly’s protégées and ‘Abduh-style 
reformers sometimes found scandalous.  And truly committed reformers, while finding ways to 
justify attending the kandoeri of their neighbors, refused to allow recitations at the small feasts 
they held at their own homes for the purposes of marking deaths, weddings, and funerals. 
 Another reason why differences in orientation to Islamic reformism seemed to remain 
salient in Nagan Raya, despite the relative decline of reformist polemics since the mid-twentieth 
century, was continuing devotion to the key figures of the oral histories of the 1930s through the 
1960s.  Habib Muda, Zakaria Yunus, and Muda Waly had commanded great respect and 
devotion among their followers.  Even if someone attended neighborhood kandoeri, for example, 
if he or she had felt a personal attachment to Zakaria Yunus, he or she usually identified as a 
reformist.  Some followers of the Habib Seunagan and lay members of the Naqsyabandi sought 
legal advice from reformist teachers whom they knew and trusted.  But they remained devoted to 
their Sufi teachers and, in many situations, would identify as anti-reformist for this reason.  It 
was, significantly, in the context of discussing the confrontations of the 1930s through the 1960s 
that those with whom I spoke were most adamant about identifying themselves in terms of their 
stance for or against Islamic reform.  Nonetheless, these stances remained an important 
interpretive frame through which those in Nagan Raya understood Muslims to be divided into 
recognizable groups. 
“They Were Really on the Same Side”: Alternative Histories of Habib Muda and Zakaria 
Yunus 
 
  Given the continuing salience in Nagan Raya of an ideal type interpretive frame based 
on the polemics of Islamic reformism, I was surprised when Bapak Amin told me a quite 
different version of the events of the 1950s.  In his late sixties, Bapak Amin was no uninterested 
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party.  On our first encounter, just a few weeks into my fieldwork, he enthusiastically told me 
how as a boy he had informed on the movements of government troops for Darul Islam 
guerrillas.  With his stories, he seemed to slightly frighten his colleagues in the government 
office where he worked part time.  “Oh, that guy,” the office head muttered when I asked who 
had told the stories about Darul Islam several weeks before.  “Don’t pay any attention to him.  
He doesn’t know anything.” 
 Shortly after his boss’ evasive response, however, I successfully located Bapak Amin, 
and asked him if he might tell me more about his childhood during Darul Islam.  As a way of 
answering my inquiry, he took me on a tour of local sites related to the rebellion: an old village 
that had been washed away when the Seunagan River changed its course, a few graves of 
religious teachers, an old religious school, and the points at which Darul Islam guerrillas would 
come down from the hills to conduct raids.  We were resting at his house after our excursion 
when I noted that I had heard that Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus were related by marriage.
82
  
“Of course,” he responded, “They were very close.  Family.  During DI, Habib Muda and 
Zakaria Yunus met in the evening to eat together after sunset prayers.  They would hang out all 
night.  During the day they would fight each other.  Bang-bang-bang!
83
  But they were family.  
And really, they were on the same side.” 
 Bapak Amin never did explain which “side” (I., pihak) Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus 
were on.  I found his assertion somewhat jarring, given how starkly histories of Darul Islam in 
Nagan Raya tended to portray the opposition between Zakaria Yunus, in one faction, and Habib 
Muda and Muda Waly, in the other.  But while everyone in Nagan Raya was aware that the two 
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 The patrilines from which Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus descend are understood to have been 
intermarried at several points over the centuries, as discussed below.  Zakaria Yunus’ mother was none other than 




 Here Bapak Amin imitated the sound of guns firing. 
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had been enemies during Darul Islam, quite a few of those with whom I spoke in Nagan Raya 
seemed unsurprised that Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus might have maintained cordial personal 
relations during the rebellion.  I began to ask people if they knew of the story of the two enemies 
sharing rice in the evening during the rebellion.  While only a handful had heard it, most people 
to whom I mentioned the story found it plausible that such meals might have occurred.  “They 
were family,” some offered.  Other people invoked a common refrain: “Teungku Tjik di Kila is 
the Habib Seunagan’s right hand.”   
 Teungku Tjik di Kila was the patrilineal ancestor of Zakaria Yunus.  This reference to 
him as the Habib Seunagan’s “right hand” (I., tangan kanan) was one drawn from genealogical 
histories linking Zakaria Yunus’s patriline to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  These 
histories of Nagan Raya’s Islamization are central to understanding the second broad way 
through which residents of Nagan Raya conceptually organized groups of Islamic practitioners in 
the regency. 
Genealogies of Islamization 
 
 Oral and written histories of the coming of Islam to Nagan Raya, embraced by nearly all 
with whom I spoke in the region, attributed the conversion of the regency to a figure named 
Habib Abdurrahim, the genealogical progenitor of those people who claimed membership in the 
family of the Habib Seunagan (Azman 1962; Bowen 1989b, 602-604; Daud 2009).  Details such 
as the century in which Habib Abdurrahim lived and carried out his work tended to be secondary 
concerns in these histories and often were omitted.
84
  In these histories, Habib Abdurrahim was 
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 Based on stories told regarding Habib Abdurrahim, his contemporaries, and their descendants, it seems 
that he was active in the period just before the Dutch-Aceh war, although there was much disagreement in Nagan 
Raya about precisely when he had lived.  Also, see Bowen (1989b, 602-604) and Hurgronje (1906, II, 14).  The lack 
of a fixed date for Habib Abdurrahim contributed to some ambiguity about precisely what was meant when those 
with whom I spoke in Nagan Raya claimed that Habib Abdurrahim “Islamicized” (I., mengislamkan) the Nagan 
Raya countryside.  This term can have either the meaning of bringing about the initial conversion of the population 
of a region, or that of facilitating a process through which a region’s people come to a deeper commitment to Islam.  
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identified as the qutubul ujud (I., Ar. quṭb al-wujūd) or qutub (I.).  He was said to have carried 
out his work of Islamicizing the Nagan Raya countryside with the help of four deputies, whom 
were identified with the term autad (I., Ar., autād).  One of these deputies was none other than 
Teungku Tjik di Kila, the ancestor of Zakaria Yunus mentioned in the previous section as the 
Habib Seunagan’s “right hand.” 
 The terms qutub and autad were drawn from mystical discourses most closely associated 
with the influential twelfth- and thirteenth-century Andalusian mystic, Ibn ‘Arabī.  In mystical 
cosmologies based on Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought, especially those developed by the fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century figure ‘Abd al-Qarīm al-Jīlī, qutub usually denotes the singular most important 
human figure in the world at any one point in time, the central “pole” around which the 
relationship between humans and the divine revolves (Hodgson 1974, II: 227-230; Trimingham 
1971: 133-165).  The qutub, along with the autad and progressively lesser figures surrounding 
him, mediate between creation and the divine, and are sometimes thought to be able to intervene 
with God on behalf of their devotees.  For many Sufis, the very fabric of creation depends upon 
the existence of such a figure in each and every age.  Without him, the universe could rend apart. 
 The cosmological system developed by al-Jīlī, placing the qutub as the central pole in a 
mystical hierarchy that includes autad and other lesser figures, has been adapted in a wide 
variety of times and places (Florida 1995; Hodgson 1974).  These adaptations have taken al-Jīlī’s 
universal cosmology and inscribed it in local mystical, social, and political contexts.  In Nagan 
Raya, the language of al-Jīlī’s cosmology had become one of the central idioms through which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
In the oral histories that I heard, there was some ambiguity as to whether Habib Abdurrahim was the first to bring 
Islam to Nagan Raya, or if he was simply a major figure in its deepening intensity there.  What was consistent in all 
histories I collected, however, was that it was the period of Habib Abdurrahim to which all of the major family lines 
in Nagan Raya connected themselves via genealogical ties to figures in the history of the regency’s Islamization.  
Thus, whether Habib Abdurrahim was thought of as the initial agent converting Nagan Raya’s residents to Islam or 




residents of the regency narrated the history of the region’s Islamization.  This idiom identified 
figures such as Habib Abdurrahim and Teungku Tjik di Kila using the titles of qutub and autad.   
 Especially for those Muslims who participated in the practices of the Habib Seunagan, 
such linkages evoked the mystical significances of al-Jīlī’s cosmology, reinforcing the Habib 
Seunagan’s claims to centrality in local mystical practice.  Further, the idiom of al-Jīlī’s 
cosmology was linked to genealogy in a manner that allowed the descendants of Habib 
Abdurrahim and Teungku Tjik di Kila to lay claim to the titles of qutub and autad as well.  It 
was this ability to lay claim to these titles through genealogy that underpinned the second 
manner in which residents in Nagan Raya organized groups of Islamic practitioners, as well as 
helped to explain why it might not seem counterintuitive that Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus 
may have shared meals during the Darul Islam rebellion. 
Nyak Nur’s Entangled Genealogy 
 One evening, Nyak Nur, one of Zakaria Yunus’ direct descendants, stopped by my house 
just before sunset prayers.  I had conducted an interview with him earlier in the day in which he 
had related to me aspects of the life history of Zakaria Yunus.  Nyak Nur began that interview by 
narrating his family’s genealogy.  He clearly had invested much time in learning and 
documenting the genealogical links of his patriline and felt strongly that I needed to properly 
record it.  In fact, this was his reason for visiting me that evening.  He had decided to stop by my 
house in order to bring me a computer-generated copy of his patriline, consisting of five pages in 
the form of a flow chart (see Figure 9).   
 In this computer-generated document, Nyak Nur had traced his genealogy to a “Raja 





Figure 9: First page of “Family Line of Teungku Tjik di Kila” 
 
(Syria), and thus was translatable as “King of Syria.”  From there, the genealogy worked its way 
through twelve generations.  Nyak Nur identified several of these generations as having moved, 
first from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, and then from Aceh’s north coast to Nagan Raya.  
He therefore stressed his patriline’s distant Arabic origins. 
 More important than these Arabic origins, however, were the ways in which Nyak Nur’s 
genealogy configured his patriline’s place in Nagan Raya’s history of Islamization.  The 
computer-generated genealogy was entitled the “Family Line (I., Silsilah Keluarga) of Teungku 
Tjik di Kila.”  Teungku Tjik di Kila was neither the first nor the last link in the genealogy.  He 
was, however, the first link in Nagan Raya, and, as mentioned above, one of Habib 
Abdurrahim’s primary deputies (autad) in the Islamization of the Nagan Raya countryside.  The 
title of the genealogy, thus, drew attention not to Nyak Nur’s deep genealogical ties to the 
Middle East, but to his patriline’s central place in the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.   
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 This emphasis on the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization was reinforced by the ways in 
which Nyak Nur’s genealogy was entwined with the genealogy of the Habib Seunagan.  On the 
document’s first page was a note explaining that one “Banta Sultan” of Baghdad, the brother-in-
law of Raja Syam’s son, was the ancestor of the Habib Seunagan.  This established a link of 
marriage between the patriline of Teungku Tjik di Kila and the Habib Seunagan, several 
generations before either had reached Nagan Raya.  Because the genealogy declared itself the 
patriline of Teungku Tjik di Kila, this marriage looked forward to the period of Nagan Raya’s 
Islamization as well, and portended future marriages between the two families, such as that of 
Habib Muda’s sister to Zakaria Yunus. 
 One of the effects of Nyak Nur’s genealogy, then, was to link him to the period of Nagan 
Raya’s Islamization through drawing attention to his descent from Teungku Tjik di Kila.  
However, this required that he link himself to the Habib Seunagan.  Nyak Nur was clearly 
ambivalent about this tie.  Recall that Nyak Nur was the direct descendant of Zakaria Yunus, the 
preeminent Islamic reformer of the previous generation and the leader of Darul Islam in Nagan 
Raya.  Nyak Nur embraced Yunus’ legacy, and took himself to be similarly reformist in his 
religious sensibilities, maintaining a critical attitude towards the Habib Seunagan.  Even as he 
gave me the genealogy attesting to his own patriline’s ties to the Habib Seunagan, he told me a 
story that called into question Habib Muda’s alleged mystical powers.  However, he refused to 
divorce himself or his family line from entanglements with the Habib Seunagan and the 
Islamization of Nagan Raya.  This was evident in his oral and written articulations of his 
family’s genealogy, as well as his acknowledgement that he, as the direct descendant of Teungku 
Tjik di Kila, was, in fact, the “right hand” of the Habib Seunagan. 
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 It was not only Nyak Nur who did this.  His siblings, all direct descendants of Zakaria 
Yunus, and therefore descendants of Teungku Tjik di Kila, acknowledged the various titles that 
their genealogy allowed them to claim, namely, that of autad and “right hand” of the Habib 
Seunagan.  One of these siblings, for example, attempted to shed the mystical connotations of 
these titles by claiming that they were simply like the titles of civil servants working in 
bureaucratic offices:  “Teungku Tjik di Kila was like the assistant head of the office of 
Islamization (I., kantor Islamisasi).  That is all the title autad means.”  Nonetheless, this sibling 
did not deny that the title could be used to denote his patriline, or that it linked him to the Habib 
Seunagan through the project of Islamization carried out jointly by Habib Abdurrahim and 
Teungku Tjik di Kila.   
 In Nagan Raya, genealogical links between individuals in the present and ancestors from 
the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization could be invoked in daily social practice through the 
use of greetings and titles.  The first time I met Zakaria Yunus, in fact, he was introduced to me 
as “Teungku Tjik di Kila,” the name of his paramount ancestor standing in for his own given 
name.
85
  The generic term Habib typically implied a similar kind of identification with one’s 
patrilineal ancestors, as the unmarked term usually indicated the descendants of Habib 
Abdurrahim.
86
  All of these titles referenced the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  Together 
with the cultivation of genealogies such as Nyak Nur’s, they turned the living descendants of 
Nagan Raya’s paramount ancestors (i.e., Habib Abdurrahim, Teungku Tjik di Kila) into flesh-
and-blood tokens of the narrative of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.   
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 This, admittedly, was done in a playful manner.  Nonetheless, it suggests the close identification of 




 In Nagan Raya, there were Sayyids who were not descendants of Habib Abdurrahim, and therefore not 
members of the Habib Seunagan.  But when the term “Habib” was used in daily conversation, it usually was taken to 
refer to the Habib Seunagan, unless someone specified otherwise. 
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 It was not simply Nyak Nur and his siblings that cultivated the links between the 
patrilines of the Habib Seunagan and Teungku Tjik di Kila.  The ties between the two families 
were guarded by members of both patrilines, even though they remained deeply suspicious of 
each other as a result of their different religious sensibilities and the history of open conflict 
between them in the period of the 1950s and early 1960s.
87
  Members of the Habib Seunagan, 
from prominent scions of the family to young and not yet influential men and women in their 
twenties, volunteered to me that Teungku Tjik di Kila was their “right hand,” explicitly 
extending the title to cover his patrilineal descendants.   
 Many residents of Nagan Raya seemed to see things the same way.  In fact, one person 
told me that Nyak Nur initially had produced the computer-generated copy of his genealogy that 
he shared with me in order to garner supporters in a regency election.  He banked on the fact that 
his ties to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization would carry votes.  In the end, he did not win.  
But this was in part because another candidate, the grandson of Habib Muda, could claim a more 
prestigious, and dual, genealogy, via a patriline to one of Nagan Raya’s hereditary chiefs and a 
matriline to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization via Habib Muda. 
 Seen in the light of the genealogical practices described in this section, Bapak Amin’s 
story of Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus eating together during Darul Islam makes more sense.  
These two men, while enemies, each descended from a patriline understood locally to be 
traceable to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  Further, their patrilines were intermarried 
at numerous places, and their paramount ancestors had worked together, as qutub and autad, to 
bring about Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  As such, they were imagined to form a local religious 
elite responsible for the conversion of Nagan Raya.  Their shared genealogical history was 
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 Not all descendants of the patriline of Teungku Tjik di Kila descended from Zakaria Yunus, or shared his 
reformist sensibilities.  Nonetheless, it was Zakaria Yunus’ descendants who were most influential in Nagan Raya 
from among those people who claimed to descend from Teungku Tjik di Kila. 
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understood by some in the regency to overcome even the otherwise violent divisions between 
them: “During the day they would fight each other.  Bang-bang-bang!  But they were family.  
And really, they were on the same side.” 
 To be sure, such expressions of alignment between Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus were 
highly context dependent, alternating with others that reflected the rift between the two 
patrilines.  However, the moments in which unity between these two rivals was stressed during 
my fieldwork were common and salient.  They appeared to be meaningful to a wide variety of 
social actors, from members of the two patrilines themselves to villagers like Bapak Amin who 
recalled displays of familial affection between Nagan Raya’s most prominent enemies.   
 Perhaps most telling, however, was how Muda Waly fell out of such histories.  Muda 
Waly, who was neither from nor resided in Nagan Raya, was extremely prominent in narratives 
of Darul Islam that stressed the opposition between reformed and anti-reformed Islamic practices 
and sensibilities.  However, he and his followers rarely featured in histories of Darul Islam when 
they were narrated in terms of Nagan Raya’s prominent patrilines.  Muda Waly’s influence in 
Nagan Raya really only began in the 1940s, when several of the earliest generations of his 
students returned to Nagan Raya after studying with him in South Aceh.  However central Muda 
Waly’s role had been in developing an anti-Darul Islam front in partnership with Habib Muda, he 
and his students had no claims to prestigious genealogies linking them to Nagan Raya’s 
Islamization. 
(Dis)entangling Genealogies: Two Imaginaries of Islamic Practitioners 
 This chapter examined two sets of ideal types that organized Islamic practitioners in 
Nagan Raya according to separate criteria.  The first took a group’s adherence to Islamic reform 
as the interpretative basis for dividing Muslims into reformed and unreformed Islamic 
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practitioners.  This ideal type often arose in people’s recollections of the period from the 1930s 
through the 1960s, when reformist polemics were at their height.  It remained a salient way in 
which Muslims marked distinctions between each other at the time of my fieldwork, even though 
the confrontations of the earlier period had been muted following the discord of the 1950s.  This 
was in part because the institutional networks of practitioners associated with Habib Muda, 
Muda Waly, and Zakaria Yunus continued to exist.  While most individual practitioners were 
somewhat eclectic in their religious practices, specific types of practice could and often would be 
identified using the interpretive ideal types that arose from the reformist polemics of the 1930s 
through the 1960s. 
 The second set of ideal types organizing Muslims into different groups of Islamic 
practitioners involved their place in genealogical histories.  Rather than placing Muslims into 
groups based on their position vis-à-vis Islamic reform, this interpretive frame identified 
Muslims according to their genealogical links to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  
Establishing such links depended on social practices such as the cultivation of genealogies (i.e., 
Nyak Nur’s “Family Line of the Teungku Tjik di Kila”), and the recognition of specific people’s 
ties to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  One of the effects of these genealogical 
histories was to reconfigure the ways in which residents in Nagan Raya might understand 
different Muslims to be linked in networks of affiliation.  Thus, Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus 
could be portrayed as continuing their familial, and presumably for some mystical, ties as a result 
of their entwined genealogies and links to Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  Such a portrayal could 
even be set in the period when Habib Muda and Zakaria Yunus were engaged in open war 
against each other. 
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 What might my discussion of these two different ways of conceptually organizing 
Muslims in Nagan Raya suggest beyond the immediate case?  Much literature on Islamic history 
and practice, in Indonesia and elsewhere, has taken conceptual frameworks roughly parallel to 
the first set of previously described ideal types (i.e., based on polemics of Islamic reform) to be 
the primary means through which Muslims have understood differences between Islamic 
practitioners (Abdullah 1971; Bowen 1993b; Deeb 2006; Dhofier 1999; Geertz 1960; Kobo 
2009; Laffan 2003; Noer 1973; Peacock 1978; Rasmussen 2010; Scheele 2007).  This is not 
without good reason.  Islamic reformism in various iterations has been a vitally important part of 
Islamic discourse and practice throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  In Indonesia, 
ways of imagining Islam as an object of reflection and as a set of practices to be carried out in a 
proper manner, what Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori have called “objectification,” have 
been influenced deeply by polemics of reform (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996). 
 Nonetheless, there have been other ways in which Muslims in Indonesia have organized 
themselves into different groups of practitioners.  In Nagan Raya, one of these ways has been 
through genealogical links.  This should not be surprising.  Genealogical idioms have long been 
central to Islamic discourse and practice.  Central to Islamic jurisprudence, for example, is the 
verification of chains of transmission, from one scholar to the next, of records of the Prophet’s 
words and deeds (I., hadis; Ar., aḥādīṭṭ).  Similarly, the authority of teachers sanctioned to 
transmit the teachings of a Sufi order usually is expressed primarily through a chain of 
transmission known as a silsilah (I.; Ar. silsila).  These chains record the transmission of esoteric 
knowledge from teacher to student, and usually stretch back to the Prophet Muhammad himself.  
In some cases, such chains have been tied directly to the genealogical patrilines of specific 
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families, for example, the ‘Alawi Sayyids described by Engseng Ho as having inhabited the far-
flung littorals of the Indian Ocean since the tenth century (Ho 2006).   
 Of particular interest in the case of Nyak Nur’s “family line,” and genealogical histories 
of Nagan Raya’s Islamization more generally, are the ways in which genealogy cuts across 
distinctions made in terms of polemics derived from ‘Abduh-inspired Islamic reform.  This is 
because genealogical idioms, while permeating Islamic practice, have tended to be associated 
with “traditional,” that is unreformed or anti-reformist, practitioners.  The genealogical and 
educational pedigree of particular reformers has sometimes been noted by analysts (Abdullah 
1971; Bowen 1993b).  However, it is unreformed ulama, for example, that have most often been 
portrayed as passing boarding schools and knowledge to favorite sons and son-in-laws (Dhofier 
1999).
88
  Conversely, ‘Abduh-inspired reformers have tended to be described as skeptical of 
practices associated with the transmission of knowledge in a genealogical idiom, for example, 
the bonds between teacher and student institutionalized in Sufi orders, and the privileges 
sometimes afforded the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (Abdullah 1972; Bowen 1993b; 
Geertz 1960; Ho 2006).  This all suggests that genealogical idioms of Islamic practice more 
properly belong to groups of Muslims that are the least influenced by the styles of objectification 
associated with ‘Abduh-style Islamic reformism. 
 Nyak Nur’s genealogy, however, suggests otherwise.  The direct descendant of Nagan 
Raya’s most prominent twentieth-century reformer, Nyak Nur embraced ‘Abduh-style reform.  
This was evident in his questioning of the Habib Seunagan’s mystical powers.  It was also 
evident in his daily practice and social milieu.  Although most in Nagan Raya were eclectic in 
their religious practice, I never met Nyak Nur at any of the kandoeri held at the graves of the 
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 An important exception to this is scholarship on reform movements not inspired primarily by 
Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā (Metcalf 1982).  These reform movements have been portrayed as 
maintaining, if at times altering, a wide range of genealogical idioms. 
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Habib Seunagan.  The kandoeri at which I did meet him were all marked by distinctly reformed 
practice.  At these kandoeri there were no prayers offered to lessen the suffering of the deceased.  
Rather than long strands of litanies, much of the ritual involved a respected member from among 
those in attendance, often one of Nyak Nur’s siblings, leading a spontaneous prayer. 
 All of this marked Nyak Nur as embracing ‘Abduh-style reform.  Yet, it was clear that his 
genealogical descent from Teungku Tjik di Kila remained central to an Islamic imaginary that 
informed his daily social practice and placed him in broader histories of Nagan Raya’s 
Islamization.  Genealogy, thus, was a central medium through which he expressed affinities with 
other Muslims, as well as his place in Nagan Raya’s Islamic history.  In this instance, then, it was 
clearly not the case that genealogical styles of imagining and organizing Muslims and Islamic 
practice were primarily the domain of unreformed practices and individuals. 
 Conclusion: On Finding a Place in Islamic History 
 Of the two ways of conceptually organizing the relationship between groups of Islamic 
practitioners described above, the genealogical ties to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization 
are of particular interest to my broader arguments regarding the ways in which Acehnese 
Muslims orient themselves to local Islamic pasts.  The cultivation of these genealogical ties in 
many ways paralleled the reading of the past on landscapes and bodies described in Chapter 2.  
Signs of the past were to be found in the patrilines descending from the major figures of Nagan 
Raya’s period of Islamization, for example, the patriline of Teungku Tjik di Kila.  These signs 
were made readable by the genealogies and titles that indexed these patrilines and found their 
way into social and political interactions ranging from the daily use of terms of address to the 
contesting of elections for local political office.  As such, the cultivation of these genealogies 
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were instances of the ways I found Acehnese to place themselves in relationships with local 
Islamic pasts through embodied and emplaced practices.   
 The period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization could be conceptually linked to the period of 
the Prophet Muhammad through the genealogies of the Habib Seunagan, who as Sayyids claimed 
patrilineal descent from the Prophet’s immediate family.  However, this rarely occurred in daily 
narrative or social practice in Nagan Raya.  The focus of genealogical histories in Nagan Raya, 
for example, Nyak Nur’s “Family Line of the Teungku Tjik di Kila,” tended to be on the period 
of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  This was the paradigmatic period for Muslims in Nagan Raya 
who took up genealogy as an idiom of Islamic history. 
 That many Muslims in Nagan Raya frequently oriented themselves to the period of 
Nagan Raya’s Islamization is not simply noteworthy because local Islamic pasts represent the 
foci of this dissertation.  Recall that the narratives of Christianization that helped to contextualize 
concern over migration to South Aceh, described in Chapter 3, revealed that Islamization could 
be understood as an unfolding historical project, one that could be reversed or intensified in 
different time periods.  As such, linking oneself to this unfolding historical project of 
Islamization through genealogical ties could carry moral resonances that underpinned both the 
authority of those people who claimed these prestigious genealogies and a sense that such people 
should be involved in the on-going work of Islamization. 
 Such a sense of responsibility was common among both descendants of Habib 
Abdurrahim and Teungku Tjik di Kila.  The Habib Seunagan remained the central figures in the 
devotional practice of their devotees.  One young member of the family, a recent university 
graduate, suggested to me the great responsibility that came with this position, which included 
supporting the people of Nagan Raya in their social, economic, and religious development.  The 
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descendants of Zakaria Yunus were involved in a range of activities that they identified as 
“religious outreach” (I., dakwah), from preaching to participation in village “mutual self-help” 
(I., gotong-royong) development projects. 
 Maintaining genealogical ties to figures such as Habib Abdurrahim and Teungku Tjik di 
Kila also required on-going narrative work.  As historical circumstances of the post-colonial 
period shifted, so did the contexts in which those in Nagan Raya cultivated genealogies linking 
them to the regency’s Islamization.  Members of the Habib Seunagan and descendants of 
Teungku Tjik di Kila cultivated their genealogical ties to Nagan Raya’s period of Islamization 
through an ever changing array of narrative, social, and ritual practices.  Chapter 6 introduces 
further ways in which the past of Nagan Raya’s Islamization was readable in emplaced and 
embodied manners, for example, through graves that dotted the Nagan Raya countryside and 
ritual practices that occurred at these graves.  First, however, I turn to two spatial-temporal 
frames (i.e., the world and the afterlife) through which residents in Nagan Raya approached 
questions of ethical risk and responsibility. 
 









“Young People are Seeking Their Blessings”: 
Eschatology, Contingent Lives, and Temporalities of Ethical Practice in Nagan Raya 
 
 
 This chapter examines different temporal orientations Muslims in the regency of Nagan 
Raya brought to pursuits of Islamic learning and ethical practice.  Much recent ethnographic 
literature on Islamic practice that intersects with the temporal experience of practitioners has 
tended to focus on what I here call “striving time,” a temporal orientation that entails a 
progressive and self-reflective refinement of the self and, in some cases, society (Deeb 2006; 
Hirschkind 2006; Khan 2011; Mahmood 2005).  In a subsection of this literature, the adoption of 
striving time by individual Muslims is motivated in part by encounters with the Islamic 
eschatological tradition (Hirschkind 2006).  In these accounts, the juxtaposition of the mundane 
and frail temporariness of the present world with invocations and vivid images of horrid tortures 
of the grave, trials of the day of judgment, and sufferings of hell helps to bring practitioners to 
self-reflective pursuits of ethical self-refinement.  Eschatological literature, thus, helps to 
produce the striving time that underpins revivalist projects.  Such striving time, concerned with 
the progressive transformation of self and society, was an important mode through which Islamic 
practitioners in Nagan Raya oriented their pursuits of Islamic practice during my fieldwork in 
2008 and 2009.  However, it was not the only, nor even the predominant, one.   
 In Nagan Raya, striving time was most closely tied to discourses of the provincial state 
apparatus, involved in a project of Islamic legal reform designed to transform Acehnese society 
through encouraging more thoroughly Islamic practice.  Activists, religious teachers, government 
 
174 
officials, and villagers of various social and occupational statuses all proclaimed support for 
these reforms, which were identified with the term syariat Islam (I.).  In other moments, 
however, these same interlocutors revealed more “contingent” temporal sensibilities (Bledsoe 
2002).  In these moments they approached their own religious practice, and that of others, not as 
a progressive process of self-refinement, but as linked to such factors as age, social position, and 
individual life circumstances.  The contingent temporalities I observed in Nagan Raya were 
directly tied to the basic eschatological concepts of the “world” (Ac., dōnja, I., dunia) and the 
“afterlife” (I., akhirat), in some cases as a result of the study of Islamic eschatological writings.  
Thus, despite the power of activist and revivalist discourses, Muslims in Nagan Raya approached 
religious and ethical life in a manner that reflected complexity, conflicted attitudes, and 
commitments to multiple and competing ethical orientations, as has been observed among 
Islamic practitioners in other contexts (Marsden 2005; Schielke 2010a, 2010b).  Much of this 
complexity arose from within the Islamic tradition itself, which supported both striving and 
contingent temporalities.  
 This chapter begins with a brief discussion of ethnographic literature on Islamic 
eschatology and ethical practice, drawing attention to how anthropologists have tended to stress 
striving temporalities rather than the ways Muslims relate Islamic discourse and practice to such 
things as aging and the life course.  I then move to an ethnographic account of Islamic 
practitioners in Nagan Raya pursuing Islamic practice and education in manners that reflected 
contingent temporalities.  Beginning with religious lessons for non-specialist practitioners (I., 
majlis taklim), I look first at articulations of idealized relationships between aging and Islamic 
practice.  I then turn to more individualized notions of the ethical risks and responsibilities 
associated with one’s relationship to the world and the afterlife.  Building on the ethnography 
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presented to this point, I reflect on how the two nodes of the world and the afterlife organize 
ethical risk and responsibility, objectifying Islamic practice, but often in a manner inconsistent 
with striving temporalities.  Finally, I conclude by suggesting that attention to such non-striving 
temporalities, in addition to providing tools for ever more nuanced accounts of Islamic practice 
and history, highlights problematic assumptions that remain in much ethnographic and historical 
literature regarding what constitutes Islam ethical practice. 
Striving Time, the Life Course, and Eschatology in the Anthropology of Islam 
One of the most fruitful fields of study for anthropologists of Islam in recent decades has 
been examining the ways in which Muslims have adopted attitudes and sensibilities conducive to 
processes of self-reflection connected to a striving towards improved Islamic practice.  While 
most recently associated with well-known work on Islamic revivalist movements and individual 
practices of ethical self-formation (Deeb 2006; Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005), this field has 
a much longer history.  It can be traced, for example, to work on late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Islamic reform movements, from as early as the 1960s (Abdullah 1971; Bowen 
1993b; Geertz 1960; Metcalf 1982; Noer 1973).  Perhaps the most influential articulation of such 
a field has been the formulation offered by Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori (Eickelman 
1992; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996).  Eickelman and Piscatori found increasing access to 
Islamic knowledge and debates over normative practice to be characteristic of a twentieth 
century form of “objectification,” a process through which factors such as increased literacy and 
internationally circulating notions of orthodoxy resulted in an ever greater self-reflective 
awareness on the part of Islamic practitioners.
89
  Though critiqued in its particulars by some of 
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 See also the summary and analysis of Eickelman and Piscatori’s objectification thesis in Osella and 
Soares (2010, 4). 
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the authors discussed here (Deeb 2006, 20-23; Mahmood 2005, 53-57), Eickelman and 
Piscatori’s formulation continues to influence these and other studies of Islamic practice. 
Central to the analyses cited here, from accounts of Islamic reformism in the 1960s to 
recent work on Islamic revivalism, is a particular notion of temporality and temporal experience 
reflected in the intention of Muslims to achieve progressive self-improvement.  This temporality, 
which I here call “striving” time following work by Naveeda Khan (Khan 2011, 2012), is most 
often embedded in narratives of individual or collective projects of political or ethical striving.  
Khan writes:  
My argument, in brief, has been that the creation of Pakistan inaugurated the 
aspiration to strive to be Muslim.  This aspiration did not concern itself with final 
ends.  Thus while the emphasis of striving was on self-perfectibility, it never 
emphasized perfection.  Although undoubtedly Pakistan has seen leaders, 
movements, and parties with notions of what kind of society, state, or self 
Pakistan should forge, the particular tendency that I track[…] maintained the 
necessity of an open future to enable striving and experimentations on the self.  I 
take the construction and maintenance of mosques in neighborhoods of Lahore to 
be sites of such experimentation[…]  Other scenes of aspiration appear in the 
theological arguments within the weave of everyday life and the assiduous 
attempts at piety that may involve bold moves to seek out extraordinary guidance 
within a milieu beset by ambiguities over religious authority.  I even incorporate 
state efforts to develop a position on the Ahmadi question as a possible scene of 
aspiration[…] (Khan 2012, 203) 
 
As Khan suggests, the precise end of such ethical striving can be difficult to pin down.  Indeed, 
the end is often less significant than the project of striving itself.  For those attempting to emulate 
the Prophet Muhammad, such striving may necessarily end in failure, which in turn prods further 
striving (Metcalf 1993).  However, all such striving is underpinned by models and experiences of 
time that are at least potentially progressive and oriented to a moral end. 
This chapter asks whether there might not be other temporalities that inhere in Islamic 
ethical practice besides the progressive striving time of self-refinement.  During fieldwork in 
Nagan Raya, I became attuned to how my interlocutors pursued religious and ethical practices in 
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manners that were deeply influenced by age and other life circumstances.  Such age- and life 
circumstance-contingent practices reflected how practitioners understood themselves to be tied to 
the “world” (Ac., dōnja; I., dunia) and the “afterlife” (I., akhirat).
90
  Ethical pursuits were 
differentiated and uneven in time, some deferred until later periods, others embraced in earnest 
immediately at particular moments.  While notions of striving abounded, other temporal models 
and sensibilities informed ethical pursuits in manners that at times seemed to contradict the 
imperatives of striving time. 
The ethnography that follows attends closely to the ways in which Islamic practitioners in 
Nagan Raya linked their pursuits of religious and ethical practice to their age and personal 
histories, and to the ethical nodes of the world and the afterlife.  It thus participates in a scattered 
but suggestive ethnographic and historical scholarship that has treated aspects of Islamic practice 
and sociality along with attention to the life course.  This work has drawn attention to, for 
example, historical patterns of migration by young men in Islamic Southeast Asia (Abdullah 
1971; Andaya 1993; Mrázek 1972; Siegel 2000), the centrality of life-staged categories in the 
practice of Islamic jurisprudence (Peirce 2003, 149), and gendered moral codes reflecting the 
positions of men and women of different ages vis-à-vis forms of Islamic authority (Abu-Lughod 
1988; Boddy 1989).  Islamic life passage rituals such as circumcision, marriage, and the adoption 
of sartorial markers are also common topics of historical and ethnographic treatments, though 
usually without commentary on the broader resonances these rituals have for models of ethical 
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Akhirat might be more properly translated as “end times,” especially when referencing the apocalypse and 
the post-apocalyptic realm.  As a short hand, however, it was used by my interlocutors to indicate the period in an 
individual life following death, including the time in the grave, the resurrection, the apocalypse, and after.  
Alternately, my interlocutors would refer to this second node of ethical risk and responsibility as the “grave” (Ac., 
koeboe; I., kubur).  Both terms appear in the ethnography that follows.  Here I use akhirat, loosely translated as 
“afterlife,” in order to capture the sense in which this second node encompassed the entire period following one’s 





  Similarly, age and life stage has been incorporated in analyses of Islamic practice 
through the inscription of “generations” of reformers or revivalists, with different waves of 
activist or pietistic sensibilities being associated with different age cohorts (Abdullah 1971; 
Brenner 1996; Deeb 2006).
92
 
My own approach to the life course might be termed “contingent,” following Caroline 
Bledsoe’s analysis of non-linear temporal experiences and imaginations through which women 
experience fertility and childbirth (Bledsoe 2002).
93
  I examine how my interlocutors understood 
the progress of their own and others’ lives in terms of specific occurrences and circumstances 
that placed them in relation to the world, the afterlife, and common idealizations of the life 
course.   
I see the contingency of these notions as two-fold.  They involved contingent life courses 
in Bledsoe’s sense, that is, life courses that never simply progressed from an idealized start to an 
idealized finish, but were the products of multiple and contradictory historical pushes and pulls.  
In addition, these notions were contingent in a second way.  They allowed for the formulation of 
ethical practices that were underpinned by a temporality based in the contingencies of actual life 
courses, rather than the progressive ethical striving of reform and revivalist movements.  I 
examine these contingent temporalities in contexts framed, explicitly and implicitly, by Islamic 
eschatological literature. 
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 These accounts can be divided into those that deal primarily with generations as political idealizations 





 For a similar approach that I also have found productive, see Jennifer Johnson-Hanks’s discussion of 
“vital conjuncture” (Johnson-Hanks 2002). 
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Islamic eschatological traditions describe the happenings following one’s death and at the 
end of time.  They frequently include graphic portrayals of the various tortures believed to be 
inflicted on the body in recompense for earthly sins and during the trials of the apocalypse.  They 
are the focus of many ethnographic and historical studies, most recently as an important genre of 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century Islamic reform and revivalist movements (Hirschkind 2006; 
Mahmood 2005; Rudnyckyj 2009, 104, 125-126, 128).  Charles Hirschkind, for example, 
describes the rhetorical use of these traditions in Islamic sermons aimed at producing a particular 
kind of ethical sensorium, a body of senses properly attuned to the world and its moral 
resonances:  
One of the primary tasks of khutaba’ is to afford listeners[…] a taste of death, to 
portray death in its manifold dimensions and ramifications with a vividness and 
moral depth so as to root it in their sensory experience, to constitute it as a habit 
of thought, heart, and body.  The tasting of death through continual acts of 
remembrance enables an ethical orientation in this world, a moral emotional 
bearing proper to pious human action[…] [F]ear of the horrors of the grave and 
the fires of hell[…] is[…] a virtue of character, a condition not only for the 
avoidance of error but for the proper performance of good as practiced in all fields 
of human endeavor[…] That is to say, an experiential knowledge of death is a 
condition of moral agency. (Hirschkind 2006, 176)  
    
Accounts of eschatological literature in twentieth- and twenty-first-century Islamic 
revivalist movements have suggested these traditions have worked to produce a striving temporal 
orientation among Islamic revivalists.
94
  The ethical orientation that Hirschkind describes as 
being fostered by the above described homiletic traditions both motivates ethical action and 
represents ethical action itself.  Muslims, thus, have often juxtaposed the coming period of the 
grave and end times with the present world in order to provoke a turn towards self-refinement 
and to provide practitioners with the ethical and emotional tools to pursue such a project.  This 
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 Other aspects of Islamic eschatological belief and practice that have received scholarly attention include 
their role as a site of contestation regarding orthodoxy (Bowen 1993b; Halevi 2007, 226-233; Hurgronje 1906, II, 
especially 269-357) and ideas regarding the tortures of the grave as purgative, i.e., as preparing an impure soul for 
paradise (Halevi 2007: 215-225). 
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end is not simply the purview of recent revivalist movements.  Indeed, Muslims repenting upon 
mystical visions of the grave and fires of hell is a common theme in the biographies, some 
centuries old, of renowned Muslim figures (Reynolds 2001, 188, 193). 
Like the practitioners described in such literature, my interlocutors discovered and 
molded ethical imperatives by juxtaposing Islamic eschatological concepts with the 
circumstances of their own lives.  The results of these juxtapositions, however, frequently varied 
markedly from the progressive self-refinement typical of striving time.  Striving time was linked 
to ethical projects stressing certain kinds of moral risks and responsibilities.  In Aceh these were 
especially associated with the continuing Islamization of the province that was an explicit goal of 
Islamic legal reforms.  The existence of other temporal orientations and sensibilities, however, 
entailed different configurations of such risks and responsibilities. 
Majlis Taklim and the Majlis Taklim Ansharullah 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, styles and forms of Islamic practice in Nagan Raya were 
varied, with at least three main institutional networks of practitioners identified locally: devotees 
of the Habib Seunagan, the followers and students of the Naqsyabandi Sufi teacher Muda Waly, 
and cadres of Islamic reformists inspired by the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Cairo-based 
scholars Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā.  While many in the region professed an affiliation 
to one or more of these groups, in daily practice participation in religious activities often was 
eclectic, with some people seeking knowledge, blessings, and instruction from representatives of 
more than one of these networks. 
 This eclecticism was apparent in religious lessons for adults who were not themselves 
religious specialists, lessons known locally as majlis taklim (I.).  Phillip Winn has noted that the 
term majlis taklim, drawn from Arabic but exclusively Southeast Asian in its usage, can indicate 
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a range of educational and devotional practices involving relatively non-specialist Islamic 
practitioners (Winn 2012).  In Nagan Raya, majlis taklim were regularly meeting, often weekly 
or monthly, and involved gatherings at which a teacher would instruct participants using one or 
more religious texts.  These lessons were closely associated with the boarding school networks 
controlled by the intellectual descendants of Muda Waly, and were usually taught at these 
boarding schools.  Attendees at these lessons, while predominantly rural villagers who often 
shared the sensibilities of these teachers, nonetheless included those who in other contexts 
represented themselves as reformed or who participated in the ritual activities of the Habib 
Seunagan.  Groups tended to be segregated by gender and age, although a few were mixed by 
gender.  Groups attended by the eldest participants, men and women in their sixties and over, 
were attended most regularly.
95
 
 Lessons participated in patterns of the aural transmission of Islamic knowledge found in 
different forms widely throughout the Muslim world in different times and places (Dhofier 1999; 
Messick 1993; Nelson 1985).  The teacher, usually the head of the boarding school at which a 
lesson was held, led the study of a text from a corpus of Malay language sources written in 
Arabic script.
96
  These texts were most often translations of and commentaries on revered 
Arabic-language originals.  In other instances, they were compilations of basic elements of 
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 There is much in the following description of majlis taklim in Nagan Raya that is consistent with Julian 
Millie’s description of “non-specialists” attending Majelis Istighotsah Ukkasyah bin Mihshon in Bandung, West 
Java in the early 2000s (Millie 2008).  In particular, his stress on the importance of such non-specialists in the 
intellectual and ritual life of the pesantren, as well as the efforts of the head of the school to incorporate such non-
specialists into this life through adjusting his teaching to their knowledge and interests, is strikingly consistent with 
what I observed.  An important difference, however, is that, while some exhibited the kind of lack of engagement 
with textual exegesis that Millie describes as being common among such non-specialists in the context in which he 
conducted his fieldwork, those who attended majlis taklim in Nagan Raya, especially older participants, often were 
intensely engaged in making sense of the text.  This was in large part due to reasons that will become apparent in 
what follows, as to an important organization difference.  Majlis taklim in Nagan Raya were overwhelmingly only 
attended by non-specialists, unlike Majelis Istighotsah Ukkasyah bin Mihshon, which was attended by both students 
at the pesantren where it was held and the general public. 
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 On the use of these kinds texts and the history of educational practices associated with them, see Dhofier 
(1999) and van Bruinessen (1990; 1995). 
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belief, jurisprudence, and mysticism.
97
  The most common form of these works consisted of lines 
in Arabic followed by a Malay translation or commentary.  At lessons, the teacher read a source 
out loud, adding his own Acehnese language gloss following each Arabic and Malay pairing.
98
  
The teacher then often added his own commentary or explanation, also in Acehnese.  Sometimes 
he simply defined a key concept, but in other cases the teacher offered several minutes of 
extended commentary designed to move attendees to more pious understanding, belief, or 
practice.  Some attendees brought their own editions of the texts under study to lessons, 
following along as the teacher read the work out loud.  But most attendees simply listened. 
 Between August of 2008 and June of 2009, I regularly attended six different majlis 
taklim, taught by three different teachers.
99
  The various majlis taklim I attended in Nagan Raya 
tended to focus their studies around three general, and overlapping, topics: foundational belief 
and practice, sometimes glossed as usuluddin (I.); practical Islamic jurisprudence, into which fit 
a range of topics, including, for example, how to perform ablutions and the proper procedures for 
figuring and collecting the religious tax; and eschatological literature on the tortures of the grave 
and the apocalypse.   
 The majlis taklim that I first attended, and at which I came to feel the most comfortable, 
was the Majlis Taklim Ansharullah, held on the grounds of the Dayah-Pesantren Mutaallamin, a 
boarding school in the village of Nigan.
100
  The members of Majlis Taklim Ansharullah studied 
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 Indonesian is a dialect of Malay.  Thus, although these texts were marked by a distinct and somewhat 
archaic style, the Malay sections were relatively easy to understand for attendees, all of whom were fluent in 








 In this chapter, I use pseudonyms for all of my interlocutors with only one exception.  “Abon Nigan” 
was the term of address used by most in Nagan Raya for the teacher of the Majlis Taklim Ansharullah.  It would 
have been impossible to disguise his identity without also disguising the name and location of this majlis taklim, 
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several texts during the months that I attended their lessons.  These included Sayr al-Salikin, a 
well-known eighteenth-century translation of a work by the eleventh- and twelfth-century mystic 
Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, Aqidah al-Najin, a nineteenth-century work on basic 
elements of faith, and other works on usuluddin, the basic elements of religion.
101
  While these 
texts each covered a wide range of topics, Majlis Taklim Ansharullah tended to focus their 
studies on eschatology, reading selections from the above works that focused on the spectacular 
and frightening details of the ordeals of the grave and the afterlife.  Topics covered in these 
selections included, among others, the size and weight of the mallets that are used by the angels 
Munkar and Nakir to punish the bodies of dead sinners, the razor thin bridge Muslims will one 
day cross into paradise, and the mysterious instruction that at the apocalypse one should always 
remember to “turn to the right” (Ac., wét oeneun).   
 One of the things that impressed me from my earliest visits with this group was the 
apparent fit of the usual subject matter of the lessons and the age of the attendees.  All members 
of Majlis Taklim Ansharullah were men, and all but one of these men were over the age of sixty.  
At least two claimed to be one hundred.  Members in their seventies, eighties and nineties 
outnumbered the “young” attendees in their sixties.  Already from the first few times I attended 
Majlis Taklim Ansharullah, I was struck by how participants seemed acutely aware of the 
imminent relevance of the material under study. Given their advanced age, after all, the ordeals 
of the afterlife were neigh.
102
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 Others have made similar observations in Java.  See, for example Dhofier (1999, 261, 272), Geertz 
(1960, 182-184), Howell (2001, 715-718), and Peacock (1978, 84-85). 
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 Majlis taklim that I attended in Nagan Raya typically were quite lively, even rowdy, as 
participants forwarded questions and commentary to their teachers and fellow classmates in 
manners that sometimes exhibited bravado and that sometimes interfered with the progress of the 
lesson.  At Majlis Taklim Ansharullah, the connection between the age of participants and the 
subject matter under study was further reflected in the specific questions put forward at these 
sessions.  Inquiries regularly involved such topics as the number of litanies one might need to 
recite while still alive in order to purify one’s heart before death, the consequences for failing to 
respond appropriately to a specific test of the apocalypse, and the status of one’s ritual purity in 
the unfortunate event that one passed on to the next life while using the toilet.   
 Not everyone found all such questions equally edifying.  Pak Panyang, a man in his 
seventies who had initially invited me to Majlis Taklim Ansharullah, once privately complained, 
“Those people asking all the questions are dumb!  If they knew already, they wouldn’t ask.”  
Nonetheless, they were an inescapable part of each lesson, and most attendees seemed to enjoy 
them.  Sessions frequently remained light-hearted, with a lot of joking and gentle teasing, despite 
the heavy subject matter.  Nonetheless, through both the object of study and the questions 
forwarded by participants, I observed an intense interest in death and the hereafter.  The sessions 
held a distinct air of meetings for those who were gathering to prepare for their own afterlives. 
“At the Least You Should Make Your Worship Consistent with Your Age”: Aging and 
Ethical Pursuits 
 
 Majlis Taklim Ansharullah and most of the other majlis taklim that I attended or about 
which I gathered data during my field research were dominated by older attendees who 
frequently showed intense interest in death and the afterlife.  But what of the young?  As 
mentioned above, eschatological traditions of graphic literature on the ordeals of the grave and 
the day of judgment have been a major genre invoked in the activism of Islamic revivalist 
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movements.  These accounts often highlight the engagement of adolescents and young adults 
with this literature (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005).  Acehnese, both young and old, regularly 
reminded me during my fieldwork that the moment of one’s death (I. ajal) was both preordained 
by God and unknown to the individual in this world.  With only a few exceptions, we would each 
be accountable for our lifetime of sins, both in the grave and at judgment day.
103
  Further, 
Acehnese ritual practice, especially in Nagan Raya, was inextricably tied to graves and funerary 
ritual.  The ritual cycles of village life, then, were full of reminders of death and the period of 
trial thereafter, and they often involved the recitation of litanies to lessen these trials for oneself 
and one’s deceased associates.   
 Majlis Taklim Ansharullah was exceptional for just how old its participants were, 
however, it was very rare at any of the majlis taklim I studied that anyone under the age of forty 
would attend.  “Younger” groups for forty or fifty year olds tended not only to be smaller, but 
also less engaged, as some attendees dozed along the short walls of open-air pavilions where 
lessons were held.  Almost no adolescents or young adults came, and the sessions for “college 
students” at the boarding school where Majlis Taklim Ansharullah was held seemed to be 
perpetually postponed, “until school holiday,” as I was repeatedly told. 
 After several visits to the Majlis Taklim Ansharullah, I offered my observations about the 
lack of youth at the majlis taklim I was attending.  “Why is it the case that most people who 
attend majlis taklim are old?” I asked in the informal and friendly moments before our teacher 
arrived to give the lesson.  A short pause was followed by soft chuckles.  Then Pak Mudin, in his 
sixties and always smiling, offered an answer to my inquiry: “Ah, actually, young people are 
seeking their blessings (Ac. and I., rezeki).  They want to get married.  So they work.  And they 
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go out.  We are close to death.  So we think about the tortures of the grave and the day of 
judgment.  And we defend ourselves (I., menjaga diri).”  I was intrigued by Pak Mudin’s 
response.  I pressed further, referring directly to the topic to be discussed when our lesson began 
in a few minutes: “But should they not also be interested in the day of judgment?  I mean, only 
God knows when we will die, right?  If they do not defend themselves today, and they die 
tomorrow, will they not suffer greatly in the grave?” 
 This question provoked a longer pause, and lots of smiles.  Finally one of our 
companions, a bit younger than Pak Mudin, exclaimed, “He’s right!”  As the room erupted in 
laughter, Teungku Rofik, an instructor at Darul Mutaallimin and by far the youngest member of 
the group in his late forties or early fifties, began an explanation that did less to address my 
confusion than it did to reiterate my inquiry.  “It is true, Nil.  If young people (I., pemuda-
pemudi) do not study about the tortures of the grave and the day of judgment, then they may not 
understand, and they will be tortured as a result of their sins.  They should come to our 
lessons.”
104
  Despite the self-evidence of the proposition, I found myself less than convinced by 
the lack of enthusiasm I observed in its deliverance.  On one hand, Teungku Rofik and others in 
the room clearly believed that young people should pay more attention to questions of death and 
repentance, however, none of them seemed terribly moved by the prospect of younger people 
joining their own, or any other, majlis taklim.  Not only did it seem that they did not expect it to 
happen, they appeared genuinely disinterested in whether any younger people came or not. 
 After this exchange, I began to raise the same inquiry with others.  This included men and 
women, both young and old, outside of majlis taklim.  The responses I received nearly always 
mirrored those of the members of Majlis Taklim Ansharullah.  Some of my interlocutors were 
more enthusiastic than others when it came to moralizing, even damning, the overwhelming 
                                                          
 
104
 In Nagan Raya, especially in Nigan, I came to be called Nil, a shortened version of my first name. 
 
187 
tendency of youth to be concerned with their material well-being and romantic pursuits.  All 
admitted that a more focused attention on the concerns of the grave represented by attendance at 
majlis taklim and similar kinds of lessons would, in fact, be of great moral benefit to such young 
people, however, virtually no one were surprised by my characterization or seemed to expect that 
it would be any other way.  All of those whom I questioned indicated that it is, in fact, expected 
that young people pursue such worldly concerns.  Not only did many seem genuinely 
disinterested, quite a few were sympathetic.  The reasons for this ambivalence seemed to rest in 
common understandings of human nature, ethical responsibilities and the development of 
capacities to control one’s baser desires.  Different people stressed different configurations of 
these three elements in their commentaries about religious study and ethical action.  Yet nearly 
all with whom I spoke acknowledged differences in the moral capacities and responsibilities of 
people of different ages and life circumstances. 
 Consider, for example, the following comments by a young man, Andi, in his early 
twenties and living on his family’s homestead as a not-yet-married son: 
Daniel (D):  Why do more old people (Ac., oereuëng toeha) attend majlis 
taklim than those who are young (Ac., njang moeda)? 
Andi (A):  Because they (i.e., old people) are afraid of the tortures of the 
grave.  Because they are near death[…]  They are closer to death, 
aren’t they? 
D:  Yes, yes.  But if, for example, one waits until one is old, and, let’s 
say, sins a lot, won’t it be the case that one’s torture in the grave 
will also be a lot? 
A:  Oh, a lot! 
D:  So why wait until you’re old? 
A:  It is like I said earlier[…]  Because those who are young 
sometimes still have a lot of desire (I., nafsu)[…]  They still like to 
have a good time.  They don’t yet have conviction (I., pendirian).   
D:  Conviction?  What do you mean by that? 
A:  Conviction, it means certainty of the heart (I., penetapan hati).  For 
example, I want to do this, and continuously, until I’m old.  An 
example would be if we had opened a business.  If there isn’t 
conviction then maybe the business will close.  What remains is for 
 
188 
it to be built.  We open it, but work remains, and there must be 
conviction. 
D:  I understand.  So young people, their desire is high and their 
conviction is low.  And old people have a low level of desire?  
A: Ah.  Maybe their desire is high, but old people might also have a 
lot of experience.  Life experience (I., pengalaman hidup).  As a 
result, they might have conviction.  Even more if they are already 
married.  
 
 Andi’s articulation of why young people do not attend majlis taklim rested on a model of 
moral action that entailed the control of one’s desires through the acquisition of appropriate 
psycho-moral tools.  It in some ways resembled the ideas of mid-twentieth century Acehnese 
Islamic reformers, who employed the language of Islamic mystical practice to identify the 
rational intellect (Ac., akaj, I., akal) as the means of checking one’s desires (Ac. and I., hawa 
nafsu or nafsu) (Siegel 2000).  However, rather than posing the intellect as that which guides 
desire, Andi suggested that a different quality served this function, that is, pendirian, which 
might translate as “conviction” or “standing.”
105
  In doing so he revealed himself to share in the 
sensibilities of the Naqsyabandi Sufis descendent from Muda Waly, members of whose lineage 
held the vast majority of the majlis taklim that Andi indicated young people chose not to attend.  
For these Sufis, the notion that the rational intellect alone might check one’s desire represented 
an impoverished psycho-moral model.  The intellect itself must be guided by other faculties, for 
example the soul (Ac., rōh, I., roh) and the heart (Ar. sirr), which, in descriptions these Sufis 
offered me, were the seats of the sort of conviction that, to borrow Andi’s language, entails “a 
certainty of the heart[… a desire] to do this, and continuously, until I’m old.”
106
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 For a short discussion of the role of capacities of moral reflection and discernment in Islamic mystical 
practice, sometimes identified as the “subtle organs,” see the entry for sirr in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, second 
edition (Amir-Moezzi 2012).  For a discussion of popular ideas about proper conduct that rely on a similar notion of 
moral capacities related to akal and hawa nafsu that appear in different distributions in people of different genders 
and life stages, in this case Egyptian Bedouins, see Abu-Lughod (1986, 85-99, 124-133). 
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 Many of my interlocutors who were Naqsyabandi teachers would no doubt hold that the 
process of cultivating the necessary capacities to form something akin to Andi’s pendirian might 
as well begin immediately through, for example, attendance at majlis taklim.  Andi seemed less 
convinced.  His comments did not, in fact, suggest the purposeful cultivation of virtuous 
capacities described in recent literature on ethical self-formation.  It was not the attendance at 
lessons that allowed people to cultivate pendirian in his model.  Rather, it was the development 
of pendirian that brought one to these lessons.  This was achieved through “life experience” (I., 
pengalaman hidup), the precise meaning of which Andi left unspecified.  However, what he did 
specify is revealing.  He began and closed his response to my inquiry by indicating important 
moments in an idealized life cycle when pendirian might develop, i.e., as one approaches death 
and after one is married. 
 The understanding that ethical and ritual practice was contingent upon one’s life stage 
was not limited to just the young or those who held affinities with lineages of Naqsyabandi 
teachers.  Teungku Ramli, for instance, was of an advanced age, already in his seventies.  His 
wealth, reputation and descendants were firmly established.  When he was not in the bureaucratic 
office where he still held a government appointment, he spent most of his time attending family 
and community events.  He was a critic of the forms of authority and religiosity associated with 
the network of boarding school teachers who trace their lineage to Muda Waly.  As such, he 
chose not to attend the kinds of majlis taklim that I describe above.  Instead, he participated, 
often as a teacher, in occasional public lessons for small groups of members of the organization 
Muhammadiyah, and its women’s wing, Aisyiyah, both of which derive from an Islamic 
reformism traceable to the nineteenth-century figure Muhammad ‘Abduh.  Nonetheless, during a 
discussion in which he explained to me the importance of remembering the apocalypse as a 
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means of keeping oneself motivated to carry out moral and ritual acts (I., amal and I., ibadat) he 
articulated a model of religious learning and pursuits that paralleled those of my other 
interlocutors: 
Daniel (D):  So you, yourself are of an advanced age[…] are you preparing 
yourself[…]? 
Ramli (R):  Yes. 
D:  How? 
R:  It is like this.  For a long time I have always, in my sermons, told 
people that at the least you should make your worship (I., ibadat) 
consistent with your age. 
D:  Consistent with your age? 
R:  Ah-ha!  When one is sixteen years old, and the obligatory prayer 
time comes, one should pray.  Then add a little more, add to this 
with what is optional but full of merit (I., sunat-sunat).  If one is 
around my age now, it is no longer enough to do the optional 
prayers [immediately before or after the obligatory prayers…]  
One has to add to it with others[…] [w]ith prayers at night, at least 
three more sets[…] 
 
 Here, Teungku Ramli clearly described an age-contingent model of devotional practice.  
For the youngest practitioners, the basic requirements of the practicing Muslim (i.e., the five 
daily prayers) are sufficient.  As one grows older, however, more and more prayers should be 
added.  Teungku Ramli’s suggestion that older practitioners might rise at night to perform 
additional ritual activities was consistent with a notion that such practitioners are relatively free 
of the kinds of worldly concerns that must preoccupy the young.  This is a point I discuss in the 
next section, and one also made by my interlocutors in the Majlis Taklim Ansharullah.  In fact, 
Teungku Ramli frequently seemed exhausted, often dozing during public meetings, suggesting 
that he did in fact maintain the night time regiment of optional prayers that he prescribed.  Not 
unlike my interlocutors at Majlis Taklim Ansharullah, however, Teungku Ramli became more 
ambivalent when I asked specifically about whether it was not true that youth should attend to 
the affairs of the grave with the same intensity as do the old: 
 
191 
D: And how about this[…]  I frequently attend majlis taklim in the 
villages.  Those that come to the majlis taklim are old people…  
Young people very rarely come[…]  So, according to your 
reasoning, is this actually appropriate?  If a child is sixteen to 
twenty-five is it appropriate that they only do their five daily 
prayers?  The older they get, the more they add, [then] going to 
majlis taklim?   
R: No.  It doesn’t have to be that way.  They should go from the time 
they are young.  What I mean is that if someone already gets to be 
old and is not yet conscious (I. sadar), that’s going to be difficult 
isn’t it?  It shouldn’t be that way.  They should come from the time 
they are young.  Because it is like this[…]  The messenger 
Muhammad said that repentance is good[…]  It is even better from 
the time of one’s youth[…]  Why did I say consistent with one’s 
age[…  I said] at least consistent with one’s age.  What is good is if 
it is from one’s youth[…]  It is better if it is since the beginning.  
But at the least [it should be] what I said earlier.  For example, if I 
am already forty years old, I observe that which is optional but full 
of merit.  I increase it again, it is not enough to do what is optional 
at the five prayer times, adding to it with other optional things.  
Because it is like this, if we are already old then it is true that later 
we will be behind what is appropriate for our age.  Like someone 
of my age.  One (i.e., of Teungku Ramli’s age) should not be 
allowed to sleep anymore at night.  Decrease one’s sleep, do more, 
bringing oneself closer to God.  One should not be able to [sleep] 
anymore[…]  I now, after the required night time prayer, I recite 
litanies (Ac., meurateb), then I do more. 
Jami (J)
107
: At two o’clock [in the morning], three o’clock, one gets up again. 
D: Gets up again?  Are you like this too? 
J:  Sometimes.  (Said while chuckling.) 
 
 In the second quotation Teungku Ramli shifts to a description of ritual practice and 
religious study that, in some ways, more closely approximates discourses of the progressive 
cultivation of ethical capacity common in recent ethnographic literature.  This is especially 
evident in the way he characterizes the increase of ritual practice that he prescribes in terms of a 
layering of ritual that sets the foundations for the increased quantity of religious activity at the 
next level: “[I]f we are already old then it is true that we will be behind what is appropriate for 
our age.”  Here it is possible to see an idea of the progressive development of a religious and 
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ethical capacity designed to bring one “closer to God.”  Yet Teungku Ramli’s description, even 
in asserting that it is better to begin such practice at a young age, continues to adhere to a 
distinctly age-contingent frame.  It is, after all, the goal of not getting “behind what is 
appropriate for our age” that drives this practice, not an attempt at cultivating moral virtue in 
general.   
 The ambivalence found in Teungku Ramli’s statement is not uncommon.  As pointed out 
above, it also existed in the sentiments expressed to me by majlis taklim participants.  I raise it in 
order to stress that the contingent pursuits of Islamic learning and ethical action that I describe 
here were not limited to those who might otherwise be thought of as least affected by the styles 
of objectification associated with twentieth-century Islamic reform and revivalism.
108
  One might 
expect Teungku Ramli, as a committed Abduh-style reformer who continued to actively engage 
in projects of individual and social critique through reformed Islamic practice, to more 
consistently adhere to a progressive striving time.  Yet, even in his rejoinder to my suggestion 
that contingent approaches to religious practice might be appropriate, he returned to a frame 
dependent on age and examples drawn from his own age-contingent practice. 
The Pursuit of Rezeki as Ethical Imperative 
 Andi and Teungku Ramli indicated that young people, especially the unmarried, chose 
not to attend majlis taklim because they had not yet developed the capacity to do so.  Others 
subtly suggested that it might not yet be ethically prudent for someone like Andi to do so.  Recall 
that on the morning that I vocalized my observation regarding the lack of young people who 
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attended majlis taklim, my classmates at Majlis Taklim Ansharullah responded that young people 
were still pursuing their “blessings” (I. and Ac., rezeki), especially love and financial gain.  This 
was the most common response I received when inquiring into why such lessons were nearly 
absent of young attendees.  Interlocutors commonly responded that young people were simply 
too busy with the world (Ac., dōnja, I., dunia) to attend.  I first understood this response as one 
meant to chide those overly focused on the world instead of the concerns of the afterlife, but I 
soon came to realize that this was not the case.   
 Rezeki, the term chosen by my classmates at Majlis Taklim Ansharullah to indicate the 
blessings being pursued by young people, regularly was used in daily speech in Nagan Raya.  It 
referred to a range of valuables that one might obtain through sincere and serious efforts, 
including income, children, and knowledge.  Rezeki’s most common usage in daily conversation 
was to indicate material gain, especially legitimate earnings or unexpected windfalls.  In this 
sense, the term was used by Acehnese in contexts where the Indonesian term peruntungan, 
translatable as “profit” or “benefit,” might also be appropriate.  However, Acehnese rarely used 
peruntungan in these contexts.  The preference for rezeki was so strong, in fact, that my use of 
the term peruntungan was corrected on multiple occasions.  In these instances, after I drew 
attention to my own or someone else’s good fortune using the term peruntungan, my 
interlocutors frequently looked up and said, “Not peruntungan, rezeki!” (Ac., Kòn peruntungan, 
rezeki!). 
 This preference pointed to nuances in common Acehnese usages of rezeki that have 
significance to the arguments of this chapter.  In some parts of Indonesia, rezeki refers primarily 
to money or earnings, and can be more properly translated as “livelihood,” rather than 
“blessing.”  In Aceh, however, rezeki reflected a shared divine-human agency that was central to 
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its wide usage to refer to the pursuit of material gain.  Some Acehnese described peruntungan as 
a term belonging to a system of secular and capitalist socio-economic relations that treats human 
beings as the agents of their own material success.  They defined rezeki, conversely, in terms of 
the responsibility of humans to strive for the material opportunities that have been made manifest 
for them by God.  Underlying this definition was the assumption that the pursuit of material gain 
is itself a divinely sanctioned activity, when it is carried out in a manner consistent with divine 
will.  
 The pursuit of one’s rezeki was an intense concern among both Acehnese men and 
women, for whom the failure to achieve material success could have grave consequences, 
ranging from the inability to meet expectations of neighborly and familial reciprocity to true 
indigence.  Striving for one’s rezeki was not morally optional, but an ethical responsibility of 
great importance.  This was all the more the case given the fact that rezeki was tied to the 
reproduction of one’s family line, and thus social relations generally, through marriage and 
reproduction.  In particular, young Acehnese men frequently worried about their ability to 
present themselves as financially stable, especially if they wished to pursue a marriage to a 
woman who had caught their attention.  These worries were stoked by stories that circulated 
among these young men about true loves lost to older and more financially stable suitors, while 




 Thus, most of my interlocutors took the pursuits of wealth and marriage to be not only 
legitimate, but also ethically imperative upon young Muslims.  This placed the young in a 
different constellation of relationships with the world and the afterlife than their older 
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coreligionists.  Those “close to death” were freer to focus their religious pursuits on the grave 
and the end times, attending majlis taklim and engaging in ritual practices designed to prepare 
them for the trials of their afterlife.  Young, especially unmarried, men and women were engaged 
in virtuous pursuits of a different kind, namely, the righteous struggles for wealth, a suitable 
marriage partner, and children.  Even if they wanted to join majlis taklim, some doubted that they 
had the ethical wherewithal to remain committed to such study, or to participate in an effective 
manner.   
 Sensibilities linking age and life-circumstance to the appropriateness of taking up 
different kinds of religious practice were not limited to participation in majlis taklim.  Nor was it 
only by choice that youth did not participate in certain religious pursuits.  A young man in his 
thirties, married with one child, once complained to me that he had repeatedly asked to join the 
practice sessions of the group of men in his village who led the samadiyah recitations at funeral 
feasts.  He desperately wanted to join these weekly practices, for reasons that he did not make 
clear to me.  But the older men who ran the practice had repeatedly rejected his requests: “They 
say I am not yet ready.  But I am ready!  Still, every time I go they do not give me permission.”   
The life-staged notions of ethical capacity and responsibility discussed in this and the 
previous section are themselves instances of a “contingent” ethical temporality when compared 
to the striving time of activists and revivalists (Bledsoe 2002).  They take participation in 
religious pursuits and ethical formation to be uneven and qualitatively specific to particular life 
contexts, rather than part of a single continuous stream of ethical development.  In the next 
section, however, I turn to how this basic framework of aging was complicated further by the 
ways in which my interlocutors understood themselves to be tied to the ethical nodes of the 
world and the afterlife in a manner that reflected their specific circumstances.  The examples in 
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the next section involve contingent temporalities individualized to reflect the details of particular 
lives. 
Dōnja and Akhirat: The Contingency of Life and Death 
 The discourses on aging and religious practice that I discuss in the previous section 
appear to support a model that, if not exactly staged, associates the passage of years in a 
Muslim’s life and the ever progressive approach of the grave with a decreasing involvement in 
worldly affairs and an increased interest in the afterlife.  This parallels some ethnographic 
scholarship on aging and religious practice that has taken an orientation towards the afterlife to 
be geared at a process of exiting the world (Eberhardt 2006; Lamb 1997, 2000).   
 There is much about ethnographic literature on aging and decreased involvement in 
worldly affairs that is consistent with my observations in Nagan Raya.  Participants in Majlis 
Taklim Ansharullah, for example, were clearly involved in a process of retiring from the world, 
no longer holding much responsibility in the day-to-day affairs of village or family life.  Further, 
younger groups of majlis taklim participants, those in their forties and fifties, tended to focus 
their studies on basic religious doctrine and practical jurisprudence, foci that belie a more 
worldly orientation than the eschatological literature that was common fare at Majlis Taklim 
Ansharullah.  Andi’s description of pendirian suggested another wrinkle in this model, namely, 
that the development of the psycho-moral faculties necessary to engage in religious studies and 
to pay sustained attention to the grave might not yet be available to younger practitioners.   
 While models linking aging to retirement from worldly affairs were powerful ways in 
which my interlocutors structured their religious pursuits and interests, in themselves they are 
insufficient for understanding the ways in which people in Nagan Raya approached the 
navigation of ethical risks and responsibilities associated with the world and the afterlife.  While 
 
197 
these two nodes could, and frequently were, emplotted in a directly inverse fashion on an 
abstract life course (i.e., as worldly responsibilities fade, those associated with the afterlife 
increase), the world and the afterlife impinged on the experiences of men and women in different 
fashions and degrees, depending on one’s individual circumstances. 
 Vital for understanding the ways in which the world and the afterlife served as nodes 
through which my interlocutors oriented religious and ethical pursuits is Aceh’s recent history of 
guerrilla war and natural disaster.  Since 1873, there have been roughly ninety years in which 
some form of guerrilla conflict has raged in the province.  The most recent conflict, between the 
Indonesian military and the Free Acheh Movement, resulted in a brutal counterinsurgency in 
which anywhere from twelve to twenty thousand people, most of whom were non-combatants, 
lost their lives.  Many others were kidnapped, raped or tortured (Aspinall 2009, 2).  This conflict 
ended in 2005, following the devastating December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami.  The 
earthquake and tsunami took another 140,000 lives, almost a full three percent of Aceh’s 4.3 
million people at that time (Aspinall 2009, 221).  Both the conflict and the tsunami have become 
central episodes in narratives of Acehnese history that stress Acehnese suffering in the post-
colonial period.  
 In the memories of most of those whom I knew in Nagan Raya, the conflict between the 
Free Acheh Movement and the Indonesian military only reached the regency in 1998.  However, 
once it did, it did not spare the population of Nagan Raya its brutality.  Most people living near 
Jeuram remember nightly crossfire and regular kidnappings that began at that time.  Based on 
oral histories, the fighting in Nagan Raya had less of an ideological flavor than it did in other 
parts of Aceh, ironically making it even more difficult for local residents to avoid.  Kidnappings 
and the collection of protection money became a sort of cottage industry, associated in the 
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memories of my interlocutors with greedy gangs more interested in turning a profit than in any 
ideological cause.  While most in Nagan Raya blamed the beginnings of the conflict in the 
regency on Free Acheh Movement guerrillas “coming [to Nagan Raya] from Pidie” (Ac., dja’ 
keunòë dari Pidie), it was clear that the military was widely feared as well.  One of the most 
brutal massacres carried out by Indonesian military personal during the conflict occurred at a 
boarding school in Nagan Raya’s mountainous interior in July of 1999 (Aspinall 2009, 99).
110
   
 Similarly, with the bulk of its population living in the hills away from the coast, Nagan 
Raya did not suffer the effects of the tsunami to the degree that those on Aceh’s west and north 
coastal regions did.  Yet it sits just fifty kilometers from the city of Meulaboh, the epicenter of 
the disaster.  Many from Nagan Raya commuted to Meulaboh on a regular basis, as it was the 
closest urban center to the regency’s heartland.  Further, during the initial months of relief and 
recovery after the tsunami, supplies were delivered to Meulaboh via the mountain road that runs 
through Nagan Raya, as the coastal highway had been washed away. 
 Thus, the experiences of Nagan Raya’s residents with both the recent conflict and the 
December 2004 natural disasters were in some ways less prolonged than in other parts of Aceh.  
They nonetheless entailed intense periods of suffering and brushes with death.  In light of this 
history, placing the afterlife at the end of a period of youthful engagement with the world was 
something flagrantly at odds with the lived experiences of many, if not most, Acehnese, 
including my interlocutors in Nagan Raya. 
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 This massacre, of a religious teacher named Teungku Bantaqiah and fifty-six of his students, may be one 
of the reasons why most in Nagan Raya pegged the beginning of the conflict in the region to 1998.  Bantaqiah 
actually had been arrested in 1993, accused of supplying logistical support and esoteric knowledge used in self-
protection to Free Acheh Movement cadres who had set up camp near his boarding school in the mountainous 
region of Beutong Ateuh (Aspinall 2009, 99).  1998 was also the year of the Indonesian dictator Soeharto’s 
resignation from the presidency, perhaps making it overdetermined that those in Nagan Raya would associate it with 
new kinds of uncertainty and unrest. 
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 Consider, for example, Teungku Sum’s story of the path that led him to pursue religious 
knowledge.  A student-teacher at Darul Mutaallimin, where Majlis Taklim Ansharullah met, 
Teungku Sum was in his early thirties at the time of my fieldwork.  He was already well-
respected for his intelligence and learning among the other student-teachers at the school, and 
was known as a skillful composer of didactic poems called qasidah (I.).  He was withdrawn and 
somewhat aloof, traits often considered appropriate for religious teachers.  One afternoon we sat 
together next to the school’s library and talked about his life history.  He narrated a string of 
events, the details of which he left vague, in which he had found himself in a series of troubles as 
a result of the conflict between the Free Acheh Movement and the Indonesian government.  As a 
result he was forced to flee successive homes over a period of several years.  Moving from 
boarding school to boarding school, half out of a desire to learn more and half out of the 
necessity to flee something or someone that he clearly did not feel comfortable naming, Teungku 
Sum finally had landed at Darul Mutaallimin, finding “peace” (I., tentram) and “safety” (I., 
aman).  He settled there and became one of Abon Nigan’s assistants.   
 Teungku Sum described his journey as one that had been brought about by God, a life 
history in which his own human agency worked together with and was guided by that of the 
divine.  In his typically aloof fashion he accepted his life history, both the hardships and the 
opportunities, with resignation.  Chief among the rewards of his life was the religious knowledge 
he had accumulated during his travels, which he counted among his “blessing” (I., rezeki).  Yet 
his withdrawn manner turned a shade of melancholy when he broached the topic of marriage: “I 
am not objecting.  But I think about it a lot.  How will I ever get married?  I am rich in 
knowledge (Ac., èleumèë), but I have no money.”  A man in his early thirties, considered a prime 
age for contracting a wife, Teungku Sum had taken a different path than one he assumed to be 
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compatible with the goals of material wealth and marriage.  In so doing he had prioritized 
knowledge that most of my interlocutors deferred to moments when they felt closer to death, if 
they pursued it at all.  While he studied and taught a wide range of subjects, he described his 
knowledge as that pertaining to the afterlife, contrasting it to the knowledge pursued by his age-
mates engaged in studies at universities.
111
  Perhaps it was his own brushes with death to which 
he alluded in his life history that had pushed him to pursue these concerns of the grave and the 
hereafter.  Regardless, he clearly felt deep concern over the way in which this life course might 
have stalled or even foreclosed the possibility of marriage.  While life circumstances, his own 
choices, and divine agency had led him on a path that differed from the models of age-




 Teungku Sum’s life history reveals a relation to the world and the afterlife that, rather 
than moving along the age-inflected arc described by, for instance, Andi or Teungku Ramli, 
involved a different kind of “contingent” experience of time and the life course (Bledsoe 2002).  
Thrust face-to-face with the afterlife as a result of the armed conflict in his homeland, he found 
himself drawn to a life of religious study, partly as a result of desperate circumstances and partly 
as a result of the mysteries of divine intervention.  Yet death and the afterlife were not only 
culled into people’s consciousness as a result of violence of this kind.   
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 This was a common rhetorical move on the part of boarding school teachers of this milieu, but also 




 One common alternative model of age-appropriate practice in Aceh and in Indonesia more broadly 
reflects precisely the path taken by Teungku Sum, i.e., devotion of one’s youth to pious study in Islamic boarding 
schools, especially by young males.  The goal of marriage is not discarded, even for these young scholars.  
However, this goal must be deferred until completion of one’s studies or when the opportunity to marry, often 
within networks of scholarly families, presents itself.  In my visits to boarding schools in rural Aceh in 2006 and 
2007-2009, I frequently heard the kind of complaint articulated by Teungku Sum.  Young men wondered how they 
would get married when they had no money and were restricted from socializing with women by their teachers.  
Several suggested that they hoped to leave their studies and pursue more lucrative trades or educations.  These kinds 
of concerns have a wider resonance in Islamic boarding school circles throughout the archipelago.  For a humorous 
depiction of them, see the short story “Kang Amin” by A. Mustofa Bisri (Bisri 2003).  
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 Near the end of my fieldwork, in May of 2009, a young man from a village near my 
residence was killed when a riptide pulled him out to sea.  After searching for his body through 
the night, young men from his village finally located it the next morning and brought it back to 
the village for burial.  It was washed in his family’s house, and then wrapped in cloth before 
being put into a simple, perfumed coffin.  After being wrapped in batik cloths, the coffin was laid 
on several pillows.  Men lined up in rows next to it, women behind them, to perform prayers.  
This was followed by a homily. 
 The man who delivered the sermon at this young man’s funeral was identified by those 
who sat next to me as a “religious teacher” (Ac., teungku), although I was not able to gather any 
information about his educational level or style of religiosity.  Often such functions are carried 
out by a village official known as the teungku meunasah, a role that requires little religious 
training aside from knowledge of basic life cycle rituals and good rapport with one’s village 
neighbors.  The teungku in this case had led the prayers and now addressed the assembled 
community: 
We all knew Zaini.  He was a child of our village.  Just two years ago he 
graduated from high school.  Some might say we should be sad.  But think about 
this.  In Islam, one’s actions only begin to be counted from the time one is 
sixteen.  Sixteen.  Zaini was just two years out of high school!  So he was 18, 19?  
If he had lived until old age, like the rest of us, think about his tortures in the 
grave.  He did not live long enough to be tempted.  His sins were few.  Much 
fewer than those of us who have outlived him.  Zaini was lucky.  We will be 
tortured in the grave.  But Zaini?  No!  He will suffer only a little. 
  
 Notice how this portion of the sermon reflects the age-contingent senses of ethical 
practice described above, but also introduces elements that are specific to the circumstances of 
the untimely death of the young man.  Unlike the explicit statements of my classmates at Majlis 
Taklim Ansharullah, who while sympathetic to the pursuits of youth also asserted that the young 
would suffer greatly in the grave if they died before they began the practice of “defending” 
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themselves, this religious teacher asserted the opposite: “Zaini[…] did not live long enough to be 
tempted.  His sins were few.”  While Teungku Sum’s brushes with death had propelled him to a 
life of religious study, one that he feared might indefinitely defer the fulfillment of his worldly 
wishes and responsibilities regarding marriage, Zaini’s death was here portrayed as 
circumventing, or at least deemphasizing, both his worldly concerns and those of the grave.  His 
life was short, his sins were few, and his punishment would be similarly abridged.
113
 
 A similar, if also reverse, logic appeared in a session of Majlis Taklim Ansharullah.  The 
lesson on this day focused on a section of Sayr al-Salikin that discussed the basic elements of 
faith.  This has given rise to a discussion of repentance (I., taubat).  In one string of questions 
and answers, our group discussed the fact that a non-Muslim who converts to Islam is not held 
responsible for sins that he or she may have committed prior to the point of conversion.  Abon 
Nigan was careful to stress the circumstances under which such a conversion counted, noting 
that conversions wrought under duress or out of fear were not valid and would have no effect.  
Here he used the example of Chinese-Indonesians, living in the provincial capital of Banda 
Aceh, stories about whom were circulating widely in Aceh at the time of my fieldwork.  These 
stories alleged that some of these Chinese converted to Islam as the tsunami waves approached 
in December 2004, with some versions including miraculous accounts of waves parting for those 
converts in manners evoking Moses’ flight from Egypt.  As was usual, however, my classmates 
had their own interpretations and questions to discuss.  Pak Mudin gave me a sideways glance 
and grinned.  “Nil!  That means you can do whatever you want!  If you convert later, it all gets 
erased!  We are not so lucky.  Our sins count.  So, maybe, you should wait until you are near 
death, and then convert, huh?”   
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 For a similar sentiment, offered in relation to the death of an infant, see Siegel (2000, 107). 
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 While some in the room, not least of whom Abon Nigan, seemed skeptical of this 
strategy, everyone was in agreement on the first point.  I was lucky because if I was to convert, I 
would not be answerable for the sins I had committed to that point.  Much of the conversation 
that followed revolved around questions that attempted to discern just how long one might defer 
repentance without suffering too much in the way of divine punishment.  “What if Nil was to 
wait to convert until his last breath?”  “What about a Muslim?  Can a Muslim repent (I., 
bertaubat) just before death?”  Pak Mudin, in particular, progressively pushed the boundary of 
repentance ever closer to one’s last moment of life: “What if one repents halfway through his last 
breath?”  Then, later, “What if one repents halfway through that?”  Abon Nigan, who tended to 
be extremely scrupulous in making pronouncements about the jurisprudential status of various 
acts that attendees forwarded during discussion, was clearly troubled by this line of inquiry.  
Nonetheless, he seemed unable to deny the implications of Pak Mudin’s questions.  After each 
time Pak Mudin halved the previous fraction of a breadth, Abon Nigan responded not with a 
definitive answer, but with friendly, if firm, advice: “Don’t [be like that]!” (Ac., Bè’!). 
 The examples of Teungku Sum, Zaini’s funeral, and Pak Mudin’s persistent questions 
illustrate aspects of the contingent nature of ethical pursuits and knowledge in Nagan Raya.  One 
may have the ethical node of the afterlife thrust upon one in one’s youth, or one may attempt to 
defer it through a potentially risky delaying of repentance until one’s last fraction of a breath.  
For those born Muslims, the last strategy may guarantee entry to paradise, but not defense from 
the tortures of the grave.  For converts, conversion brings a clean slate, but only under specified 
circumstances.  In each case, different sorts of ethical and temporal relationships are established 
between the period of the afterlife and one’s years in the world. 
Dōnja and Akhirat: Nodes of Ethical Risk and Responsibility 
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 Since 1998, Aceh has been the site of a series of legal reforms designed to create a more 
thoroughly Islamic state and society.  Identified with the term syariat Islam (I.), these series of 
reforms ostensibly have been geared at implementing a more thoroughly Islamic legal system 
and explicitly Islamic legal codes in the province.  However, very little in the way of formal or 
procedural law has changed in this time period.  Instead, the fruit of these much touted reforms 
has been a new layer of bureaucracy that includes the Department of Syariat (Dinas Syariat) and 
the morality police (Wilayatul Hisbah, WH), on one hand, and a powerful vision of “social 
engineering” through Islamic law, on the other (Feener 2012).  Identifying the roots of such a 
vision in multiple strands of twentieth-century Acehnese Islamic thought, R. Michael Feener 
traces some of the most important influences on Aceh’s contemporary Islamic legal project to 
dakwah movements of the 1970s and 1980s that, like their counterpart movements elsewhere in 
the Muslim world, sought to transform society through gaining the commitment of individual 
Muslims to repent and rededicate themselves to a more thoroughly Islamic life.  The vision 
behind the recent round of Acehnese legal reforms, Feener argues, shares this sensibility, 




 The vision behind recent Islamic legal reforms in Aceh, thus, participates in strands of 
Islamic activist thought that call for immediate commitment to Islamic renewal.  It participates in 
the striving time of certain types of objectified practice discussed above.  Its architects and 
supporters seek the transformation of Acehnese society through progressive moral refinement.  
One of the most important ways that this is attempted is through the legislation of visible, and 
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 Feener argues this expectation originates in the New Order period (1968-1998) when the authoritarian 
state intervened in a variety of fields.  Further, much of the religious bureaucracy that has become prominent during 
the recent legal reforms was actively pioneered during the New Order, in some cases serving as a model for 
national-level institutions, such as the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majlis Ulama Indonesia) (Feener 2012). 
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often explicitly symbolic, aspects of Islamic practice: women’s dress, the building of mosques, 
Friday communal prayers, the yearly fast, etc. (Feener 2013).  This focus has had the effect of 
devaluing subtler and more contingent articulations of Islamic ethical practice, at least in the 
public sphere, where highly visible Islamic practice and symbols have become the sine qua non 
of Islamic ethical action and identity.  For example, popular traveling preachers who make 
appearances at events and holidays around the province frequently rail against Acehnese society.  
They lament young people’s lack of interest in religious study and the afterlife.  In these sermons 
the positive valuation of worldly pursuits, especially by those such as my interlocutors at Majlis 
Taklim Ansharullah, while not wholly disavowed, are deemphasized and give way to a rhetorical 
figure of the world and worldliness as a site of intense temptation. 
 Consider, for example, the following excerpt from a sermon in a village in the regency of 
South Aceh, south of Nagan Raya, delivered by Teungku Hasani: 
This is the first time this year that I have accepted an invitation [to give a 
sermon…] from college kids.  I do not share the same principles as college kids 
(I., seprinsip dengan mahasiswa).  College kids are free.  In Blang Pidie they 
make demonstrations against the injustice of the regency head, but they go out 
and commit adultery[…]  Nowadays you can commit adultery with your cell 
phone.  “Honey.  I’m waiting for you at Krueng Raya!”  “Okay Honey, I’ll be 
right there[…]”  If we look at what constituted prostitution in Arabia, before, in 
the time of ignorance (I., jahilliah), a man could not even meet a woman who was 
not of his blood[…]  College girls come to me and say, “But Teungku, if I do not 
dress like this, how will I find my soul mate (I., jodoh)[…]”  But before marriage 
there is no such term as “coupling” (I., pacaran) in Islam.
115
 
    
Here Teungku Hasani, himself widely identified as a “young” religious teacher in his early 
thirties, attacked the moral failings of young people, especially young female college students, 
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 Using tone and dialect, in this quotation Teungku Hasani imitated the voices of young female college 
students calling their boyfriend via cell phones.  These kinds of performative features of his sermons were 
exceptionally important to his rhetorical style.  Audiences loved them, even when attendees explicitly questioned 
aspects of the preacher’s message.  In his reference to Arabia, Teungku Hasani was implying that sexual mores were 
stronger among pre-Muslim Arabs in the period before the Prophet Muhammad than among Acehnese Muslims in 
the contemporary period.  The Indonesian term pacaran, here translated as “coupling,” might also be translated as 
“dating,” with the full range of connotations this term carries in English.  However, in moralizing commentary such 
as Teungku Hasani’s, the term nearly always implies scandalous sexual activity. 
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who he took as inviting sexual temptation, failing to fulfill responsibilities to adhere to divine 
law and risking further moral compromise.  These were common recurrent themes in his 
preaching, as they were in the sermons of other popular traveling preachers.  Teungku Hasani 
preached widely on Aceh’s west coast during my fieldwork, also giving a sermon, for example, 
in the Nagan Raya town where I resided in 2008.  He had been invited by the village head after 
the latter listened to him deliver a sermon in a neighboring village.  While some with whom I 
spoke had questions about the content of his talk, finding it too “harsh” (Ac., kreuëh), his 
sermons were popular and clearly enjoyable for those assembled, who reacted with verbal 
interjections and laughter as he, for example, imitated the tone and Jakarta-inflected dialect of a 
stereotypical college couple newly in love.   
 For those more sympathetic to the pursuits of the world, the risks given voice in the 
sermons of traveling preachers like Teungku Hasani were certainly acknowledged.  For example, 
in commenting on shortcomings of neighbors, both real and imagined, my interlocutors in Nagan 
Raya, as well as Acehnese living in the regency of Aceh Besar (Kloos 2011), sometimes 
described a very fine line between the honest striving for one’s rezeki and misguided efforts that 
ultimately might end in the extreme of greed, destructive of both the self and community.  
Similarly, while flirtation and pre-marital socializing between members of the opposite sex was 
nearly always frowned upon, many tacitly recognized a need for young men and women to meet 
each other in order to move towards marriage.  Similar to the pursuit of one’s material gain, 
these actions carried with them serious risks, especially that they might lead to one’s moral ruin 
as a result of allowing oneself to be drawn into morally illegitimate sexual pursuits.   
 Both those defending premarital romance and those attacking it, like Teungku Hasani, 
acknowledged these moral risks.  What differed was the stance these parties took towards the 
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question of how such dangers should be navigated.  These risks, especially those around sex and 
marriage, were not distributed evenly.  The consequences of moral missteps for women were 
frequently more serious than for men, especially in the field of sexuality.  This was apparent in 
Teungku Hasani’s sermon, in which he compared female college studies to prostitutes, an 
accusation that would have carried much less resonance if made about men.  Despite the 
admonitions of traveling preachers that young people should dedicate themselves to religious 
study instead of actively pursuing wealth and marriage, for many of those whom I studied, 
pursuing wealth and marriage remained legitimate Islamic activities, worldly pursuits incumbent 
upon young Muslim men and women.   
 A telling exchange that reinforces this point occurred when a friend from the coastal city 
of Meulaboh, the closest urban center to Nagan Raya, explained to me his thoughts on the love 
magic for which Aceh’s west coast is infamous.  Rather than condemn the practice as not Islamic 
(as some reformers have) or suggest that instead of concerning themselves with romance young 
people should devote themselves to religious study, he noted in a matter-of-fact manner that the 
moral status of love magic “depends on one’s intentions”:  “If he wants to marry the girl, there is 
nothing wrong with it!  If he just wants to fool around with her, that is not allowed.” 
 The different models of ethical action described here are not coterminous with commonly 
invoked sociological divisions, be they those of age, gender, class, education level, varieties of 
religious practice or others.  It is true that the progressive striving time inherent in Aceh’s legal 
reforms is propagated in powerful ways by traveling preachers, editorials by journalists and 
intellectuals, political speech, the morality police, and other particularly authoritative sites and 
figures.  Very few in Aceh, however, would explicitly stand against the project of progressive 
transformation through Islamic revival that underpins these discourses.  These discourses’ 
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authority is in part a product of the authoritative sources that circulate them and in part the result 
of their appeal to a universal standard that explicitly claims not to see moral significance in 
human differences.  This helps to explain why nearly all of my interlocutors who defended the 
lack of interest in the pursuit of certain kinds of religious knowledge by the young also claimed, 
when pressed, that the young should still attend such lessons.  This was true of young and old 
alike, men and women, urban and rural folk.  
 However, while on an abstract level most would express concern over Aceh’s declining 
moral state and support for the transformative syariat reforms, when it came to interpreting the 
behavior of closely known others, a lack of interest in projects of moral self-refinement on the 
part of young, especially unmarried, people often could be tolerated.  Many unmarried 
adolescents and young adults defended their own borderline immoral activity (e.g., riding on 
motorbikes with members of the opposite sex or staying out late) as appropriate to their 
legitimate pursuits of wealth and marriage, or as a result of an underdeveloped but not 
immediately correctable sense of self-control that led them to admittedly immoral acts.  The 
older majlis taklim participants described above were similarly sympathetic, openly 
acknowledging that young people were pursuing their rezeki.  Even the project of implementing 
Islamic law in the province, which especially targeted moral lapses associated with the young 
and unmarried, ironically seemed premised at times on one of the very assumptions that ran 
through many of the discourses on age and ethical practice that I describe in this chapter, namely, 
that young people do not yet have the capacity to engage in sustained ethical or religious activity.  
Thus, the community, in the form of the state, must use its power to help these young people 
navigate the moral risks of their legitimate worldly concerns.  This helps to account for the 
countless youth and college students with whom I spoke who adamantly supported specific 
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legislation designed to restrict socialization between members of the opposite sex, yet discussed 
with relish their own past and anticipated infractions against this legislation. 
 It would not be difficult to read the inconsistencies in moral discourses in contemporary 
Aceh in any number of analytically familiar ways.  As suggested above, one such reading might 
look for fault lines between different sociological groups, for example, generations, activists and 
non-activists, gender groups, and others.  As already discussed, this is not consistent with 
contemporary practice.  Great numbers of young people, even young people who flaunt syariat 
legislation in practice, support the legislation in the abstract.  Majlis taklim participants are both 
sympathetic to a lack of youthful interest in religious study, and acknowledge that young people 
should attend their lessons.  Not only were discursive and embodied stances taken according to 
these two different models of ethical action not reflective of general sociological categories, they 
were often present within the same person in different moments.   
 One might take these inconsistencies as evidence of the ways in which Muslims are 
motivated by multiple “grand schemes,” pursuing Islamic virtue in some contexts and, for 
example, romantic love or the advantages offered by a liberalized and consumerized public 
sphere in others (Schielke 2010a, 2010b).  While it is no doubt true that such schemes influence 
Muslims in Aceh, these were not common ways in which my interlocutors explained the pursuits 
of youth that kept young people from religious study.  Returning to Andi’s comments above, he 
did not describe his age cohort’s general lack of interest in majlis taklim and other forms of 
religious learning in terms of an alternative model of Islamic ethical practice that opposed the 
knowledge sought by those who do attend majlis taklim.  Nor did he articulate, either explicitly 
or implicitly, an alternative “grand scheme” in place of Islamic ethical norms.  Further, Andi did 
not simply leave his description of the lax religious studies of his age cohort as an example of 
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Aceh’s moral degeneration.  It would not have been surprising if he had.  These kinds of 
discourses were commonly deployed in Aceh during my fieldwork, for example, to justify the 
on-going syariat reforms or as a moral explanation of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami.  Instead 
Andi’s narrative frame was one in which he set such lack of commitment in a longer process of 
maturation through life experience, referencing specific life stages.  Andi’s response rested on 
the logic I heard again and again from my interlocutors: “They (i.e., old people) are closer to 
death, aren’t they?” 
 What matters most for my arguments here, is that very often articulations of youthful 
disinterest in certain kinds of religious pursuits were not articulations of generational conflict, the 
embracing of an alternative non-Islamic grand scheme, or simply descriptions of youth being 
bad.  They were instead subtle articulations of ethical action, based not in the progressive 
striving time of activists and the Acehnese state but on a more contingent temporal model.  My 
interlocutors in Nagan Raya, while often espousing a progressive model of self-refinement in the 
abstract, tended to orient their own religious pursuits and ethical practice through a consideration 
of their personal relationship to the ethical risks and responsibilities of the world and the 
afterlife.  While the risks associated with the world, for example greed or illicit sex, were 
apparent and frequently stressed in the public sphere, they could not simply be held at arm’s 
length.  They were inherent in important ways to the fulfillment of worldly ethical 
responsibilities, for example, marriage, progeny, financial gain, and the seeking of rezeki more 
generally.  Similarly, the benefits of the fulfillment of one’s responsibilities in relation to the 
afterlife seemed fairly obvious to my interlocutors (e.g., the avoidance of damnation and the 
lessening of divine punishment in the grave), however, the fulfillment of these responsibilities 
entailed time and energy that might not be available to those otherwise engaged in appropriate 
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worldly responsibilities.  Further, engrossing oneself in the affairs of the afterlife could entail the 
risk that the fulfillment of one’s worldly responsibilities might be put in jeopardy.  Here, one is 
reminded of Teungku Sum’s predicament, and his earnest, if resigned, question, “How will I ever 
get married?”  For my interlocutors in Nagan Raya, then, the pursuit of religious knowledge and 
ethical action involved navigating these two nodes of risk and responsibility with attention to the 
ways their specific life circumstances placed them in relation to both the world and the afterlife. 
Concluding Remarks 
 Before concluding, I want to first stress that my description of the ways in which those in 
Nagan Raya navigated their religious pursuits and ethical practice through attention to the nodes 
of the world and the afterlife is not meant as an argument that those I studied, especially the 
young and unmarried, were uncommitted Muslims.  This should be evident on several levels.  
For one, although I have stressed the lack of interest on the part of many young people in certain 
kinds of religious study, using majlis taklim as my primary example, there were, of course, 
young people who did engage in the pursuit of religious knowledge.  Some, like Teungku Sum, 
described this pursuit in a way that was consistent with the framework of contingent time that I 
explore in this chapter.  Others, especially college students and activists in the provincial capital 
of Banda Aceh, were more attuned to the kinds of progressive, self-refining temporalities of 
Islamic revivalist movements.  They understood their religious practices in terms of a personal 
striving for on-going ethical improvement. 
 Further, the pursuit of Islamic knowledge through majlis taklim was not the only form of 
Islamic practice in which the young and unmarried might engage.  Andi, for instance, pointed out 
elsewhere in our conversation that young men did frequently join Qur’anic recitation circles and 
attended ritual events such as funerals in order to fulfill needs for recitation.  Similarly, it was 
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predominantly young, unmarried men who engaged in recitational practices at yearly reciprocal 
feasts celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday.  Women of all ages gathered at sometimes 
weekly readings of Qur’anic verses, most frequently the surah known as “Ya-Sin” (Surah 36).   
 However, it was significant that participation in these practices by the young seemed 
predicated on contingent models rather than on striving time.  Young men participated in the 
recitation at reciprocal feasts in part because their young, male bodies were thought to have 
characteristics that increased the quality of their recitation.  Both the Qur’anic recitations at 
funerals and the reading of Ya-Sin by women were closely tied to the achievement of divine 
reward and lessened punishment for a deceased acquaintance or family member.  In these cases 
the young participated not only, or even primarily, out of a concern for their own afterlife, but 
also as a part of communal rituals in which ties of reciprocity were maintained between the 
living and the dead, ties associated with kin networks on which the young depended in the 
pursuit of their worldly blessings. 
 Most important for my arguments here, however, is the point that even youthful 
disinterest in religious study described above was frequently not understood as a forsaking of 
one’s ethical responsibilities, but as a measured fulfilling of them in a manner that was consistent 
with one’s specific life circumstances.  This was, of course, dependent on which temporal 
framing a practitioner brought to an evaluation of ethical action.  As should be clear by now, 
some of the very same people who expressed sympathy towards, or even justified, youthful 
disinterest in religious study in terms of the pursuit of rezeki, were, in other contexts, the very 
same people who condemned this behavior or expressed unease at it, suggesting that young 
people should pay more attention to the affairs of the grave.  Nonetheless, when approached 
through a contingent framing, the framing I found to be most common in daily practice in Nagan 
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Raya, the pursuit of romance and wealth, even at the expense of religious study, could hardly be 
dismissed as un-Islamic.  Quite the contrary, these pursuits were ethically incumbent upon most 
Muslims, even if they also entailed salient and serious risks. 
 What ramifications do contingent models of ethical pursuits have for the anthropology of 
Islam?  While accounts that examine ethical and religious action that occur in or in conjunction 
with some form of striving time have been exceptionally productive in bringing to light patterns 
of practice that characterize twentieth- and twenty-first century Islamic revival movements 
(Deeb 2006; Hirschkind 2006; Khan 2011; Mahmood 2005), they may unintentionally steer us 
towards specific understandings of proper Islam that prevent us from seeing other ways in which 
Muslims act as religious subjects.   
 This tendency has been critiqued by some, often by drawing attention to the nearly 
exclusive focus on activist subjectivities in much of the ethnographic literature on ethical self-
formation (Schielke 2010a; 2010b).  In some respects my critique runs parallel to this one, 
however, it differs in important ways.  I am less concerned with differences between activists 
and non-activists than I am with different models and experiences of time, models and 
experiences that, as my examples above illustrate, can exist simultaneously within the same 
people, whether or not they engage in Islamic activism.  Further, I do not share these critics’ 
sense that the solution to problems found in accounts that rely on what I here call striving time 
can be alleviated simply by describing non-Islamic motivations and contexts motivating ethical 
and social practices.  These contexts are no doubt of importance in the lives of Muslims, and it is 
undoubtedly true that Muslims, like Christians, Jews, secularists, and others, engage in ethical 
and social projects for a wide range of reasons.  However, seeking a foil to accounts of activist 
subjectivities in explicitly non-Islamic action only reifies the notion that good Muslims 
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participate in striving temporalities and the specific projects of moral self-improvement they 
engender.  This chapter has been meant to illustrate that pursuits of Islamic knowledge and 
ethical practice come in many varieties, each underpinned by different temporal models and 











Putting the Habib Seunagan in Their Place:  
Narrative, Ritual, and Genealogies of Islamization in Nagan Raya 
 
 
 This chapter returns to practices through which Muslims in Nagan Raya have linked 
themselves and others to the past of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  One way in which this has been 
achieved has been through the recognition of genealogies tying Muslims to ancestors widely 
believed to have played central roles in converting Nagan Raya to Islam.  Chief among the 
ancestors believed to have participated in Nagan Raya’s Islamization was Habib Abdurrahim, the 
progenitor of all surviving lines of the Habib Seunagan.  Most Muslims in Nagan Raya 
recognized Habib Abdurrahim as the primary actor in a process of Islamization carried out by a 
group of companions who were identified locally using titles derived from Sufi cosmological 
hierarchies (e.g., qutub, autad).  The role of Habib Abdurrahim in this process lent added 
prestige to the patriline of the Habib Seunagan. 
 In the post-colonial period, the Habib Seunagan’s links to the past of Nagan Raya’s 
Islamization via Habib Abdurrahim proved a particularly fruitful ground on which members of 
the Habib Seunagan engaged in reconfigurations of their genealogy, ritual practice, and political 
position.  Beginning in the 1950s, members of the family began to cultivate links in their 
genealogies in manners that inserted the Habib Seunagan’s ancestors into prestigious histories of 
the Indonesian archipelago’s Islamization.  However, the Habib Seunagan’s genealogical 
histories reversed some of the most fundamental spatial-temporal resonances of the histories that 
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were being published in the same period by intellectuals such as Ali Hasjmy, in large part by 
reversing the direction of Islamization from westward out of Aceh to eastward into Aceh.  The 
resulting constellations of genealogy and narrative history placed the Habib Seunagan’s patriline 
at the center of three interrelated spatial-temporal frames: a universal mystical cosmology, a 
realm of local customary practice, and the Indonesian nation.    
 Members of the Habib Seunagan involved in these processes deftly articulated the 
reconfigurations of genealogy that placed their patriline into prestigious histories of the 
archipelago’s Islamization.  The ways in which the genealogical links and narrative episodes 
cultivated by these members of the family resonated with and came to frame social and ritual 
practices in Nagan Raya helped to make the Habib Seunagan’s genealogical narratives 
compelling for Muslims in the regency.  In particular, the periodic kandoeri at the graves of the 
Habib Seunagan served as points at which ordinary Muslims in Nagan Raya encountered and 
engaged with the three interrelated spatial-temporal frames of the Islamic cosmos, the realm of 
Nagan Raya’s customary practice, and the Indonesian nation.  These three frames converged in 
the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization, and they came to serve as primary frames through 
which Muslims in Nagan Raya oriented their ritual and mystical practices towards local Islamic 
pasts. 
 The Habib Seunagan’s narrative and ritual inhabiting of the three above-mentioned 
spatial-temporal frames, each of a radically different scale, resembles similar instances in which 
potent Islamic mystics have been understood by their devotees to operate in multiple spatial-
temporal fields at once (Gilsenan 1973; Ho 2004, 2006; Sila 2001; Werbner 2003).  In particular, 
patterns of mystical and devotional practice surrounding the “friends of God” (Ar., auliyā’; I., 
wali), frequently glossed in English as “saints,” often have entailed the expression, negotiation, 
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and transformation of creative tensions and potentials that exist in the claims of these figures to 
belong to multiple scales and types of space and time.  The case of the Habib Seunagan suggests 
that the different constellations of space and time such figures narratively, socially, and ritually 
inhabit challenge any simple notion of locality one might use to classify Islamic practice.  The 
case is also particularly apt for considering the spatial-temporal orientations of Muslims to local 
Islamic pasts. 
“A Local Customary Practice… Having Its Origins in Islam” 
In 1962, the head of the sub-regency of Seunagan, Teuku Azman, filed a “yearly report” 
(I., lapuran tahunan) (Azman 1962).
116
  On the surface, the filing of this report was rather 
unremarkable.  The document reflected common post-colonial bureaucratic forms, offering a 
snapshot of population statistics, data on land use, information on infrastructural projects, and 
lists of indicators of economic development in the sub-regency.  The report probably was 
intended to be passed up a bureaucratic chain, from the regency to the district-level government.  
From the very beginning of the report, however, there were indications that the filing of the 
document involved more than the fulfillment of bureaucratic protocol.  In particular, the 
“General Overview” (I., Pemandangan Umum) very quickly identified three groups in the 
regency, two of which were named minorities threatening to the national interest, and one a 
majority constituted of loyal Indonesian citizens.   
Recall that 1962 was also the year in which Darul Islam in Aceh ended.  Teuku Azman, a 
local hereditary chief (I., raja; Ac., oelèëbalang) who had married one of Habib Muda’s 
daughters, had been a key figure in opposing the rebellion.  Along with his father-in-law, Teuku 
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 The territory that at the time of my fieldwork constituted the regency of Nagan Raya was a sub-regency 
of the regency of West Aceh when Teuku Azman filed his yearly report in 1962.  In this chapter, when discussing 
the period of the 1962 report, I sometimes refer to Nagan Raya as “the sub-regency of Seunagan,” or simply 
“Seunagan,” in order to maintain consistency with the language of the archival document. 
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Azman was passionate in his opposition to Darul Islam, aligning himself with the prominent 
religious teachers who opposed the rebellion on religious grounds.  Thus, it should come as little 
surprise that one of the groups identified as threatening to the national interest in Teuku Azman’s 
1962 report consisted of villagers who aligned themselves with Zakaria Yunus, the leader of 
Darul Islam in Nagan Raya.
117
  For much of the previous decade, Yunus had been at war with 
Azman and the Indonesian Republic.  The rebellion had just come to its end a mere six months 
before the filing of the 1962 report.
118
  Azman clearly remained unconvinced of Yunus’ loyalty 
and took the opportunity offered by the filing of the yearly report to raise his doubts about his 
rival’s allegiances. 
It should be similarly unsurprising, then, that Azman’s report asserted that the patriotic 
majority in Nagan Raya consisted of the followers of the Habib Seunagan.  More interesting are 
the reasons he offered for the relative strength and nationalist loyalties of the Habib Seunagan 
and their followers.  These reasons, and not the threat posed by Yunus, was the rhetorical focus 
of the 1962 report’s general overview.  Azman attributed the loyalty of the Habib Seunagan to 
the “leadership and direction” (I., pimpinan dan ashuan) provided by Habib Abdurrahim, the 
deceased eponymous ancestor of all living members of the Habib Seunagan.  Azman’s report 
identified Habib Abdurrahim as the transmitter of Islam to Nagan Raya.  It also identified Habib 
Abdurrahim as the “qahtubul ujud,” the term qutub (I.; Ar., quṭb) being drawn from the Sufi 
cosmological discourses that were central idioms through which residents in Nagan Raya linked 
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 The second group Azman identified as potentially having compromised loyalties was constituted by 
immigrants who had come to the region in order to work on local palm oil plantations.  Most likely Azman was 
referring to Javanese agricultural laborers.  What reasons Azman had for identifying this group as potentially 








themselves genealogically to the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.
119
  The report further 
identified Habib Abdurrahim as the founder of Nagan Raya’s local customary practice (I., adat).  
Azman left what he meant by “local customary practice” undefined, but he was sure to note that 
it “had its origins in Islam” (I., bersumbur pada Islam).  Further, Azman identified Habib 
Abdurrahim as the descendant of “the saints who built the great mosque of Demak,” a reference 
to the famous “Nine Saints” (I., wali songo) who are widely believed in Indonesia to have 
converted the island of Java to Islam (see Map 1).
120
   
In a local government report such as this one, clearly aiming to draw attention to the 
Habib Seunagan’s loyalty at the end of a decade-long period of open and violent conflict, why 
also highlight the family’s role in the Islamization of the region, or the founding of local 
customary practice?  Why mention Habib Abdurrahim’s descent from the Nine Saints of Java, or 
his status of qutub?  What did these claims bring to the family’s narrative of loyalty to Jakarta 
that was not already apparent in their nine years of opposition to Darul Islam?  In order to answer 
these questions, this chapter considers the ways in which local Islamic pasts have mediated the 
relationship between the Indonesian nation and Muslims in Nagan Raya through entwined 
narrative, genealogical, and ritual practices. 
Graves and Genealogy: Grounding the Habib Seunagan in Nagan Raya 
 At the time of my fieldwork, the Nagan Raya countryside was dotted by grave 
complexes, some hidden in difficult-to-reach wooded areas, others humbly, but carefully, 
cultivated in small villages, and still others lying at the center of grand courtyards that included 
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 Recall that all of this is consistent with the narrative and social practices described in Chapter 4.  These 
practices named Habib Abdurrahim the qutub, attributing the Islamization of Nagan Raya to him and his 




 The Nine Saints are central figures in popular Islamic narrative and ritual practice throughout Java.  See 
Florida (1995) and Rinkes (1996).  For a discussion of the Nine Saints in relation to narratives of the Demak 
mosque’s construction, see Florida (1995, 319–351). 
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mosques and shelters set aside for the performance of the rhythmic recitation of the names of 
God (Ac., ziké or dike; I., zikir, Ar., zikr), praises to the Prophet Muhammad (Ac., seulaweuët; I., 
selawat, Ar., ṣalawāt), or other verbal formulas used in mystical and devotional practices.  
Residents in Nagan Raya widely believed these graves to belong to members of the Habib 
Seunagan. 
 The graves that dotted the Nagan Raya countryside were closely connected to practices of 
recalling the Habib Seunagan’s genealogy.  Each grave was a sort of mnemonic device, 
connected not only to the genealogical web that linked the entirety of the countryside, but to 
narrative fragments that could be pieced together through connecting genealogical links in a 
chain.
121
  Those narrating these fragments usually began with the grave in their immediate 
vicinity, relating stories of the person buried within it.  Then, if someone held the requisite 
knowledge and were so inclined, he or she would begin to point in different directions on the 
horizon, indicating where one might find the grave of the son, student, or companion of the 
person in the local grave.  These graves inscribed on the landscape a web of genealogy akin to 
what, for example, Engseng Ho has described for the graves of ‘Alawi Sayyids spread across the 
Indian Ocean (Ho 2006).   
 While the metonymic character of Nagan Raya’s graves allowed for an inscription of 
genealogical history and narrative fragments across the Nagan Raya countryside, the relatively 
imprecise and broken genealogies that Nagan Raya’s graves inscribed stood in marked contrast 
to the well-kept family records found among many Sayyids in other parts of the Indian Ocean 
world (Ho 2006).  The Habib Seunagan carried no family name, making it impossible to place  
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 For an insightful illustration of how genealogical forms are particularly conducive to bringing together 




Figure 10: Déah in front of Intu’s Grave, Kuta Aceh, Nagan Raya 
 
them, even in a very vague way, within the often meticulously-recorded genealogies of other 
Sayyids.  As different narrators forwarded different versions of the Habib Seunagan’s genealogy, 
links in the chain frequently changed names, and connections between figures were broken and 
rearranged. 
 Nonetheless, most of the genealogies I collected from interlocutors at these graves 
included several key figures in the Habib Seunagan’s patriline.  In Nagan Raya, this line began 
with an individual who was buried in a relatively small complex in the village of Kuta Aceh, just 
a few kilometers from the district’s commercial center, Jeuram (see Figure 10 and Map 3).  
Commonly referred to as Intu, the person buried in this grave was associated by many narrators 
with the Nine Saints of Java alluded to in Teuku Azman’s 1962 report.  These narrators 
recognized Intu either as one of these Nine Saints himself, or as a close descendant of one of 





Figure 11: Déah on Habib Abdurrahim’s grave complex, Pulo Ie, Nagan Raya  
 
 Following Intu, several generations passed with little agreement among my interlocutors 
about the links in the Habib Seunagan’s genealogy.  All versions, however, converged on the 
figure of Habib Abdurrahim as the next major link in the chain.  Habib Abdurrahim was buried 
just a few kilometers from Intu’s grave, in the village of Pulo Ie (See Map 3).  As described 
above, Habib Abdurrahim was widely believed to be the progenitor of all of the patrilines of the 
Habib Seunagan that existed at the time of my fieldwork, and he commonly was credited with 
Islamicizing all of Seunagan.  His grave was one of two sites at which regular large ritual 
gatherings occurred at several points in the year (see Figure 11). 
 The second site at which such large ritual gatherings occurred was the grave of Habib 
Muda, the charismatic and influential figure featured prominently in oral histories of the Darul 





Figure 12: Inside of Habib Muda’s Grave Complex, Peuleukung, Nagan Raya 
 
Muda’s grave was located several kilometers inland and upland from those of Intu and Habib 
Abdurrahim, in the village of Peuleukung, where Habib Muda lived (see Figure 12 and Map 3). 
The Habib Seunagan’s Ritual Practice and the Syattariyah Sufi Order 
 The Habib Seunagan, whose ancestors constitute the majority of those people buried in 
the graves just described, were also the central figures in a complex of mystical and ritual 
practices associated with a branch of the Syattariyah Sufi order (I., tarekat syattariyah, Ar., 
ṭarīqa shaṭṭārīya) (Kraus 2010).  These mystical and ritual practices, like similar practices 
described elsewhere in the world, served to invest the family’s devotees in the Habib Seunagan’s 
genealogical histories, forging links between the living and the dead in powerful ways (Cornell 
1998; Gilsenan 1973; Green 2004; Ho 2006; Werbner 2003).   
 My efforts to meet the members of the Syattariyah in Nagan Raya who held the authority 
to initiate and teach members of the order (I., khalifah: Ar., ḳalīfa) proved difficult.  It was at 
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times not easy to tell whether this was because I was being diverted from such people, or because 
the organizational structure of the order itself was quite diffuse.  The knowledge passed through 
the order was, of course, esoteric, and it would not have been surprising if I were being 
purposefully kept from it for that reason.  However, many members of the Syattariyah were quite 
open in discussing with me what they knew of the order’s mystical and ritual practices.  Some 
members made a point of cautiously identifying the group as having affinities with the sixteenth-
century figure Ḥamzah af-Fanṣūrī.  Recall that in common histories of the seventeenth-century 
Acehnese Sultanate, af-Fanṣūrī’s followers were purged by the religious scholar ar-Ranīrī.  This 
was the result, according to the most popular versions of these histories, of af-Fanṣūrī’s followers 
adhering to a mystical philosophy known as wujudiyah.
122
  One member of the Habib Seunagan 
identified Al-Durr al-Nafīs, an eighteenth-century work once popular in the archipelago among 
wujudiyah devotees (van Bruinessen 1998), as a text studied by more serious members of the 
Syattariyah.   
 For the vast majority of the Habib Seunagan’s followers, however, participation in the 
Syattariyah meant attending events at which groups of people gathered to conduct ratéb (Ac.), 
that is, the recitation of the names of God, praises to the Prophet Muhammad, and various other 
formulas.  These gatherings occurred at the graves dotting the Nagan Raya countryside.  I was 
told that semi-weekly gatherings were held at small grave complexes in Nagan Raya’s villages.  
These events were said to have been attended mostly by women.
123
  Large gatherings, which I 
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 See Chapters 1 and 2 for brief discussions of af-Fanṣūrī, ar-Ranīrī, and wujudiyah.  For discussions of 
wujudiyah more generally in Indonesia, see Al-Attas (1966; 1970), Drewes and Brakel (1986), and Florida (1995).  
While wujudiyah was an issue in the history of Indonesian mystical thought that continued to capture the 
imaginations of Indonesian Muslims at the time of my research, polemics surrounding wujudiyah have been a part of 
a much broader, and often equally vitriolic, series of debates among Muslims in various times and places, especially 
the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Indian sub-continent.  On these related polemics, see Damrel (2000), 




regularly attended myself, were held several times yearly at Habib Muda’s and Habib 
Abdurrahim’s graves.  These were attended by mixed groups of men and women from around 
the Nagan Raya countryside and beyond.  These gatherings occurred on the anniversaries of the 
deaths of the people buried in each grave complex, on each of the two major Islamic feast days 
(i.e., Idul Adha and Idul Fitri), and at other times during the year.   
 At these large gatherings, sponsored by the senior living members of the Habib 
Seunagan, the most distinctive aspects of the mystical and ritual practices of the Syattariyah 
order were on display.  These included litanies recited collectively in loud voices and with 
demonstrative rocking back-and-forth.  These litanies often employed the pronoun Hu, Arabic 
for “He,” and were understood by many with whom I spoke as a means through which ordinary 
people might experience absorption into God’s oneness and unity (I., fana; Ar., fanā’).  Both 
members of the Syattariyah and other groups of Islamic practitioners in Nagan Raya believed 
these litanies were distinctive features of Syattariyah practice.
124
 
 Some critics, including both ‘Abduh-style reformers and members of the Naqsyabandi, 
felt that Syattariyah litanies gave undue stress to the physical body rather than the inner heart.  
Other critics objected to the ways in which Syattariyah practice encouraged relatively 
unadvanced mystics to seek a loss of self in God’s unity before they had engaged in longer 
periods of mystical self-discipline.  Nonetheless, these litanies, and the events at which they were 
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 I never had the opportunity to attend these semi-weekly events.  I suspect that this was because they 
were strongly identified as women’s practice.  When men and women spoke to me about the shelters next to these 
smaller graves, they most frequently identified them as places where “women recite litanies” (Ac., oereuëng inòng 
meuratéb).  Because I was unable to attend these events myself, I cannot confirm that they occurred as often as my 
interlocutors suggested.  Nonetheless, the descriptions that people offered me of them were consistent with the kinds 
of practices of recitation that I observed elsewhere.  Further, next to many of these graves were shelters erected for 
the purposes of reciting litanies (Ac., déah).  In these shelters I found evidence that the buildings were, indeed, used 




 A recently published biography of Habib Muda closes with an extensive section in which the specific 
methods of these litanies are described and explained at length.  See Daud (2009, 189-235).  For a comparison of 
different forms of Syattariyah practice prescribed in different texts, each popular in different parts of the 
archipelago, see Fathurahman (2008, 180–185). 
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recited by large numbers of people, remained the focal point of Syattariyah practice.  When I 
asked members of the order about the Syattariyah, rather than answering my questions, they 
frequently invited me to such events.  
A Kandoeri at Habib Muda’s Grave: The Feast of the Sacrifice at Peuleukung 
 One early December evening in 2008, I hopped on my motorbike to attend the 
celebration that would occur to mark Idul Adha, the “greater feast” or “feast of the sacrifice,” at 
the grave of Habib Muda in Peuleukung.  I arrived just after evening prayers.  The large 
courtyard around the grave complex, which included several open shelters and a mosque, was 
just beginning to attract groups (I., rombongan) of reciters from various parts of Nagan Raya and 
other parts of Aceh.  I sat at a makeshift coffee and noodle stall that had been erected along the 
road just outside the courtyard and watched as flatbed trucks, each hauling groups of fifteen to 
fifty people, made their way slowly down the road looking for places to park. 
 It was a wet evening.  It had been raining much of the afternoon, and the grass, now 
covered by tarps, was still very damp.  All of this made the night air rather cool, and some of the 
senior members of the Habib Seunagan with whom I spoke indicated that this kept some people 
away.  Still, by the time the event began, just after night prayers, there were several thousand 
people at the grave, sitting with their groups.  These individuals had brought food and drink, 
which they periodically pulled out and shared with those around them.  They gathered in 
multiple places around the courtyard, in the shelters, on tarps on the lawn, and in the mosque.  
Wherever they sat, they faced the grave complex in which Habib Muda and several members of 
his family were buried.  Inside this complex were the most senior members of the family, 
including Habib Muda’s last surviving son, Abu Kodrat, who was recognized at the time of my 
fieldwork as the head of the Syattariyah. 
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 As I walked around the courtyard, I observed an aural and visual frenzy akin to what I 
had observed at the kandoeri maulid described in Chapter 4, but in this case the sheer number of 
participants amplified the effect.  Unlike the kandoeri maulid, both men and women participated, 
with groups of women sitting behind or next to men.  Each group recited litanies in unison, often 
jerking their bodies back-and-forth with each syllable.  Groups did not attempt to choreograph 
their litanies or movements with other groups, even the ones immediately adjacent to them.  The 
result was overwhelming, especially for anyone who wandered around the courtyard battered by 
a cacophony of sacred syllables at every turn.
125
 
 The litanies consisted primarily of two types: praises to the Prophet Muhammad and 
recitations of the names of God.  As the evening wore on, they seemed to shorten.  First, praises 
to the Prophet Muhammad began to drop out of the aural mix.  Eventually, many groups came to 
focus on litanies involving only the Arabic pronoun “Hu,” repeated in slowly building 
crescendos of increasing speed and volume.  The litanies of each group would eventually stop, 
only to start again, once more growing faster and louder with each repetition. 
 Approximately two hours before midnight, there was a short lull in these recitations.  
Many people took this opportunity to eat.  When the litanies began again, Abu Kodrat and 
several other senior members of the Habib Seunagan came out from Habib Muda’s grave 
complex.  They slowly worked their way through the crowd, ritually greeting each devotee in 
attendance.  Abu Kodrat and his companions reached out their hands to devotees, one-by-one.  
Each person thus greeted responded by taking the hand, often leaning over it and sniffing its 
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 I was not the only one walking around the courtyard in this way.  While others were not doing so for 
reasons of ethnographic observation, people regularly got up from their group to seek food or visit friends in other 
groups.  Such people undoubtedly experienced the same effect that I did, although I could not tell how they 
interpreted it from their vantage point as participants in the ritual. 
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backside in a common display of respect and affection offered to parents and religious 
teachers.
126
   
 While Abu Kodrat and his companions greeted those assembled, I found myself in a 
ginger tea stall outside the grave complex with a middle-aged man, perhaps in his late forties or 
early fifties.  He was from the remote regency of Gayo Lues, in Aceh’s mountainous highlands 
not far from the border with Medan.  He was a Sayyid, although not of the patriline of the Habib 
Seunagan.  Nonetheless, he was an enthusiastic devotee of the family, and he claimed that he 
would never miss an event at the family’s graves, if it could be helped.  He did not say exactly 
how long it had taken him to reach Peuleukung, but given the distance from Gayo Lues and the 
state of the mountain roads on which he traveled, it undoubtedly had been at least an eight-hour 
journey.   
 This man’s interest in talking about his devotion to the Habib Seunagan caused us both to 
miss what had been identified to me by multiple people as the climax of the Idul Adha rituals at 
Peuleukung.  Sometime around midnight, Abu Kodrat led those assembled in a 
circumambulation of Habib Muda’s grave.  This ritual has been targeted by critics, who see it as 
an unauthorized innovation in Prophetic tradition and as an idolatrous imitation of the 
circumambulation of the Kaaba, the large stone structure around which pilgrims walk while on 
the major and minor Islamic pilgrimages to Mecca.  The major pilgrimage to Mecca occurs in 
the days before and after Idul Adha, thus highlighting the scandalous parallel to the 
circumambulation of the Kaaba, although the circumambulation of the graves of renowned Sufis 
is not, in itself, an unusual practice among mystically-inclined Muslims.  I first had decided to 
travel to Nagan Raya in August of 2006 in large part because residents of the nearby coastal city 
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 This gesture was used by members of Majlis Taklim Ansharullah, for example, to take leave of Abon 
Nigan at the conclusion of a lesson.  
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of Meulaboh had told me stories of a “strange” (I., aneh) family in the hills whose practices 
were, if not unorthodox, unusual.  Chief among the practices cited by those who recommended 
that I go to Nagan Raya was the practice of circumambulating Habib Muda’s grave. 
 Once I realized that I had missed the circumambulation of the grave, I quickly excused 
myself from the ginger tea stall, determined not to miss anything else.  People were settling back 
into their groups, and the recitation of litanies in the manner described above continued until the 
early morning hours.  At times the volume and intensity of the litanies seemed to wane, as 
attendees grew tired and groups took breaks in order to eat and rest.  Nonetheless, the recitations 
continued until daybreak, when morning prayers were followed by a sermon, delivered by 
someone I could not identify.  The sermon was given from the mosque on Habib Muda’s grave 
complex.  Afterwards various animals (e.g., cows, water buffalo) were sacrificed, and the meat 
distributed, presumably to a combination of the poor and family members of the sponsors who 
had purchased the animals for sacrifice.
127
  By the time the sacrifices had begun, however, most 
of the family’s devotees already had piled into the tens of flatbed trucks that would carry them 
home. 
Entwined (but Unclear) Lines of Authority: Descendants of the Prophet Muhammad 
through Eminent Sufis of the Past 
 
 Events such as the Idul Adha rituals just described tied together ritual practice and 
genealogical histories through the occurrence of the rituals at the Habib Seunagan’s graves.  One 
way the ritual accomplished this linkage was to highlight key links in the family’s genealogy, as 
well as the Habib Seunagan’s mystical descent via a Sufi lineage, both of which served to 
underpin their authority among their followers.  This dual line of authority based on genealogical 
descent from the Prophet Muhammad and the holding of a mystical lineage resembled lines of 
                                                          
 127 This reflected general practice in Indonesia. 
 
230 
authority imagined for similar figures in other times and places (Ho 2006).  However, neither the 
Habib Seunagan’s extended genealogy nor their mystical lineage buttressed their authority in 
ways consistent with idealized notions of unbroken chains of descent. 
 The ritual practices at the grave of Habib Muda were grounded in a genealogical history 
inscribed in the territory of Nagan Raya.  Beyond the local links in the family’s genealogical 
chain, inscribed on the Nagan Raya countryside, the family claimed to be Sayyids, that is, 
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad via the Prophet’s close family members, usually the 
Prophet’s daughter Fatimah and son-in-law Ali.  This claim was performed via several aspects of 
the Idul Adha celebration discussed above, including the respect paid to the members of the 
family during ritualized greetings and the litanies bestowing peace and praises on the Prophet 
Muhammad.
128
  The Habib Seunagan’s claim to descend from the Prophet Muhammad’s family 
was not documented.  Nonetheless, the family and its supporters stressed certain important links 
within their genealogical patriline. 
 Before Intu, the ancestor of the Habib Seunagan whom many recognized as the first 
member of the patriline to be buried in Nagan Raya, there were three key links on which nearly 
all members of the family and their devotees agreed.
129
  The first of these links involved the 
Prophet and his direct descendants.  However, without a definitive genealogy, the family had no 
way of verifying the specific genealogical path through which they could trace their links to the 
Prophet Muhammad.  This, however, may have worked to their advantage, as it allowed them to 
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 I should note that unlike the graves of Habib Abdurrahim and Habib Muda, there was some 
disagreement as to the precise identity of the person buried in Intu’s grave.  Not all people with whom I spoke were 
even certain that Intu was, in fact, an ancestor of the Habib Seunagan.  Nonetheless, it was common for people in 
Nagan Raya to associate Intu with the Habib Seunagan’s patriline, and those who challenged this notion did so 
under the assumption that most people believed Intu to be an ancestor of Habib Abdurrahim. 
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claim a rather unusual combination of ancestors that included the other two major links on which 
some of their most important genealogical claims rested. 
 As mentioned above, those who forwarded genealogies of the Habib Seunagan to me 
frequently understood Intu to have descended from the renowned Nine Saints of Java.  Some 
with whom I spoke identified Intu as one of the Nine Saints himself.  Others took him to be the 
son or grandson of one of these Saints.  Precisely which of the Nine Saints was Intu’s ancestor 
changed from account to account, with the names of Sunan Kalijaga, Sunan Giri, and Sunan 
Gunung Jati frequently appearing.  Some of my interlocutors did not offer the name of a 
particular ancestor at all, simply noting, as did the 1962 yearly report of Teuku Azman cited 
above, that Intu descended from the Nine Saints.  The narrative episodes told to me regarding 
this link between Intu and the Nine Saints were sometimes fantastic.  One man, for example, 
suggested that the body in Intu’s grave was actually that of Sunan Kalijaga, who had sent his son 
to Nagan Raya in order to facilitate the region’s conversion to Islam.  After Sunan Kalijaga’s 
death, this man suggested, the great Saint had mystically transported his own body to the grave 
now recognized as Intu’s, in order to be close to his son’s descendants.
130
 
 Between the Prophet Muhammad and the Nine Saints, there was a period of eight to ten 
centuries in the Habib Seunagan’s genealogy that no one with whom I spoke, either from within 
or outside of the family, could describe in any detail.  One genealogical link, however, was an 
exception.   The Habib Seunagan claimed the eleventh- and twelfth-century Sufi ‘Abd al-Qādir 
Jīlānī as their ancestor.  This was a strange link indeed.  ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī remains one of the 
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 By the late nineteenth century, some Sayyids in Southeast Asia were tracing genealogies that linked the 
Nine Saints to the Prophet Muhammad through the patriline of the ‘Alawi branch of the Prophet’s descendants.  This 
made the Nine Saints the ancestors of ‘Alawi Sayyids (Laffan 2011, 8).  That the Nine Saints were claimed as 
ancestors here, in an Acehnese and non-‘Alawi context, is peculiar in ways that I discuss below.  Also of interest 
was the frequency with which my interlocutors in Nagan Raya mentioned Sunan Kalijaga as an ancestor of the 
Habib Seunagan.  While many of the Nine Saints have been recognized as descending from Arabs and other non-
Indonesian peoples, Sunan Kalijaga has widely been taken to have descended from a native Javanese genealogical 
line.  See, for example, Geertz (1968, 25-29). 
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pre-eminent historical personages in Islamic mystical circles.  Believed to be the founder of the 
Sufi order that bears his name, the Qādirīya, he is revered throughout the world for his mystical 
prowess and esoteric knowledge, and many consider him without equal.  He was also a Sayyid 
(Braune 2010; van Bruinessen 1989).   
 Throughout Aceh, Sufis with whom I met regularly told me stories of ‘Abd al-Qādir 
Jīlānī.  This was true of both mystical adepts and Muslims who had studied only basic levels of 
mystical practice.  All of these Sufis took ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī as a primary example to be 
emulated and as a mediator between humans and God.  The patrilines of Sayyids common in 
Southeast Asia, however, do not have ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī in their genealogies.  Nonetheless, 
‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī was widely recognized in Nagan Raya as an ancestor of the Habib 
Seunagan.   
 I once asked a young man in a coffee shop who had introduced himself as a descendant 
of the Habib Seunagan what his family name (I., marga) was.  Most Sayyids do carry family 
names, which link them to the particular patriline within the family of the Prophet Muhammad 
through which they tie themselves to the Prophet.  Because the Habib Seunagan had no definitive 
genealogy, this question should have been impossible to answer.  But this young man quickly 
and confidently responded “al-Qādiri,” thereby identifying himself not by any recognized 
patriline linking him to the Prophet Muhammad, but with ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī directly.  Even 
many of the Habib Seunagan’s critics recognized the Habib Seunagan’s descent from ‘Abd al-
Qādir Jīlānī.  Recall that Nyak Nur’s genealogy discussed in Chapter 4, for example, noted ties 
of marriage in the distant past linking Nyak Nur’s patriline to that of the Habib Seunagan.  The 
genealogy also noted that “Banta Sultan,” the ancestor of the Habib Seunagan described in the 
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genealogy as the brother-in-law of Nyak Nur’s ancestor, had a child who “went to Iran and was 
the ancestor of the Habib Seunagan via Syekh Abdul Qadir Jailani.” 
 Thus, what emerged from the genealogical and narrative fragments that circulated 
regarding the Habib Seunagan’s descent was a rather unusual genealogy.  This genealogy 
consisted of long stretches, sometimes covering centuries, of unclear chains of descent 
punctuated by six key links: the Prophet Muhammad and his family, ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī, one or 
more of the Nine Saints of Java, Intu, Habib Abdurrahim, and Habib Muda.
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 The assertion of genealogical links to the Prophet Muhammad through these key figures 
represented just one source of the Habib Seunagan’s religious and social authority.  A second 
arose from their claim to a mystical lineage (I., silsilah; Ar., silsila) tying them to the Syattariyah 
mystical order (Bowen 1989b, 602-604; Krauss 2010, 223-224).  The Habib Seunagan’s mystical 
lineage, however, like their genealogy, was unclear (Kraus 2010, 223-224).  I never was shown a 
complete mystical lineage, nor was one ever recited for me or in my presence.   
 In a recent biographical work about Habib Muda and the Syattariyah Sufi order in Nagan 
Raya, published with the involvement of prominent members of the Habib Seunagan, no links 
between the family and any documented Syattariyah lineages are established.  A Syattariyah 
lineage is published in this biography.  However, this is the lineage of the seventeenth-century 
scholar Sheikh Yūsuf of Makassar (Daud 2009, 190-191).  That the lineage of Sheikh Yūsuf is 
employed in this manner, even for illustrative purposes, is curious, given the importance in Aceh, 
and more widely in the archipelago, of ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf, the seventeenth-century Acehnese holder 
of a Syattariyah lineage who has a major place in the well-known “Mecca’s verandah” narrative 
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  Indeed, one member of the Habib Seunagan claimed to me that their lineage did run 
through ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf.  Another, however, claimed a different lineage that ran directly through 
the genealogical family line of the Habib Seunagan without meeting either ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf or 
Sheikh Yūsuf.  Neither presented a lineage to me, however, in either written or recited form. 
 My inability to locate a more detailed mystical lineage might have resulted from a desire 
on the part of Syattariyah adepts to keep me from accessing this knowledge.  As described 
above, there were clearly times in my interactions with members of the family and their close 
associates when my questions regarding mystical doctrine and practice seemed to be deferred.  
Whether this was the case or not, the ambiguous status of both the Habib Seunagan’s genealogy 
and their mystical lineage had, in the past, resulted in criticism of the family and its claims to 
genealogical and mystical preeminence.  At the time of my fieldwork, however, such criticism 
had not resulted in a lessening of the Habib Seunagan’s importance in local ritual, social, and 
political affairs.  Quite the contrary, the ambiguity in the Habib Seunagan’s genealogical and 
mystical lineages may have allowed members of the family to engage in narrative and ritual 
work that buttressed their claims to prestigious lines of descent.   
 One central factor that aided the Habib Seunagan in buttressing their claims to prestigious 
genealogies were the ways in which narrative, social, and ritual practices in Nagan Raya tended 
to draw attention to the significance of the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  This allowed 
the Habib Seunagan to highlight their role in the process of Islamization, a role for which they 
were widely recognized in Nagan Raya.  In post-colonial Indonesia, as narratives of the 
archipelago’s Islamization were being given new political resonances, the narrative practices of 
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 ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf is a primary link in the lineage of a Syattariyah complex in Minangkabau, a region to the 
south of Aceh (Fathurahman 2008, 173).  Werner Kraus points out that neither of the two major branches of 




the Habib Seunagan also allowed members of the family to recast their family’s history in a new 
manner, tying it to local and national histories of Islamization as well as staking a claim to the 
family’s cosmic significance. 
The Nine Saints of Java and the Habib Seunagan: Reversing the Direction of Islamization 
 
 In the 1950s and 1960s, members of the Habib Seunagan began to cultivate narrative and 
genealogical histories in the form of common post-colonial narratives of Islamization.  The 
versions of these narratives espoused by the Habib Seunagan tied together Nagan Raya, Aceh, 
the Indonesian nation, and the Habib Seunagan in ways that undermined some of the most 
fundamental spatial-temporal and political resonances of the histories of Islamization being 
written and popularized by intellectuals such as Ali Hasjmy in the same period. 
 John Bowen offers an account of the popularization of narratives of Islamization in the 
1950s that focuses on the difficulties these narratives posed for local intellectuals in Aceh’s Gayo 
highland regency (Bowen 1989a).  Recall that many of these histories of Islamization were 
underpinned by a chronotope of temporally and spatially progressive Islamization.  Because the 
histories of Aceh being cultivated in the 1950s insisted on a process of Islamization that was 
progressive and unidirectional, moving from the west to the east and from the coasts to the 
highlands, they challenged Gayo histories of the coming of Islam to Gayoland that gave a more 
prominent place to the highlands.  By the 1980s, however, some Gayo intellectuals had found 
ways to insert their own historical materials into the chronotope of Islamization.  They did so by 
introducing episodes of Gayo village histories into progressive narratives of Islamization, 
interpreting characters in Ali Hasjmy’s histories as Gayo historical figures, and through other 
narrative strategies (Bowen 1989a, 687-690). 
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 In the 1950s and 1960s, Habib Muda and several of his associates seem to have engaged 
in a similar strategy to bring local Nagan Raya narratives into the chronotope of Islamization.  
Further, Habib Muda cultivated these links in a manner that was particularly compelling locally.  
Instead of simply finding a place to insert his family’s patriline along the chains of conversion 
characteristic of the Islamization chronotope, Habib Muda managed to flip several of the most 
important political and spatial-temporal valences of the histories of Aceh being developed in the 
1950s and 1960s.  In the process, he placed the Habib Seunagan at the center of three spatial-
temporal frames: a cosmologically all-encompassing Islamic universe, a realm of Nagan Raya’s 
local custom and history, and the newly independent Indonesian nation. 
 A key to understanding how Habib Muda successfully inserted his family’s patriline into 
prestigious histories of the coming of Islam to the Indonesian archipelago is the manner in which 
he cultivated his family’s links to the Nine Saints of Java.  I cannot say for certain when the 
association with the Nine Saints became a dominant strand in genealogical narratives of the 
Habib Seunagan.  The earliest documentary evidence for such a link is the 1962 report by Teuku 
Azman described above.  Based on oral histories anchored to objects in the Nagan Raya 
countryside, it was in the 1950s, during Darul Islam, when these ties began to be stressed in 
earnest.  Habib Muda, his associates, and his descendants have gone to great lengths to highlight 
these links ever since.   
 One story featured prominently in oral histories I collected from members of the Habib 
Seunagan and their devotees involved a trip that Habib Muda took to Java during Darul Islam.
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Habib Muda’s descendants claim that on this occasion, President Sukarno invited Habib Muda to 
the national capital of Jakarta as a gesture of gratitude for Habib Muda’s loyalty in combating 
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Darul Islam.  Stories of Habib Muda’s trip suggestively paralleled similar stories told by Muda 
Waly’s followers of a journey Muda Waly took to West Java in the 1950s to participate in a 
meeting of ulama, a meeting at which he met Sukarno.
134
  I have yet to uncover independent 
evidence verifying that Habib Muda’s trip occurred.  Members of the Habib Seunagan, however, 
were adamant that Habib Muda’s journey to Jakarta had taken place.   
 While on Java, Habib Muda was said to have conducted ritual visits (I., ziarah; Ar., 
ziyāra) to the graves of several of the Nine Saints.  He was also said to have received two gifts 
from the president.  The first was a Land Rover, long since destroyed, but the memories of which 
still sparked excitement among members of the family old enough to remember Habib Muda 
cruising the rural Nagan Raya landscape in it.  The second gift, more substantial in its own way, 
was a Javanese dagger (I., kris).  This dagger was alleged to have belonged to Sunan Kalijaga, 
one of the Nine Saints.  At the time of my fieldwork it was displayed inside the main pillar of the 
mosque on the complex where Habib Muda was buried (see Figure 13).  It was renowned for 
bringing calamity upon those who entered the mosque with ill-intentions, and it served as a 
potent symbol of the family’s ties to the Nine Saints, both as an index of Habib Muda’s trip to 
Java and as an icon of the family’s Javanese descent. 
 By the time of my fieldwork, the narrative of Habib Muda’s trip to Java was well-known.  
Nearly all versions of the story I heard conformed to the basic outline presented above.  Most 
importantly, the links Habib Muda cultivated to the Nine Saints of Java, via his visitations at 
their graves and his return with Sunan Kalijaga’s dagger, were the central themes of these 
narratives.  The presence of the Javanese dagger in the mosque on Habib Muda’s grave complex 
anchored these narratives in the Nagan Raya landscape and tied them to Habib Muda’s  
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Figure 13: Javanese dagger in main pillar of mosque at the  
grave complex of Habib Muda, Peuleukung, Nagan Raya 
 
  
grave just a few meters away.  In fact, most people who told me about Habib Muda’s trip to 
Jakarta closed their story by encouraging me to go to Peuleukung to see the knife for myself. 
 But what, precisely, did stressing these genealogical links to the Nine Saints accomplish?  
Remember that in most histories of the coming of Islam to the archipelago, it was from Aceh that 
Islam spread throughout the archipelago.  It was this point, in large part, that made these histories 
compelling for Acehnese in the 1950s.  Especially attractive were the ways in which these 




Figure 14: Two versions of Islamization 
 
source of a counterinsurgency that Darul Islam supporters frequently understood to emanate 
from an anti-Islamic and Javanese-dominated central government.  The Nine Saints of Java, 
however, lived in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  Aceh’s Islamization was believed to have 
begun as early as the thirteenth century, if not before.  If the Habib Seunagan were responsible 
for the Islamization of Nagan Raya, yet were also the descendants of the Nine Saints, this 
implied that Java had been Islamicized before Nagan Raya, potentially challenging value-laden 
geographies that took Aceh as the font from which Islam spread throughout the archipelago. 
The members of the Habib Seunagan with whom I spoke during my research did not 
deny that Islam, indeed, had come first to Aceh before spreading to Java.  But they went on to 
claim that the initial coming of Islam to the archipelago landed only on Aceh’s north coast before 
passing to Java.  Their own ancestors, descendants of the Nine Saints, had then returned to 
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Aceh’s west coast, Islamicizing Nagan Raya.  The Habib Seunagan thus asserted a place in the 
history of the conversion of the archipelago that constituted a moment of Islamization from Java 
to Aceh (see Figure 14). This assertion began in earnest with Habib Muda’s cultivation of 
genealogical links to the Nine Saints of Java during a period when he found himself opposing 
Darul Islam. 
 Habib Muda’s cultivation of these links in the manner described above turned relational 
hierarchies associated with Aceh, the Indonesian nation, and Islamization from their usual 
rhythms.  Darul Islam supporters, like most Acehnese and many Javanese, regularly represented 
Java as comparatively less Islamicized than Aceh.  The chronotope of Islamization and its stress 
on continuous and progressive narratives of conversion had itself been part of efforts to end 
Darul Islam in Aceh.  These efforts were carried out through stressing the primacy and grandeur 
of an Islamic past that all Acehnese were alleged to share, a past thought sufficient to justify the 
granting of special autonomy to Aceh, and widely taken as marking Aceh as unique and primary 
in relation to Java.   
 Habib Muda, however, came to express his family’s loyalty to Jakarta in terms of his 
descent from the Nine Saints of Java.  As a result, the Habib Seunagan’s patriline was inserted 
into the history of the archipelago’s conversion to Islam in a manner that adhered to the Aceh 
history’s pattern of spatial and temporal progression while simultaneously flouting one of its 
most fundamental political valences.  In claiming to be the descendant of Javanese Muslims who 
brought Islam to Acehnese converts, Habib Muda not only articulated his allegiance to a central 
government perceived by most Acehnese as dominated by Javanese, but asserted a measure of 
Javanese primacy in the Islamization of at least his own portion of Aceh.  Further, he did this 
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through a historical narrative of conversion that was originally cultivated in part to do precisely 
the opposite, that is, to assert Acehnese primacy over Java. 
These unusual resonances would grow only stronger, and more counterintuitive, as time 
passed.  When the Free Acheh Movement broke out in 1976, Acehnese nationalists were even 
more resentful towards Javanese dominance of Indonesian political and social life than Darul 
Islam guerrillas had been (Aspinall 2009, 70-74, 193-219; Tiro 1984).  Free Acheh Movement 
activists portrayed Java as comparatively less Islamicized than their Acehnese counterparts and 
used histories of Aceh’s glorious past as rallying points for Acehnese nationalism, stressing the 
ways in which this past established Aceh as different from and primary to Java.  “Java” became 
the alterity against which Acehnese nationalists came to define their project, articulating 
Indonesia as synonymous with Java in a manner that made it difficult to claim both Acehnese 
and Indonesian identities (Aspinall 2009, 70-74).
135
   
Nonetheless, throughout the period of the Free Acheh Movement, the Habib Seunagan 
continued to cultivate their links to the Nine Saints, Java, and the Indonesian central government.  
They did so while continuing to claim that Habib Abdurrahim had brought Islam to Nagan Raya 
and founded authentic customary practice there.  Their senior family members frequently 
boasted about the family’s links to both Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, and the man who 
deposed and replaced him, Soeharto.  They stressed their close ties to the Indonesian military 
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, including during Darul Islam, the massacres 
of the Indonesian Left in 1965 and 1966, and the conflict between the Free Acheh Movement 
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 Narratives of Islamization were an extremely minor part of the Free Acheh Movement’s historical 
propaganda.  I would suggest that this was because the telos of such narratives had, by the 1970s, become so 
thoroughly entwined in notions of the Indonesian nation that it seemed counterintuitive to stress them as part of an 
Acehnese nationalist project.  Nonetheless, notions of fundamental differences between Acehnese and Javanese 
were sometimes expressed using the idiom of Islamization (i.e., Acehnese Islam versus Javanese Hindu-Buddhism).  
More importantly, the ways in which the Habib Seunagan’s narratives of Islamization asserted Javanese historical 
primacy over Nagan Raya openly flouted the Free Acheh Movement’s insistence that Aceh held historical 
precedence over Java in just about every social, political, and historical category. 
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and the Indonesian state.  Important symbols of these relationships to Indonesian central 
authority hung in their homes and grave complexes, for example the abovementioned dagger of 
Sunan Kalijaga, photographs of family members with civilian and military officials in the field, 
and a framed copy of the service star posthumously awarded by the Indonesian government to 
Habib Muda for his service to the Republic.  Thus, at the time of my fieldwork, they resolutely 
expressed their loyalty to an Indonesian central government that most Acehnese had, at the very 
least, come to distrust.  They did so through the idiom of Islamization, which held deep historical 
resonances at the regency, provincial, and national level. 
Placing the Habib Seunagan: Three Entwined Spatial-Temporal Frames 
 
 It is probably the case that very few people outside of Nagan Raya were even aware of 
Habib Muda’s recasting of Aceh’s place in narratives of Indonesia’s Islamization.  While the 
cultivation of genealogical links with the Nine Saints of Java seemed aimed, in part, at 
illustrating the Habib Seunagan’s loyalty to Jakarta, these genealogical histories proved popular 
mainly among those living in or near Nagan Raya.  Nonetheless, that a large number of people 
within the regency accepted the validity of these ties, despite the ways in which they were so 
flagrantly were at odds with common narratives of Indonesia’s Islamization and more robust 
standards of genealogical verification, begs a question.  Why? 
 One answer to this question lies in the ways in which, aside from inserting his patriline 
into the chronotope of Islamization, Habib Muda’s cultivation of genealogical links with the 
Nine Saints simultaneously placed his patriline in three spatial-temporal frames that overlapped 
in the period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  The first of these spatial-temporal frames, described 
in the previous section, was that of the Indonesian nation articulated in terms of progressive 
Islamization.  By cultivating ties to the Nine Saints, Habib Muda and his descendants placed the 
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Habib Seunagan’s patriline within prestigious histories of the coming of Islam to the Indonesian 
archipelago.  As discussed in earlier chapters, narratives of Islamization have been a powerful 
way Acehnese and other Indonesians have come to imagine their place in the Indonesian nation.  
In the case of the Habib Seunagan, narratives of Islamization facilitated the family’s links to the 
Indonesian Republic in periods in which they found themselves in opposition to anti-government 
guerrilla movements.  At the time of my fieldwork, Habib Muda’s descendants and followers 
continued to remember him as an Indonesian patriot. 
 Yet there were at least two other spatial-temporal frames in which the Habib Seunagan, 
through their genealogical links to prestigious Islamic pasts, could claim a central place.  Recall 
that the genealogies of the Habib Seunagan claimed that the family’s patriline descended from 
‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī.  ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī has remained perhaps the single most paradigmatic 
figure in traditions of Sufi devotion in the Indian Ocean Islamic world.  He has been assumed by 
many devotees to be the most likely candidate to fill the role of cosmic pole (I., qutub) in his 
own age.  While the status of qutub is not usually associated with genealogical descent, recall 
that in Nagan Raya the title has been bequeathed along the Habib Seunagan’s patriline.  Thus, 
this link to ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī strengthened claims of the Habib Seunagan to the status of qutub 
in their own right.   
 By the late nineteenth century, an increasing number of genealogical histories of the Nine 
Saints of Java linked the Nine Saints to the patrilines of Sayyids resident in the Indonesian 
archipelago.  None of these histories tied the Nine Saints to ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī.  Nonetheless, 
placing the Nine Saints in a genealogical line between the Habib Seunagan and ‘Abd al-Qādir 
Jīlānī further suggested the esoteric prominence and power of the Habib Seunagan.  The Nine 
Saints were widely taken in Java to be figures active in the kinds of mystical hierarchies 
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associated with the qutub.  Thus, drawing attention to links with the Nine Saints of Java 
augmented the Habib Seunagan’s central place in a cosmological geography in which their 
family line was, quite literally, the “central pole” of the universe.  This mystical Islamic cosmos 
was the second of the spatial-temporal frames the Habib Seunagan’s genealogy allowed them 
inhabit. 
 This cosmological position as central pole reinforced the Habib Seunagan’s place in the 
third of the spatial-temporal frames under discussion here.  This was the realm of Nagan Raya’s 
local customary practice.  Recall again the claim made in Teuku Azman’s 1962 report that Habib 
Abdurrahim brought into being a local customary practice in Seunagan that “had its origins in 
Islam.”  The category of local customary practice (I., adat), which was a key concept in the 
Dutch narratives of Islamization discussed in the Introduction, has a long and contested history 
in the archipelago (Benda 1958; Bowen 2003, 1-63; Hurgronje 1906; Lev 1972, 1985; Spyer 
1996; Steedly 1993; van Vollenhoven 1981).  One of the chief lines of contestation regarding 
this term has been whether or not, and under what circumstances, local custom is considered 
forbidden or allowed according to Islamic jurisprudence (Benda 1958; Bowen 2003, 1-63; Lev 
1972, 1985).  In classical Islamic jurisprudence, however, ‘āda (Ar.), or the related term ‘urf 
(Ar.), could be construed as a category of local practice that, if not inconsistent with Islamic 
legal principles, was itself legally binding.  In this sense, ‘āda was a category used to bring local 
norms and practices into the Islamic legal tradition (Stewart 2012).  In twentieth-century 
Indonesia, however, the general assumption has been that the category of local custom includes 
things that are resolutely local and that stand against Islamic practice or outside of it. 
 Herein lies much of the significance of Teuku Azman’s claim that Seunagan’s customary 
practice “had its origins in Islam.”  By virtue of its inception at the moment of Habib 
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Abdurrahim’s conversion of the region, Seunagan’s local customary practice was taken as a fully 
Islamic customary practice, self-consciously contrary to the unmarked category of adat in its 
common Indonesian usage to mean local practice in opposition to or outside of Islam.  Its very 
existence was the result of the actions of descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through ‘Abd 
al-Qādir Jīlānī and the Nine Saints of Java. 
The centrality of the Habib Seunagan to the realm of Nagan Raya’s local customary 
practice was further reinforced by the ways in which the cosmological realm in which they 
claimed the status of qutub was symbolically replicated in daily social relations in Nagan Raya.  
Recall that the titles of qutub and autad descended through genealogical patrilines and that many 
in Nagan Raya continued to recognize the representatives of these patrilines as carrying these 
esoteric titles.  Beyond the two most elevated titles (i.e., qutub, autad), a full range of lesser ones 
associated with the Sufi cosmologies described in Chapter 4 also passed in this manner (Bowen 
1989b, 687-690).  This meant that a great number of people in Nagan Raya could be associated 
with such titles, and thereby place themselves, or be placed by others, in a systematic hierarchy 
that simultaneously reflected local customary practice and universal cosmological gravitas.  Even 
those not personally moved by the Sufi cosmologies, for example Nyak Nur, could not help but 
know their place within this hierarchy of local customary practice. 
Thus, by cultivating key links in their genealogy, the Habib Seunagan were able to stress 
their place in three intersecting spatial-temporal frames: the Indonesian nation articulated in 
terms of progressive Islamization, a cosmological realm in which their patriline represented the 
central pole of the universe, and a locality in which they were the originators and arbiters of a 
thoroughly Islamic customary practice.  Each of these realms reinforced the other two.  They all 
in some way were refracted through the key period of Nagan Raya’s Islamization, where local, 
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national, and cosmological frames were entangled.  This was apparent in Teuku Azman’s 1962 
yearly report, which linked the nationalist loyalties of the Habib Seunagan and their followers 
with Habib Abdurrahim’s status as qutub and his role as transmitter of a conjoined Islam and 
customary practice. 
Returning to Peuleukung: Grounding the Habib Seunagan in a Different Kind of Kandoeri 
While the three entwined spatial-temporal frames of the Indonesian nation, Islamic 
cosmos, and Nagan Raya’s realm of customary practice were eloquently expressed in the 
narratives and genealogies of the Habib Seunagan described above, this eloquence in itself does 
not explain why these frames became so compelling for many Muslims in Nagan Raya.  Part of 
the answer to this question lies in the social practices described in Chapter 4.  Genealogical 
histories served as a dominant idiom of social life in Nagan Raya, linking prominent Nagan Raya 
patrilines to the region’s Islamization and predisposing Muslims to orient themselves to this 
period.  Given this common orientation to the local past of Islamization, a local past in which all 
three of the spatial-temporal frames described above entwined, the various symmetries and 
interconnections between these frames have been apparent to many in Nagan Raya. 
 Those in Nagan Raya also encountered the interconnected spatial-temporal frames that 
arose from the Habib Seunagan’s genealogy through their participation in ritual practices at the 
graves of the Habib Seunagan.  Almost five months after I attended the Idul Adha kandoeri in 
Peuleukung, I returned to Habib Muda’s grave complex for another kandoeri, this one to mark 
the anniversary of Habib Muda’s death.  This kandoeri was described by the Habib Seunagan 
and their devotees as a haul (I.), a term used throughout much of the Islamic world to indicate an 
event commemorating the anniversary of the death of a renowned Sufi.  In many ways, this 
kandoeri resembled the one I attended on Idul Adha.  Large numbers of attendees arrived in the 
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evening by truck.  These attendees sat in groups and recited litanies without paying much 
attention to the litanies being recited by the groups adjacent to them.  This resulted in the 
cacophony of sacred syllables that had impressed me at Idul Adha.  Finally, attendees remained 
throughout the night, leaving the next morning. 
 There were, however, some significant differences between this event and the one that 
had been held for Idul Adha in early December.  For one, there was no circumambulation of 
Habib Muda’s grave.  Rather than being arranged around Habib Muda’s grave complex, all of 
the groups in attendance sat in or near a large building that served as a shelter for reciting litanies 
(Ac., déah).  Not only was this building outside the walls of the courtyard surrounding Habib 
Muda’s grave, it was across the street.  The floors of the two-story building were crammed with 
attendees, as was the small courtyard outside of it.  Rather than being oriented to a single point, 
groups of attendees sat facing any number of directions. 
 Further, there were no makeshift food or drink stalls lining the street in front of the 
complex as there had been in early December.  Instead, behind the shelter in which most of the 
attendees were reciting their litanies stood a large cooking area.  Men prepared pots of rice and 
Acehnese goat curry, which was served all night to those in attendance, free of charge.  The food 
was sponsored by Habib Muda’s close relatives, and the men who prepared it volunteered to me 
that they were happy to have been selected for such an honor. 
 At first glance, the differences between the kandoeri commemorating the anniversary of 
Habib Muda’s death and the one held on Idul Adha might seem insignificant.  From one point of 
view, the only major ritual difference between the two events was that no circumambulation of 
Habib Muda’s grave took place at the latter event.  There was no noticeable difference in the 
litanies recited at either kandoeri, for example.  While there was no time set aside for Abu 
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Kodrat and his companions to greet each of the attendees at the kandoeri on the anniversary of 
Habib Muda’s death, Abu Kodrat and several other prominent members of the family remained 
stationed at various points on the grounds.  They received all visitors who wished to speak with 
them.  Yet the different spatial arrangements of the two events, and the fact that food was served 
to all attendees on the anniversary of Habib Muda’s death, signaled important differences 
between the two kandoeri.  Further, it suggested one of the most important ways in which the 
genealogical histories of the Habib Seunagan were tied to ritual practice in Nagan Raya. 
 Much of the kandoeri commemorating the death of Habib Muda participated in wider 
patterns of practice associated with the devotion of mystically-inclined Muslims toward 
renowned Sufis (Cornell 1998; Gilsenan 1973; Hoffman 1995; Werbner 2003).  What is 
important for the purposes of this chapter, if not unique to Nagan Raya, is how the Habib 
Seunagan defined the large events at the graves of Habib Muda and Habib Abdurrahim as 
kandoeri.  In certain respects, referring to these feasts as kandoeri simply reflected the use of this 
term to indicate any sort of gathering at which prayers were recited and food exchanged.  Yet the 
commemoration of Habib Muda’s death conformed particularly well to common Acehnese ideals 
of kandoeri feasts, which were tied to notions of social reciprocity and generosity among 
Muslims.  The relatives of Habib Muda, in fact, went to some length to highlight this fact, 
receiving guests at the complex the entire day before the feast and drawing attention to the 
copious amounts of food that were available to anyone who attended. 
 Members of the Habib Seunagan regularly described the practices of the Syattariyah Sufi 
order in terms of the bonds of social solidarity that kandoeri were imagined to facilitate.  
Consider the comments of Sayyid Bas, a young and well-educated descendent of Habib Muda, 
still in his twenties.  He identified “three foundations” (Ac., lhèē bòh dasar) for understanding 
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his family’s “community” (I., komuniti).  The first foundation was the remembrance of God 
through the litanies described above, with the eventual goal of absorption into awareness of the 
oneness of God through this remembrance.  The second two foundations were kandoeri and 
silaturahmi.  Recall that silaturahmi roughly indicates cordial relations between individuals or 
groups, and was valued highly in Nagan Raya.  In citing both kandoeri and silaturahmi, Sayyid 
Bas referenced the ritual feasts and visits that occupied the center of ritual and social life in 
Nagan Raya.  Both terms were intimately tied to metadiscourses on properly Islamic customary 
practice. 
It would not be correct to claim that the Habib Seunagan held a monopoly on these terms 
or their usage to describe properly Islamic customary practice.  One would have been hard 
pressed to find a Muslim in Aceh who did not value silaturahmi as an expression of Islamic 
sociality.  While various reformers have criticized kandoeri, most Acehnese, especially on 
Aceh’s southwest coast, openly embraced the term and nearly all of its resonances with 
Acehnese customary practice.  Nonetheless, it was difficult to disentangle the Habib Seunagan 
from what was considered by most in the region, and even some outside of it, as the 
exceptionally strong customary practice of Nagan Raya.  The family cultivated this close 
association with kandoeri and local custom through their sponsoring of ritual feasts such as the 
ones previously described.  This association also was embedded in their genealogy, which 
highlighted their role in the coming of an entwined Islam and customary practice to the region. 
In a very important sense, it was through these gatherings, understood locally as ritual 
feasts that entailed bonds of spiritual and material reciprocity, that the genealogical history of the 
Habib Seunagan came to be compelling for those people who attended them.  In my 
conversations with attendees at these events, it became clear that a nexus of concerns motivated 
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followers of the Habib Seunagan to attend, including personal devotion, social reciprocity, the 
seeking of supernatural aid, and the desire to achieve mystical knowledge.  These followers 
tended to express these motivations in a manner that mirrored the tripartite constellation of 
spatial-temporal frames that arose from the Habib Seunagan’s narrative and genealogical 
practices.  This was especially apparent at the grave of Habib Muda, who personified the 
family’s place in cosmic, national, and local spatial-temporal frames.  Different devotees with 
whom I spoke at the kandoeri marking the anniversary of Habib Muda’s death, for example, 
described Habib Muda’s “superiority” (I., kelebihan) to me in terms of his being a national hero 
who defended the Indonesian Republic, a mystical mediator through whom devotees could more 
effectively secure divine grace and favors, and a local figure to whom they were connected 
through networks of reciprocity that included the kandoeri at which we spoke. 
The kinds of practices in which these three spatial-temporal frames would have been 
apparent to devotees included a range well beyond the various yearly gatherings at the graves of 
Habib Muda.  Remember that the graves inscribing the genealogy of the Habib Seunagan on the 
Nagan Raya landscape dotted the countryside.  At some of these graves, there were opportunities 
to recite litanies on a weekly basis.  Perhaps even more importantly, people regularly visited 
these graves to make vows (Ac., ka’ōj; I., nazar) in which devotees promised to recite Qur’anic 
verses or to sacrifice an animal in exchange for help from the person in the grave in obtaining 
certain deeply held wishes.  Sayyid Samsol, a descendant of the Habib Seunagan in his early 
sixties, once took me on a tour of the most powerful of these graves, most of which were at 
difficult-to-reach points in the Nagan Raya countryside.  Spending a day outside Habib Muda’s 
grave complex, I encountered approximately ten people seeking the intercession of Habib Muda 
in their worldly affairs.  These included schoolboys seeking higher test scores, a young couple 
 
251 
struggling with infertility, and a middle-aged man who could not figure out why his new 
business was not bringing in more profit. 
 Again, it should be stressed that such practices are not unusual.  The graves of renowned 
and powerful Sufis are the sites of such activity around Indonesia and the greater Islamic world 
(Cornell 1998; Gilsenan 1973; Werbner 2003).  But it is notable how ritual practice at the graves 
of the Habib Seunagan encouraged those in Nagan Raya to participate in emplaced and 
embodied practices that depended on the three spatial-temporal frames inherent in the Habib 
Seunagan’s genealogy.  These were not simply instances of Muslims seeking supernatural favors 
or engaged in transaction rituals with local holy men.  Instead, they involved networks of 
reciprocity within the local, cosmic, and national spatial-temporal frames that arose from the 
Habib Seunagan’s narration of their genealogical history.  As such, these practices invested 
Islamic practitioners in Nagan Raya in the local Islamic histories that underpinned the Habib 
Seunagan’s narrative, social, and ritual practices. 
 Certainly, not all people in Nagan Raya oriented themselves in uniform ways to the 
narrative, social, and ritual practices associated with the Habib Seunagan.  It should be clear by 
this point that the ways in which the Habib Seunagan narrated their genealogies and conducted 
the social and ritual practices that underpinned their versions of local Islamic pasts were highly 
contested.  One devotee explained to me, for example, that each year on the anniversary of Habib 
Muda’s death, the mystic’s soul (I., roh) returns to the grave, making it an especially auspicious 
time to recite litanies and seek intervention.  Another devotee, however, told me this was 
nonsense.  With the exception of the six links in the genealogy described above, nearly each 
genealogy I received from members of the Habib Seunagan and other residents of Nagan Raya 
involved a different chain of names and links.  Similarly, following the death of Habib Muda in 
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1972, a controversy ensued over where to hold the Idul Adha kandoeri described above.  Before 
Habib Muda’s death, this event had been held at the grave of Habib Abdurrahim, but Habib 
Muda’s social, political, and mystical prominence caused his descendants to believe that the Idul 
Adha kandoeri should be moved to Peuleukung.  Other branches of the family resisted this 
move.  At the time of my research, this controversy was no longer discussed openly.  But some 
devotees of the Habib Seunagan still celebrated Idul Adha at Habib Abdurrahim’s grave complex 
in Pulo Ie, while others traveled back and forth between the two complexes.  All of these 
examples illustrate contestation among the Habib Seunagan and their devotees.  Even more 
varied readings of the family’s narrative, social, and mystical practices were to be found among 
the family’s critics, for example ‘Abduh-style reformers such as Nyak Nur. 
 Returning once again to Nyak Nur, however, brings us to the key point.  It is true that the 
three entwined spatial-temporal frames linking the Habib Seunagan to central positions in a local 
customary realm, the Islamic cosmos, and the Indonesian nation were contested by different 
Muslims in Nagan Raya.  But even the family’s most ardent critics seemed unable to divorce 
themselves entirely from these frames and from the local past of Islamization to which they were 
connected.  This was because these frames and local Islamic pasts inhered in daily embodied and 
emplaced practices of reading the past in the present.  Such practices were layered into daily 
social and ritual interaction in Nagan Raya.  Nyak Nur might have refrained from attending the 
kandoeri held at Habib Muda’s grave in Peuleukung, but he seemed loath to renounce his 
genealogical links to Nagan Raya’s Islamization.  Some devotees of the Habib Seunagan did not 
hold prestigious genealogies, but attended kandoeri through which they took themselves to be 
participants in a local customary practice that linked them to networks of reciprocity that 
included a national hero and mystical cosmic pole (i.e., Habib Muda).  Both Nyak Nur and these 
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devotees became invested in the tripartite spatial-temporal frames described here, albeit to 
different degrees and through different instances of social and ritual practice. 
Waiting for the Keramat to Drop: The Continuing Work of Narrative and Its Limits 
 Habib Muda was an astute political player and a charismatic mystical figure, yet he could 
not have cultivated genealogical links to the Nine Saints of Java in any historical context.  The 
particular configuration of events in and through which he acted helped to buttress the 
constellation of genealogy he forwarded.  These events included the Darul Islam rebellion 
against the central government, the alliance of religious teachers opposing the revolt, his family’s 
embeddedness in material and mystical networks of reciprocity in Nagan Raya, the Habib 
Seunagan’s genealogy inscribed on the Nagan Raya countryside, and others.  The histories in 
which he inserted his patriline, that is, new histories of Aceh underpinned by the chronotope of 
Islamization, were themselves expressed in a narrative form that was the product of his historical 
period.   
 Maintaining the Habib Seunagan’s place in these local, national, and cosmic spatial-
temporal frames has required on-going narrative, social, and ritual work on the part of Habib 
Muda’s descendants.  As Indonesia-wide efforts to more systematically document genealogical 
links between Sayyids and the patrilines descending from the Prophet Muhammad’s family 
spread to Aceh, the question of where the Habib Seunagan fit into this larger family tree has 
become one of increasing concern for members of the family.
136
  However, as is evident from the 
discussion above, the Habib Seunagan’s authority has never derived from the existence of this 
kind of detailed genealogy. 
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 On the documentation of these genealogies in Indonesia, see Ho (2006, 325-326) and Rabithah 
Alawiyah (2012).  At the commencement of my research, the group most interested in documenting these links, 
Rabithah Alawiyah, had recently opened a branch office in Banda Aceh. 
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 Concern with newly popular standards of verifying genealogical descent may have been 
what motivated descendants and followers of Habib Muda to publish his biography in 2009.  In 
this book the author, who claimed to be a spiritual deputy (I., khalifah) of the Syattariyah, 
admitted that the family has no definitive genealogy.  Nonetheless, he continued to assert that 
Habib Muda descended from the Prophet Muhammad:  
Abu Habib Muda Seunagan[... has] a lineage (I., silsilah) to the Messenger (i.e., 
Muhammad)[...  Sayyids] have various family names (I., marga) or clans (I., klan) 
such as Al-Atas, al-Habsyi, Al-Ayrus, Al-Haddad, and others.  Abu Habib Muda 
Seunagan who [only has] the family name Habib is still the descendant of the 
Messenger[...]  History provides a strong justification for this. (Daud 2009, 25) 
 
This rather unconvincing argument is not, in fact, accompanied by any historical justification at 
all in the text of the work.  The extent of the argument presented by the author is, at its root, that 
Habib Muda was known to be a Sayyid, therefore he was one. 
 While such an argument may appear to have little hope of overcoming rigorous standards 
of complete and unbroken genealogies that could discredit the Habib Seunagan’s status as 
Sayyids, consider the following.  In a move strikingly reminiscent of Habib Muda’s return from 
Java with Sunan Kalijaga’s dagger, the book’s sponsors arranged to hold a book opening, at the 
headquarters of the Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Jakarta (anonymous 2009).  
Nahdlatul Ulama is Indonesia’s largest mass-member Islamic organization and popularly 
perceived as closely associated with none other than the Nine Saints of Java.  Recalling Habib 
Muda’s visitation to the graves of the Nine Saints, the choice of venue for the book opening 
involved travel to Java in order to stress the Habib Seunagan’s otherwise difficult-to-verify links 
to the Nine Saints.  Such a move was clearly aimed not at overcoming the standards of complete 
and unbroken genealogies that may soon threaten the Habib Seunagan’s genealogical claims, but 
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at buttressing the Habib Seunagan’s genealogical history by cultivating relationships with living 
representatives of the Nine Saints (i.e., NU). 
 Rather than threats posed from newly ascendant standards of genealogical verification, 
one of the biggest challenges that faced the Habib Seunagan at the time of my research was the 
question of to whom the mystical powers (I., keramat) once possessed by Habib Muda would 
descend next.  To contextualize the significance of this question, I first turn to a discussion I had 
with an elderly woman in Nagan Raya one afternoon.  I was brought to this woman by a friend, a 
young, male devotee of the Habib Seunagan, who told me that she was somehow related to 
Habib Muda.  As I attempted to steer the conversation towards questions regarding ritual 
practice, litanies, and similar topics, she continuously returned to what I came to realize was, 
perhaps, the central historical moment in her understanding of the order.  She told me about a 
time when a light, which she described as the “Muhammadean light” (I., nur Muhammad), 
descended upon Habib Muda.  Before I could hear much more in the way of details, however, 
my conversation with this woman came to an abrupt end, when a man much younger than she 
was stepped in and scolded her for circulating the story.  He then turned to me and inquired into 
my purposes and visa status. 
 This was not the first or last time I would hear such a story.  In fact, I heard a few 
different versions of it during my time in Nagan Raya.  These stories were rarely more than 
fragments, and they frequently were more evocative than descriptive.  However, clearly several 
people remembered an event at which something in Habib Muda’s mystical status changed.  
Some told me that at this point he came to be called Habib Muda, translatable as the “young 
Habib.”  At least one of the Habib Seunagan’s critics insinuated that it was only at this time that 
he began claiming descent as a Sayyid.  In all versions of these stories, the event in question 
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involved the descent (Ac., tron; I., turun) of mystical power (I., keramat; Ar., karāma), often in 
the form of a light (I., terang). 
 Questions regarding to whom such mystical powers might descend next were a central 
concern of many of my interlocutors from the Habib Seunagan, although this concern rarely was 
discussed openly.  The stories of the descent of the these powers to Habib Muda helped to 
contextualize the preoccupation among so many of the Habib Seunagan with the question of to 
whom they might descend next.  The descent of these powers involved the acquisition of 
miraculous abilities, often involving super-perceptive sensoriums or the ability to calm the forces 
of nature.
137
  Yet much more was at stake.  Habib Muda became the head of the Habib Seunagan 
in part because he exhibited powers that indicated his divinely-sanctioned spiritual superiority.   
 While the Habib Seunagan remained socially, politically, and religiously prominent at the 
time of my research, the leadership of the branch of the Syattariyah they formally headed had 
passed from one of Habib Muda’s sons to another, and then another.  To that point, there had 
been no dispute about succession to leadership in the order.  But it was clear that some from the 
family were waiting to see to whom mystical powers would fall next.  One member of the 
family, while showing me the grave of a particular powerful ancestor of Habib Muda, made sure 
to point out the negative effects that would occur if such mystical powers were to descend on 
him at that very moment.  His proximity to this ancestor’s power, now located with his body in 
the grave, would result in a kind of mystical short-circuiting, and his feet would become as heavy 
as lead.  My interlocutor told this story in a hushed voice that suggested the expectation that at 
some point, such a thing might very well happen, if not to him then to another in his extended 
family. 
                                                          
 
137
 The miraculous powers of Sufi saints frequently involve these kinds of powers, especially super-
perception.  See, for example, Ewing (1994; 1997), Gilsenan (1973; 2000, 75-141), Green (2004), Hoffman (2005), 
and Werbner (2003). 
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 In fact, following Habib Muda’s death in 1972, someone had indeed exhibited at least 
some of his most potent powers.  This was Habib Muda’s daughter, Hajjah Peunawa.  Following 
her father’s death, she led much of the ritual practice associated with the Syattariyah in Nagan 
Raya, despite the fact that the leadership of the order officially belonged to her brother (Helmy 
1987, 44-45; Kraus 2010, 223).  Upon her death, Hajja Peunawa was buried in the same complex 
as her father, along with her sister Won Doneh, the daughter of Habib Muda married to Teuku 
Azman, and her brothers.  Some devotees, in fact, came to this complex to receive the benefits of 
this women’s intercessionary power, and kandoeri were held at the complex yearly to 
commemorate the anniversary of her death.  Yet, despite this, these women rarely were 
mentioned when someone noted that the mystical powers that once descended upon the Habib 
Muda had yet to fall to anyone since his death, nor were they counted in genealogical reckonings 
of the Habib Seunagan or Syattariyah.   
 The examples of the ways in which the Habib Seunagan remained attuned to the question 
of to whom mystical powers would descend next suggests that the creative potential of the Habib 
Seunagan’s narrative, social, and religious practice was not unconstrained.  Habib Muda was 
able to cultivate and assert the links of his genealogy in a specific set of historical circumstances.  
Hajjah Peunawa, widely-recognized to have received many of her father’s powers, but not able 
to transmit the family’s genealogical patriline, dropped out of most narrative accounts of the 
family, despite the fact that devotees continued to visit her grave.  From these constraints, 
however, arose a creative potential.  Genealogy, Sufi lineage, and mystical powers combined in 
unpredictable ways to bring a Javanese dagger to Aceh, an Acehnese woman to the leadership of 
Syattariyah retreats, an ‘Abduh-style reformer to the title of autad, and a book opening to Java.  
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It is little wonder that so many of the Habib Seunagan I met seemed to be waiting for the 
keramat to drop. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter began with a 1962 report in which Teuku Azman, the head of the sub-
regency of Seunagan and the son-in-law of Habib Muda, lauded the locally-renowned Habib 
Abdurrahim as a proto-Indonesian patriot, a mystical “central pole,” and the transmitter of a 
conjoined Islam and customary practice to Nagan Raya.  The broader significances of the 
configuration of local, national, and cosmic spatial-temporal frames expressed in this otherwise 
common yearly report should now be apparent.  By 1962 Habib Muda and his associates had 
begun to cultivate and assert genealogical links to the Nine Saints of Java.  In doing so, Habib 
Muda made his patriline central to three interrelated spatial-temporal frames: a cosmic mystical 
realm of Sufis and Sayyids, an order of thoroughly Islamic local customary practice, and the 
Indonesian nation expressed in terms of progressive Islamization.  In so doing, he reversed some 
of the most prominent political and social valences these narratives usually held, identifying his 
own ancestors as the descendants of Javanese Sayyids and shifting the direction of Islamization 
from eastward out of Aceh to westward returning to Aceh.   
 The processes through which all this occurred, and through which these connections 
continued to be re-established at the time of my fieldwork, involved a nexus of narrative, social, 
and ritual practices that helped to enact these shifting spatial-temporal frames for the Habib 
Seunagan and their devotees.  Social and ritual practices in Nagan Raya predisposed those in the 
regency to orient their Islamic practice to the local Islamic past of Nagan Raya’s Islamization, 
where each of these three spatial-temporal frames met.  Further, ritual practice in the regency 
provided opportunities through which ordinary Muslims in Nagan Raya came to orient 
 
259 
themselves within these three frames.  Muslims participating in ritual feasts at the graves of the 
Habib Seunagan, for example, focused their devotional practices on figures that they recognized 
as at the center of each of these three spatial-temporal frames (e.g., Habib Muda, Habib 
Abdurrahim). 
 The example of the Habib Seunagan illustrates the complexity with which Islamic 
practitioners often are emplaced in constellations of Islamic pasts, presents, and futures, 
potentially inhabiting multiple spatial-temporal frames at once.  Muslims frequently do not feel 
the need to choose between local or global frames for their practice.  This, of course, is not 
always the case.  Some popular forms of Islamic reformism, for example, have encouraged 
Muslims to think of their own practice in terms of local versus universal traditions.  But in many 
cases the necessity of making such a distinction is not apparent to Islamic practitioners who 
inhabit complex constellations of interrelated spatial and temporal scales.  Even the Habib 
Seunagan’s cosmic realm was immensely local in its horizons and contexts of practice.  Even 
their claims to the founding of an extremely local customary practice were enacted only through 
their performance of a translocal cosmic authority.  It is not so much that at different points in 
time the Habib Seunagan have chosen to represent or perform their narrative, social, and ritual 
practices in terms of one scale or the other.  Instead, for the Habib Seunagan and their followers, 










On Localities, Peripheries, and Islam 
 
 This conclusion opens with a question to the reader.  Should studies of Indonesian Islam 
leave the archipelago?   
 This dissertation has explored the spatial-temporal orientations of Muslims to local 
Islamic pasts.  It has taken these orientations to be tied to spatial-temporal frames through which 
Muslims engage local moments in Islam’s history.  All of the chapters in this dissertation 
therefore touch on two sets of tensions that have long concerned historians and anthropologists 
of Islam.  These are tensions between the local and the global, and tensions between centers and 
peripheries.   
 Concern over these tensions has been especially acute among historians and 
anthropologists of Indonesian Islam, with generations of scholars struggling with how to de-
center, re-center, globalize, localize, or simply place in broader social-historical context 
Indonesian Islamic practice (Azra 2004a; Bowen 1993; Feener and Laffan 2005; Feener and 
Sevea 2009; Florida 1995; Geertz 1960; Laffan 2003, 2011; Noer 1973; Reid 2010; Ricklefs 
2006; Ricci 2011; Riddel 1990; Roff 1985; Siegel 2000).  Many of these scholars have been 
motivated to write accounts of Indonesian Islam that seek to move it from a periphery.  They 
often have done so by showing how Indonesian Muslims have participated in central spaces, 
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networks, and institutions of a global Islamic world.  To the question of whether or not accounts 
of Indonesian Islam should leave the archipelago, many of these scholars have resoundingly 
answered in the affirmative. 
 The approach of this dissertation, however, has been different.  Very few of the people 
about whom I write ever left the Indonesian archipelago.  Many of them never left Aceh.  
Nonetheless, I argue that approaching the orientations of these Muslims to local Islamic pasts 
suggests productive ways to understand tensions between the local and the global, and the center 
and the periphery. 
 Different historical and ethnographic approaches to Islam have configured the categories 
of local, global, center, and periphery in different ways.  A large number of works on Islamic 
reformism, for example, have taken oppositions between the global and the local, and the center 
and the periphery, as central to their analyses (Azra 2004a; Bowen 1993; Geertz 1960; Gilsenan 
1973; Kobo 2009; Laffan 2003; Noer 1973; Ricklefs 2012; Scheele 2007).  This is one of their 
strengths, as such oppositions are themselves undoubtedly central to the reformist discourses and 
practices these works seek to describe.  Indeed, they were central to my own description of 
Nagan Raya’s history of reformist polemics because a distinction between local and Islamic 
practices was a primary analytic device my interlocutors in Nagan Raya used to determine 
different degrees of reformed practice.   
 Literature on Islamic revivalism and ethical self-formation, to take a second example, has 
tended to deemphasize tensions between global and local, as well as center and periphery (Deeb 
2006; Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005; Metcalf 1993).  This literature has focused on argument 
and debate among Muslims qua Muslims without much attention to how Muslims act as Muslims 





  This literature has been inspired by important work by Talal Asad, and one 
is here reminded of Asad’s segue to his formulation of the Islamic discursive tradition: “[T]he 
most urgent theoretical need for an anthropology of Islam is a matter not so much of finding the 
right scale but of formulating the right concepts” (Asad 1986, 14). 
 Another group of studies, mentioned briefly above, have attempted to destabilize 
hierarchies of global, local, center, and periphery through drawing attention to how Muslims 
from around the world have traveled across the space of the Indian Ocean in order to participate 
in central Islamic spaces, networks, and institutions (Al-Attas 1966, 1970; Azra 2004a, 2004b; 
Feener and Laffan 2005; Feener and Sevea 2009; Ho 2004, 2006; Laffan 2003; Reid 1972, 2010; 
Riddell 1990, 2001, 2005; Roff 2005; van Bruinessen 1989, 1990).  I have drawn much 
inspiration from this literature.  But it continues to raise important unanswered questions for me.  
Do Muslims have to move to and from recognized centers of Islamic discourse and practice in 
order to challenge the notion that some parts of the Islamic world (e.g., Indonesia) are inherently 
peripheral?  Does the movement of Muslims through the space of the Indian Ocean necessarily 
challenge notions of such peripherality?   
 Some of the above studies, while clearly showing Indonesian Muslims participating in 
translocal networks of Islamic practice, nonetheless continue to depict a starkly unidirectional 
movement of Islamic knowledge from the Middle East to Southeast Asia (Azra 2004a, 2004b; 
van Bruinessen 1990).  Even those scholars who set out to challenge an analytic narrative in 
which Islam moves from west to east across the Indian Ocean often rely on evidence of Muslims 
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 To the extent that scholarship on ethical self-formation has approached the practice of Muslims in terms 
of extra-Prophetic spatial-temporal frames, it has tended to do so by contextualizing Islamic practice in secular space 
and time, often the space and time of the respective nation-states in which such studies are set.  This is no doubt a 
vitally important focus.  But it is not the only one worth exploring.  For considering Indonesia, I wonder how 
relevant it really is.  Indonesia has never been a secular nation-state in any straight forward way, as I hope my 




from the archipelago leaving the islands to join or found some other geographic center (Feener 
and Laffan 2005).  This is not without good reason.  Just as an approach to local Islamic histories 
cannot deny that an orientation to the time and place of the Prophet Muhammad is a central 
spatial-temporal orientation of Muslims, it is impossible to ignore that the Islamic world has 
various kinds of geographic and temporal centers.  Some of these have come and gone in 
different time periods, for example, Abbasid Baghdad, Ottoman Istanbul, and post-Revolutionary 
Iran.  Others have been more enduring.  Mecca and Medina were the sites of the Prophet’s life 
where the Qur’an was revealed (in Arabic), and thus remain centers of pilgrimage.  
Notwithstanding recent scholarship on Islamic vernacular literatures that contextualize the 
centrality of even these instances (Florida 1995; Ricci 2011), these facts unquestionably inscribe 
the geographic and temporal space of the Islamic world with centers and peripheries. 
 How might recognizing that Indonesian Islam is not marginal to the broader Islamic 
tradition by tracing the movements of Indonesians to Islamic centers outside of the archipelago 
limit our understanding of the productive tensions produced by the categories local, global, 
periphery, and center?  This question returns me, yet again, to the Habib Seunagan.  I have been 
returning to the Habib Seunagan over and over since I first heard about their “strange” (I., aneh) 
practices during a preliminary research trip to Meulaboh in August 2006.  Research, writing, 
revisions, public lectures, informal conversations among colleagues, and countless other 
moments in the history of this project have brought me back to the Habib Seunagan.  Whether as 
a result of my scholarly instincts or their charisma, these periodic returns to their graves, to their 
followers, and to their kandoeri shaped nearly everything in this dissertation. 
 There are two dominant ways scholars have tended to treat those, like the Habib 
Seunagan, who claim to descend from the Prophet Muhammad.  One has been to accept their 
 
264 
claims at face value.  This has most often been the case in studies of Sayyids whose claims to 
descend from the Prophet Muhammad meet certain evidentiary standards that place them within 
recognized genealogies (Ho 2004, 2006; Reid 1972).  In these treatments, Sayyids are described 
as properly belonging within a translocal Islamic world, if also sometimes enmeshed in social 
networks proper to specific localities that they have called home.  These Sayyids are prominent 
figures in scholarly accounts of a pan-Indian Ocean Islamic world. 
 A second analytic approach to figures who claim to descend from the Prophet 
Muhammad has been to deny or deemphasize their links to the broader Islamic world.  Scholars 
usually justify deemphasizing the links of figures like the Habib Seunagan to the broader Islamic 
world based on the fact that these figures do not hold the necessary evidentiary credentials to 
support their claims of Prophetic descent (i.e., verifiable genealogies).  Additionally, scholars 
sometimes point to the allegedly heterodox or pre-Islamic practices of these would-be Sayyids 
(Kraus 2010; Sila 2001).  This approach takes figures like the Habib Seunagan as inextricably 
local, sometimes interpreting their claims to descend from the Prophet Muhammad as delusional 
or manipulative.  In short, in this approach, figures like the Habib Seunagan are taken to be a 
combination of local, peripheral, and inauthentic. 
 There were aspects of the Habib Seunagan’s narrative, social, and ritual practices that 
rang true with an approach deemphasizing their ties to the broader Indian Ocean Islamic world 
(Kraus 2010).  The Habib Seunagan’s genealogies were, in fact, unverifiable, and some people 
identified the Habib Seunagan’s ritual practices as infused with local, and sometimes heterodox, 
practices.  The Habib Seunagan had no traceable mystical pedigree that I could uncover.  They 
did not move through the space of the Islamic Indian Ocean world.  In recent decades, some 
members of the family had begun going on the pilgrimage to Mecca.  But this was the extent of 
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their authenticable ties to the broader Islamic world.  Even their travels to Java remained 
interpretable primarily through eminently local networks of narrative, social, and ritual practices.  
Yet, to take the narrative, social, and ritual complex that surrounds the Habib Seunagan as an 
instance of the local and the periphery, in opposition to the global and the center, would be a 
grave misreading of the Habib Seunagan’s place in the Islamic world.  The complex 
configurations of space, time, and scale that so magnificently underpinned their claims to 
centrality in Nagan Raya, the Indonesian nation, and the Islamic cosmos challenge any simple 
reading of the Habib Seunagan as inherently local.   
 I have sometimes been surprised by just how important some of my academic 
interlocutors think the Habib Seunagan are after hearing my descriptions of them.  Many do not 
realize, until I tell them, that very few Indonesians pay any attention, or even know about, the 
family’s genealogical claims.  I have watched as some of these interlocutors realize, sometimes 
with disappointment, that while the family has tens of thousands of followers, their influence lies 
almost entirely within a regency of one hundred forty thousand people in one of Aceh’s most 
isolated regions.  I secretly revel in the fact that my descriptions belie this family’s relative 
unimportance to almost everyone outside of Aceh’s southwest coast.  That my descriptions make 
this family seem central, when by so many other measures they might be taken as peripheral, is, 
in large part, the point. 
 My treatment of the Habib Seunagan is in many ways a microcosm of the larger 
questions and interests motivating this dissertation.  The Habib Seunagan’s narrative, social, and 
ritual practices were saturated with the productive tensions that lie at the heart of much of this 
dissertation.  The family’s genealogical narratives and kandoeri rituals are perhaps the best 
examples of how orientations to local Islamic pasts have linked Acehnese to the Indonesian 
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nation in a manner fully dependant on Acehnese locality.  I have argued that Islam mediates the 
Indonesian nation for Acehnese, but in a manner that ties Islam inextricably to the local.  This 
has been possible through attention to the orientations of Muslims to ever-shifting constellations 
of Islamic localities (e.g., Mecca, Indonesia, Aceh, Medan, Nagan Raya, Java).  If Aceh has 
increasingly come to be known as “Mecca’s verandah” in the course of the twentieth- and 
twenty-first centuries, this has made it not a new Islamic center, but a central locality in these 
constellations. 
 This observation returns to the question with which this conclusion began.  Should 
studies of Indonesian Islam leave the archipelago?  Literature on the movement of Indonesian 
Muslims in the Indian Ocean has drawn valuable attention to the long engagement of the peoples 
of the archipelago with Islamic knowledge and practice.  Nonetheless, I want to suggest that 
enthusiasm for the study of the movement of people, ideas, and things through the Indian Ocean 
Islamic world might actually obscure some of the productivity that inheres in tensions between 
the local and the global, and the center and the periphery.  Ironically, this is what scholars of 
Indian Ocean Islamic networks often set out to illuminate. 
 Let me return one last time to the Habib Seunagan to illustrate how studies of the Indian 
Ocean Islamic world might obscure productive tensions in the categories local, global, center, 
and periphery.  From the sailboats, steam ships, and airplanes that have crisscrossed the Indian 
Ocean over the centuries, the full range of productive tensions in spatial-temporal scale that 
make the Habib Seunagan’s practice so compelling for their followers does not appear.  Instead, 
one sees localism and syncretism (Kraus 2010).  Conversely, it is only through spending 
extended periods on the shores of the archipelago that one is able to make sense of the Habib 
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Seunagan’s practice in its own terms, as the product of engagements with Islamic pasts that bring 
together the local, the global, the center, and the periphery in sometimes unpredictable ways.   
 One might correctly note that such insights are based on rather traditional ethnographic 
sensibilities: single-sited fieldwork, interest in the marginal and peripheral, and an emphasis on 
understanding local frames of meaning and practice.  Let me be clear that I am not suggesting a 
return to traditions of ethnographic scholarship on Islam that see locality primarily as an analytic 
with which to catalog the diverse practices of Muslims in different parts of the world (El-Zein 
1977; Geertz 1960; Gilsenan 1973, 2001).  This scholarship has much to offer.  My interests, 
however, run counter to it.  I see the local as a vantage point not in opposition to the global, but 
as a place from which tensions between the global and the local, and center and periphery, can 
become apparent in ways different than they might from other vantage points.   
 Further, I am not suggesting that interest in the movement of people and objects through 
the Indian Ocean Islamic world should be abandoned.  The turn towards such studies has and 
continues to produce central insights about Islamic history and practice.  Scholarship on the 
Indian Ocean Islamic world is vital for understanding many of the concerns of this dissertation.  
Some of the best instances of this work reflect upon how things look when one spends as much 
time on the shore as on the ship (Ho 2006).  I simply suggest that we may overlook opportunities 
to explore productive tensions that inhere in hierarchies of global and local Islamic practice and 
the centers and peripheries of the Islamic world when we assume that it is by traveling through 
the Indian Ocean with Indonesian Muslims that we afford ourselves the best opportunity to 
reconfigure these hierarchies. 
 Should studies of Indonesian Islam leave the archipelago?  Some should, because some 
must.  Indonesian Muslims, after all, leave the archipelago.  Scholars who choose to follow these 
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travelers, however, would do well to remember that the people they leave behind on the 
archipelago’s shores may have just as many insights about the global and the center as the 








Appendix 1: List of Texts Used in Majlis Taklim Attended by Author in Nagan Raya  
 
 
Aqidah an-Najin [Creed of the saved]- Late nineteenth-century work on the basic elements of 
faith, authored by Zainal Abidin bin Muhamad al-Patani.  Topics covered in the text include, 
among others, the twenty characteristics of God, God’s prophets and messengers, and proper 
belief. 
 
Kitab Perukunan Melayu Besar [Great Malay book of foundational (belief)]- Late nineteenth-
century work widely attributed to Jamaluddin bin Syaikh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari, son of 
Muhammad Arshad al-Banjari, but likely authored by Muhammad Arshad al-Banjari’s 
granddaughter Fatimah binti Syaikh Abdul Wahab Bugis (van Bruinessen 1995).  This short 
work compiles basic studies in three fields: jurisprudence, the oneness of God (I., tauhid), and 
mysticism. 
 
Maulid Nabi Muhammad SAW dan Kelebihannya [The birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, 
peace be upon him, and its superiority]- This was a work justifying the practice of celebrating the 
Prophet Muhammad’s birthday.  Majlis Taklim Ansharullah studied it just once during my field 
research, just before the beginning of Aceh’s three month “maulid season” (I., musim maulid).  It 
was clearly authored as a response to critics of maulid celebrations.  The section of the text 
studied by members of the Majlis Taklim Ansharullah during my research reiterated the same 
argument multiple times, namely, that maulid celebrations are innovations on the practice of the 
Prophet (I., bidah), but that they are “good innovations” (I., bidah yang baik), and therefore 
consistent with Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
Sabil al-Muhtadin [Way of the guided], - Eighteenth-century work, primarily of Islamic 
jurisprudence, authored by Muhammad Arshad al-Banjari (d. 1812?) (Laffan 2011, 30, 55; van 
Bruinessen 1995, 101).  Martin van Bruinessen refers to Sabil al-Muhtadin as “the most 
important work of Islamic jurisprudence in the Malay language” (van Bruinessen 1995, 101).  At 
the majlis taklim that I observed at which this text was studied, topics considered included, for 
example, how to properly conduct ritual ablutions under various and sundry conditions (e.g., if 
no ritually pure water is available, if one has two faces) and how to properly reckon and 
distribute the religious tax.   
 
Sayr al-Salikin [Journey of the seekers]- Eighteenth-century work by ‘Abd al-Samad al-
Falimbani (1719-1789).  This text consists mostly of a translation of original work on Islamic 
mysticism by the eleventh and twelfth-century Sufi Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-
1111), with some additional materials on the mystical path of the Sammaniyah Sufi order 
(Laffan 2011, 30; van Bruinessen 1995, 63).  The work is in the form of an interlineal 
translation, with lines in Arabic followed by Malay-language translations and commentary.  At 
majlis taklim in Nagan Raya, Sayr al-Salikin was described to me as containing mysticism, 
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jurisprudence, and basic elements of faith.  All of these fields were discussed in relation to the 
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Appendix 3: Major Figures in the Genealogy of the Habib Seunagan 
 
 
I. The Prophet Muhammad and his family (sixth and seventh centuries, Arabian Peninsula) 
↓ 
II. ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī (11th
 
and 12th centuries, Persia and Baghdad) 
 ↓ 
III. Nine Saints of Java (15th and 16th centuries, Java) 
↓ 
IV. Intu (time period unclear, Seunagan, buried in Kuta Aceh) 
↓ 
V. Habib Abdurrahim (19th century, Seunagan, buried in Pulo Ie) 
↓ 
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